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ABSTRACT 
 
FROM ANTI-IMPERIALISM TO HUMAN RIGHTS: THE VIETNAM WAR AND RADICAL 
INTERNATIONALISM IN THE 1960S AND 1970S 
Salar Mohandesi 
Warren Breckman 
This dissertation explores changing forms of internationalism among the French and U.S. radical 
left from the 1960s through the late 1970s. In the 1960s, Vietnamese resistance to U.S. 
imperialism inspired French activists to forge an international antiwar alliance with U.S. activists 
opposing their government’s aggression. Together, they created a form of anti-imperialist 
internationalism based on the right of nations to self-determination. Despite transnational protest, 
the United States escalated the war, leading many activists to argue that the best way to aid 
Vietnamese national liberation was to translate that struggle into their own domestic contexts. In 
so doing, they triggered a wave of upheaval that reached new heights in May 1968. But when this 
anti-imperialist front faced repression and imprisonment in France and the United States, these 
same radicals began to advance individual rights alongside anti-imperialist revolution in the early 
1970s. Once they learned of South Vietnam’s heightened repression of political dissenters, they 
grafted their new attention to rights onto the antiwar movement, demanding the restoration of civil 
liberties. Yet in arguing that South Vietnam violated fundamental democratic rights, anti-
imperialist internationalism increasingly took the form of criticizing the internal affairs of a 
sovereign state. In this way, anti-imperialists lent legitimacy to a rival form of internationalism that 
shared the progressive aspirations of anti-imperialism but rejected nationalism in favor of human 
rights. When genocide, internecine war, and refugee crises in Southeast Asia undermined faith in 
national liberation in the late 1970s, former French radicals sided with the U.S. government to 
lead a global movement championing human rights against the sovereignty of nation-states like 
Vietnam. By tracing this history of solidarity with the Vietnamese liberation struggle from the 
1960s to the 1970s, this dissertation explains how and why human rights came to displace anti-
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imperialism as the dominant form of internationalism. It shows that the Vietnam War was a truly 
global phenomenon, that the trajectory of the left in countries like France was powerfully shaped 
by developments in what was then called the Third World, and that the rise of human rights was 
closely connected to transformations within anti-imperialist internationalism. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In February 1968, as the Tet Offensive repulsed the U.S. military across Vietnam, 
thousands of antiwar activists from North America and Western Europe met at the Technical 
University in West Berlin to end the war. From the United States arrived activists representing 
Students for a Democratic Society and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee. From 
France came groups like the Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire and the Comité Vietnam 
National. The organizations, collectives, and individuals that traveled to Berlin by plane, car, or 
train represented a broad spectrum of the far left, from anarchism to Third Worldism, Castroism to 
Trotskyism. Although divided by many political and ideological differences, what brought them all 
together was a commitment to not only ending the Vietnam War, but overturning the very 
international system that allowed wars like the one in Vietnam to happen in the first place. It was 
this call for fundamental change, which hinged on connecting the war to imperialism, that turned 
these antiwar activists into radicals. 
In Berlin, beneath a giant flag of the National Liberation Front, this new international 
network of radicals set to work. Committed to anti-imperialism, guided by the ideas of national 
self-determination, and inspired by the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese against U.S. 
imperialism, most radicals came to argue that the best way to support the Vietnamese liberation 
struggle was to open a “second front” within the imperialist centers. Internationalism, these 
radicals came to believe, meant worldwide revolution led by the Vietnamese. After the 
conference, radicals return home and searched for ways to reproduce the distant struggle they 
sought to support. In France, young radicals’ efforts to bring home the anti-imperialist revolution 
of the Vietnamese triggered a series of events that would set off May ’68. Internationally, just as 
the Vietnamese inspired the French, the events of May ’68 inspired radicals in other countries, 
like the United States, who in turn tried to translate May ’68 into their own domestic vernaculars.  
A decade later, a new generation of activists, led by many veteran antiwar radicals, once 
again turned their eyes to Southeast Asia. But this time, they allied with the U.S. government in a 
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massive international campaign against human rights violations in the newly unified the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam. Against the backdrop of internecine war between Vietnam, Cambodia, and 
China, tens of thousands of Vietnamese refugees risked their lives to escape state repression, 
often in derelict boats floating across the South China Sea. Advocating humanitarian intervention 
into the internal affairs of Vietnam to save the “boat people,” these new rights activists 
championed a very different kind of internationalism – one that turned from the nation to the 
individual, from violence to nonviolence, and from anti-imperialism to human rights. 
This dissertation explores changing forms of international solidarity among the French 
and U.S. radical left from the early 1960s through the very late 1970s to explain how and why 
human rights displaced anti-imperialism as the dominant form of internationalism in the 1970s. I 
argue that the success of Vietnamese resistance to U.S. imperialism made possible a renewed 
internationalism that framed anti-imperialism as the dominant principle of radical politics. But 
when the failures of nationalism in the 1970s crippled anti-imperialism, a rival form of 
internationalism privileging human rights over national self-determination rose to dominate 
mainstream political culture.  
 
France, the United States, Vietnam 
This project focuses primarily on French radicals because they played the most decisive 
role in the international shift from anti-imperialism to human rights. In the 1960s and early 1970s, 
French activists helped encourage a new radical internationalism, spearhead the turn to 
revolution, and initiate a reconsideration of the value of civil liberties. Later in the 1970s, activists 
in France, more so than anywhere else, abandoned anti-imperialism to lead a new kind of human 
rights internationalism that rejected national sovereignty in favor of humanitarian interventionism. 
But while the French emerged as the driving force in this history, they did not act alone. As 
consummate internationalists, French radicals constantly looked to, and were transformed by, 
developments abroad. Thus, the story of how human rights displaced anti-imperialism cannot be 
told from a strictly national perspective, but must be firmly situated within a transnational 
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framework. This project sets the trajectory of the French radical left within two distinct, 
reciprocally implicated sets of transnational relations.  
First, I examine the relationships between French radicals and their peers in other 
advanced capitalist countries in Western Europe and North America. As this project shows, the 
French constantly interacted with comrades in neighboring countries, producing a number of 
dense, overlapping networks across Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the 
Federal Republic of Germany, among other countries. But the most important contacts for the 
French were the Americans. Indeed, despite enormous national differences, the French 
consistently learned from their American comrades. In the early years of the war, they borrowed 
tactics, like the teach-in. Later in the 1960s, many French radicals prioritized U.S. struggles 
because of their crucial strategic role in fighting U.S. imperialism from inside the “belly of the 
beast.” In the early 1970s, French activists learned from black prison organizing, while also 
following the Americans’ new emphasis on political prisoners in South Vietnam. And in the late 
1970s, some activists collaborated with human rights advocates close to the administration of 
U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Thus, while the French played the most decisive role in the 
transition from anti-imperialism to human rights, their trajectory cannot be understood without 
taking full account of the ongoing American connection. For that reason, this dissertation, while 
focusing on French radicals, necessarily also tracks developments in the United States. 
Second, I explore the transnational relationships between radicals in the advanced 
capitalist world and developments in what was then called the “Third World.” One of my central 
arguments, explored in greater detail below, is that struggles in the Third World transformed 
politics in countries like France from beginning to end. While radicals looked to many struggles 
abroad, such as Cuba, Algeria, Vietnam, China, Palestine, and Mozambique, in the 1960s, 
Vietnam was the most important reference point. Indeed, Vietnam played such a profound role in 
defining the very identity of the radical left in countries like France, that many radicals came to 
see themselves as the “Vietnam Generation.” For that reason, this project focuses primarily on 
developments in Vietnam from the early 1960s to the very late 1970s, using Vietnam as a window 
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into international solidarity.1 I show how the Vietnamese revolution expanded the radical left, 
reframed radicalism as anti-imperialism, and inspired radicals to embrace revolution. Moreover, 
the successes of the Vietnamese, along with their fervent internationalism, led them to serve as a 
kind of “binding element,” allowing otherwise separated radicals to come together. In this way, 
this transnational relation between Vietnam and the advanced capitalist world helped make 
possible the other set of relationships between North American and Western European radicals 
mentioned above. 
This dissertation therefore tracks the history of internationalism by zeroing in on moments 
of encounter between events at home in France and those abroad. In the late 1960s, for 
example, the encounter between growing domestic unrest in France, the militancy of black 
radicals in the United States, and the audacity of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam led French radicals 
to argue that the best way to aid the Vietnamese was to bring the war home to France. In the 
early 1970s, domestic experiences with repression, incarceration, and left unity; black prison 
organizing in the United States; and South Vietnam’s heightened repression of political dissenters 
led French radicals to reframe antiwar solidarity as the demand to liberate the Vietnamese 
political prisoners and restore civil liberties in South Vietnam. And in the late 1970s, the decline of 
the French left at home, a new post-Vietnam foreign policy in the United States, and a 
humanitarian catastrophe in Southeast Asia, all helped human rights internationalism bypass anti-
imperialism. By integrating developments in France, the United States, and Vietnam, therefore, 
this dissertation presents a transnational and transatlantic history of how radical internationalism 
transformed in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
The French Left 
                                                
1 Of course, as Vietnam was by no means the only reference point, especially after 1968, it may 
have been possible to tell parts of this story with reference to other struggles. I felt, however, that 
keeping the focus firmly on a single struggle, rather than rapidly shifting the analysis to different 
solidarity movements with different revolutions abroad, would be the best way to understand how 
internationalism changed in this period. 
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In order to explain how human rights displaced anti-imperialism, my project bridges four 
historiographies: literature on the French left, the Vietnam War, internationalism in the Global 
1960s, and human rights.  
In the 1960s and 1970s, a combination of factors led to the reemergence of the radical 
left as a meaningful force in French politics. Activists breathed new life into Marxism, filled the 
streets with protests, and called for revolutions in all spheres of life. During the “68 years,” an 
expansive cycle of contestation that stretched from the early 1960s to the 1970s, radicals pushed 
democracy in new directions, overturned social roles, challenged accepted forms of 
representation, and redefined the very meaning of politics.2 Given the overall importance of the 
radical left to French political life at this time, it is little surprise that the literature on this topic has 
grown so expansive. There are now innumerable historical, sociological, and theoretical works 
exploring various facets of the radical left.  
In recent decades, scholarship has begun to situate the French radical left within a larger 
global context. In particular, some historians have now begun to emphasize the importance of 
what was then called the “Third World” to the development of the radical left.3 I build on this new 
turn in the literature to argue that struggles abroad were not simply a source of inspiration; they 
profoundly shaped the entire trajectory of the French radical left. But some struggles, I hope to 
show, were more transformative than others. Indeed, one of my central arguments is that while 
radicals looked to many different movements in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, it was the 
Vietnamese revolution that played the most decisive role in defining the identity of French 
radicals. Unfortunately, scholars have only recently begun to fully appreciate the enduring role of 
France’s former Southeast Asian colony in shaping ideas, movements, and politics in Europe. As 
                                                
2 For the concept of the “‘68 years,” see Geneviève Dreyfus-Armand et al. eds., Les Années 68: 
Le temps de la contestation (Brussels: Éditions Complexe, 2000). 
3 The most path breaking in this regard is Kristin Ross, May ’68 and its Afterlives (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2002). Scholars have since explored the precise ways in which the 
“third word” influenced the left. Christoph Katler, The Discovery of the Third World: Decolonization 
and the Rise of the New Left in France, c. 1950-1976, trans. Thomas Dunlap (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016) explores “the concept of the Third World”; Daniel A. Gordon, 
Immigrants & Intellectuals: May ‘68 and the Rise of Anti-Racism in France (Pontypool, Wales: 
Merlin Press, 2012) investigates the relationship between immigration from the “third world” on 
the French left. 
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historian Bethany Keenan has argued, for the longest time, although “historians recognized that 
Vietnam garnered large amounts of attention from the French in general, their presentation of the 
time between the end of the Algerian War in 1962 and 1968 created the impression that for most, 
interest in the Vietnam War was a way to pass the time until life at home kicked up again.”4  
Vietnam, it was assumed, captured attention, but did not play a fundamental role in shaping the 
course of French politics. 
That assessment began to change in the late 1990s. In 1997, Laurent Jalabert published 
a perspicacious article connecting antiwar activism to the May events.5 In 1998, Nicolas Pas 
penned an exhaustive dissertation tracking antiwar solidarity among the French far left up to the 
events of May 1968.6 He followed this with an article on antiwar organizing, showing how Vietnam 
helped the left secure an independent position to the left of the Communist Party (PCF).7 Soon 
after, Kristin Ross showed how the Vietnam War played an enormous role in shaping the politics 
of the activists who went on to spark the May events.8 In 2009, Bethany Keenan offered a 
detailed account of Vietnam’s impact not only on the far left, but on other sectors of French 
society, showing just how important Vietnam was to defining France’s postwar identity.9  
Taken together, these works have reshaped our understanding of the left. They 
demonstrate how Vietnam radicalized a generation of activists, allowed radicals to bypass the 
PCF, and created an opportunity for them to experiment with new tactics, strategies, and 
organizations that would take center stage during May. In this way, these studies have forced 
                                                
4 Bethany Keenan, “‘Vietnam is Fighting for Us:’ French Identities in the U.S.–Vietnam War, 1965-
1973” (Ph.D. Diss., University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2009), 4-5. 
5 Laurent Jalabert, “Aux origines de la génération 68: Les étudiants français et la guerre du 
Vietnam,” Vingtième Siècle: Revue d’histoire, no. 55 (July-September 1997): 69-81. 
6 Nicolas Pas, “Sortir de l’ombre du Parti Communiste Français: Histoire de l’engagement de 
l’extrême-gauche français sur la guerre du Vietnam, 1965-1968” (Mémoire DEA, Institut d’Etudes 
Politiques, Paris, 1998). Pas’s was not the only dissertation on the Vietnam War to appear in the 
1990s. See, also Sylvie Tigroudja, “Les Intellectuels de gauche face à la guerre du Viêt-nam, 
1964-1973” (Mémoire de DEA, Université Charles de Gaulle-Lille-III, Villeneuve-d’Ascq, 1997) 
and Sophie Boulte, “L’Influence de la guerre du Viêt-nam sur les comités Viêt-nam en France 
entre 1966 et 1973” (Mémoire de DEA, Université Paris-I, Paris, 1996). 
7 Nicolas Pas, “‘Six Heures pour le Vietnam:’ Histoire des Comité Vietnam français, 1965-1968,” 
Revue Historique 301, no. 1 (January-March, 2000): 157-85. 
8 Ross, May ’68 and its Afterlives. 
9 Keenan, “‘Vietnam is Fighting for Us.’” 
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scholars to recognize the crucial role that the Vietnam War played in shaping radical politics, 
social movements, and the broader left during this period. Scanning the anthologies published for 
the 40th anniversary of May ‘68, it is now clear that no one can write the history of the radical left 
without engaging with Vietnam in some way.10 
And yet, the impact that Vietnam had on the radical left has still not yet been fully 
recognized. My dissertation adds to this literature by investigating three key areas that remain 
underexplored. First, following Kristin Ross, I argue that Vietnam shaped the very political horizon 
of the radical left in the 1960s. By situating the radical left within a wider transnational field, I show 
how radicals saw themselves as junior partners in a worldwide anti-imperialist struggle. Indeed, 
they regarded their struggles, which reached new levels of militancy during the vents of May 
1968, as nothing more than another front in the revolutionary wave led by Vietnam. Thus, I argue, 
political developments in western countries like France in the 1960s cannot be understood in 
isolation; they were contingent upon a vast transnational struggle. In this way, we can say that the 
Vietnam War was May ’68’s condition of possibility. 
Second, I show how Vietnam allowed French radicals to connect with activists in other 
countries. Following a number of scholars, I show that transnational connections were profoundly 
important for the French radical left. I argue, however, that the key element allowing these 
transnational connections to come into being was Vietnam. Indeed, Vietnam, I argue, acted as a 
kind of “binding element,” creating the conditions that permitted radicals from different countries 
to come together into an international alliance. My research shows that the French played a 
leading role in this process. Recognizing the international nature of the war, French radicals tried 
to internationalize antiwar opposition, reaching out to radicals in the United States and Western 
Europe. Together, they shared information, coordinated actions, and learned from one another. 
With the French in the lead, they created a number of intersecting antiwar networks: they creating 
an underground transnational network to resisting and deserting U.S. GIs, they tried to organize 
                                                
10 For example, Dominique Damamme et al., eds., Mai-Juin 68 (Paris: Les Éditions de 
l’Atelier/Éditions Ouvrières, 2008); Philippe Artières et Michelle Zancarini-Fournel, eds., 68: Une 
histoire collective 1962-1981 (Paris: La Découverte, 2008); Antoine Artous, eds., La France des 
années 68 (Paris: Éditions Syllepse, 2008). 
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international brigades to fight the U.S. military in Southeast Asia, and convened the Bertrand 
Russell International War Crimes Tribunal, which put the United States on trial for war crimes. 
Through these networks, French activists picked up new forms of struggle, adopted new tactics 
and strategies, and discovered new ideas. In this way, Vietnam, more than any other event, 
encouraged not only the revival of a new radical internationalism in the 1960s, but precipitated 
the formation of a functional radical international like those of the past. 
Lastly, my dissertation takes the story all the way to the very late 1970s. As many 
historians have shown, after May, radicals returned their attention to the “hexagon,” putting 
antiwar solidarity on the backburner. As a result, most scholars tend to conclude their treatment 
of Vietnamese solidarity in 1968. Of course, there are some exceptions, the most important of 
which is Christine Sabine Rousseau’s account of Christian opposition to the Vietnam War, but 
even this text focuses only on Christians, who opposed the war not out of any critique of 
imperialism, but from a sense of religious values and duties.11 I argue that contrary to 
appearances, solidarity with Vietnam shaped the history of the radical left every step of the way. 
Solidarity with the Vietnamese was not some kind of instrument that radicals simply discarded 
once they achieved their ulterior motives; Vietnam continued to play a role even into the 1970s. 
To take just one example, after the turn to revolution was met with state repression, South 
Vietnam’s heightened repression of political prisoners had an effect on the left’s conception of 
international solidarity, contributing to a general rethinking of the role of rights. By maintaining the 
focus on Vietnam, I show how the trajectory of the radical left was always shaped by the constant 
encounter between events at home with those abroad.  
But this profound connection between the French radical left and the Vietnamese national 
liberation struggle was double-edged. In the 1960s, as revolutions exploded across the globe, the 
alliance with national liberation was a source of great strength. But since the radical left’s very 
identity was so powerfully shaped by Vietnam, if the Vietnamese revolution were to ever fail to 
deliver on the extraordinary emancipatory hopes that radicals expected, it would have devastating 
                                                
11 Sabine Rousseau, La colombe et le napalm: des Chrétiens français contre les guerres 
d’Indochine et du Vietnam, 1945-1975 (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2002). 
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consequences for the radical left. Indeed, this is precisely what happened in the 1970s: genocide 
in Cambodia, internecine war between Cambodia, China, and Vietnam, and a catastrophic 
refugee crisis in Southeast Asia shattered the radical left. 
In this way, my project also challenges how we understand the decline of revolutionary 
politics in France. Scholars variously blame state repression, argue that individual radicals 
betrayed their politics, or show how the historical conditions for the left’s rise were eroded over 
the course of the 1970s. All these factors no doubt played a part, but I argue that the events 
abroad were just as important to the left’s decline. Indeed, since the radical left was not shaped 
exclusively by events at home, but through complex encounters between developments in France 
and those in the Third World, it should come as no surprise that simultaneous transformations in 
the Third World played a crucial role in the radical left’s political decomposition in the 1970s. In 
that decade, all the great hopes that radicals placed in national liberation struggles came undone: 
liberated countries turned into dictatorships, governments repressed their citizens, newly 
independent countries were still beholden to western capital, and the very countries that once led 
the charge in a new internationalism soon turned on one another. Southeast Asia in 1979 was the 
nail in the coffin. It is no accident that these events nearly coincided with the collapse of the 
radical left as an organized force and the end of the long cycle of struggle in which May 1968 
stood in the center. For if the Vietnam War helped generate the imaginary that made May ’68 
possible; genocide, internecine war, and refugee crises in Southeast Asia in the late 1970s 
helped sound its death knell. Vietnam not only stood at the origins of the radical left, but was also 
a part of its end. 
 
The Vietnam War 
Although the literature on the Vietnam War, or the Second Indochina War, to be more 
precise, is voluminous, much of this work has focused squarely on the United States, treating the 
conflict as a largely American affair. But a new spate of scholarship on the war has taken 
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advantage of Vietnamese archives to produce a more inclusive account.12 These historians have 
also begun to look beyond Vietnamese and U.S. relations, insisting on the truly global nature of 
the war. Scholars like Lien-Hang T. Nguyen have convincingly shown how the “war itself 
transcended the borders of Vietnam.”13 Indeed, the conflict centered not only on the United 
States, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Republic of Vietnam, but directly involved 
Laos, Cambodia, China, the USSR, Australia, and New Zealand, and indirectly affected dozens of 
countries like Japan, Germany, or France.14 The war, it is now becoming clear, played a key role 
in a number of global historical trends such as the Sino-Soviet conflict, Sino-American 
rapprochement, détente, and decolonization. Since the Vietnam War was a fully global event, its 
story must now be told from a transnational perspective. 
Yet much of the new transnational history of the Vietnam War remains within the subfield 
of diplomatic history. To be sure, this approach has offered tremendous insights, radically 
transforming our understanding of the war, but the literature often ignores non-state actors. The 
oversight is significant not only because the conflict extended beyond the realm of states, but 
because even at the diplomatic level, the Vietnamese practiced a kind of “people’s diplomacy” 
that involved directly collaborating with non-state actors across the world, above all the vibrant 
antiwar movements forming in the capitalist countries of North America and Western Europe.15 
My project therefore aims to deepen this transnational turn in Vietnam War historiography by 
                                                
12 The best book on the war is William S. Turley, The Second Indochina War: A Short Political 
and Military History, 1954-1975, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2009). For accounts that 
draw on both perspectives, see Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists’ Relations with China 
and the Second Indochina conflict, 1956-1962 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1997); Ang Cheng 
Guan, The Vietnam War from the Other Side (London: Routledge, 2002); Andreas W Daum et al., 
eds., America, The Vietnam War, and the World: Comparative and International (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International History 
of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); Pierre 
Asselin, Hanoi’s Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2013). 
13 Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, “Cold War Contradictions: Toward an International History of the Second 
Indochina War, 1969-1973,” in Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and 
Transnational Perspectives, eds. Mark Philip Bradley and Marilyn B. Young (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 219. 
14 For France’s role in the Second Indochina War, see Pierre Journoud, De Gaulle et le Vietnam, 
1945-1969: La réconciliation (Paris: Tallandier, 2011). 
15 Harish C. Mehta, “‘People’s Diplomacy’: The Diplomatic Front of North Vietnam During the War 
Against the United States, 1965-1972” (Ph.D. Diss., McMaster University, 2009). 
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complementing the work of the diplomatic historians with research into the transnational antiwar 
movements that bypassed, directly challenged, or collaborated with states. 
To be sure, I am not the first to examine the transnational dimension of antiwar struggles, 
but the existing scholarship remains painfully limited. Most American accounts of the antiwar 
movement almost entirely ignore the fact that activists in other countries opposed the war.16 
Those that make mention of the international dimension merely describe examples of 
international contact, but never explain connections across borders.17 Recently, however, some 
steps have been made in this direction.18 Combining comparative and transnational approaches, 
Geneviève Dreyfus-Armand and Jacques Portes offered a brief survey of antiwar movements in 
different countries in 2000, suggesting that opposition to the war was not only widespread in 
different European countries, but that these antiwar struggles often in dialogue with one 
another.19 Exploring the role that Europe played in the war, as well as the role the war played in 
Europe, Christopher Goscha and Maurice Vaïsse’s anthology, La Guerre du Vietnam et l’Europe, 
1963-1973, gathers a number of excellent essays about European antiwar activism.20 Another 
edited collection, America, The Vietnam War, and the World: Comparative and International, 
includes a few essays about the international nature of antiwar activism.21  
Scholars now acknowledge that antiwar activity was always situated in a larger 
international context, but there is still no systematic treatment of these international 
                                                
16 For representative examples antiwar movement, see Fred Halstead, Out Now!: A Participant’s 
Account of the American Movement Against the Vietnam War (New York: Monad Press, 1978); 
Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the 
Vietnam Era (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990); Tom Wells, The War Within: 
America’s Battle over Vietnam (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994); Melvin Small, 
Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the Battle for America's Hearts and Minds (Wilmington, DE: 
Scholarly Resources Inc., 2002). 
17 Simon Hall, Rethinking the American Anti-War Movement (New York: Routledge, 2012). 
18 For example, Martin Klimke, The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the 
United States in Global Sixties (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), chapter 3. 
19 Geneviève Dreyfus-Armand and Jacques Portes, “Les interactions internationales de la guerre 
du Viêt-nam et Mai 68,” in Les Années 68: Le temps de la contestation, eds. Geneviève Dreyfus-
Armand et al. (Brussels: Éditions Complexe, 2000), 50.  
20 Christopher Goscha and Maurice Vaïsse, eds., La Guerre du Vietnam et l’Europe, 1963-1973 
(Brussels: Bruylant, 2003). 
21 Andreas W Daum et al., eds., America, The Vietnam War, and the World. 
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connections.22 My dissertation aims to fill this gap. Building on this earlier work, my project offers 
the first transnational history of radical antiwar movements. Of course, it is not possible to survey 
the entire field of antiwar movements in North America and Europe, let alone the entire world in a 
dissertation. As a result, I have been forced to limit my analysis primarily to France, the United 
States, and occasionally Great Britain, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Nevertheless, 
by investigating the international antiwar convergences, exchanges between activists from 
different countries, and the internationalist ideas that animated their solidarity, this dissertation 
does begin the process of explaining how and why these different movements fit together. 
By focusing on transnational antiwar movements, however, I do not intend to replace a 
narrow focus on the diplomatic with an even more narrow perspective on movements “from 
below.” On the contrary, I try to weave these different levels into a coherent story. Thus, I 
complement my study of the antiwar movements with an analysis of Richard Nixon’s changing 
justifications of the war, Jimmy Carter’s policies in Southeast Asia, The People’s Republic of 
China’s shifting foreign policy, or the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s diplomatic efforts. This long 
history from anti-imperialism to human rights, I argue in the dissertation, was the product of 
complex interactions between movements from below and state power from above. 
 
Internationalism 
Until recently, work on the 1960s and 1970s was dominated by a methodological 
nationalism that rendered transnational connections invisible. Thus, while some scholars traced 
the trajectory of radical social movements from the 1960s to the late 1970s, their exclusive focus 
on a single country led them to neglect the transnational relationships in which they were 
embedded.23 Even comparative studies still frame social movements around national boundaries, 
                                                
22 For example, Michelle Zancarini-Fournel, “Le champ des possibles,” in 68: Une histoire 
collective 1962-1981, eds. Philippe Artières and Michelle Zancarini-Fournel (Paris: La 
Découverte, 2008), 40. 
23 Much of this work, to be clear, has generated many rich insights about the 1960s and 1970s. 
For example, Michael Scott Christofferson’s book on French politics in the 1970s remains 
indispensible. Yet a more transnational frame could have enriched his account by highlighting the 
crucial role that anti-imperialism played in the overall story of French politics in the 1970s. 
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obscuring the fact that these movements not only learned from one another politically, but saw 
the fate of their diverse struggles as inextricably linked.24 
In recent decades, some scholars have adopted a “transnational turn,” producing new 
work on these decades that aims to resolve this gap. Scholars now pay closer attention to 
immigration, revolutionary tourism, or the circulation of symbols, texts, and ideas across 
borders.25 More commonly, in their search for international connections, many have turned to the 
study of transnational activist networks.26 While this attention to international exchanges has 
generated many insights into the 1960s and 1970, much of this work remains limited. There is, for 
example, a tendency for some historians to take international connections for granted, simply 
unearthing innumerable connections across space without paying attention to their overall 
significance. As a result, these histories often run the risk of generating a static representation of 
links that happened to transcend national borders, with the mere detection of transnational links 
effectively serving as an end in itself. 
                                                                                                                                            
Michael Scott Christofferson, French Intellectuals Against the Left: The Anti-Totalitarian Moment 
of the 1970s in French Intellectual Politics (New York: Berghahn, 2004). 
24 The classic example is David Caute, The Year of the Barricades: A Journey Through 1968 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1988). Caute brilliantly surveys developments in each country during 
1968, but does not explain the connections between them. Subsequent histories began to 
integrate the transnational with the comparative, see, for example, Arthur Marwick, The Sixties: 
Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958-c.1974 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998); Gerd-Rainer Horn, The Spirit of ’68: Rebellion in Western Europe and 
North America, 1956-1976 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
25 For immigration, see, for example, Gordon, Immigrants & Intellectuals; Burleigh Hendrickson, 
“Imperial Fragments and Transnational Activism: 1968(s) in Tunisia, France, and Senegal,” 
(Ph.D. diss. Northeastern University, Boston, Mass. December 2013); Quinn Slobodian, Foreign 
Front: Third World politics in Sixties West Germany (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012). For 
travel, see Richard Ivan Jobs, “Youth Movements: Travel, Protest, and Europe in 1968,” 
American Historical Review 114, no. 2 (April 2009): 376-404. For the circulation of texts, see 
Alexander C. Cook, Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013). 
26 For a few representative examples, see Michael Clemons and Charles E. Jones, “Global 
Solidarity: The Black Panther Party in the International Arena,” in  Liberation, Imagination and the 
Black Panther Party: A New Look at the Panthers and their Legacy, ed. Kathleen Cleaver and 
George Kastiaficas (New York: Routledge, 2001); Klimke, The Other Alliance; Manus McGrogan, 
“Vive la Révolution and the Example of Lotta Continua: The Circulation of Ideas and Practices 
between the Left Militant Worlds of France and Italy following 1968,” Modern and Contemporary 
France 18, no. 3 (August 2010): 197-222; Robert Gildea, James Mark, and Niek Pas, “European 
Radicals and the ‘Third World’: Imagined Solidarities and Radical Networks, 1958-1973,” Cultural 
and Social History 8, no. 4 (2011): 449-71. 
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More sophisticated studies, however, show how the discovery of transnational 
connections can serve less as an end goal than as an approach, which, if properly employed, can 
fundamentally transform our understanding of the decade, challenge our assumptions, or shift 
conventional periodizations. This work carefully explains why these transnational connections 
were formed, what they meant to those who forged them, and how they changed over time, 
intersecting with major global transformations in the process. In this, many scholars, not only of 
the 1960s and 1970s, but of earlier periods, have begun to return to the idea of internationalism.27 
But while much of this work has refined our knowledge of what these various internationalisms 
meant, there is unfortunately still a tendency among many scholars to flatten the ideas, 
motivations, and objectives shaping each of these very different forms of internationalism. For 
example, some scholars still speak of some coherent “Third World internationalism,” a term that 
obscures the fact that there were in fact many competing internationalisms with distinct objectives 
in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s: Afro-Asianism, Non-alignment, Marxist anti-imperialism, or pan-
Islamism were not equivalent.28  
Part of the difficulty stems from general confusion over the concept. In an age of 
transnational history, one finds the word “internationalism” almost everywhere now, but rarely do 
historians define what they mean by this word. Is internationalism simply a fancy way of saying 
that connections exist across borders? How does it relate to the concept of international 
solidarity? Can internationalism refer to a simple feeling or must it involve a more formally 
organized network? Ultimately, what is internationalism? To answer that question, we need 
recourse to another concept: articulation.  
                                                
27 In fact, one of the best new historical works on internationalism looks to the 1920s. Michael 
Goebel, Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). A good exploration of ideas of internationalism 
in the 1950s and early 1960s can be found in Jeffrey James Byrne, Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, 
Decolonization, and the Third World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
28 The best work on “Third World internationalism” remains Vijay Prashad’s The Darker Nations: 
A People’s History of the Third World (New York: New Press, 2007). While Prashad remains very 
attentive to important political differences, he sometimes exhibits a tendency to speak of a single 
coherent “Third World” project. 
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The term’s genealogy is well known, from the debates of the Russian Social Democratic 
Labor Party to the carceral notebooks of Antonio Gramsci to the writings Stuart Hall, Ernesto 
Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and others.29 In this body of literature, articulation points to a political 
problem. In capitalist social formations, individuals remain divided from one another, a condition 
actively reproduced by the state, which disaggregates the horizontal unity of social forces and 
decomposes social forces into a sea of individuals.30 Articulation, then, refers to the pulling 
together of distinct social forces through political construction and struggle into what is called a 
form of unity. Perhaps the best historical illustration of this process remains the October 
Revolution: recall how its success depended on articulating the diverse interests of the various 
sectors of the working class, different layers of the peasantry, and the soldiers, a unity captured in 
the slogan “Peace, Bread, Land.” 
But as many have pointed out, articulation is a contingent process. Which social forces 
end up in what form of unity, how they create such unity, and what they aim to accomplish are all 
historical. Social forces are not compelled by “economics” to aggregate into a predetermined 
unity. They may unite; they may not. Indeed, rival social forces with divergent class characters 
might actually find themselves on the same side. Nor are forms of unity destined to follow any 
preordained ideology; social forces may be articulated under the sign of social democracy or of 
communist revolution or neoliberalism. In short, articulation does not reflect invisible laws of 
history; it is a highly contingent, uneven, and contradictory process, that involves strategy, 
programs, and organization.  
Of course, social formations do not exist in isolation from one another. They are 
connected by flows of capital, people, ideas. Developments in one will produce effects in others. 
                                                
29 For articulation, see Christine Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the State (London: Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1980 [1975]); Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, 
Fascism, Populism (London: Verso, 1987 [1977]); Chantal Mouffe, “Hegemony and Ideology in 
Gramsci,” in Gramsci and Marxist Theory, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1979); Stuart Hall, “On Postmodernism and Articulation: An Interview with Stuart Hall,” 
Journal of Communication Inquiry 10, no. 2 (Summer 1986): 45-61; Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, second edition 
(London: Verso, 2001 [1985]). 
30 Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: New Left Books. 
1978). 
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Thus, articulation cannot be limited to a single social formation. Internationalism is what I call the 
articulation problem at the global level. It is the coming together of various social forces across 
distinct social formations into a form of unity, or an international. As with the process of 
articulation, it is a messy process. To begin with, there is never just one international. Indeed, at 
any given movement there are dozens of competing internationals crisscrossing the globe. This 
was especially true of the 1960s, a time of enormous international foment.  
Furthermore, internationals need not only belong to dominated social forces. In other 
words, when we think of internationals, we often think of bodies with oppositional politics, like the 
Comintern, the Non-Aligned Movement, or the Tricontinental. But we must also recognize that 
ruling blocs also have their own internationals. At the same time, some internationals may have 
highly contradictory social compositions, uniting dominant social forces from one country with 
dominated social forces from another. Moreover, the same social forces can belong to several 
internationals, even if they compete with one another in some respects. 
Different internationals possess different levels of strength: some are quite weak, while 
others are more durable. At one end of the spectrum, internationals may consist of nothing more 
than feelings of goodwill, epistolary exchanges, and the occasional solidarity action. At the other 
end, some internationals are highly organized, endowed with a central apparatus, boast a 
sophisticated communication network, and are flush with resources. Think, for example, of the 
Comintern: an intricate international organization where different sections met regularly, pooled 
resources, fought for one another, and followed orders. Indeed, no matter how weak an 
international, internationalism always signifies more than a vague feeling of wanting to support 
others; it exists in actions, or what can be called forms of solidarity. These can include everything 
from propaganda campaigns, sharing resources, solidarity strikes, to military support. In this way, 
each international has as its disposal a repertoire of forms of solidarity, the contents of which are 
dependent on that international’s overall strength. The more developed and internally cohesive 
the international, the more expansive the repertoire.  
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That said, internationals are always guided by common ideas. They are shaped by basic 
assumptions, a body of principles, a set of objectives. Of course, as conglomerations of distinct 
social forces, internationals always exhibit a degree of incoherency. But underlying these 
differences is what I call an internationalist imaginary. By this, I mean a semi-conscious system of 
ideas organizing those more manifest interests. This concept allows us to better distinguish 
between different kinds of internationals that may at first glance seem identical. Thus, by looking 
at competing internationalist imaginaries, we can better understand the crucial differences 
between, say, Che Guevara’s Marxist anti-imperialism and Gamal Abdul Nasser’s Pan-Arabism, 
or between Afro-Asianism and Non-Alignment. 
At the same time, it helps us avoid the opposite danger of total nominalism. Confronted 
with so many differences, one may be tempted to simply catalogue hundreds of seemingly 
distinct internationals, too afraid of organizing them into any greater unity for fear of doing 
violence to their particularity. The concept of the “internationalist imaginary” allows us to see how 
competing internationals may have actually shared the same core assumptions. To take an 
example from this dissertation: the Maoist Gauche proletarienne and the Trotskyist Ligue 
Communiste both belonged to distinct internationals. The GP worked with other Maoist groups 
and expressed its loyalty to China while the Ligue represented the French section of the Fourth 
International. The differences between the two internationals were not insignificant. That said, 
beneath these differences, both groups held the same central assumptions, themselves rooted in 
a Leninist problematic of the right of nations to self-determination.  
This dissertation, therefore, advances the concept of the internationalist imaginary as a 
way of adding some nuance to recent scholarship about internationalism in the 1960s and 1970s. 
In the following pages, I identify, delineate, and follow the trajectory of a single internationalist 
imaginary, one based in the Marxist-Leninist notion of anti-imperialism. I show how events in the 
1960s seemed to validate the core assumptions of this imaginary. But events a decade later, in 
the same part of the world no less, shattered those very assumptions, destabilizing this imaginary 
and throwing into disarray all those radicals who operated within it. 
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Human Rights 
The historical study of human rights has grown rapidly in the last two decades. However, 
until very recently, much of this work tended to treated human rights in a linear manner, as the 
unfolding or “cascading” of a continuous project whose origins were said to begin as far back as 
the French Revolution. In 2010, Samuel Moyn’s highly polemical intervention, The Last Utopia, 
began to unsettle these key assumptions, helping to usher a new phase in human rights 
historiography. Criticizing the triumphalism of earlier accounts, Moyn set out to show that human 
rights were in fact a highly contingent, and extremely recent, phenomenon.  
Moyn makes several interventions, several of which have helped establish the conceptual 
and historical parameters of the present study.31 First, human rights and national self-
determination constituted two, radically distinct political projects. Second, that until the 1970s, the 
vast majority of activists subscribed to the latter, not the former. Indeed, as my research confirms, 
very few activists in France, and even in the United States, adopted the language of human 
rights. In the rare cases they did, they meant something like national self-determination, not 
individual rights that transcended the sovereignty of nation-states. Third, the rise of human rights 
among activists was very much a product of the 1970s. Lastly, and most crucially, human rights 
succeeded in this decade because other “utopias” failed. Thus, Moyn sees the 1960s and 1970s 
as a field of competing “utopias,” or what I call instead “internationalisms,” arguing that the 
relationship between them was one of “displacement, rather than one of succession and 
fulfillment.”32 
                                                
31 This book has unsurprisingly generated considerable debate. Some scholars are responding 
that human rights and national liberation are in fact incompatible. Others, especially those 
working on abolitionism, insist that human rights emerged earlier. Some are now trying to argue 
the human rights emerged not in the conference rooms of the advanced capitalist countries but 
from the Global South. On the question of human rights and decolonization, see Roland Burke, 
Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2011) and Steven L.B. Jensen. The Making of International Human Rights: 
The 1960s, Decolonization, and the Reconstruction of Global Values (New York: Cambridge 
Universit Press, 2016). 
32 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), 116. 
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This dissertation deepens this argument about the rise of human rights. Against some 
historians, like Julian Bourg, who seem to suggest that the initial politics of revolution was always 
already based in ethics, and therefore the transition from former to the latter followed that of a 
teleological unfolding, Moyn is absolutely right to insist that human rights did not “evolve” out of 
anti-imperialism.33 Nevertheless, the relationship between the two was far more complex than 
one of simple displacement, especially when one looks at France. As Moyn himself suggests in 
The Last Utopia, the transformation within the French left in the 1970s played an important role in 
the overall shift to human rights. My project details this exact process, showing how anti-
imperialism played a crucial role in the rise of human rights in the 1970s. 
While a number of writers have acknowledged this complex transition in France, pointing 
to the fact that certain anti-imperialists became champions of humanitarian interventionism later 
in the decade, much of this work is anecdotal and descriptive, and there are very few detailed 
historical studies that explain exactly how this transition happened.34 The best account by far is 
Eleanor Davey’s Idealism Beyond Borders: The French Revolutionary Left and the Rise of 
Humanitarianism, 1954-1988, which sets out to explain the process by which sans-frontiérisme 
came to displace tiers-mondisme in France. But while there is some significant overlap with my 
project, Davey’s book is crucially not a study of internationalism proper, but of different ways of 
“approaching suffering.”35 For this reason, she focuses on humanitarianism and Third Worldism, 
not human rights and anti-imperialism – the latter of which she tends to completely subsume 
under a very amorphous notion of Third Worldism. Nevertheless, the book offers important 
                                                
33 Julian Bourg, From Revolution to Ethics: May 1968 and Contemporary French Thought 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007). For a good critique of the 
teleological tendencies in this book, see Warren Breckman, “From Revolution to Ethics: May 
1968 and Contemporary French Thought. By Julian Bourg,” Journal of Modern History 81, no. 1 
(March 2009): 207-209. 
34 Paul Berman tracks this history, but remains too focused on celebrities. Power and the 
Idealists: Or, the Passion of Joschka Fischer and its Aftermath (Brooklyn, NY: Soft Skull Press, 
2005), chapter 2. Timothy Nunan, in his excellent book on development and humanitarianism in 
Afghanistan, points to this crucial shift in France, but offers no explanation. Humanitarian 
Invasion: Global Development in Cold War Afghanistan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2016).  
35 Eleanor Davey, Idealism Beyond Borders: The French Revolutionary Left and the Rise of 
Humanitarianism, 1954-1988 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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insights into the period as a whole, which I build on to explain the complex ways in which human 
rights displaced anti-imperialism as the dominant form of international solidarity. 
My contributions to the study of the rise of human rights are threefold. First, I argue that 
after the turn to revolution was met by a wave of state repression in France, the United States, 
and other countries in the late 1960 and early 1970s, anti-imperialist radicals who had only 
recently shunned all talk of reformism began to reconsider the struggle for civil liberties. When 
they learned of state repression outside France, these anti-imperialists began to advocate for the 
liberation of political prisoners in countries like South Vietnam. Indeed, with regards to Vietnam, 
antiwar solidarity increasingly focused on demanding that the government of South Vietnam 
restore civil liberties and release all the political prisoners. Thus, anti-imperialists continued to 
advocate the formation and defense of strong states in the Third World to fight against 
imperialism while simultaneously beginning to criticize certain third-world states for violating the 
rights of individuals. Through this new iteration of antiwar solidarity, in conjunction with domestic 
experiences of incarceration, radicals grew more accepting of the idea of fighting for individual 
rights against states. At the same time, anti-imperialists made certain tactical alliances with 
human rights groups, like Amnesty International, in campaigns such as the one to free the South 
Vietnamese prisoners. In this way, they effectively introduced human rights, which was quite 
marginal among activists as compared to anti-imperialism, to a larger, more radical audience. 
Thus, while very few radicals made the personal leap from anti-imperialism to human rights in the 
early 1970s, they did help create the political terrain that allowed a rival form of internationalism 
based in human rights to grow.  
Second, my dissertation argues that when anti-imperialists defected to human rights in 
the 1970s, they brought with them a repertoire of activism that helped human rights develop into 
a truly rival form of internationalism. When anti-imperialism began to crumble in the 1970s, 
human rights increasingly emerged as a viable alternative; but despite its purity, it could not offer 
an attractive form of activism. To be sure, human rights groups like Amnesty International already 
enjoyed their own forms of activism, such as letter writing, but these seemed uninspiring 
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compared to the dynamic activism associated with the anti-imperialist radicals of the 1960s and 
early 1970s. In order to compete with anti-imperialism, human rights needed more than moral 
purity, it needed a viable repertoire of activism. This was accomplished through the encounter 
between human rights and a new kind of French humanitarianism. For many French radicals did 
not leap directly to human rights; they first developed a form of humanitarianism, exemplified in 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), that channeled the aura of anti-imperialism, and preserved 
many of the forms of activism traditionally associated with anti-imperialism, yet rejected the 
foundational ideas of anti-imperialism, such as the right of nations to self-determination. In the 
1970s, this new kind of humanitarianism began to fuse with the idea of human rights, and it was 
precisely this encounter that elevated human rights into a substantial form of international 
solidarity that could not only compete with anti-imperialism, but perhaps even beat it at its own 
game. 
Lastly, my dissertation shows that while the French played a decisive role in the overall 
transition from anti-imperialism to human rights, the transition would not have happened without 
crucial though unpredictable transnational encounters. In the late 1970s, catastrophe struck 
Southeast Asia, and tens of thousands of refugees fled Vietnam. Human rights organizers sprung 
into action, organizing an international campaign against human rights violations in Vietnam. In 
the United States, activists collaborated with the Carter administration, which sensed a perfect 
opportunity to divert attention away from the Vietnam War, restore American virtue, and 
reestablish the United States’ leadership role in the international community.36 In the final 
chapters of the dissertation, I show that the story of the transition cannot be told within a national 
framework, that a study of the rise of human rights at this time must examine the complex 
relationship between activists and state governments, and lastly, that we must recognize just how 
critical the contingent, and opportunistic, transnational encounter between humanitarianism and 
human rights in the very late 1970s and early 1980s were to shaping politics and state policy. 
 
                                                
36 Barbara Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014). 
  
 
22 
Sources and Methods 
The aim of my dissertation is to track how the transformation of the radical left allowed a 
rival form of human rights internationalism to achieve hegemony on both the left and the 
mainstream. In order trace to these changes, my dissertation focuses on what I have called the 
internationalist imaginary.37 There are many ways to grasp this imaginary, but I have found that 
some are more effective than others. For example, reading refined theoretical tracts about 
imperialism, although helpful in some respects, often do not provide the best window into the 
imaginary: they are deliberately abstract, divorced from everyday organizing, and often intended 
to accentuate differences between groups that otherwise shared the same core assumptions. Far 
more useful, I have found, are close readings of posters, leaflets, pamphlets, agitational 
materials, manifestos, programs, newspaper and magazine articles, journal essays, meeting 
notes, membership lists, conference programs, films, political novels, letters, and diaries.  
To access these texts, which are largely still undigitized, I conducted extensive research 
in a number of archives. The Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine (BDIC) 
in Nanterre, which has conveniently centralized archival materials from a broad spectrum of 
French radical groups, served as my primary archive. I supplemented this with research in the 
Bibliothèque nationale de France (BNF), the Archives nationales, and various online databases. 
In the United States, I worked at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, the King Center in Atlanta, the 
Bancroft Library at Berkeley, the Tamiment Library in New York, and in the archives of Columbia 
University and Swarthmore College, among others. Since U.S. groups forged many international 
contacts, I found that many of these U.S. archives contained valuable documents pertaining to 
the various international convergences and networks, as well as important archival materials from 
other countries. 
                                                
37 As I have explained above, by this term, I mean the semiconscious political assumptions that 
informed concrete practices, overall strategy, and everyday organizing. Focusing my attention 
here brings to light the core convergences between radicals of many stripes: despite their 
palpable differences and minutely formulated positions, radicals came together on several crucial 
issues and practices at certain points in time. 
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To complete this project, I read these texts not only for their explicit content, but with an 
eye to the imaginary that structured them. What did certain concepts mean? What goals were put 
forth? What did these texts take to be self-evident? What were their limits, silences, and gaps? 
Reading texts from different groups, I found that more often than not, groups shared similar goals, 
converged on the same kinds of issues at the same time, and suffered the same limits. Of course, 
this is not to ignore the explicit content, to treat the literal words as epiphenomenal; my goal 
throughout this project has been to understand the larger intellectual system organizing and 
making possible the specific ideas, arguments, and practices presented in these texts. 
I also supplemented this archival work with memoirs and oral interviews conducted after 
the events covered in this dissertation. I used these sources primarily to add richness, detail, and 
color to the narrative. In addition, I found them essential in uncovering some of the lost 
connections that made radical politics possible at this time. After all, when reading a text, one can 
certainly suspect traces of international contacts; but memoirs, published testimonies, and 
interviews are crucial for definitively proving their existence. In some cases, I used these kinds of 
sources for their analytical value, but, like Kristin Ross, I am very cautious about relying on them 
to drive the argument.38 In many cases, those interviewed had invested their entire lives in 
making revolution, only for that project to fail. As anyone who has conducted oral histories will 
know, this background will undoubtedly have a profound effect on how radicals remember that 
period. Some aggrandize their role. Others completely reject what they had done. Still others 
mutate the past to justify their actions in the present. Even the most modest and honest often 
misremember what they were up to decades ago, the ideas that drove them forward every day. 
Of course, since the shift from anti-imperialism to human rights cannot be told solely 
through the trajectory of the radical left, my dissertation has relied on other sets of sources. I have 
drawn on some documents produced by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the National 
Liberation Front, and later the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. For the first few chapters the most 
important of these has been the Courrier du Vietnam, the largest foreign language newspaper 
                                                
38 Ross, May ’68, 17. 
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produced by North Vietnam. This paper not only illuminates the DRV’s internationalist strategy, 
but allows me to see the ways in which this internationalist imaginary was shared by radicals 
across borders. For later chapters, the Vietnamese produced a series of texts responding to the 
charge of human rights violations. These are extremely useful for understanding how those 
operating within the anti-imperialist imaginary conceptualized human rights, and especially the 
relationship between individual rights and collective rights. In addition, I have worked with 
documents from the Nixon and Carter administrations to see how radical movements intersected 
with state power, to understand the course of the war affected U.S. policy, and to explain why the 
United States adopted human rights as state policy in the late 1970s. Lastly, my dissertation 
looks at material produced by human rights and humanitarian organizations – primarily Amnesty 
International and MSF – to see how human rights advocates crossed paths with anti-imperialist 
radicals, how human rights gained momentum in the 1970s, and the ways human rights 
internationalism successfully absorbed some of the progressive aspects of anti-imperialism. 
 
Chapter Summary 
Chapter 1 begins by mapping the radical critique of the Vietnam War. Starting with the 
antiwar struggle in the United States, I show how radicals argued that the war was not simply an 
isolated affair, but the product of a larger system. As an international war, then, opposition 
likewise had to be international. Thus, some U.S. radicals set about trying to internationalize 
antiwar struggle, coordinating various movements in different countries. While they were primarily 
looking to movements in the “Third World,” activists in Europe proved to be especially 
enthusiastic about international antiwar unity. Although recognizing that most European countries 
did not play a direct role in the war, these European activists, above all the French, argued that 
Europe was nevertheless essential for U.S. imperialism: in order to pursue its foreign policy, the 
United States needed the support, or at the very least neutrality, of capitalist countries in Europe. 
Protesting in countries like France, or against international alliances like NATO, could help 
destabilize the U.S. position. Led by the French, European activists set about creating a radical 
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antiwar international. In this way, I argue, the Vietnam War made possible the revival of radical 
internationalism in the 1960s. 
Chapter 2 surveys the various forms of solidarity that anti-imperialist internationalism 
assumed. Radicals set about building a number of intersecting international antiwar networks. 
They coordinated protests, created a vast transnational network to assist resisting or deserting 
U.S. GIs, and they even tried to form international brigades to fight the U.S. military directly in 
Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese welcomed all these efforts, but as their response to the 
international brigades indicated, they felt the primary goal of international solidarity should be 
propagandistic. The ideological terrain, the NLF and DRV argued, was a crucial aspect of the 
overall war effort: radicals abroad could play a decisive role in shifting the balance of forces by 
trying to change public opinion. The prime example of ideological struggle, I argue, was the 
Bertrand Russell Peace Tribunal, which put the United States on trial for genocide. While the 
Tribunal had no power to enforce its verdict, it was able to generate considerable informational 
materials for antiwar activity, and it did have an effect on public opinion in countries like France. 
This chapter also explains exactly what activists meant by anti-imperialist 
internationalism. As the war progressed, Marxism dominated the radical imaginary, not only in 
France, but in countries like the United States. Indeed, radicals now came to see their struggle 
against the war in solidly Marxist terms. Following V. I. Lenin, the vast majority of radicals came 
to frame anti-imperialism as the fight for the right of nations to self-determination. In the context of 
the 1960s, with successful national liberation struggles erupting across the globe, the alliance 
between anti-imperialism and national liberation was a tremendous boon. But if nationalism were 
to ever fail to deliver on its promises, the results could be disastrous for anti-imperialists. 
In chapter 3, I show how some activists argued that the best way to assist their 
Vietnamese comrades was to bring the war home to the imperialist centers. Despite coordinated 
international protest, the U.S. military continued to escalate the war throughout 1967. In light of 
this, some radicals felt that the kind of ideological struggle exemplified by the Bertrand Russell 
Peace Tribunal was insufficient; they now had a duty to end the war by any means necessary. 
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Black nationalists in the United States and revolutionaries in Latin America led the way. Because 
they both faced the same enemy as the Vietnamese, U.S. imperialism, they were uniquely 
positioned to aid the struggle. Che Guevara soon codified this strategy by calling for “two, three, 
many Vietnams.” Representatives from the NLF and DRV welcomed Che’s new internationalist 
strategy, and the General Secretary of the Vietnamese Workers Party, Le Duan, even called for a 
worldwide anti-imperialist front. 
Although they did not confront U.S. imperialism in the same way as African Americans or 
Latin Americans, French radicals suggested that they, too, could play an important role in this 
anti-imperialist front. Building on earlier arguments about how U.S. imperialism depended on the 
support of other capitalist states, they argued that opening a “second front” in Europe would deal 
a decisive blow to imperialism, relieving the pressure on the Vietnamese. In February 1968, 
thousands of radicals from over a dozen European countries met in Berlin to coordinate their 
efforts to open new fronts across the continent. As they met, the NLF launched a surprise attack 
against the U.S. military throughout South Vietnam. If the Vietnamese could repel the most 
devastating military machine in history, they thought, then surely they could make revolution. 
Chapter 4 explores how, exactly, radicals tried to bring the war home. After the Berlin 
Conference, French radicals heightened the antiwar struggle, which ultimately triggered the 
events of May 68. For them, I argue, May 68 was one of those potential second fronts in the 
Vietnam War. Just as the Vietnamese inspired the French, so too did the French inspire radicals 
elsewhere. Indeed, May 68 showed that revolution was still possible in the advanced capitalist 
world. Activists in other countries, like Great Britain or Italy, tried to reproduce the French 
example in their own countries. The May events proved so extraordinary that they even 
compelled the Americans to reconsider their attitude towards the Europeans. Whereas before 
1968 the Americans largely ignored struggles in Europe, afterwards they saw European 
struggles, above all the French, as paradigmatic. Activists everywhere, however, saw their 
struggles as deeply interconnected to one another and to Vietnam. In this way, I argue that the 
arc of radical upheaval not only in France, but in other countries, can be understood as the 
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opening of other fronts in the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle. Lastly, this chapter ends with a 
long discussion about the role of “translation” in politics at this time. While some activists tried to 
simply duplicate the Vietnamese example, others tried to creatively translate the Vietnamese 
revolution into the unique historical conditions of their particular country. In this, Vietnam emerged 
by the late 1960s as a master symbol of revolt, coloring nearly every struggle in France. 
Chapter 5 shows how the turn to revolution explored in the previous two chapters was 
met with widespread state repression. In France, the United States, and other Western European 
countries, governments infiltrated, subverted, or simply outlawed radical organizations, throwing 
activists in prison. In this context of widespread repression some radicals began to reconsider the 
fight for civil rights as a legitimate form of activism. Above all, experiences of imprisonment gave 
rise to a vibrant transnational prisoners rights movement in France, the United States, and Italy 
that pushed radicals to seriously reconsider the rights, status, and struggles of prisoners. This 
process of rethinking led to a change in strategy as well: radicals now built alliances with more 
moderate organizations, thought more seriously about the law, and demanded civil rights from the 
very states they sought to abolish. Although some saw this move towards “democratic rights” as a 
tactical expedient, it soon began to transformed the very imaginary of the French radical left. 
In Chapter 6, I show how flagging domestic and international support for the Vietnam War 
forced the U.S. government to find new ways of justifying its involvement in Southeast Asia. 
Under President Richard Nixon, the United States tried to justify the war by drawing attention to 
the POWs held in North Vietnam. In this way, he hoped to recast U.S. intervention as a just 
humanitarian campaign to liberate prisoners. In response to Nixon’s instrumentalization of the 
POW issue, antiwar activists, first in the United States, then France, and then throughout Western 
Europe, drew attention to the hundreds of thousands of political dissenters rotting in South 
Vietnamese jails. In this, they effectively grafted their new concerns with civil rights onto the 
antiwar movement. Informed by their own experiences of incarceration, they called for the 
liberation of all political prisoners in South Vietnam. This demand grew even more central to 
radicals after the United States agreed to withdraw from Vietnam in January 1973, thereby 
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depriving radicals of their main target. With this particular issue, they could maintain the antiwar 
momentum despite the Paris Peace Accords. In fact, this common demand helped reunite the 
radical left, which culminated in a massive anti-war demonstration in May 1973, when tens of 
thousands of Western European and U.S. radicals, including Native American activists from 
Wounded Knee, met in Milan, Italy. 
However, in arguing that South Vietnam was violating fundamental democratic rights, 
anti-imperialists increasingly began to criticize the internal affairs of a sovereign nation-state. In 
this chapter, I trace this shift to the language of rights, which promoted the individual, rather than 
the nation state, as the constitutive unit of sovereignty. While radicals did not adopt the specific 
language of human rights, their own attention to rights, along with alliances with rival groups such 
as Amnesty International, developed the intellectual and political terrain on which a competing 
form of international solidarity could grow. 
Chapter 7 tracks the collapse of the radical left in France in the 1970s. I show how the 
decline of the workers’ movement, the restructuring of capitalist relations, the proliferation of new 
social movements, a changed political horizon, and a crisis of Marxism all worked to destabilize 
the radical left. One crucial, though overlooked, reason for the left’s decline, I argue, was the fate 
of national liberation struggles abroad in the 1970s. Since the French left’s identity was so 
powerfully shaped by these struggles, it should come as no surprise that their defeats would 
redound on the left in catastrophic ways. In 1979, Vietnamese troops marched into Cambodia, 
followed by a Chinese invasion of northern Vietnam. Three socialist countries once allied against 
U.S. imperialism now found themselves embroiled in a bloody internecine war. The Third 
Indochina War, as it was called, threw French radicals in disarray. Some defended Vietnam, 
others Cambodia. Whichever side radicals chose, events in Southeast Asia shattered the core 
assumptions of anti-imperialism. The failures of nationalism crippled anti-imperialism, leaving 
internationalism open to capture. 
This chapter also examines the rise of human rights interventionism in France. For while 
some anti-imperialists remained steadfast in the face of crisis, a minority began to turn to a new 
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idea of internationalism, one based not in national liberation but in human rights. In switching 
sides, so to speak, they brought with them a set of techniques, a style of activism, and certain 
radical credentials that helped human rights become a serious challenger to anti-imperialism. 
When anti-imperialism began to crumble in the very late 1970s, this new kind of human rights 
internationalism would rush to fill the void. 
If chapter 7 explains the fall of anti-imperialism, chapter 8 shows how human rights 
succeeded in achieving hegemony. The Third Indochina War aggravated a major refugee crisis in 
the region. Faced with mounting state repression, tens of thousands fled the new Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, many by boats. In Cambodia, thousands more fled after the Vietnamese 
invasion. While what remained of the anti-imperialist left stood paralyzed as tens of thousands of 
Indochinese refugees fled communist governments in Southeast Asia, human rights activists, 
working closely with Vietnamese refugee activists, sprung into action, organizing an international 
campaign against human rights violations in Vietnam. The French took the lead, even sending a 
hospital ship to rescue refugees in the South China Sea. Effectively interfering with the internal 
affairs of a sovereign nation-state, this action inaugurated a new kind of humanitarian 
interventionism that promised to surpass Cold War ideological divisions.  
The campaign soon spread internationally, entering the United States through the efforts 
of Joan Baez and Ginetta Sagan, who had led the West Coast branch of Amnesty International 
and now directed their own human rights organization. For its part, the Carter Administration used 
the crisis, and the international attention stoked by the humanitarians, to restore American virtue. 
Although the Vietnamese, backed by anti-imperialist radicals, eventually fought back by 
denouncing human rights as a mask for American imperialism, they offered no viable alternative. 
This final chapter, then, explains the rise of this new “Human Rights International.” 
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CHAPTER 1: THE VIETNAM INTERNATIONAL 
 
On evening of May 26, 1966, Stephen Smale of the Vietnam Day Committee rose to 
speak at the “Six Heures pour le Vietnam,” a colossal teach-in organized by French antiwar 
radicals. Smale’s friend Laurent Schwartz, the event’s primary organizer, hoped the presence of 
an American radical at Paris’ most spectacular antiwar action yet could deepen the feeling of 
international solidarity beginning to emerge around the Vietnam War. After briefly surveying the 
state of the American antiwar movement, Smale insisted on the importance of united action. 
“People in France have asked me if there is any point in Frenchmen getting involved in the 
Vietnam protest,” Smale said.39 “I tell them definitely yes.” Since the Vietnam War was an 
international war, he explained, the antiwar struggle likewise had to be international. Only 
international unity between activists in the United States, France, Vietnam, and across the world 
could help halt the war. Affirming this new commitment to radical international solidarity against 
war, Smale walked across the stage to shake hands with Mai Van Bo of the North Vietnamese 
delegation in Paris. The auditorium erupted in applause. 
Although most Americans initially supported the Vietnam War, some, such as Smale, 
dissented from the outset. At the forefront of the antiwar struggle were radicals who advanced a 
systematic critique, arguing that ending the war necessarily meant radically transforming the 
system that had created it in the first place. Although marginal for decades, radicals increasingly 
became a significant force in American politics, in part because of the political turmoil of the 
Vietnam War. But these radicals not only took the lead in antiwar organizing at home, some tried 
to internationalize the struggle, contacting antiwar activists across the globe. Although American 
radicals prioritized connections with movements in the Third World, Western European radicals 
proved especially responsive, organizing coordinated actions to support their American peers. In 
France, some radicals hoped to translate this feeling of internationalism into an organized 
international, in some ways like the radical Internationals of the past. Joined by other radicals in 
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Western Europe, they also began to insist on the strategic value of organizing an antiwar 
international among radicals in the advanced capitalist countries of North America and Western 
Europe. While most Americans in the early years of the antiwar struggle paid little attention to the 
struggles in Europe, French radicals arguing for the value of coordinated struggle in Europe 
received tremendous encouragement from Steven Smale that night in 1966. 
 “What is going on in Vietnam affects the world,” he argued. The Vietnam War, he 
continued, was part of a much broader global struggle between the United States and 
movements for self-determination across the globe. But the United States was by no means 
alone in trying to prevent the people of the world from “putting their own future in their hands.” To 
continue its foreign policy, which had culminated in the Vietnam War, the United States depended 
on the support of its “traditional allies,” namely, Western European capitalist countries such as 
France. Thus, French antiwar activism could not only “reinforce American demonstrators,” but 
also weaken the pro-American alliance that made the Vietnam War possible.40 
French radicals, joined by others across Western Europe, articulated these insights into a 
political strategy, arguing that radicals in North America and Western Europe had a special 
responsibility to combat the international alliance of capitalist countries that made American 
foreign policy possible. To that end, they met in Liège in October 1966, and then again in 
Brussels in March 1967, to build a functional radical international to coordinate their actions, 
which included a formal secretariat composed of various radical organizations. Over the course of 
1967, it grew to include not only many radical organizations in Western Europe, but also in the 
United States, such as SDS and SNCC.  
While the encounter of domestic microsystems of struggle in North America and Western 
Europe on the one side with a global political ecosystem of interconnected national liberation 
movements made such a radical antiwar international possible, it was above all the specific 
characteristics of the Vietnamese struggle that made it a reality. Indeed, without the Vietnam War, 
there would have never been a new international of radicals. In serving as a binding element the 
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Vietnamese struggle allowed otherwise isolated activists in not only the United States and 
France, but throughout Western Europe and North America, to unite in a new international. 
Fervent internationalists, Vietnamese revolutionaries, both in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
and the National Liberation Front, consciously played this uniting role, giving rise to a new radical 
international in the 1960s. 
 
Radicals Against the War 
American involvement in Vietnam began long before 1965, when President Lyndon 
Johnson dispatched U.S. Marines to the South and systematically bombed the North. In 1945, 
American ships were used to transport French troops to overthrow the newly independent 
Vietnam.41 During the first Indochina War, the United States provided France with weapons, 
supplies, and funds to help restore colonial rule.42 By 1954, the United States financed about 80 
percent of the French war effort.43 When the war ended in Vietnamese victory, the 1954 Geneva 
Convention temporarily divided the country into two zones at the 17th parallel, with the North 
governed by the communist Viet Minh, the South by Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem and Emperor 
Boa Dai, who had collaborated with the Japanese and French. According to the Convention, both 
zones were to participate in a July 1956 general election to form a unified Vietnamese state. But 
the United States, convinced that the communists would win handily, blocked the election. As 
President Dwight Eisenhower wrote in 1954, “I have never talked or corresponded with a person 
knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the 
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time of the fighting, possibly eighty percent of the population would have voted for the 
Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bảo Đại.”44 For the United 
States, the fiction of an independent South had to be preserved to halt the spread of communism. 
 American support only grew when South Vietnamese dissidents began to challenge 
Diem’s rule. In December 1960, the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam (NLF) united all 
those, including non-communists, wanting to overthrow what they saw was an illegitimate 
government in the South.45 Though initially hesitant to involve itself in what would certainly slide 
into a destructive war with the United States, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) 
eventually backed the Southern rebels with troops, weapons, and supplies.46 The United States, 
which saw the Southern insurgency as part of a Northern conspiracy to subvert the sovereign 
state in the South, began playing a very active role in South Vietnam, engaging in a cover 
actions, increasing the number of military advisors, and authorizing a coup against Diem once his 
unpopularity fell to irrecoverable levels.47 
Despite this aid, the government of South Vietnam enjoyed neither the popular support 
nor the military ability to defeat the NLF on its own. In fact, in its attempt to crush the resistance 
the government resorted to methods that only increased the NLF’s support among the people.48 
Desperate to save the United States’ failing client state, President Johnson took the fateful step of 
throwing the United States into what would become a full-scale war.49 On February 7, 1965, 
Johnson ordered 49 retaliatory airstrikes across North Vietnam. On March 2, the U.S. military 
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began a sustained bombing campaign of the North that would last over three years.50 Five days 
later, Johnson dispatched 3,500 marines to the South. The U.S. government, despite studiously 
avoiding the word, was at war.51 
Although the war in Vietnam initially enjoyed widespread approval in the United States, 
some Americans loudly denounced their government’s policies.52 This early, fragmentary dissent 
famously culminated in a massive demonstration on April 17, 1965 in Washington, D.C. The 
organizers expected only a few thousand demonstrators; to everyone’s surprise 20,000 gathered 
in the capital for the single largest antiwar demonstration in American history up to that point.53  
The significance of these numbers cannot be overstated. Protesting one’s government during 
wartime was still a punishable offense. During the First World War, antiwar activists were arrested 
under the Espionage Act of 1917, and some, such as Socialist Presidential candidate Eugene V. 
Debs languished in prison for years. In addition, the April 1965 march unfolded in a politically 
charged Cold War atmosphere still shaped by widespread anticommunism, FBI’s COINTELPRO, 
and the House Un-American Activities Committee. Protesting the government in its war against a 
Liberation Front dominated by communists could be dangerous, even for those who were firmly 
anti-communist. 
 Taking their chances, on April 17 demonstrators picketed the White House, and then 
marched to the Sylvan Theater, on the grounds of the Washington Monument, where they 
listened to a series of speeches on the war, interspersed by performances from Joan Baez, Judy 
Collins, Phil Ochs, and the SNCC Freedom Singers.54 In his speech, Senator Ernest Gruening, 
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one of only two members of Congress not to vote for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, demanded 
the “immediate cessation of our bombing in North Vietnam.”55 Stoughton Lynd spoke of French 
activists who opposed the Algerian War.56 Paul Potter, the President of the Students for a 
Democratic Society, ended the rally with a rousing call to build a mass movement to end the war. 
“I believe that the administration is serious about expanding the war in Asia,” he said. “The 
question is whether the people here are as serious about ending it.”57 The only way to do that, he 
explained, was to build a “massive social movement,” a “movement rather than a protest or some 
series of protests.”58 
 By 1965, something like an “antiwar movement” was beginning to take shape, though this 
never approached anything like a singular, coherent movement. In fact, what is often 
misremembered as “the antiwar movement” was a very amorphous collection of diverse political 
currents united only by a general opposition to the Vietnam War.59 Although they occasionally 
coordinated their actions, especially for large marches such as this one, groups remained fiercely 
independent of one another. They issued from different political backgrounds, pursued different 
tactics, opposed the war for different reasons, and championed wildly different courses of action – 
from negotiated settlement, to gradual American withdrawal, to total communist victory. As the 
April 17 march revealed, the American “antiwar movement” was a cacophonous hodgepodge of 
                                                                                                                                            
creeps.” “Thousands of Students in Capital Protest the War,” Los Angeles Times, April 18, 1965, 
1 
55 Quoted in “15,000 White house Pickets Denounce Vietnam War,” The New York Times, April 
18, 1965, 3. 
56 Fred Halstead, Out Now!: A Participant’s Account of the American Movement Against the 
Vietnam War (New York: Monad Press, 1978), 41. 
57 Paul Potter, “The Incredible War,” April 17, 1965, Voices of Democracy: The U.S. Oratory 
Project, http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/potter-the-incredible-war-speech-text/. An abridged 
version can be found in “Takin’ it to the Streets”: A Sixties Reader, eds. Alexander Bloom and 
Wini Breines (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 174-78. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Melvin Small, Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the Battle for America's Hearts and Minds 
(Wilmington, D.C.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2002), 3-9. 
  
 
36 
isolationists, pacifists, liberals, civil rights activists, black nationalists, anti-communists, social 
democrats, Communists, anti-revisionists, and socialists of various stripes.60 
 Though most antiwar dissenters were politically moderate, some identified with the 
radical left.61 Contrary to the claims of American anti-communist propaganda, the most 
conservative of these was in fact the Communist Party USA. For although the CPUSA survived 
McCarthyism, the party emerged not only numerically diminished, but also far more moderate, 
having effectively abandoned the goal of revolution. During the Vietnam War, the party opposed 
immediate withdrawal with the slogan, “Negotiate Now,” which infuriated those further to the left 
who felt that calling for negotiations implied that the United States had a right to be in Southeast 
Asia in the first place. Organizationally, the CPUSA matched its reformist line by trying to channel 
the antiwar movement into a narrow electoralism, at times supporting the Democratic Party. But if 
the CPUSA was clearly no longer radical as a national organization, some individual communists 
still were.  
The largest of these radical formations was Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). 
Originally founded as the youth affiliate of the League for Industrial Democracy, SDS won its 
independence in the 1960s, emerging as a beacon for a new generation of activists hoping to 
move beyond what they called the “Old Left.” Championing participatory democracy, the struggle 
for racial equality, and a kind of anti-anti-communism, SDS became the premier organization of 
the white “New Left” – by 1969, membership peaked at about 100,000. Although claiming a few 
socialist members, in its early years SDS was rather moderate, especially at the national level. 
For example, at the National Council meeting in December 1964, SDSers voted against two 
antiwar proposals – one to organize draft resistance and the other to send medical supplies to 
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Vietnam – for being too radical.62 That said, SDS was the one of the first to appreciate the 
importance of Vietnam and organized the April 1965 event.63  
 Also in attendance that day were members of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating 
Committee. One of the leading civil rights organizations, SNCC was known above all for its 
grassroots organizing, taking the lead in sit-ins, freedom rides, and voter registration campaigns 
in the South. Although a primarily civil rights organization, many in the group connected the 
struggle for rights at home with the war abroad. But while some individuals publicly opposed the 
war – SNCC leader Bob Moses spoke at the April 17 demonstration – others in the group were 
reluctant to formally condemn the U.S. government, fearing loss of state support and cuts in 
funds. But in January 1966, after much debate, SNCC became the first civil rights organization to 
formally condemn the Vietnam War, openly encouraging draft resistance.64 
 Another group that would play an enormous role in the American antiwar movement was 
the Trotskyist Socialist Workers’ Party. The SWP, which advanced the slogan, “U.S. Out Now,” 
advocated mass demonstrations, but consistently opposed civil disobedience, which the party 
feared would alienate the broader American public – a stance that would put the SWP at odds 
with others on the far left as the decade progressed. Through its youth affiliate, the Young 
Socialist Alliance (YSA), the SWP exerted considerable influence over a number of antiwar 
initiatives, winning near complete control of the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in 
Vietnam, a coalition that would boast some 100,000 members.65 Unsurprisingly, the SWP and 
YSA’s role raised many criticisms. Some felt the SWP’s influence proved vital to antiwar effort; 
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others argued that the SWP was merely using the war to recruit members, discomfit rivals, and 
impose its own agenda.66 Irrespective of one’s attitude to the SWP, it is undeniable that the party 
worked its way to the center of antiwar organizing in the United States.67 
Lastly, there was Progressive Labor (PL). Critical of their party’s growing moderation, a 
number of Communists broke with the CPUSA in the fall of 1961, forming an anti-revisionist 
organization by the name of Progressive Labor in 1962. PL was fiercely anti-imperialist, followed 
the Chinese line, and organized illegal trips to Cuba. Although mostly comprised of older 
militants, through its influence over the May Second Movement (M2M), PL also enjoyed contacts 
with the burgeoning youth movement. For its part, M2M, which had emerged out of coordinated 
demonstrations on May 2, 1964 in New York, San Francisco, and several other cities, became 
the first far left youth group to focus on Vietnam.68 M2M soon earned a reputation as one of the 
most militant pro-NLF groups. “We support the National Liberation Front of south Viet-Nam and 
other revolutionary movements because we realize that their struggle is our struggle, that when 
we aid our brothers in other countries, we are aiding ourselves,” a 1965 statement explained.69 
But after attending the April 17, 1965 demonstration, PL quickly recognized SDS’s potential and 
decided to dissolve M2M and send its members into the larger student organization.70 
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In spite of their common opposition to the Vietnam War, these groups fought bitterly. 
They debated whether to carry U.S. or NLF flags at demonstrations; whether the movement 
should focus exclusively on ending the war or aim to connect the war to other domestic issues; 
whether activists should organize large, visible actions, such as marches, or promote more local 
initiatives; whether the movement should adopt a more centralized structure or remain capillary; 
and whether or not to pursue electoral politics. In addition to tactics, they disagreed over their 
analysis of the situation abroad. Was the Vietnamese struggle a single, continuous revolution; or 
would it have to follow a two-stage process, first a democratic revolution, then a properly socialist 
one? Was the Workers Party of North Vietnam a progressive, international force; or would it 
degenerate into a “Stalinist” bureaucracy once in power?  
Yet as serious as these differences were, they belied a deeper unity. Indeed, beneath 
these finely argued debates, many of these radical groups shared the same semiconscious 
strategic assumptions about antiwar struggle. Even if they expressed it differently, they all argued 
that since the war was the product of a much larger system, ending the Vietnam War necessarily 
meant thoroughly transforming that system. For them, halting the bombing, withdrawing troops, 
pursuing negotiations, electing a new President, or moving past Cold War rivalries – as more 
moderate antiwar voices suggested – would not stop the Vietnam War. Even if, by some chance, 
such actions did reduce hostilities in Southeast Asia, without a systematic change, the United 
States would find itself involved in another “Vietnam” elsewhere. Instead, the strategic objective 
was to change the system that had made Vietnam possible in the first place. It is precisely for this 
reason that one can call these activists radicals – true to the word’s etymology, they sought to 
grasp the fundamental “roots” of the issue. And it is this radical strategic perspective that 
distinguished the radicals from other antiwar currents.  
Of course, as the April 17 march revealed, there was some ambiguity over exactly how 
radicals defined this “system.” Paul Potter, who helped inject the radical perspective into the 
demonstration that day, raised this question when he spoke directly about the system: 
We must name it, describe it, analyze it, understand it and change it … For it is only 
when that system is changed and brought under control that there can be any hope for 
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stopping the forces that create a war in Vietnam today or a murder in the South tomorrow 
or all the incalculable, innumerable more subtle atrocities that are worked on people all 
over—all the time.71 
 
For many radicals in the audience, especially those of the older generation, the answer was 
obvious. They defined the “system” as either “capitalism” or “imperialism,” and in some cases, the 
two terms were used roughly synonymously or fused into a single concept, such as “capitalist 
imperialism.” But Potter remained conspicuously silent on the word’s meaning, prompting some in 
the crowd to clamor that he name the system he was describing.72  
Potter later explained his reticence that day: “I did not fail to call the system capitalist 
because I was a coward or an opportunist. I refused to call it capitalism because capitalism was 
for me and my generation an inadequate description of the evils of America – a hollow, dead 
word tied to the thirties and a movement that had used it freely but apparently without 
comprehending it.”73 In other words, instead of relying on inherited concepts, or getting mired in 
antiquarian debates, Potter, along with many in the New left, hoped to embark on an open 
journey to find the most accurate way to describe the system. This did not make his stance any 
less radical. Indeed, although avoiding the words “capitalist” or “imperialist,” Potter, and those like 
him, effectively agreed with other, more ideological radicals. It is precisely this shared assumption 
about the need to transform the system, often buried under petty sectarian bickering or 
terminological minutia, that allows us to speak of something like a radical Left. It should be added 
that by the end of the decade, many in the New Left came to agree that “imperialism” and 
“capitalism” were in fact the best ways to describe the system, lending the U.S. radical left a 
common vocabulary rooted in Marxism.74 
To be sure, this radical left resided on the fringes of American politics in the early 1960s. 
But that changed over the course of the decade as a number of struggles, such as the civil rights 
and student movements, helped pull the radicals into the mainstream. But it was Vietnam, more 
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than anything else, that presented radicals with the perfect opportunity to grow, consolidate, and 
escape the political margins. First, the need for unity against the war prompted some activists to 
resist the virulent anticommunism of earlier years. For example, in stark contrast with earlier civil 
rights and nuclear disarmament demonstrations, where many organizers flatly banned 
Communist participation, SDS activists, even liberal ones, did not exclude any current from the 
April 17, 1965 march. This infuriated many of the anti-communist peace groups, such as SANE, 
which refused to participate in any event with pro-NLF radicals.75 Yet, after sensing the 
importance of the march, SANE changed its mind and ended up rubbing shoulders with radicals. 
In this way, the Vietnam War helped the radical left gain mainstream exposure and even 
acceptance. 
In addition, the war radicalized some Americans by prompting them to turn a more critical 
eye towards their government, think more expansively about the United States’ international role, 
and seriously consider the possibility of major systematic change. When the draft expanded, the 
death toll soared, and victory continued to elude the United States, the radical left was there to 
propose a coherent political analysis to help Americans articulate their frustrations, push their 
ideas in more radical directions, and provide organizations to translate those feelings into action. 
The Vietnam War, more than anything else, thickened the ranks of these radical tendencies.76 
Lyndon Johnson, some joked, was their best recruiter. 
Lastly, radicals filled the void left by traditional progressive organizations. Peace groups, 
labor unions, and moderate Old Left formations could have likely taken the lead in antiwar 
organizing, but the militancy of the Vietnamese struggle led them to hesitate.77 Groups like SANE 
certainly participated, but adopted a lukewarm stance. Others, such as the AFL-CIO actively 
supported the war – indeed, ALF-CIO President George Meany only admitted the war was a 
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mistake in 1974, after the United States had already withdrawn.78 Sensing an opening, radicals 
seized the initiative. Their organizing experiences, indefatigable efforts, and firm political 
convictions more than made up for their miniscule size. Radicals came to play a leading role in 
many antiwar initiatives, calling conferences, organizing marches, planning teach-ins, resisting 
the draft, and presiding over national coalitions.79 In fact, in the early years, when moderate 
organizations only approached with caution, radicals proved themselves to be the most dynamic 
element in the antiwar opposition. The Vietnam War gave the ghettoized radical left a chance to 
become a visible force in American political life.  
 
Internationalizing the Movement 
Although antiwar radicals organized across the United States, certain parts of the country 
emerged as national rallying points. One of these was Berkeley, California. Here, radicals 
successfully channeled the energies of earlier struggles, such as the Berkeley Free Speech 
Movement (FSM), towards antiwar organizing, founding one of the most militant radical antiwar 
initiatives, the Vietnam Day Committee.80 The VDC began when Barbara Gullahorn, then a 
political science major, and her boyfriend, Jerry Rubin, met with Steven Smale about organizing a 
massive teach-in at UC Berkeley. Rubin, who moved to Berkeley in January 1964 to pursue a 
graduate degree in sociology, soon dropped out to join the civil rights movement, then traveled to 
Cuba. There, he met Che Guevara, who allegedly explained that the “most exciting struggle in the 
world is going on in North America. You live in the belly of the beast.”81 Inspired, he returned to 
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the United States to wage the struggle at home. Smale, a famous mathematician at the university 
with a long history in radical politics, was eager to help.82  
On May 21-22, 1965, the trio threw the largest teach-in to date.83 Vietnam Day, as it was 
called, rolled a debate, protest, and spectacle into a colossal 36-hour extravaganza to raise 
critical awareness about the war. But because of the far more radical atmosphere of the Bay 
Area, this teach-in was not only larger, attracting over 35,000 people, but far more militant than 
others. Many of the major radical tendencies of the time participated. Paul Potter spoke on behalf 
of SDS, Bob Parris of SNCC, Mario Savio of the FSM, Jack Barnes for the YSA, and Levi Laub of 
the Progressive Labor Party, along with a number of famous personalities, such as Staughton 
Lynd, the radical pacifist Dave Dellinger, and the famous biographer of Leon Trotsky, Isaac 
Deutscher.84 On the tables, one could find a host of radical literature, including copies of the black 
nationalist journal, Soulbook. In addition to creating a space for some of the most radical views in 
American politics, the organizers also hoped to foster a sense of unity.85 To that end, they hosted 
a panel titled, “United Political Action,” which featured speakers from rival radical antiwar groups 
such as the YSA, M2M, the W.E.B. Dubois Clubs of America (the Communist Party’s youth 
affiliate), and the International Socialist Clubs (a small Trotskyist tendency). The VDC followed up 
by publishing a pamphlet, Did You Vote for the War?, which collected the perspectives of nearly 
all the radical groups of the time – from the IWW to the Sparticist League, the SWP to the 
CPUSA.86 
After Vietnam Day, Gullahorn, Rubin, Smale, and others decided to continue their efforts 
as a formal organization, the Vietnam Day Committee, which quickly became the leading radical 
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antiwar formation in the United States.87 After the April 1965 march everyone expected SDS to 
take the lead. As Paul Booth of SDS recalls with regret, “We had the opportunity to make SDS 
the organizational vehicle of the anti-war movement,” but instead, he continued, “we chose to go 
off in all kinds of different directions.”88 With SDS preoccupied, the VDC filled the national 
leadership vacuum.89 One of the group’s keys to success was its radical inclusivity.90 True to its 
roots, the VDC welcomed every radical current – the CPUSA, SWP and YSA, International 
Socialists, along with many radicals who remained independent of formal organizations. 
At the forefront of the antiwar struggle, the VDC made several contributions to radical 
antiwar organizing in the United States. First, the committee served as a model for loose, 
democratic, yet uncompromisingly radical grassroots antiwar organizing. For instance, the VDC 
launched the Community Project as a way to organize antiwar sentiment outside the university. 
Second, the VDC, far more so than most antiwar groups at the time, championed civil 
disobedience. In August, for example, VDC activists tried to stop trains carrying troops through 
the Bay Area, prefiguring the kind of militant confrontational politics that would characterize the 
struggle several years later. Lastly, the VDC’s greatest contribution was its commitment to 
internationalizing antiwar struggle. The VDC laid the most important foundations for the idea of 
radical internationalism against the Vietnam War. 
This internationalism appeared from the beginning. In selecting speakers for Vietnam 
Day, Smale and Rubin invited foreign intellectuals, such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Bertrand 
Russell. Sartre, whose vocal opposition to the French government during the Algerian War 
became an important inspiration for American radicals, refused to visit the United States in 
protest to the war; Russell, now in his eighties, could not make the trip, but recorded a speech for 
the event. In organizing Vietnam Day, Smale also recalls receiving valuable international support 
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from others abroad, above all Laurent Schwartz from France.91 In fact, it appears that Schwartz, 
one of the most recognized antiwar radicals in France, was one of the first to seriously suggest 
organizing not only a coordinated day of international protest, but possibly some kind of radical 
international network.  
On May 14, 1965, before Vietnam Day, Schwartz wrote to Smale expressing his solidarity 
with the forthcoming teach-in. Schwartz, who had protested the Algerian War, began by drawing 
parallels between his experiences in France and the nascent American movement against the 
Vietnam War. You will “know in the following months a situation very similar to ours during the 
Algerian War,” he remarked. “The government will become more and more ferocious and 
hypocritical; in a general climate of fear throughout the country, you will be rather isolated, 
calumniated, accused of beeing [sic] enemies of the USA.” But, he added encouragingly, “your 
cause is the right one, and is considered as much everywhere in the world.” Schwartz wanted 
Smale to know that he and others like him would do whatever they could to support the American 
struggle against the war, “You may be sure to receive from your colleagues in France any help 
you want.” Although he doubted there was much they could do to directly assist the American 
movement, Schwartz wondered if there might be a way to internationalize the movement by 
inventing ways of ensuring continued international support for American efforts. “But perhaps,” he 
suggested, “we could think of an international Committee against war in Vietnam.” And if not that, 
at the very least, “an international day of protest, say in October; what do you think?”92 
 The VDC did just that. Soon after Vietnam Day, the VDC prepared for what it called the 
International Days of Protest for October 15-16, 1965, the first major, internationally coordinated 
mass protests against the Vietnam War. As one of the VDC’s fliers explained, “People throughout 
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the world must now move beyond single demonstrations and teach-ins to one massive 
internationally coordinated action.”93 Through a demonstration of this scope, supported by mass 
protests throughout the world, the “full impact of world opinion can be brought to bear against the 
policy of the American government.”94 With that objective in mind, the VDC organized an 
international committee in late June 1965 to contact activists in other countries. The committee, 
largely composed of international students studying in the United States, released international 
calls for support in seven languages and sent “hundreds of letters to foreign governments, 
political parties, trade unions, student organizations, peace groups and individuals, asking their 
support for the October 15-16 International Days of Protest.”95  
The response was “immediate and encouraging.”96 When October 15 arrived, activists 
protested in dozens of countries on every habitable continent, from Mexico to Canada to Senegal 
to Prague to Tokyo to Melbourne. In London, Bertrand Russell kicked off a weekend of protest by 
“tearing up his Labour Party membership in front of a capacity audience, to show his disgust at 
the Labour Government’s support for U.S. policy.”97 In Italy, activists organized sizeable, 
coordinated demonstrations in seven cities.98 In Brussels, home to a rapidly growing antiwar 
movement, thousands participated in a weekend of antiwar events. Although the idea for an 
international day of protest slated for sometime in October came from a Frenchman, the French 
organizers chose not to organize any major events that day because of conflicts with the French 
academic calendar.99 Thinking they could reach more students, they postponed their action to 
November. The change of date worked well since the VDC, buoyed by the resounding success of 
the International Days of Protest, decided to call yet another coordinated international action for 
November 1965. Thus, in anticipation of the November 27, 1965 march on Washington, D.C., 
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French activists of the Collectif Intersyndical Universitaire (CIU) organized an “International 
University Week Against the Vietnam War” from November 18-25 to support their American 
comrades. The CIU, which comprised the three major French academic unions, served as an 
umbrella organization for those who opposed the Vietnam War in the university. But the CIU 
hoped to use the International University Week to go beyond the university to reach the “wider 
public” as well.100 They succeeded – that week of action, organized explicitly to support the 
American movement, proved to be the “first mass demonstration in France” against war.101 
By that point, the VDC had joined with several other radical antiwar organizations, 
including SDS, the YSA, the CPUSA, and dozens of smaller antiwar collectives, to form a national 
organization, the National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NCC).102 Together 
with the VDC's international committee, the NCC published a pamphlet, The International Protest 
Movement Against American Intervention in the War in Vietnam, to develop the international 
movement. First, they aimed to “explain and document” the “international protest movement 
against American intervention in the war in Vietnam.”103 Second, the authors explained that since 
the mainstream media had ignored the international protests, likely in order to lead Americans to 
believe that the rest of the world somehow supported U.S. foreign policy, the pamphlet hoped to 
educate the general public about antiwar opinion throughout the world. “It is most important,” they 
clarified, “that American citizens be informed about these demonstrations and that the truly 
worldwide, unified dissatisfaction with current U.S. foreign policy be adequately publicized.”104 
Lastly, they hoped the booklet could contribute to the growth the international antiwar movement 
by deepening contacts. As a sign of its commitment to internationalism, the NCC called for a 
second International Days of Protest for March 1966, which proved even larger than the first. 
Thus, by 1966 many American antiwar radicals were keen to build an international 
                                                
100 “Semaine universitaire en France contre la guerre du Vietnam,” Le Monde, November 6, 1965, 
7. 
101 Nicolas Pas, “Sortir de l’ombre du Parti Communiste Français: Histoire de l’engagement de 
l’extrême-gauche français sur la guerre du Vietnam, 1965-1968,” (Mémoire DEA, Institut d’Etudes 
Politiques, Paris, 1998), 20. 
102  DeBenedetti, An American Ordeal, 121-22. 
103 The International Protest Movement, ii. 
104 Ibid. 
  
 
48 
antiwar network. But in their minds, international connections largely meant forging links with 
movements in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Diane Carole Fujino, who worked on the Asia 
section of the report, spoke for many when she admitted, “I was most interested in Third World 
people and politics.”105 After all, the Third World was where revolutions were unfolding. This was 
where history was being made, where American activists looked for inspiration, ideas, and 
models. If there were to be international links, they had to be with the Third World. This attitude 
was explicitly theorized by Richard Aoki, another member of the international committee, who 
explained the VDC’s efforts to internationalize the war in the Committee’s newsletter. In true 
radical fashion Aoki argued that the Vietnam War was not some “unfortunate error,” but the result 
of a deliberate “policy.”106  The United States, he explained, was determined to “crush national 
liberation movements” across the globe through military intervention, economic exploitation, and 
the creation of pro-American dictatorships. In this sense, Aoki explained, the Vietnam War was 
just one part of a broader “international war” between the United States and “[r]evolutionary 
struggles for self-determination” throughout the Third World. If  “the war in Vietnam is an 
international war,” he concluded, then “its opposition must be international.”107 But since the fight 
was essentially between the United States and the Third World, then internationalization meant 
real coordination with third-world movements. 
Western Europe, by contrast, was not a battlefield in this international war. Thus, while 
Americans certainly appreciated solidarity from Europeans, connections with those movements 
were without question secondary. Indeed, before May 1968, most American antiwar radicals did 
not pay serious attention to Europe, and certainly not to France.108 Many drew inspiration from 
the French resistance to the Nazis and later the Algerian War, and in some cases lionized that 
experience as a model for antiwar struggle in the United States, but contemporary French anti-
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Vietnam War activism did not hold the interest of American radicals.109 The French antiwar 
struggle was tiny, and student radicals seemed harmless, especially compared with their 
pugnacious German peers.110 Of course, there were plenty of contacts on an individual basis, but 
no sustained, international network linking American radicals with those in France or other 
capitalist countries of Western Europe. For most Americans in early 1966, building an 
international network between radicals in North America and Western Europe made little strategic 
sense. 
That said, these early American efforts to build an international movement, even if 
focused on the Third World and not on Europe, did end up playing a crucial role creating a new 
kind of international solidarity between radicals in North America and Western Europe later in the 
decade. For if these early international connections with Western European activists may not 
have been important for most Americans, they were for Europeans, who looked to the United 
States for inspiration. The teach-in, for example, spread across Europe like wildfire. More 
importantly, many Western European antiwar radicals, especially in France, initially 
conceptualized their antiwar internationalism as a way of supporting U.S. activists, whom they 
saw as the lynchpin. In this way, a feeling of internationalism had emerged by early 1966, but it 
was highly asymmetrical and largely unidirectional. While U.S. radicals provided the 
indispensable spark and laid the groundwork for future networks, the heavy task of not only 
deepening that feeling of internationalism, but also building a functional international network 
connecting radicals in the advanced capitalist world would be taken up by Western European 
radicals, and especially the French. 
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French Radicals Call for An International Front 
In 1966 the teach-in washed onto the shores of France. The May 1966 “Six Heures pour 
le Vietnam,” explicitly convened to show solidarity with American antiwar struggles, brought 
together five thousand French antiwar activists from a variety of otherwise antagonistic political 
tendencies for a six-hour marathon of speeches, discussions, music, and films.111 The Collectif 
Intersyndical Universitaire, which took the lead in organizing the event, called for “the union of all 
forces who, in France and in the world, notably in the United States, fight against the Vietnam 
War and support the fight of the South Vietnamese people for their independence, under the 
direction of the National Liberation Front.”112 Indeed, French radicals not only heeded the call to 
internationalize the movement, they worked even harder than their American peers to develop a 
revived sense of internationalism among antiwar radicals.  
For French radicals from a number of distinct currents, the war was not a localized affair 
between the United States and Vietnam, but a global struggle. This perspective defined the 
second mass meeting of radicals in Paris, the “Six Heures du Monde pour le Vietnam,” which 
captured the internationalist emphasis in its very name.113 There, on November 28, 1966, 
philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre argued that the French had a duty to support the Vietnamese 
struggle since the NLF and North Vietnam were part of a much larger, common fight against 
“American hegemony, against American imperialism.”114 In this context, the “defeat of the 
Vietnamese people would be politically our defeat, the defeat of all free people.” “Vietnam,” he 
concluded, “is fighting for us.”115 Sartre’s speech, which “caused unbridled enthusiasm,” gave 
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perfect expression to the thoroughly internationalist vision of many French radicals, and his 
words, “their struggle is ours,” would become the official slogan of the most dynamic radical 
antiwar organization in France, the Comité Vietnam National (CVN), which emerged from that 
meeting in November.116 
Just as important as defining an internationalist perspective on the antiwar struggle, the 
Six Heures du Monde showed that radicals could, against all odds, organize independently of the 
French Communist Party (PCF). Like their fraternal party in the United States, the PCF had 
tempered its radicalism by the 1960s; but unlike the CPUSA, the PCF remained a mass party of 
enormous consequence, casting a wide shadow over the entire left in France. Although involved 
in the French antiwar struggle from the beginning, the PCF disliked anything it could not directly 
control.117 The unparalleled success of the first Six Heures in May 1966, which originated outside 
the party, seemed to confirm their fears that through antiwar organizing other radical currents 
might outflank the Party. Thus, when the organizers of the original Six Heures approached the 
PCF about organizing a second meeting, the PCF tried to sabotage the event, forcing the 
organizers, Laurent Schwartz, Jean-Paul Sartre, Alfred Kastler, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, and Henri 
Bartoli to take the enormous risk of not only organizing the next Six Heures independently of the 
PCF, but to use the gathering to launch an autonomous organization, the CVN.118 
As it turned out, their gamble paid off. As Ken Coates, a noted British antiwar radical, 
reported, “The remarkable thing about the whole meeting is the way in which it was assembled 
entirely by the independent socialist forces.”119 This success cannot be exaggerated. The primary 
challenge of the French radical left after the Second World War had been to find a way to 
organize outside the PCF without completely losing touch with the masses under the Party’s 
control. Vietnam was their solution. As in the United States, the Vietnam War, more than anything 
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else, allowed French radicals to develop into a major political force. But in the United States, 
Vietnam brought radicals back into the mainstream by building a loose sense of unity that 
overcame the anti-communism of the 1950s; in France, Vietnam strengthened the radical left by 
allowing it to escape the hegemony of the PCF.120 Vietnam was an issue where the radical left 
could not only distinguish itself from the PCF, but even bypass the Party. Where the PCF’s 
antiwar organizing was hierarchical, French radicals promoted grassroots, autonomous initiatives. 
Where the PCF adopted a very ambiguous stance on the war, chanting “Peace in Vietnam,” the 
radicals countered with the intransigent, “The NLF will Win!” Where the party apparatus 
sponsored only the most moderate actions, the radicals called for militant struggle. And where the 
PCF leadership saw Vietnam as only another tragic issue in need of resolution, the radicals saw it 
as the focal point of a worldwide struggle. With Vietnam, the French radical left could truly come 
into its own.121  
Vietnam allowed radicals to organize independently of the PCF. But despite shared 
opposition to the Communist Party, the radical left in France was just as fragmented as in the 
United States, and radical groups created their own rival antiwar formations. One was the Centre 
Information-Vietnam sponsored by the Parti Communiste Marxiste-Léniniste de France.122 Far 
more effective, however, was the Comité Vietnam de base (CVB), organized by the Union des 
jeunesses communistes marxistes-léninistes (UJC-ml). The UJC-ml began as a Maoist student 
group within the PCF’s youth organization (UEC), based primarily at the prestigious École 
Normale Superieur.123 After being expelled from the UEC, they formed themselves into a distinct 
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political organization on December 10, 1966 and quickly developed what would become one of 
their primary axes of organization, the CVBs.124 The CVBs were militant, grassroots committees 
that sought to develop the antiwar struggle not only in universities, but in neighborhoods and 
factories.125  
Of course, the most important of these non-PCF radical antiwar initiatives was the CVN. 
Like the CVBs, the CVN sponsored more militant actions than the PCF, adopted a far more 
radical stance on the war, and encouraged grassroots committees across France – Schwartz 
even called for teach-ins at Renault factories.126 Yet, the two formations differed in crucial 
respects. First, the CVBs offered unconditional allegiance to the DRV, whereas the CVN, though 
still supporting North Vietnam against the United States, remained a bit more cautious. Second, 
while the CVBs eschewed institutionalized hierarchy, the CVN possessed a firm federalist 
structure.127 Third, the CVN often relied on the star power of intellectual celebrities, unlike the 
CVBs, which tried to remain closer to the grassroots. Most importantly, whereas the CVBs were 
very sectarian, criticizing every other group while hosting their own separate actions, the CVN 
practiced a radical inclusivity.128 
In fact, much like the VDC in the United States, the CVN successfully fused a number of 
distinct radical currents. There were dissident Communists, such as Jean-Pierre Vigier, a hero of 
the French Resistance, who opposed the PCF’s organizational obstinacy and lukewarm stance 
on the war. There was also a small but distinct tendency of radical Christian socialists, such as 
Henri Bartoli, one of the original CVN organizers, and Nicolas Boulte, the CVN’s official 
secretary.129 Far more important than either of these two currents, however, was the Parti 
Socialiste Unifié (PSU), a leftist organization formed out of a union of several socialist currents in 
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April 1960. The bulk of the PSU were former members of the SFIO, France’s mainstream socialist 
political party, who abandoned their party after it threw its weight behind the Algerian War.130 The 
PSU, which counted some 15,000 members, was therefore less a disciplined party based on 
ideological unity than a conglomeration of activists from distinct political currents, from Christian 
socialism to Trotskyism, social democracy to Castroism. Although the PSU never played an 
ideologically or even organizationally preponderant role in the CVN, a number of PSU radicals, 
such as Laurent Schwartz, Claude Bourdet, Pierre Naville, and Marcel Francis-Khan, helped form 
the backbone of the Committee. The fourth, and most significant component of the CVN was the 
Trotskyists, themselves adhering to a number of distinct groups. Schwartz, for instance, was a 
Trotskyist from the PSU. Others issued from explicitly Trotskyist organizations such as the 
Alliance Marxiste Révolutionnaire. Indeed, more than any other general political perspective, 
Trotskyism dominated the CVN. This did not mean that the CVN was a Trotskyist front group, but 
as historian Nicolas Pas argues, their influence was so great that “one can rightly speak of a 
strongly Trotskisante organization.”131  
The CVN, more so than the CVBs, was also a profoundly intergenerational political 
formation, uniting radicals who had fought the Nazis, militants who came of age during the Cold 
War, antiwar activists who cut their teeth on the Algerian War, and the young people who would 
compose the generation of May 68. The most important youth organization in the CVN, and one 
that would go on to play a central role in the events of May 68, was the Jeunesse Communiste 
Révolutionnaire (JCR). Like the UJCml, the core of the JCR originally consisted of young activists 
from the Communist UEC, though predominantly issuing from the Faculty of Letters of the 
Sorbonne, rather than the ENS. They, too, were expelled by the PCF, but for refusing to endorse 
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François Mitterand in the 1965 Presidential elections. Joined by other young radicals, the 
expelled students decided to found their own autonomous organization on April 2, 1966.132  
JCR radicals, who declared in the very first issue of their paper that “the war in Vietnam 
will become one of the central axes of our struggle,” served as the foot soldiers of the CVN.133 
They organized the grassroots, developed the CVN in the provinces, and extended the radical 
antiwar struggle to high school students encouraging the formation of Comité Vietnam lycéens 
(CVL).134 With one of its leaders, Alain Krivine, serving on the National Bureau of the CVN, the 
JCR also played something of a leadership role in the organization. Indeed, as one of the most 
radical currents in the CVN, the JCR ultimately helped push the CVN towards a more 
revolutionary position over the course of the decade. But their partnership with the CVN proved 
transformative for JCR radicals as well. The JCR benefited from the CVN’s role as a transmitter 
of radical historical memory as young radicals learned from older militants. The CVN also helped 
the JCR forge a number of important national and international connections. But most 
importantly, through the CVN’s antiwar efforts, JCR radicals gained invaluable organizing 
experiences that would come to the fore during the tempest of May 68. Retrospectively, their time 
in the CVN can be seen as a formative radical apprenticeship. 
The JCR was politically heterogeneous, in large part reflecting its composition.135 The 
nucleus of the group was affiliated with the French Section of the Trotskyist Fourth International. 
Others came from the youth branch of the PSU. Some, such as Daniel Bensaïd, were not 
originally Trotskyists. 136 One early member of the group, gay activist Guy Hocquenghem, would 
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later become the leader of the libertarian Maoist group Vive La Révolution!137 The JCR’s 
Trotskyism was thus tempered by a potent infusion of other political trends, most importantly 
Guevarism. Indeed, like most radical youth in North America and Western Europe, JCR radicals 
were profoundly inspired by anti-imperialist revolutions abroad, above all Cuba.138  
But they also looked to the United States from the start. For example, in 1965, the young 
Sorbonne radicals who would go on to form the nucleus of the JCR wrote a detailed article about 
struggles in Berkeley, reporting on the history of the civil rights movement, the FSM, and the 
formation of the VDC. For the JCR, the antiwar movement’s formation in the United States carried 
enormous consequences. “After years of political passivity in the persistent climate of anti-
communism,” the JCR explained, “a new left is in the process of bursting forth in the United 
States.”139 The development of a radical left taking aim at the “system” was especially welcome. 
“Criticism of the Vietnam War,” the JCR optimistically forecasted, “is rapidly transforming into a 
radical movement of opposition to the Democratic Party and the anti-democratic system that 
reigns in the U.S.A.”140 This movement, the JCR hoped, could lead to a “real, mass political force” 
in the very heart of the United States, which would in turn completely transform the international 
balance of power.  
The CVN shared this optimism about American struggles and forged durable links with 
American activists. At their founding event, CVN organizers made special effort to invite U.S. 
radicals, such as Dave Dellinger and SNCC’s Courtland Cox. To underscore the French 
movement’s commitment to aiding their U.S. comrades, they held a symposium on the antiwar 
struggle in the United States.141 After the Six Heures, the CVN worked with the Paris American 
Committee to Stopwar (PACS), a group of antiwar American expatriates led by Maria Jolas, to 
formalize these relationships with American radicals. “Maria was linked to the American anti-war 
                                                
137 Ron Haas, “The Death of the Angel: Guy Hocquenghem and the French Cultural Revolution 
after May 1968” (Ph.D. diss., Rice University, Houston, Texas, May 2007), 117 and 119. 
138 Krivine, Ça te passera avec l’âge, 93-94. 
139 “Le Vietnam à Berkeley,” Avant-garde Sorbonne no. 1 (November 1965): 9. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ken Coates, “Mass Rally in Paris Backs War Crimes Tribunal,” 13-14. 
  
 
57 
movement,” Schwartz recalls, “and was our link with it.”142 Indeed, through Jolas’ efforts, PACS 
not only served as a major information center for Americans abroad, but also as a vital relay for 
French radicals. As historian Bethany Keenan has shown, “French anti-war groups sought PACS 
out for information on American activism,” and most information passing to and from the United 
States went through the group.143  
 But the CVN, though fastened to the American struggle, also looked to movements in 
other countries. At the Six Heures du monde, CVN organizers invited activists from Brazil, Cuba, 
Morocco, Algeria, Germany, Australia, and of course, Vietnam. The final symposium of the 
evening, dedicated to the theme of “The Anti-Imperialist Struggle in the World,” included talks by 
Lawrence Daly, a member of the Russell Tribunal; Marcello Cini, president of a similar Vietnam 
Committee in Italy; and Marcel Niedergang and Bernard de Vries, leaders of the Provos, a Dutch 
anarchist group. As we have already seen, from its very origins one of the CVN’s primary 
objectives was to push the internationalizing work of the VDC even further. This obsession with 
promoting internationalism had something to do with the particular domestic political situation. In 
France, de Gaulle’s vocal opposition to the United States’ war in Vietnam worked to take some of 
the wind out of the radicals’ sails, which left militant antiwar organizing in France lagging behind 
movements elsewhere.144 In other countries, especially Great Britain, West Germany, and Italy, 
whose governments played a crucial role supporting the American war effort, the stakes were 
much higher, which pushed antiwar struggles to achieve a certain amplitude, unity, and ferocity 
missing from the hexagon in 1966. Some French radicals compensated by putting considerable 
effort into solidarity campaigns, which translated into a deep commitment to internationalism. One 
can add to this the fact that the vast majority of French antiwar radicals were dedicated Marxists 
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and therefore had internationalism virtually inscribed in their DNA – unlike the Americans, for 
whom Marxism was still marginal in 1966. For these reasons, by late 1966 the CVN became a 
nodal point in a number of intersecting international antiwar networks. 
Some CVN radicals, above all the JCR youth, aspired to turn this internationalism into a 
fully organized, “coordinated” force.145 Hoping to move beyond simply forging personal contacts, 
sharing information, or synchronizing the occasional demonstration, some radicals aimed to build 
not only a feeling of internationalism, but what they now called an “international front.”146 To be 
more precise, if some American activists, led by the VDC, helped foster internationalism, that is to 
say, the political assumption that the struggle against the war had to be international, then some 
antiwar radicals in Western Europe, especially the French, responded by trying to organize this 
internationalism into an international, or a formal international organization capable of uniting 
radicals from different countries for a common aim.147  
 
Building a Radical International 
Significantly, while they certainly intended to include everyone “from Vietnam to America” 
in this new international, some French radicals also began to insist on the special value of a 
radical antiwar international specifically within the advanced capitalist countries of North America 
and Western Europe.148 For these radicals, building an international in “Berkeley, Washington 
[D.C.], New York, Paris, Brussels, and Berlin,” that is to say, in the “heart of imperialism,” was 
more important than ever because traditional internationalist forces in North America and 
Western Europe had turned their backs on internationalism precisely when it was needed 
most.149 For while third-world radicals quickly took the lead in international solidarity by forming 
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their own radical internationalism, which culminated in the Tricontinental Conference in January 
1966, the leadership of the traditional left in North America and Western Europe did the opposite, 
in the words of Alain Krivine, effectively throwing the “principles of proletarian internationalism 
overboard.”150 Indeed the social democratic parties that comprised the Socialist International had 
almost all become accomplices of imperialism. Had the SFIO not overseen both the First 
Indochinese War and the Algerian War? Now, faced with Vietnam, Krivine charged, these parties 
“shed a few tears of sympathy,” but ultimately bowed to the United States.151 As for the 
communists, Joseph Stalin had disbanded the Comintern in 1943. And while the various 
Communist Parties in North America and Western Europe still enjoyed a certain international 
network, this too had become hopelessly accommodationist. Most of these parties, such as the 
PCF and the CPUSA, did not even call for the victory of their fraternal party in Vietnam. In this, 
they reflected the USSR’s policy to prioritize “peaceful coexistence” with U.S. imperialism over 
international solidarity with revolutionary movements. In 1954, the USSR exerted enormous 
pressure on the Vietnamese to accept partition; in the early 1960s, they tried to dissuade the NLF 
from launching armed struggle; and now, in 1966, the Soviets offered pitifully little aid to the war. 
Like the Communist Parties, they called for negotiated settlement.  
Unsurprisingly, this behavior provoked a rupture in the international communist 
movement. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) blasted the USSR for raising its national 
interests above those of the international revolutionary movement. Their disputes escalated into 
an open split in the early 1960s, after which China struggled to become the leader of global anti-
imperialism, winning considerable support in Southeast Asia and beyond.152 A number of pro-
Chinese parties also emerged in North America and Western Europe, such as Progressive Labor 
in the United States and the UJC-ml in France. Although there were some attempts to unite these 
scattered parties into a new anti-revisionist international – Hardial Bains tried to create a network 
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in the Anglophone countries while Jacques Grippa of the Parti Communiste de Belgique traveled 
across Western Europe on orders from the PRC itself – these ended in failure.153 The pro-
Chinese parties – of which there were usually several in each country – were so sectarian they 
could never agree with one another, let alone work with other non-Maoist groupings. Thus, the 
Maoists proved unable to fill the space left by the renegacy of Soviet international communism. 
One internationalist tendency, however, seized the opportunity to build an antiwar 
international. Although nearly moribund in the 1950s, the deeply divided international Trotskyist 
movement held what was known as a Reunification Congress in June 1963 in order to 
reassemble the various currents into a unified Fourth International (FI).154 In December 1965, the 
new Fourth International held another Congress, which reconfirmed its commitment to anti-
imperialist struggle, specifically naming the Vietnamese revolution. In its official statement, The 
International Situation and the Tasks of Revolutionary Marxists, adopted in June 1966, the FI 
declared that, “The most urgent immediate task facing revolutionary Marxists on a world-wide 
scale is to strengthen the struggle against the imperialist aggression in Vietnam and for the 
Vietnamese Revolution.”155 The best way to do that, the statement continued, was by “tirelessly 
stressing the need for an anti-imperialist united front on an international scale.”156 To stop the 
Vietnam War, radicals had to build a new antiwar international. 
But the Fourth International could never play that role itself. Trotskyism still had a terrible 
reputation, the organizational capacities of the FI were severely limited, and the various Trotskyist 
groups were miniscule. Ernest Tate, an FI international organizer, recalls that in the early 1960s, 
the French section claimed perhaps 100 members, the Belgians fifty or sixty, and the Italians 
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even less.157 In Great Britain, the Fourth International did not even have an organized presence, 
and the Unified Secretariat had to send Tate to build a branch there.158 As a result, the FI 
Trotskyists resumed the older strategy of “entering” existing political organizations, such as the 
Socialist or Communist Parties, to organize.159 Their main focus was the youth. As the FI put it in 
1965, the FI “attaches particular importance to the working and student youth, who stand in the 
vanguard today in a number of countries.”160 As it turned out, the FI’s efforts to connect with these 
emerging youth movements proved quite fruitful. In Belgium, entryism in the Socialist Party 
helped radicalize its youth section, the Jeunes Gardes Socialistes (JGS), which grew so militant 
its parent organization ultimately expelled the group in 1964.161 In France, the FI’s relentless 
efforts helped pull some students in the Sorbonne Letters section of the UEC towards Trotskyism, 
ultimately giving birth to the nucleus of the JCR. A similar process was underway in Italy, where 
Trotskyists hoped to gain influence in the Communist Party, inspiring Trotkyisante young radicals 
to publish their own journal, Falcemartello. 
In this way, despite its many limitations, the FI succeeded in channeling internationalist 
sentiment into a new kind of functional antiwar international. They did not mastermind every step 
of the process, but they did create the conditions of possibility for a future international. Trotskyist 
militants from the Fourth International had not only helped radicalize a number of young activists 
across Western Europe, they also provided them with a very rudimentary network, making future 
multilateral conversations between them possible. Thus, when the JGS announced a militant 
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antiwar demonstration for October 1966, their call did fall into a void, but could find a powerful 
echo in a preexisting transnational network. 
The October 1966 convergence in Liège cannot be reduced to a Fourth International 
front. Some of the groups that attended, such as the JCR, included non-Trotskyist members. A 
few groups, such as the German Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund (SDS), the expelled 
youth section of the German Social Democratic Party, were not affiliated with the Fourth 
International. The organizers of the convergence, hoping to be as inclusive as possible, even 
welcomed two rival Trotskyists groups, Gerry Healy’s Young Socialists from Great Britain, and the 
“Révoltes” youth group from France, who repaid the gesture by trying to sabotage the meeting.162 
It was precisely this radical openness that allowed this nascent network to develop into a radical 
antiwar international. Indeed, although the FI helped spark an antiwar network in the 1960s, it 
would soon assume a life of its own, moving well beyond its Trotskyist imprint. 
On October 15, 1966, 3,000 young radicals representing 20 different groups gathered in 
Liège.163 As the hosts, the JGS commanded the largest contingent. By one account, the JCR 
brought about 220 activists from across France.164 The Frankfurt section of the German SDS sent 
a delegation of about 100 students. From the United States, the YSA sent Mary-Alice Waters to 
not only attend the meeting, but also visit England and France to forge stronger ties with radicals 
abroad. The major points of unity among the groups, Waters reported, were “support to the 
Vietnamese Revolution, the demand for immediate withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, 
and the demand for European countries to get out of NATO.”165 Indeed, despite the Young 
Socialists and the “Révoltes” group’s disruptions, a sense of international unity prevailed, and the 
day ended with radicals singing the Internationale. The following day, many of the groups stayed 
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to finalize a tentative program to serve as the basis for future international antiwar coordination. 
The task of all the youth organizations, the final statement declared, “is to support the struggle of 
the Vietnamese fighters by supporting their demand for immediate and unconditional retreat of 
the imperialist forces.”166 
The JCR left the gathering determined to maintain the momentum. As their paper, Avant-
garde jeunesse, explained, the Liège gathering was no “ordinary demonstration.”167 “For the first 
time,” the JCR enthused, “an independent organization of the youth, attacked by the bureaucratic 
leadership of the workers’ parties, took the initiative of an international gathering against 
imperialism and capitalist military pacts.”168 This “unprecedented success, unthinkable several 
years ago,” the JCR continued, “demonstrates the strength of this new vanguard” developing 
throughout the countries of North America and Western Europe.169 Soon after Liège, the JCR, 
which quickly spearheaded the work of building the new international, collaborated closely with 
the JGS to organize another conference in Brussels in March 1967 to refine the points of unity, 
find ways to coordinate international actions, and solidify the international.170 
Ernest Tate recalls that in preparation, the JGS and JCR “issued a call to the 
International’s few youth organizations to send people to Europe to help with its organization.”171 
The Young Socialists in Canada sent an organizer, Jess MacKenzie, who spoke French, to spend 
a couple months “helping get the printed materials ready, organizing registration of delegates and 
arranging their billeting.”172 On March 11, 1967 delegates representing over a dozen radical 
organizations arrived in Brussels.173 The JCR, JSG, YSA, and German SDS were of course all 
present. A new addition came by way of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC), the major 
                                                
166 Jeunes Gardes Socialistes, “LIEGE, 16.10.1966,” October 16, 1966, Box 47, Folder 4, SWP 
Records. 
167 “LIEGE, 15 Octobre 1966,” Avant-garde jeunesse 2 (November-December 1966): 2. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid., 3. 
170 “Première conférence internationale de la jeunesse,” Avant-garde jeunesse 4 (February 1967): 
2. 
171 Tate, Revolutionary Activism, 184. 
172 Ibid. 
173 “La Conférence de Bruxelles,” Avant-garde jeunesse 5 (April-May 1967): 18. 
  
 
64 
grouping of antiwar radicals in Great Britain.174 The VSC, which held its founding conference on 
June 4, 1966, would play a highly analogous role to the CVN. Like its fraternal organization in 
France, the core of the VSC was also Trotskyist.175 But at the same time, the new international 
continued to move beyond its Trotskyist origins, inviting the Étudiants Socialistes Unifiés (ESU), 
the youth section of the French PSU, to send delegates.176  
In Belgium, radicals produced a unifying statement that not only discussed the purpose of 
a permanent international formation, but also clearly explained why international coordination 
among antiwar activists in North American and Western Europe was so necessary. Whereas 
most Americans largely subordinated international coordination with radicals in Western Europe 
to the far more important task of building relations with movements in the Third World, Western 
European radicals now tried to make the case that a radical international within the advanced 
capitalist world could be just as important for the overall antiwar struggle. Developing ideas 
developed at Liège, the official statement of the Brussels convergence argued that U.S. 
aggression does not operate independently, but actually depends on a kind of “international 
capitalist alliance.”177 This alliance was codified in certain formal treaties and pacts, with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) being one of the most important. As the radicals explained, 
NATO “is the military expression of the solidarity of the capitalist countries of Europe,” with the 
United States serving as its “pivot.”178 In a certain sense, the capitalist countries had their own 
“international" led by the United States. 
Thus, what made American military intervention in Vietnam possible was not simply the 
power of the U.S. military, but the fact that through this imperialist international the United States 
could count on other allied countries to support its specific policies. Given the indispensability of 
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this international to the U.S. war in Vietnam, a crucial aspect of the antiwar struggle was attacking 
on this international. This meant, first of all, that antiwar struggle had to take an international form 
– against the U.S.-led imperialist international, radicals had to form their own radical international. 
More importantly, since so much of the United States’ power derived from the support of major 
Western European countries, radicals in Western Europe would play a decisive role in this new 
antiwar international.179  
Of course, this argument posed a potential problem for French radicals, some of the 
strongest proponents of this strategy, since President Charles de Gaulle had not only criticized 
the Vietnam War, but had withdrawn the French Navy from the North Atlantic fleet of NATO in 
1963. Yet French radicals remained undeterred. Although France had withdrawn from the military 
alliance, they explained, it was still a part of the Atlantic Alliance. Thus, despite de Gaulle’s 
actions, France objectively remained an important pillar of U.S. aggression. A statement from the 
CVN in Rennes developed the argument even further. Reminding readers that U.S. aggression in 
Vietnam was made possibly by “an imperialist front in the heart of which they assume the 
leadership role,” the statement went on to explain that even if de Gaulle occasionally dissented, 
this changed little since “the Gaullist positions only differ from the American theses over the 
means of containing the liberation movement of the people: that which JOHNSON attempts to 
accomplish by force, DE GAULLE tries to obtain through the diplomatic route.”180 Despite 
disagreements, French policy still legitimized the broader logic behind American aggression, 
which meant that the struggle in France was still crucial to breaking the hegemonic power that 
allowed the Vietnam War to continue. Indeed, far from dissuading radicals, de Gaulle’s actions 
further galvanized them. His withdrawal, the Belgium statement explained, should be welcomed 
because it “objectively weakens” NATO.181 It showed that contradictions had appeared within the 
enemy internationalism, that the United States’ actions were straining the international alliance on 
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which its foreign policy ultimately depended. In this context, a radical international in North 
America and Western Europe could be especially effective. 
The Liège and Brussels gatherings were the first coordinated international meetings of 
North American and Western European radicals in the 1960s. They established the general 
strategy and defining ideas of the international antiwar struggle for radicals into 1967. They would 
also give birth to a functional radical international that would fill the void left by the social 
democrats and the communists. After the Brussels conference, radicals established a permanent 
Secretariat in Brussels, complete with an Executive Bureau, composed of six radical 
organizations, including the JCR. Regularly communicating with radical groups, and holding 
meetings once every two months, the organization coordinated “international campaigns,” from 
multilingual propaganda to planned demonstrations.182 By early 1967, a veritable radical, antiwar 
international, based above all among the youth, had taken shape. 
To be sure, this international differed from those that came before. Unlike the Second, or 
Socialist International, it was not composed of formal parties; unlike the Third, it was not 
sponsored by a foreign government; and unlike the Fourth, it was not united by fidelity to the 
ideas of a singular political figure. This international was looser in structure, dominated by youth, 
politically pluralistic, and operated just as much through imaginary identification as formal 
contacts. Furthermore, while thoroughly aligned with the Third World, it was North American and 
European, with the notable exception of the Japanese.  
And yet, one can still classify this as a kind of international. After all, however inchoate, 
this international hoped to unite radicals from different countries in a coherent, sustainable, 
coordinated international organization. In this respect, the “Vietnam International” of the 1960s 
bore striking similarities with the original International Working Man’s Association, or the First 
International, as it came to be known. Like the IWMA, it was a small, loose group of radicals 
largely from Europe.183 Like the IWMA, it was anti-imperialist. Indeed, the first international was 
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founded out of support for Polish national liberation from Tsarist Russia, in the same way that this 
new radical of the international 1960s was sparked by the Vietnamese struggle against American 
imperialism. 
  
Why Vietnam? 
By 1967, the Vietnam War had become the undisputed center of international political 
attention. Many radicals not only in the United States and France, but throughout North America 
and Western Europe, made international solidarity with the Vietnamese struggle one of their 
highest priorities. Through antiwar activism, radicals developed into an independent political force 
of significant consequence in countries like the United States and France. More importantly, the 
Vietnamese struggle emerged as a kind of binding element, unifying otherwise isolated 
radicals into a new radical international. In this way, Vietnam came to shape the very identity of 
what was increasingly becoming a self-consciously international radical left. Without Vietnam 
there would likely have never been an international of radicals in North America and Western 
Europe. But why did Vietnam, and not some other struggle, come to play this function? 
To answer this question, we must take a step back for a moment. For while the 
specificities of the Vietnamese struggle played the determinant role in creating a radical 
international, two other elements were needed: the reemergence of domestic struggles in North 
America and Western Europe in the early 1960s and the wave of national liberation revolutions 
cascading across the Third World. Let’s begin with the first element. Before the Vietnamese 
struggle could unify radicals in different countries into some kind of international, there had to be 
radicals to unify in the first place. While the Vietnam War certainly provided an opportunity for the 
radical left to grow in countries like France and the United States, it did not itself create the radical 
left. On the contrary, before escalation in 1965, a number of other domestic struggles across 
North America and Western Europe had already begun to politicize a new generation, draw exiled 
radicals from the margins, and provide activists with experiences that would define their struggle 
against the Vietnam War. In this sense, the radicals who went on to form the antiwar international 
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did not emerge out of a vacuum, but from a preexisting radical microsystem of accumulated 
struggles.184 Without these domestic microsystems in North American and Western European 
countries, there would have been no antiwar radicals, and therefore, no antiwar international. 
Beginning in the 1950s and early 1960s, in nearly every country in North America and 
Western Europe, important struggles helped form the microsystems that made antiwar struggle 
possible later in the decade. In Great Britain, for example, the antiwar struggles of the 1960s are 
incomprehensible if one does not take into account the enormous impact of the peace movement 
for nuclear disarmament – after all, the majority of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign’s rank and 
file had been active in the earlier Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.185 In France, a number of 
struggles played similar roles in shaping the various microsystems of struggle, such as the 
nascent student movement, but the Algerian War played the most determinant role.186 The war 
prompted many French radicals to engage directly with a national liberation movement.187 It 
pushed intellectuals to regroup as a political force, setting a vital precedent for the subsequent 
anti-Vietnam war struggle.188 In addition, the war not only politicized a generation of French 
students, it triggered the formation of a militant, antifascist youth movement that increasingly set 
itself apart from the PCF, which adopted a “wait and see” attitude to the war.189 In short, it was 
Algeria that taught a new generation of radicals how to fight fascists, battle police, organize 
grassroots committees, and mobilize thousands. It is little coincidence that many of those 
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involved in the opposition to the Algerian War – from Laurent Schwartz to Jean-Paul Sartre, Alain 
Krivine to Bernard Kouchner, Madeleine Rebérioux to Pierre Vidal-Naquet – went on to lead the 
French struggle against the Vietnam War. 
Similarly, the United States witnessed a series of domestic struggles in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, such as the student movement, movement for nuclear disarmament, and the 
counterculture. The most important was by far the civil rights movement, which can in many ways 
be seen as the United States’ own decolonization struggle. As with French radicals and the 
Algerian War, most American activists, both black and white, passed through the civil rights 
movement in some way or another before turning to the Vietnam War.190 There, they learned 
crucial organizing skills, built important networks, and developed an array of tactics that made the 
antiwar movement possible – to take only one example, the famous teach-ins that came to define 
early antiwar activism not only in the United States, but throughout the world, were directly 
inspired by the civil rights sit-ins. In the words of SNCC Freedom Singer Bernice Johnson 
Reagon, the civil rights movement was the “centering, borning” struggle of the American 
1960s.191 
Thus, when the Vietnam War began to make headlines, a core of activists in countries 
like France and the United Sates were already radicalized, organized, networked, and battle-
tested. The struggle against the war could therefore channel these preexisting energies, 
experiences, and skills. In this respect, the timing of escalation was impeccable: the United 
States intensified the war just as the radical left was beginning to reemerge as an organized force 
in a number of countries, but also when these preceding, formative struggles had begun to 
transition, subside, or collapse. The signing of the Test Ban Treaty in 1963, for example, sent the 
British campaign for nuclear disarmament into decline. Similarly, the Evian Accords of 1962 
precipitated a lull in radical activism in France. As for the United States, the combined effects of 
urban rebellions, legislative victories, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights 
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Act of 1965, and internal political shifts in the broader black liberation struggle, above all the 
spread of black nationalism, prompted many in the civil rights struggle to reassess the 
movement’s trajectory. In this way, the Vietnam War erupted at an opportune moment, precisely 
when radicals, hardened by earlier experiences, were either eager to dive into the next struggle in 
the cycle, as in France, or caught in a moment of reevaluation, as in the United States. 
The second indispensable element was the global political ecosystem. The United States 
escalated its involvement in Vietnam amidst the cresting of a seemingly unceasing wave of 
national liberation struggles across the globe. Indeed, huge swathes of the world’s population 
were on the cusp of struggles for liberation, presently fighting revolution, or had recently emerged 
victorious. Most importantly, these struggles saw themselves as part of a global movement. 
Liberation movements in Asia connected with anticolonial struggles in Africa, which allied 
themselves with anti-imperialist movements in Latin America. Newly liberated countries gathered 
in Bandung in April 1955, an Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Conference convened in Cairo in 
1957, and in January 1966, at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana, leaders from the Third 
World founded the Organization of Solidarity with the People of Asia, Africa and Latin America to 
promote global revolutionary solidarity.192 Unfolding against this background of unity, the 
Vietnamese struggle benefited enormously from these preexisting international networks, 
structures of support, and mentalities of solidarity.  
The militant self-activity of the revolutionary movements in the Third World had a 
profound effect on radicals in North America and Western Europe. Since it was here, and not in 
the capitalist strongholds, that revolutionary movements were changing the world, radicals 
naturally turned their attention abroad.193 Searching for revolution, some traveled to revolutionary 
countries abroad, above all Cuba. They all returned transformed. General Baker, Jr., an antiwar 
black nationalist, spoke for many when he recalled how experiencing the “revolutionary 
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laboratory” of Cuba “was a real awakening.”194 Back home, radicals organized vibrant solidarity 
organizations to circulate information, offer moral support, and provide material aid to numerous 
third-world struggles, such as those in the Congo, China, and Cuba, to name only a few.195 In the 
United States, the best example of this kind of solidarity was the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, in 
which many future antiwar radicals, such as Dave Dellinger, Stephen Smale, and much of the 
SWP leadership, participated.196 Thus, the Vietnam War unfolded after structures of international 
solidarity were already taking shape, allowing radicals to easily pivot towards Vietnam. 
Without the encounter of domestic microsystems of struggle on the one hand with a 
specific global political ecosystem on the other, something like a radical international would have 
never emerged in the 1960s. This is precisely why, for example, nothing of sort took shape during 
the First Indochina War against the French in the 1940s and 1950s. On the one side, an 
independent radical left was virtually inexistent in the early 1950s. In the United States, 
McCarthyism devastated radicalism as an organized force; in France, the Cold War forced 
radicals to choose sides, banishing those who searched for alternatives to the political desert. Of 
course, some radical formations survived, and while a few even coordinated among themselves, 
their numbers were too miniscule to form anything like a meaningful radical international.197 On 
the other side, decolonization had only just begun when the First Indochina War began in 
December 1946. Although in retrospect the war marked the beginning of a worldwide surge of 
victorious revolutions, at the time, the trend was far from clear. The great international 
convergences of the liberation movements or the stunning revolutionary victories of China or 
Cuba were still in the future. Even when the Vietnamese smashed the French at Dien Bien Phu in 
1954, nearly all of Africa was still firmly under colonial rule. During the First Indochina War, 
therefore, neither element – the domestic microsystems nor the global ecosystem – obtained. But 
if the First Indochina War came “too soon,” as it were, the Second Indochina War intensified 
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precisely as domestic struggles in North America and Western Europe and international solidarity 
throughout the Third World had come to synchronize.  
But while domestic microsystems and a global ecosystem provided the necessary 
conditions for the formation of a radical international, they do not on their own explain why 
Vietnam, and not some other struggle, played the role of binding element, uniting radicals from 
different North American and Western European countries into an international. After all, from 
Palestine to the Congo, there was no shortage of galvanizing revolutionary movements in the 
1960s. Indeed, at the very same moment that the United States intensified the war in Vietnam, 
the U.S. military invaded the Dominican Republic. After a popular movement overthrew the pro-
American Donald Reid Cabral on April 26, 1965, the United States, intent on preventing another 
Cuba, authorized “Operation Power Pack,” ultimately deploying 40,000 U.S. troops to crush the 
revolt. Antiwar activists everywhere rallied behind the movement.198 In fact, it is often forgotten 
that Vietnam Day in Berkeley was also called to protest against U.S. aggression in the Dominican 
Republic.199 It is also forgotten that in 1965 French radicals leading the struggle against the 
Vietnam War, such as Jean-Paul Sartre, were simultaneously involved in the Comité de solidarité 
avec le peuple dominicain.200 Indeed, the two struggles were often joined in the imagination of 
many radicals. But then why was there no Santo Domingo International? Why did it fall to 
Vietnam to organize a new radical international?  
The answer lies in the specific characteristics of the Vietnamese struggle. To begin with, 
the sheer immensity of the suffering in Vietnam was virtually unparalleled. The Vietnamese had 
lived under colonial occupation since the 1880s, had been fighting since the 1940s, and after 
having already lost hundreds of thousands against the Japanese and French, now found 
themselves once more in the jaws of war. Northern towns were leveled, Southern villages 
torched, hundreds of thousands were forcibly relocated, over a hundred thousand political 
                                                
198 For detailed history of the invasion from an overtly pro-U.S. perspective, see Lawrence A. 
Yates, Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966, Leavenworth 
Papers no. 15, 1988. 
199 See, for example, several of the speeches reprinted in We Accuse. 
200 See, for example, Solidaridad: bulletin du comité de solidarité avec le peuple dominicain, no. 
1, Décembre 1965, F Delta Res 2089, BDIC. 
  
 
73 
dissidents rotted in prisons, and the Vietnamese people faced some of the most lethal weapons 
ever invented. Even worse, there seemed to be no end in sight. The Dominican Civil War came to 
a close in September 1965; the Vietnam War, which had in many respects begun two decades 
earlier, would not conclude for another decade. Thus, unlike in Cuba or China in the 1960s, 
where the revolution seemed relatively more secure, the Vietnamese struggle was still underway, 
which meant the results were still uncertain and the stakes incredibly high. In this context, 
international solidarity with Vietnam was a priority, for it could have a real effect on the outcome 
of the struggle. 
In addition, not only was the war ongoing, it seemed like the Vietnamese, who 
categorically refused to surrender, might even have a chance. Somehow, a tiny country of mostly 
poor rice farmers held its own against the most advanced military force in human history. 
Radicals therefore began to interpret the war as a heroic struggle between David and Goliath, a 
narrative the Vietnamese revolutionaries created themselves. Indeed, in addition to never 
showing the slightest sign of defeatism, all their public statements reaffirmed the inevitability of 
their victory. Exclamations such as “Our Unshakeable Will: All the Way to Complete Victory,” 
regularly appeared on the front pages of the Courrier du Vietnam, the primary foreign language 
publication of the DRV, printed in French and English versions.201 This kind of unflappable 
courage had a tremendous effect on American and French radicals – no other struggle in the 
1960s captivated them in this way. Demonstrating solidarity with the Vietnamese struggle 
therefore not only gave radicals the chance to aid this struggle towards victory, but allowed them 
to invest themselves affectively in the movement.202 
Although other national liberation movements spoke of international solidarity, the 
Vietnamese were arguably the most committed to orchestrating internationalism from the very 
start. They not only welcomed support from friendly governments, but encouraged radical 
internationalism across the globe. In the South, the NLF, which saw itself as part of an 
international movement, officially called for “struggle against all aggressive war and against all 
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forms of imperialist domination; support [for] the national emancipation movements of the various 
peoples,” as well as solidarity with “all movements of struggle for peace, democracy, and social 
progress throughout the world.”203 In the North, governed as it was by committed communist 
internationalists, connecting with struggles throughout the world, including North America and 
Western Europe, was a central component of state policy. As Schwartz explains, “This was one 
of the things that made the Viet-Nam war very different from the Algerian War: the North 
Vietnamese government was fully internationalist in the Marxist sense of the word.”204 No other 
ongoing revolutionary struggle made so much of international solidarity in the 1960s.  
Indeed, the NLF and the DRV genuinely believed they were fighting not only for 
Vietnamese independence, but also for the liberation of all the people of the world. Vietnam, they 
argued, stood at the front line of the global struggle for liberation. In May 1966, for example, the 
National Assembly of North Vietnam formally declared, “To defeat the American aggressors, the 
shared enemy of the peoples of the entire world, such is the noble historic mission of our people. 
All while fighting for the interests of our people, we also fight for those of the peoples of the entire 
world.”205 For the Vietnamese, in other words, all the liberation struggles were in fact 
fundamentally linked, which meant that victory in Vietnam “effectively contributes to the liberation 
movement of the people” across the planet.206 By the same token, the victory of other struggles 
could directly assist the Vietnamese. This explains why the Vietnamese placed such enormous 
emphasis on internationalism, actively figuring the success of other struggles into their own 
military strategy. To that end, both the NLF and the DRV prioritized connections with other 
liberation movements.207 The DRV, for example, not only built strong relations with countries that 
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had already won their liberation, but publicly hailed every ongoing revolution, including Soudan, 
Palestine, Cambodia, Laos, and Puerto Rico. 
In this way, Vietnam continued the work of the Tricontinental by fusing heterogeneous 
struggles into an imagined international unity: struggles still in progress with those that had just 
won their independence, movements fighting colonialism with those confronting imperialism, 
communist revolutions with non-communist movements. The Vietnamese could assume this role 
because their struggle stood at the crossroads of these differences: they fought both an anti-
colonial and an anti-imperialist war; half the country had recently emerged victorious from a war 
of independence, while the struggle continued to rage in the southern half; in the North, the 
government was explicitly communist, while in the South, the NLF coalition included anti-
communists. Vietnam, in other words, condensed all the major trends of the time.208  
But it also emerged as the focal point of global contradictions: peasants against 
landlords, the working masses against the comprador bourgeoisie, national liberation against 
colonialism, anti-imperialism against empire, socialism against capitalism, global revolution 
against American hegemony. It was precisely this unique role that led so many radicals in North 
America and Western Europe to elevate the Vietnamese struggle over all others. “The struggle of 
the people of South Vietnam against American imperialism and the ruling class of Saigon is not 
only a struggle of international importance,” the Brussels statement explained, “Vietnam is the 
key to the world situation, a decisive text of strength between American imperialism and the 
colonial revolution and the whole labor movement. The international capitalist alliance directed by 
the American government (NATO, SEATO, Treaty of Manila) is locked in combat with the 
Vietnamese revolution which is an integral part of the worldwide socialist revolution.”209 
The NLF, and especially North Vietnam, contributed to the idea that Vietnam had become 
a kind of nexus of international solidarity. Every issue of the Courrier du Vietnam featured a 
section called, “Le Monde à nos côtes,” which reported on antiwar struggles throughout the world. 
By bringing all these distinct antiwar actions – in different countries, by different groups, for 
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different ends – onto the same plane of consistency, Vietnamese revolutionaries encouraged the 
feeling that a unified international antiwar movement already existed. Politically astute, the 
Vietnamese strived for maximum inclusivity, carefully promoting, supporting, and graciously 
thanking all antiwar forces – liberals, communists, radicals, anyone who stood against the war.210 
The Vietnamese, for example, never took sides during the Sino-Soviet split, knowing full well that 
doing so would have weakened the war effort. In the same way, the DRV thanked both the PCF 
and the CVN, even though North Vietnam recognized the differences between the camps, and 
knew that each “claimed” Vietnam for their own side. In fact, the Vietnamese encouraged this 
kind of projection, adeptly balancing these contradictory political forces, domestic rivalries, and 
competing internationalisms. 
Yet Vietnam also gave strong indications to North American and Western European 
radicals that they fully endorsed their efforts. Because of the crucial strategic importance of 
antiwar contestation in the United States, American radicals frequently received approbation and 
encouragement from the Vietnamese. American radicals solidified these contacts by meeting with 
NLF and DRV representatives directly, either in Vietnam, or in other countries, such as 
Czechoslovakia or Cuba.211 These personal meetings, regular communications, and glowing 
endorsements left radicals convinced that the Vietnamese supported their cause. 
Although their struggle was certainly less important than that of their American peers, 
French radicals also received unambiguous support from the Vietnamese. In 1966, the DRV 
applauded the formation of the CVN in the pages of the Courrier du Vietnam. Around Christmas 
1966, Ho Chi Minh wrote a personal message to Schwartz thanking the CVN, which, to them, 
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“represented official recognition of the role of the CVN in the struggle against the war.”212 From 
then on the CVN enjoyed a correspondence with leaders of both the NLF and the DRV. In the 
second issue of its paper, for example, the CVN reprinted a letter from the FLN expressing its 
“militant solidarity” with the committee.213 In the fall of 1967, the CVN published a letter from DRV 
Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, in which he thanked the CVN for developing the struggle in 
France, calling the committee “a magnificent example of the militant friendship between our two 
peoples, which is destined to consolidate itself and develop ceaselessly.”214 He ended 
triumphantly, adopting the CVN’s own slogan, “as you put it in your message, our struggle is also 
yours, dear friends, let’s move forward to victory!”215 For CVN radicals, nothing could be a greater 
endorsement of their politics – Vietnam was on their side. 
French radicals also benefited from the presence of a North Vietnamese embassy in 
Paris. To the dismay of the PCF, Vietnamese delegates not only spoke at CVN events, but often 
collaborated with French radicals in organizing antiwar actions. Explaining how the Vietnamese 
began to reorient towards the more radical CVN, Schwartz recalls how Mai Van Bo of the North 
Vietnamese delegation called him during the bombing of Hanoi: 
“I need your help. I’ve tried telephoning the Communist Party office, but in vain; I didn’t 
reach anybody. So I’m calling you: can you organize a demonstration of the CVN as 
quickly as possible?” The bridges linking us to the Vietnamese authorities were firmly 
established. After that, every Vietnamese official visiting France wanted to meet with 
us.216 
 
From then on, French radicals and Vietnamese authorities, from both the NLF and the DRV, 
forged intimate relations, coordinating initiatives and discussing strategy. 
But Vietnamese revolutionaries not only encouraged radicals in countries like France and 
the United States, they also supported deeper international coordination among radicals in North 
America and Western Europe. During the Brussels conference in March 1967, for example, Mai 
Van Bo of the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris sent radicals a letter of appreciation for their 
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international initiative.217 In addition, as we will see, the Vietnamese came to agree with radicals’ 
assessment of the strategic value of antiwar struggle in North America and Western Europe. 
Radicals interpreted all this as a ringing endorsement of the new radical international, which 
continued to grow into 1967.  Indeed, by the next convergence in January 1968, even American 
groups such as SDS or SNCC would join. And while it was initially an explicitly antiwar 
international, with Vietnam at its center, it would soon grow into a radical international tout court.  
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CHAPTER 2: FORMS OF SOLIDARITY 
 
In the first issue of Pour le Viet-Nam, the CVN’s official paper, Laurent Schwartz argued 
that the resistance of the Vietnamese concerned the entire world. “[T]heir fight,” he announced, 
“is our own.” Unfortunately, there were many in France, he went on, who opposed the war, but 
felt the French could do little to affect its course. Countering the defeatists, Schwartz declared 
that it was wrong to say that “only the American left and the Vietnamese can do something about 
it.” “Our American friends feel very alone and often discouraged,” he explained to his readers. 
“They need a broad international support.” Thankfully, the CVN was there to do just that. To 
galvanize his readers, Schwartz went on to list the many forms of international antiwar solidarity 
in which the CVN was presently engaged: the spectacular Six Heures teach-in; the campaign to 
raise a million francs for Vietnam; international conferences organized by American, European, 
and Japanese antiwar students; street protests and demonstrations; a vibrant transnational 
network of draft resisters, deserters, and subversive soldiers within the army; an International 
War Crimes Tribunal; and even creation of international brigades to fight in the jungles of 
Southeast Asia. Contrary to what, some of the naysayers assumed, there was a great deal the 
French could do to help end the war.218 
The Vietnamese, for their part, were immensely appreciative of all these efforts. They 
placed particular emphasis, however, on the ideological struggle. Thus, they encouraged the idea 
of international brigades, but not for their military contribution, but their overall propaganda effect. 
Given this priority in winning the ideological war, both the NLF and the DRV were especially 
enthusiastic about the Bertrand Russell Peace Tribunal, a war crimes tribunal, modeled after the 
one held at Nuremburg, convened to try the United States for war crimes. The Vietnamese knew 
that the results, whatever they may be, could never be enforced, but saw the Tribunal as an 
excellent way of eroding the United States’ legitimacy in the western countries. Indeed, at this 
point, many antiwar radicals felt the best way to help the Vietnamese was to change public 
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opinion, win the ideological struggle, and isolate the U.S. government from its other allies in 
Western Europe. 
The Tribunal also signaled the growing popularity of the radical critique over the course of 
1966 and into 1967. As radicals strove to better understand, then change, the system that made 
this war possible, the Marxist problematic of anti-imperialism rose to dominance. Indeed, 
whatever their differences, and there were many, anti-imperialist radicals in France, and later the 
United States, all came to accept V. I. Lenin's positions on anti-imperialist struggle, the core of 
which was the idea of the right of nations to self-determination. By this, however, radicals did not 
mean individual rights protected by international law; they saw rights as collective in nature, firmly 
within the framework of nation-states. As the Bertrand Russell Tribunal shows, despite all its talk 
of international law, war crimes, and atrocities, radicals saw the subject of rights as the nation, not 
the individual. 
Of course radicals debated at length how anti-imperialist struggles should unfold, how 
many stages this should take, or who should be involved, but almost no anti-imperialist seriously 
disputed the centrality of the nation-state in the process of liberation. In the struggle against 
imperialism, oppressed peoples would fight to build their own sovereign nation-state. For the 
colonized and “semi-colonized,” as in Vietnam, this meant creating a unified nation-state where 
none existed before. For those who had already won their formal independence, as in Latin 
America, this meant securing real independence from imperialist intervention and aggression. For 
those in the imperialist centers, anti-imperialist internationalism meant supporting all of these 
struggles as best as possible. This centrality of the nation-state was, of course, double-edged. In 
the context of the 1960s, with national liberation struggles unfolding across the globe, the alliance 
with nationalism made perfect sense for anti-imperialists. But so profound was this connection 
that if anything were to ever problematize the hopes that radicals invested in the revolutionary 
nation-state, anti-imperialist internationalism could be thrown into disarray. 
 
The War in Europe 
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In early April 1976, President Johnson dispatched Vice President Hubert Humphrey to 
meet with European allies about the administration’s war policy, among other things. In France, 
he tried to reaffirm Franco-American bonds, meeting with President Charles de Gaulle, laying a 
wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and visiting the statue of George Washington on the 
Place d’Iéna. With de Gaulle openly against the war, Humphrey was eager to rebuild relations, 
especially now that international opposition had begun to mount. He made a toast to the 
“friendship that has linked our country through so many years and so many trials.”219 
French activists had other ideas. In preparation for Humphrey’s arrival they had 
organized a series of coordinated protests. Activists greeted Humphrey at the airport with chats of 
“U.S. Assassins!” They positioned themselves on the route leading to the capital, screaming at 
the Vice President, throwing rotten eggs, and pouring paint on cars. In Paris, they harassed him 
incessantly, anticipating his every move. Indeed, the night before, some pasted posters that read 
“Humphrey Go Home!” at venues he was supposed to appear. At the Arc de Triomphe, over a 
thousand protesters broke past the barricades, unleashing police repression. That day, violence 
engulfed the city. Demonstrators tore down the American flag at the American Cathedral in Paris 
and burned it. Others threw rocks at the windows of the American Express office. Another group 
attacked the offices of the New York Times. Battles raged into the night as protestors and police 
clashed near the American Embassy, and later into the streets surrounding the Opéra.220 
The day’s significance lay, however, not simply in its militancy, but in the fact that the 
French protests served as just one act in a coordinated action across Western Europe. Indeed, 
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Humphrey found little solace as demonstrators attacked him in every city he visited. In Belgium, 
activists gave the Vice President a nasty welcome, showering him with rotten eggs. In Florence, 
he met the same treatment, and one demonstrator pelted him in the face with a lemon. In Rome, 
angry crowds forced the police to rush him to safety. Not to be outdone, demonstrators in West 
Berlin threw eggs and bottles, chanting “Vice Killer.” In London, Humphrey’s last stop, only a hard 
rain succeeded in thinning the ranks of demonstrators.221 
Protestors everywhere targeted symbols of U.S. power. But such attacks cannot be 
reduced to simple anti-Americanism, as many Americans argued at the time.222 For the protestors 
focused not only on the United States, but also their own governments. Indeed, the coordinated 
protests against Humphrey’s European tour represented one of the first realizations of the plan 
radicals sketched in March. If the United States’ power rested in part on the support it enjoyed 
from its European allies, then the best way for Europeans to protest the war would be to attack 
their own government’s implicit or explicit support for U.S. foreign policy. As the CVN explained, 
they were not only protesting Humphrey, the representative of U.S. imperialism, “we denounce 
the French government’s complicity in receiving him.”223 As Humphrey himself observed, the 
French heckled the American anthem as well as the Marseillaise.224 Chants of “Humphrey 
Assassin!” were often followed by “De Gaulle complice!”225 What’s more, to French activists, the 
alacrity with which the French police began to beat protestors only confirmed the tight alliance 
between the U.S. and French states. With the French police basically crushing opposition to the 
United States’s war in Vietnam, American imperialism, the JCR argued, “is not solely to 
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blame.”226 
 Humphrey’s trip was a disaster. Not only did he meet protests in the streets, his 
European allies raised concerns about the war. De Gaulle remained opposed. In Italy, Deputy 
Prime Minister Pietro Nenni confided, “Europe does not understand American any longer. 
America does not understand Europe. The root of the discord is the Vietnam War.”227 In Great 
Britain, Prime Minister Harold Wilson urged a peace settlement, while his Foreign Secretary 
criticized U.S. bombing. The Vietnam War was beginning to strain the alliance between the 
imperialist powers. Of course, the United States was slow to listen. “No one with whom I spoke,” 
Humphrey announced after his tour, “indicated basic disagreement with our presence and 
objectives in Vietnam.” As for the protests, he argued, the United States simply needed to hire 
European journalists to redouble publicity efforts.228 
 But protestors saw right through this. They felt the timing of the trip was especially 
significant, for it showed the United States was not only getting bogged down in the battlefields, 
but also beginning to lose the propaganda war. “The American troops continue to suffer defeat 
after defeat,” a UJC-ml flier announced. “That’s why the United States Vice President Humphrey, 
traveling salesman of US imperialism, has come to Europe, and today France, seeking the 
support of the governments of the so-called ‘free’ world.”229 But instead of supporting him, the 
UJC-ml gleefully observed, the “people of the European countries have shown through 
particularly dynamic demonstrations their solidarity with the Vietnamese people and their hatred 
of American aggression.”230 
The Humphrey protests were not, however, the only form that antiwar solidarity assumed 
at this time. Nor were the young radicals behind them the only antiwar activists. Indeed, as 
Schwartz explained in the very first issue of the CVN’s paper, there were a variety of forms of 
protest, and the CVN itself served as the nexus of a number of intersecting international antiwar 
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networks. Some CVN activists tried to raise funds and collect supplies for Vietnam. Others tried to 
organize an international boycott of American products. Still others organized an international 
network to aid draft resisters, deserters, and antiwar activists still in the military. 
 
Antiwar Soldiers 
In the mid-1960s, some U.S. soldiers stationed in U.S. bases in West Germany began to 
desert. Initially, most embarked for Sweden, but given the sour relations between the United 
States and France, a trickle began to arrive in Paris as well, figuring they might be afforded some 
protection. Their legal status remained uncertain until May 1967, when Louis Armsfield, an 
American GI, was caught sleeping in a car in the Latin Quarter.231 Although obliged to return 
deserters to the United States, the French government granted him permission to stay, giving 
Armsfield a temporary visa and work card. By setting such a precedent, France began to attract 
greater numbers of deserters.  
American GIs often had assistance finding their way into Paris. In Germany, the German 
SDS agitated around American bases, not only convincing GIs to desert, but helping them flee 
the country.232 In some cases, GIs traveled directly into France, often meeting with French 
radicals in cities like Strasbourg, then making their way to Paris.233 Indeed, German and French 
radicals collaborated closely in these sensitive missions, and German SDS often gave deserters 
CVN addresses.234 In other cases, deserters took a more roundabout path, often crossing 
through the Netherlands. There, they received assistance from the Dutch Provos, who then sent 
the GIs off on the next leg of the journey into France.235 
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Once in France, deserters found a number of organizations to help them find their way. 
Two in particular worked to politicize desertion, both with ties to members in PACS and the 
CVN.236 The first, called RITA, was organized Dick Perrin, a deserter, and had connections with 
activists in France. Max Watts of PACS played an enormous supportive role, and the group used 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s mailbox as their mailing address.237 Perrin and Watts announced the 
formation of RITA in December 1967, during a televised press conference with Stokely 
Carmichael.238 As its name suggested, RITA aimed to organized soldiers inside the army. “RITA,” 
the organization announced, “is a Resister inside the Armed Forces, an American Serviceman 
who resists imperialistic aggression in S.E. Asia.”239 As Perrin later explained: “We developed a 
network with soldiers still inside the military, guys who wanted to take part but were reluctant to 
desert. We made a point of saying that was okay. In fact, those antiwar GIs who saying in 
became really helpful.”240 Indeed, RITA hoped to organize resistance inside the heart of the U.S. 
military machine itself. To reach these soldiers, RITA published ACT, the first GI paper written in 
Europe by GIs, out of Paris and smuggled copies onto bases in West Germany with the help of 
the Provos and German SDS. 
The second organization was a bit more militant. It was closely connected to Henri 
Curriel’s group Solidarité, and primarily organized by an American named Robert “Bo” Burlington, 
who went by the nom de guerre “Arlo,” and PACS member Larry Cox.241 Curriel, of course, had 
been deeply involved in the Jeanson network during the Algerian War.242 As for Burlington, he 
would later join the Weather Underground in the United States. It is no surprise, then, that the 
group was somewhat conspiratorial and even paranoid. 
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This second group also had deep international contacts. In 1967, a French representative 
of the group contacted SDS during a visit to the United States, seeking further collaboration. In 
July, SDS sent Greg Calvert to help build this transnational network of deserters and resisters. 
Calvert had studied abroad in Paris in the early 1960s and the experience left a deep impression 
on him.243 “The first anti-war demonstration I was ever in,” he later recalled, “was a demonstration 
against the Algerian war, in Paris, France.”244 He was particularly impressed with efforts to 
organize draft resistance during the Algerian War, which no doubt had some role in his early 
advocacy of pushing SDS to organize draft resistance, desertion, and support for antiwar 
soldiers.  
The group also enjoyed much deeper contacts with French radicals than Perrin’s. In April 
1968, Larry Cox organized a public event where American soldiers, backed by representatives of 
a number of antiwar groups, including the CVN, turned in their draft cards. To support resisters 
and deserters living in France, French radicals decided to create the “French Union for American 
Deserters and Resisters.”245 Unfortunately, the repression following the events of May 1968 led to 
the group’s demise. But French support for resistors continued to be such a major axis of antiwar 
struggle that a new organization was built from the ashes, the American Deserters Committee 
(ADC).246 The ADC was in fact a fully transnational movement, with branches of the same name 
in Montreal and Sweden. It distributed a publication, Second Front, in order to coordinate 
struggles around desertion in Europe, North America, and Asia. For their part, the Vietnamese 
were extremely support of the ADC’s efforts, and Tran Van Hue, representative of the NLF, 
personally thanked its Swedish branch.247 
Like its predecessor, it also enjoyed firm support from French radicals. On March 21, 
1969, for example, figures associated with the CVN, like Sartre, Schwartz, and Vidal-Naquet, 
founded a new organization, the Association for the Support and Defense of American Exiles 
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(ASDAE), to support resisters and deserters in France, gather resources, organize their legal 
defense if needed, and popularize their struggle. Beyond this, such an organization could 
“facilitate contacts” between deserters, the American left, anti-imperialists in Europe and in the 
Third World.248 This kind of “international solidarity,” the organizers concluded, constitutes “an 
essential link in the anti-imperialist struggle that is developing every day in the world.”249 Indeed, 
given the post-May atmosphere, the ADC itself was extremely militant. Its manifesto firmly aligned 
the group with the NLF, declaring, “We wish to express our solidarity with all the forces of the 
Third World standing up to imperialist domination …”250  
 While these activities signaled growing international coordination between radicals in the 
United States and France, and the deepening of an international front, they also illuminated some 
crucial differences. Significant misunderstandings and disagreements had emerged between the 
Americans and the French over media work, for instance.251 For the Americans, the primary 
objective was to use public media to connect to other soldiers and address the American public. 
For them, declaring their presence, holding press conferences, speaking out publicly about their 
desertion were important forms of resistance. But for the French, many of whom had been 
involved in the Resistance or with the Algerian FLN, where speaking out in this manner carried 
severe consequences, the American approach seemed outrageous. This disagreement pointed to 
a deeper mutual incomprehension over the objective of clandestine work in the first place. Given 
their experiences, the French radicals involved in aiding U.S deserters brought with them very 
specific ideas about clandestine operations, centralized organizing, and insurrectionary struggle, 
imagining that the resisters and deserters network could trigger some kind of underground 
revolutionary force inside the United States.252 The Americans, on the other hand, had no such 
traditions to speak of, and imagined resistance and desertion completely differently. For example, 
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instead of remaining secretive, they were eager to go public, which confounded the French. 
Calvert remembers this frustration well: 
I remember very clearly a conversation that I had with one of them. It sort of cleared the 
air for me around these issues and this is why I talk about it. In the conversation I had 
been pressed by people to come with some kind of organizational strategy and I was just 
at my wit’s end to even begin to talk in the terms they were talking about, and I finally had 
a conversation with a guy and we began talking about the situation he finally said, “I don’t 
see why you need a clandestine organization.” He said, “It sounds to me, as you present 
your political movement and the needs of that movement, that some people in your 
country need to organize some clandestine services to provide services for people who 
are in these situations, but,” he said, “it doesn’t make any sense to me that you organize 
a clandestine organization,” and everything sort of clicked, too, for me.253 
 
Calvert’s experience also points to the learning process that resulted from these transnational 
contacts. “So I came back to the States with a lot more knowledge about something that I really 
didn’t know very much about before,” he concluded. “I also had my first really heavy exposure to 
people who thought strictly in Leninist terms and were trying to devise a Leninist strategy for the 
United States.”254 Indeed, as we will see, one of the most important differences between the 
radical left in France and the United States was their relationship to Leninism. By the late 1960s, 
most of the anti-imperialist radical left in France was firmly Leninist. This was not the case in the 
United States, though that would soon change, in large part because of these emerging 
transatlantic connections and future events in France. 
 
International Brigades 
Attempting to emulate the experiences of the Spanish Civil War, some French antiwar 
radicals tried to organize international brigades as yet another form of international solidarity with 
the Vietnamese. Although its precise origins are unclear, the idea seems to have been 
encouraged very early on by the Vietnamese themselves. In March 1965, just as the United 
States unleashed its massive bombing campaign of the North, the NLF announced that “if the 
American imperialists continue to engage their troops and those of their satellites in Vietnam, and 
to expand the war to the North and into Laos, the Front National de Libération will call on the 
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peoples of different countries to send young people and soldiers to South Vietnam to join the 
population in order to annihilate the common enemy.”255  
In France, a certain Trotskyist current known as the “pablists,” named after its leader, 
Michel Pablo, welcomed the call with great excitement. The pablists had experiences with this 
kind of solidarity. In 1949, the Fourth International organized international Work Brigades for 
Yugoslavia, with the French sending over 1,500 volunteers, including future pablist leader Gilbert 
Marquis. Later, during the Algerian War, a number of pablists became deeply involved in the 
liberation struggle, with Pablo himself arrested for arms trafficking and printing counterfeit money. 
Soon after the Vietnamese appeal, the pablists issued their own call exhorting readers to 
“[o]rganize the international brigades to defend, whatever the cost, heroic Vietnam against the 
barbarian imperialist oppressor.”256 But while they were perhaps the most eager about the call, 
the pablists were not alone. Other groups, like the JCR, quickly backed the idea.257 The call for 
brigades was also formally endorsed by the CVN – which a few pablists such as Marquis, 
Jacques Grimblat, and Michel Fiant joined – almost immediately after its formation. 
By early 1967, the initiative attained a certain degree of seriousness. CVN co-founders 
Jean-Paul Sartre and Laurent Schwartz supported the project, the first issue of the Comité’s 
journal featured an article on the Brigades, Gilbert Marquis established an office for the 
campaign, and the group began to publish its own journal, Le Volontaire. From there, the 
movement grew to such a degree that in February 1967 Le Monde could write that two hundred 
French volunteers, including twenty-five women, had signed up. In addition, the organizers had 
made efforts to internationalize the campaign, revealing that they had received applications from 
many other European countries, including Germany, Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, Sweden, and 
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Switzerland.258 Ready to take the campaign to the next level, in May of that year, the French 
contingent met with Le Dinh Nahn of the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris to present the first 
list of 209 volunteers.259 
Publicly, the Vietnamese reaction was enthusiastic. As Le Dinh Nahn put it in his formal 
letter to the organizers, later reprinted in Le Volontaire, “We thank you most sincerely and 
appreciate this gesture that demonstrates your militant solidarity with the struggle we are leading 
against the imperialist of the United States, for our national independence, and for peace in 
Southeast Asia.”260 Behind closed doors, however, Vietnamese representatives expressed firm 
opposition to the plan. Marquis recalls how they were “received by the Vietnamese, who did not 
discourage us, on the contrary, thanked us, but left us absolutely no hope that they would support 
this campaign.”261  
One gets a sense of why in Tariq Ali’s autobiography. When Ali visited Vietnam in 
February 1967 as part of the Russell Tribunal, Ali directly asked Prime Minister Pham Van Dong 
about the possibility of organizing international brigades in emulation of the Spanish Civil War. 
According to Ali, Pham Van Dong aired several concerns, but he seemed most opposed to the 
idea because of its military impracticability. Brigades would be of little value in the North, given 
the nature of the air war. As the Prime Minister put it, “this is not Spain in the thirties, where the 
technological level of combat was primitive. You have seen the scale of the US attacks on us. 
International brigades are no good against B52 bombers.”262 Furthermore, international brigades 
would be ill suited to the kind of guerilla warfare waged by the NLF. “In the South,” he explained, 
“any brigade from abroad would not be able to function effectively. Many areas we control by 
night are overrun by the enemy during the day. We disappear very effectively because, after all, 
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we are Vietnamese. Just imagine trying to hide several thousand European faces in the forests of 
the South.”263 In fact, not only would volunteers prove largely ineffective, they would likely 
become a burden. The NLF would have to spend considerable time training recruits for guerrilla 
warfare, constantly look after their safety, and expend precious resources keeping them alive. In 
fact, Pham Van Dong continued, “even if we had them repair bridges and roads and schools and 
hospitals we would be more worried about their safety and would have to expend more resources 
on housing and looking after them.”264 Civil or military, international brigades were off the table. 
Why, then, had the Vietnamese themselves encouraged their formation? Indeed, Pham 
Van Dong had himself promised that Vietnamese revolutionaries would call for “brigades of 
foreign volunteers in the more or less near future and hope that there will be many Americans in 
these brigades.”265 What’s more, even after firmly rejecting these initiatives by North American 
and Western European antiwar radicals, Vietnamese representatives continued to support the 
idea of international brigades of some kind or another. For example, as late as July 18, 1968, the 
North Vietnamese Ambassador to the United Arab Republic, Nguyen Xuan, announced that he 
would be “very thankful” to receive applications from Americans willing “to come fight side by side 
with the Vietnamese people against the common enemy, that is United States imperialism.”266 
The reason for this attitude lay in what the Vietnamese felt was the immense propaganda 
value of such an initiative. Though ineffective on the battlefield, the initiative to organize 
international brigades could score a victory in the war of ideas. The mere fact that North 
Americans and Western Europeans would even consider risking their lives to die in the distant 
jungles of South Vietnam revealed the dedicated international support the NLF and North 
Vietnam enjoyed in their joint struggle against the United States. If part of the American strategy 
was to isolate Vietnam, then the formation of international brigades, even if only a possibility, 
dispelled the illusion that Vietnam was alone. Moreover, talking about international brigades could 
draw positive parallels with Spain, casting the Vietnamese revolutionaries in place of the heroic 
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Spanish Republicans, and the Americans as the rebels, or worse, the Nazis and Fascists who 
propped up General Franco’s rebellion against democracy. Indeed, by the 1960s, the Spanish 
international brigades had achieved an almost mythical status, marking the apotheosis of 
revolutionary internationalism. Evoking that legacy could lend a sense of legitimacy to the 
Vietnamese fight.  
Thus, although opposed to the idea in practice, the Vietnamese strongly encouraged it as 
a form of propaganda, a powerful symbol of dedicated moral support. In his meeting with the 
organizers of the volunteer corps in France, Le Dinh Nan confirmed that the corps could 
nevertheless play an important role in developing “active propaganda” in France.267 The French 
committee played along.268 As Marquis put it, “[A]fter the meeting with the Vietnamese delegation 
and Vietnam’s response, the volunteer corps became instead a means of propaganda.”269 The 
effort to organize international brigades for Vietnam never came to fruition and would be 
remembered as a rather marginal episode in the history of transnational antiwar activism. 
Nonetheless, the attitude of the Vietnamese revolutionaries in this matter revealed something 
very important about how they conceptualized international solidarity before 1968. For them, one 
of the best things internationalism could do for the war effort was to help wage the ideological 
struggle at an international level. While all forms of support were encouraged, ultimately, the 
greatest strength of international coordination lay in its ability to help win with the war of ideas.  
 
The Ideological Front 
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The most famous example of ideological struggle was the International War Crimes 
Tribunal (IWCT), sometimes called the Bertrand Russell Tribunal. Since the United Nations and 
the International Criminal Court were both unwilling, and unable, to do anything about the 
Vietnam War, British philosopher Bertrand Russell decided to take matters into his own hands, 
organizing an international tribunal to try the United States in direct emulation of the famous 
Nuremberg Trials. Russell collaborated with the Vietnamese from the very start. Already 
corresponding with Ho Chi Minh since 1963, Russell sent two representatives, Ralph Schoenman 
and Russell Stetler, to meet with the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam in the summer of 
1965. The idea was met with great enthusiasm, and Nguyen Huu Tho, Chairman of the Central 
Committee of the NLF, conveyed to Russell that the “National Liberation Front is ready to co-
ordinate as actively as possible in all the work of the War Crimes Tribunal. Whatever assistance 
is required from our Central Committee will be provided concretely and immediately.”270 In 
February 1966, Schoenman and Stetler spoke directly with DRV Prime Minister Pham Van Dong 
and Ho Chi Minh, who agreed to allow investigators into the North, provide them access to all 
facilities, and make available witnesses and all evidence in their possession.271 The Vietnamese 
felt the Tribunal could provide a venue for them to make their case before a larger audience, 
especially one in the orbit of the United States.272 
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In an effort to expand the Tribunal, Russell wrote to Jean-Paul Sartre in April 1966. Sartre 
readily agreed, as did others in the CVN. Indeed, French involvement proved decisive. The 
French supplied key personnel: Sartre served as Executive President, Laurent Schwartz as co-
President, and dozens of French doctors, journalists, lawyers, filmmakers lent their services, 
many traveling to Vietnam as part of the investigative teams. They also provided essential 
logistical support and publicized the event at home and abroad.273 The Tribunal ultimately came 
to include Sartre, Schwartz, de Beauvoir, and Gisele Halmi from France; Stokely Carmichael, 
former SDS President Carl Oglesby, James Baldwin, and Isaac Deutscher from the United 
States; Lelio Basso from Italy; and playwright Peter Weiss from Germany; among many others.  
During the fall of 1966, the Tribunal met to formalize its procedures. At the behest of the 
French, Tribunal organizers decided that instead of putting individual U.S. officials on trial for war 
crimes, the Tribunal would serve as an investigative commission to determine whether the United 
States had committed war crimes.274 In November 1966, they posed five questions to establish 
guilt: has the United States and its allies committed acts of aggression, has the U.S. military 
made use of illegal weapons, has the U.S. bombed civilian targets, have prisoners and civilians 
received inhuman treatment, and has the United States committed genocide in Vietnam?275 To 
answer these questions, the Tribunal not only collected as much documentary material as 
possible on the nature of the war, but dispatched a series of research teams to gather firsthand 
accounts in Vietnam. In addition, all those involved in the war were invited to submit their own 
evidence, though the United States refused to participate. First at Stockholm in May 1967, then in 
Copenhagen in December 1967, the Tribunal convened to review the evidence, hear testimonies, 
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and reach a decision. In the end, the United States was found guilty of all charges, including 
genocide.276 
In levying these charges, the Tribunal had a very specific political objective. Most of the 
organizers felt that part of the U.S. government’s war effort hinged on its ability to win over public 
opinion not just at home, but in the world. As a brochure by the “French Friends of the Russell 
Tribunal” put it, the IWCT “can facilitate rising consciousness in the western world.”277 Thus, even 
though the Tribunal could not possibly enforce its judgment, its findings had the potential to 
weaken the United States in the arena of world opinion. As Sartre explained in his inaugural 
statement, the Tribunal is a jury, but the “judges are everywhere: they are peoples of the world, 
and in particular the American people. It is for them that we are working.”278 Thus, although the 
Tribunal was designed in part to show the Vietnamese that they were not alone in their struggle, 
the primary goal was to turn audiences in the West against the war. In so doing, the Tribunal 
hoped to shift the balance of forces on the ideological terrain of struggle.  
This was precisely the kind of support the Vietnamese wanted from their North American 
and Western European comrades. As Ho Chi Minh himself put it in his telegram to the preliminary 
meeting of the IWCT, “By condemning these crimes the international tribunal will promote 
worldwide indignation against the American aggressors and will intensify the movement of protest 
among the peoples of all countries in order to demand the end of this criminal war and the 
withdrawal of the troops of the U.S. and their satellites.” “It will contribute to the awakening of the 
conscience of peoples of the world against American imperialism,” he concluded.279 Prime 
Minister Pham Van Dong underlined the point: the Tribunal “will have a wide and profound impact 
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on world opinion, helping to intensify and widen the international movement of solidarity with the 
Vietnamese people.”280 
To accomplish this task, the Tribunal did not aim to morally condemn the U.S. 
government, but to measure the United States and its allies against its their laws. As Sartre put it 
in a 1967 interview, the goal was to determine “whether imperialist policies infringe laws 
formulated by imperialism itself.”281 The United States, and all the major powers, had agreed at 
Nuremberg to a certain category of laws governing the conduct of war. The Tribunal sought to 
show that the United States had violated these. Through its investigative missions, the Tribunal 
amassed a wealth of information about napalm, cluster bombs, civilian bombings, exfoliants, 
torture, and so forth. Since the United States had lied about the conduct of the war from the 
beginning, much of this information was quite revelatory for most in North America in Western 
Europe. Even committed antiwar activists had little knowledge of the details. It was the Russell 
Tribunal, for example, that famously broke the news about cluster bombs, weapons designed not 
to kill but to brutally maim.282 Drawn as they were from copious notes, photographs, and films, the 
accounts were vivid: villages reduced to rubble, children blown apart, civilians burned alive, 
churches bombed on Sundays, rice crops devastated, dams destroyed. The United States was 
not engaged in a simple peacekeeping mission; it was to kill as much of the civilian population as 
possible in order to reduce the Vietnamese will to resist. 
In addition to focusing on the conduct of the war, the Tribunal also explored its causes. 
Lyndon Johnson justified American intervention by arguing that the United States was simply 
aiding a free country from foreign invasion. In short, the United States was in Vietnam to protect 
the national sovereignty of the Vietnamese. But the Tribunal showed quite clearly that the only 
threat to Vietnam's sovereignty was the United States. Marshaling massive historical evidence, 
the Tribunal completely disrupted the U.S. government’s narrative about the war. As the lawyer 
Lelio Basso put it, “not only is there not a war between two States of Vietnam, there is not even a 
                                                
280 Pham Van Dong, “Message du Premier Ministre Pham Van Dong à M Jean Paul Sartre,” Le 
Courrier du Vietnam 139, November 27, 1967, 3. 
281 Jean Paul Sartre, “Imperialist Morality,” New Left Review 41 (January-February 1967): 6. 
282 Mehta, “North Vietnam’s Informal Diplomacy,” 67. 
  
 
97 
civil war in the South. This war is being fought by the people on one side and by the American 
army and mercenary troops on the other.”283 In this way, Basso concluded the Stockholm session 
by arguing that the United States had violated Articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter, the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the UN General Assembly Resolution of December 1960. 
How effective was the Russell Tribunal? Although most accounts assume the Tribunal 
was virtually ignored, recent scholarship shows this was far from the case. Indeed, historian 
Harish C. Mehta has shown that the United States saw the Tribunal as a significant threat.284 The 
Undersecretary of State drew personnel from the CIA, State Department, Department of Defense, 
and U.S. Information Agency in a disinformation campaign. The group talked with French and 
British governments about how to handle the Tribunal, ordered U.S. ambassadors abroad to 
convince foreign governments sympathetic to the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation to withdraw 
their support, collaborated with the press to convince the world that the Tribunal was a 
Communist front, and even considered hosting a counter-trial, but ultimately felt doing so would 
only draw more attention to the Trial. Indeed, it was certainly the weight of the alliance between 
the United States and European countries that led de Gaulle and then Prime Minister Wilson to 
ban the Tribunal from meeting in France and Britain respectively.285 Thus, far from ignoring the 
Tribunal, the U.S. government worked hard to combat its potentially deleterious effects on the 
ideological front. Indeed, the U.S. government had reason to worry. A 1967 White House study 
concluded that the DRV was effectively winning the psychological war in the “free world” against 
the U.S. war.286 
But even with the massive repression, the Tribunal did have important effects. In France, 
the Tribunal’s findings were warmly received. The CVN distributed information from the Tribunal, 
held a giant meeting at the Mutualité to review the results, and devoted an entire issue of its 
magazine to the IWCT. The JCR actively publicized the Tribunal in France, and published an 
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interview with Ralph Schoenman in its paper.287 CVN activists were not the only ones transmitting 
the information. Indeed, Le Monde republished Sartre’s concluding remarks on its front page, 
allowing the Tribunal to reach a more mainstream audience.288 
Given the lengths the U.S. government went to undermine the Tribunal, it had much less 
impact in the United States. But while the mainstream media, liberal and conservative, denigrated 
the proceedings, the Tribunal still managed to have an important effect. Karen Wald, an American 
antiwar journalist, wrote a report immediately after the Stockholm session for her comrades in the 
antiwar movement at home. Drawing out the implications of the Tribunal for American antiwar 
activists, she argued that the proceedings could be of immense value, allowing activists to 
become better informed and supplying “documentation and evidence which can be used to recruit 
and mobilize new people into the anti-war movement.”289 In particular, she continued, activists 
could use the arguments about the violation of international law, the detailed information about 
atrocities, and the evidence proving that the assault on civilians was not “accidental” but part of 
the entire war plan. 
In his speech at the second meeting in December 1967, Carl Oglesby, former President 
of SDS, confirmed that the results the first meeting earlier in the year “has played an important 
role in the developing of the consciousness which instills this militancy among America’s young 
people.”290 Oglesby confided that the “the Tribunal has been the clearing-house of information on 
the war.” He clarified: 
You understand that it is not always easy for us, unless we probe with great care, to get 
an accurate picture of what actually happens in Vietnam. The Tribunal’s capacity for 
pulling together and then developing in a most public and conspicuous way the elements 
of the war’s reality – this function has been very important to us in the United States.291 
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Thus, if the Tribunal did not change opinion in the United States directly, it did so indirectly, by 
funneling important information to activists to then use strengthen their case against the war, 
thereby shifting American opinion. 
Oglesby also added that the Tribunal had provided a “clear legal base” for draft resisters 
since its findings proved that the United States had itself broken international law.292 Indeed, this 
was actually one of the primary motivations for forming the Tribunal in the first place. In 1965, the 
Bertrand Russell Peace foundation provided support for David Mitchell, who went on trial in 1965 
for resisting the draft. Aiming to go further, Russell hoped that by presenting concrete evidence 
that the United States was committing war crimes, the Tribunal could give resisters legal grounds 
for opposing the war.293  
Lastly, Oglesby said, the Tribunal “creates in the very heart of the West a window on the 
Third World.” In this, he concluded, the Tribunal has played a vital role in “the building of an 
internationally solid New-Left movement.”294 Indeed, the IWCT formalized contacts across 
borders, made new ones, and expanded the reach of the network to include representatives from 
countries like Pakistan, Cuba, and so forth. It was through the IWCT, for example, that the French 
CVN came to build stronger ties with SNCC and black radicals in the United States, a connection, 
we will see, that proved transformative. 
 
The Anti-Imperialist Imaginary 
The Tribunal did not simply accumulate evidence in a neutral manner; it presented the 
Vietnam War as a just struggle for national liberation against imperialism. As Russell himself 
argued in the introduction to the published proceedings, “I hope the peoples of the Third World 
will take heart from the example of the Vietnamese and join further in dismantling the American 
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empire.”295 His remarks signified a dramatic shift in the discourse about the war. From the 
formation of the Tribunal in 1966 to its final session in December 1967, the radical critique of the 
war gained currency: the objective was not simply to end the war, but to end the system. As 
radicals grasped to understand the larger system that made the Vietnam War possible, they 
increasingly embraced Marxism.  
Of course, many activists in France were already familiar with some version of Marxism. 
But over the course of the 1960s, Marxism experienced a kind of renaissance. There are many 
reasons for this surge in popularity, but two stand out in particular. First, worldwide anti-imperialist 
struggles of the late 1950s and early 1960s politicized many young activists in France, creating 
the conditions for the positive reception of Marxism. “The basis of our politicization,” Étienne 
Balibar recalls, “was mostly that of the anti-colonial and, consequently, anti-imperialist 
mobilization.”296 Second, at the very moment that activists were searching for cutting-edge radical 
theory to make sense of the radical struggles unfold around them, Marxism entered a period of 
reinvention and experimentation. Figures like Sartre, Henri Lefebvre, and especially Louis 
Althusser were taking Marxism in new directions.  
The Vietnam War unfolded in precisely this context. The Vietnamese liberation struggle, 
which was in large part led by communists, further radicalized youth, presented an example of a 
living struggle guided by Marxism, and helped circulate the Marxist critique of imperialism. Thus, 
even radicals in the United States, who had a very complicated relationship to Marxism in the 
1960s, began to follow suit by the late 1960s.297 In this way, the Vietnam War not only 
encouraged the growth of the radical left in France and the United States, or enabled a new kind 
of radical internationalism; it was also one major factor in the renewed international popularity of 
Marxism in 1960s North America and Western Europe. With the revival of Marxism, the system 
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came to be fully identified as imperialism, and the struggle against that system as anti-imperialist. 
But what, exactly, did it mean to be anti-imperialist?  
Radicals in the late 1960s understood anti-imperialism within not just a Marxist 
problematic, but a specifically Leninist one. To be clear, not all radicals in the 1960s were 
Leninists. Indeed, there were quite a few anarchist, libertarian, and left communist currents at this 
time, especially in France, that explicitly broke with Lenin on a number of points. But these groups 
were often miniscule, and often did not play as great a role in anti-imperialist solidarity.298 On the 
other hand, those radicals who cared about the struggle against imperialism, which in France and 
the United States was by far and away the majority, for the most part derived their idea of anti-
imperialist revolution from V. I. Lenin. For that reason, it is worth briefly sketching a genealogy of 
this anti-imperialist problematic. 
 The roots of the Leninist conception of anti-imperialism lay in an earlier Marxist debate 
over the “national question” in Europe.299 With numerous peoples across Europe subjected to 
imperial rule, the problem of national oppression became one of the burning issues of the early 
twentieth century. Marxists offered a number of competing solutions. Lenin’s answer to the 
problem was the right of nations to self-determination: oppressed nations had the right to secede 
and form independent nation-states if they so desired. Although it would become hegemonic by 
the 1960s, this position was in fact fiercely opposed by other Marxists, both inside and outside the 
Bolshevik Party. The most forceful and wide-ranging critique of the idea of national self-
determination, however, came from the pen of Rosa Luxemburg. 
Luxemburg began by dismantling the idea of rights. Why, she asked, did Marxists have to 
articulate the struggle against national oppression in the language of rights? “The duty of the 
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class party of the proletariat to protest and resist national oppression,” she wrote, “arises not from 
any special ‘right of nations,’ just as, for example, its striving for the social and political equality of 
sexes does not at all result from any special ‘rights of women’ which the movement of the 
bourgeois emancipationists refer to.”300 Not only was this recourse to the language of rights 
unnecessary, it was dangerous. The language of rights, she continued, suggests a universal 
solution, valid in all contexts, and thus a “metaphysical cliché” no different from “rights of man” 
and “rights of citizen” peddled by the bourgeoisie.301 With this universal “right” socialists would be 
compelled to defend national aspirations to statehood anywhere, ignoring the specific historical 
context, the opposite of what Marxism entails.302 Even worse, asserting the right to self-
determination not only flattens particular political conjunctures; it is incapable of actually achieving 
anything political. Asserting a nation’s right to self-determination, she added sarcastically, is 
“worth as much as the “right” of each man to eat off gold plates.”303  
From the criticism of rights, she moved to the concept of the nation. The nation, 
Luxemburg argued, cannot be accepted as the agent of liberation. Indeed, the nation is but a 
fiction that obscures irreconcilable class divisions within a social formation. As a result, there is no 
guarantee that the nation would lead to socialism. In other words, just because a nation 
determines itself does not mean that it will do so in a progressive manner. In fact, chances were 
very high that “nationalism” would inevitably become the nationalism of the bourgeoisie. The 
nation, she continued, has become a fundamental aspect of capitalist accumulation and is 
therefore incompatible with the emancipation of the proletariat. Indeed, the nation, she argued, is 
an “efficient instrument of conquest” and domination, not only against the proletariat, but also 
against other nations.304 In this context, talking about the rights of nations “can serve only as a 
means of deception, of betraying the working masses of the people to their deadly enemy, 
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imperialism."305 Lastly, Luxemburg suggested that the nation actually possess a kind of internal 
logic or compulsion towards war, giving the cautionary example of Latin America, where new 
nations almost immediately went to war against each other after freeing themselves from 
Spain.306 Not only could nations not guarantee peace, she concluded, they could in no way 
ensure economic independence; the right to self-determination would ineluctably result in the 
economic subordination of newly liberated nations to the great powers, turning political freedom 
into a fiction. 
These were devastatingly sharp criticisms, and they deserve to be studied again today, 
especially in light of the disasters of national liberation since the 1970s. That said, Luxemburg’s 
indisputably strong criticisms of the right of nations to self-determination were not only 
encumbered by many weak and dubious claims, but fastened to a deeply flawed conceptual 
framework, which in turn led to highly unsatisfactory political positions. Luxemburg’s entire line of 
argument rested on a philosophy of history in which capitalism was said to necessarily move 
towards higher levels of concentration, thus erasing local economies, particular cultures, and 
individual nation-states themselves. For her, this was a progressive development, and socialism, 
“the legitimate child of capitalism,” would simply take over and complete this tendency towards 
complete centralization: a completely interconnected economy, the formation of single 
international culture, and the disappearance of nations.307 Given this view, the call for national 
self-determination, which suggested small national units, the fiction of small economies, and the 
preservation of cultural particularities, was not only impossible, the demand for it was completely 
regressive. The goal was to push this natural development along towards socialism, not step 
backwards. 
Luxemburg believed that national differences would tend to dissolve as capitalism 
progressed, and that the national question would be definitively resolved with the socialist 
revolution, which was in fact the primary question. But national oppression would no doubt 
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continued to exist until then, so what was to be done in the meantime? For Luxemburg, 
oppressed nationalities should remain within the larger imperialist social formations until the 
socialist revolution, but depending on the particular circumstances they could pursue a variety of 
options. For people like the Poles, who formed the majority of a specific territory, the solution was 
regional autonomy within the larger multi-national empire. But for others, like the Jews, 
Lithuanians, or peoples of the Caucuses, the solution could only be some kind of local self-
government, legal protection, schools, and support for minority languages.308  
There were a few problems with such a solution. First, such provisions did not guarantee 
that the dominant nationalities would cease to oppress the minority peoples in these regions. 
Second, and following from the first, since Luxemburg saw national oppression as primarily 
cultural or economic, her approach denied other aspects of national oppression, namely, the 
political. Third, Luxemburg’s solution completely discounted the colonies. Their struggles, she 
argued, would have no impact on the course of the world revolution. They could only be liberated 
by revolution in the capitalist core.309 This solution no doubt left many quite displeased. What, for 
example, were the Vietnamese supposed to do? Quietly endure their oppression until the workers 
made a successful socialist revolution in France?  
Lenin responded ferociously, diving straight into the heart of the matter. He began by 
pointing out that while Luxemburg began her disquisition by declaiming against generalities, 
insisting instead on the need for concrete historical investigation, it is Luxemburg herself who has 
succumbed “to the sin of abstraction and metaphysics.”310 Luxemburg’s philosophy of history, he 
explained, had led her to completely misread the trajectory of capitalist development, discounting 
crucial historical differences and particularities. The future, he predicted, would not see the 
disappearance of nations into more homogenous units, but their rapid proliferation. Lenin argued 
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that the nation-state was not regressive, but the primary political form of capitalist 
development.311 Those remaining multinational empires, he prophesized, would soon crumble 
into distinct nation-states as capitalist spread across the globe.  
Indeed, for Lenin, the crux of the national question was the question of uneven 
development. The call for the right of nations to self-determination, he clarified, was specific to the 
underdeveloped East. For him, the countries of the capitalist core had already passed through a 
series of crucial structural transformations resulting in territorial unification, constitutions, national 
assemblies, domestic markets, and so forth. This process, Lenin continued, was only just 
beginning outside North America and Western Europe. “In Eastern Europe and Asia the period of 
bourgeois-democratic revolutions did not begin until 1905. The revolutions in Russia, Persia, 
Turkey and China, the Balkan wars – such is the chain of world events of our period in our 
‘Orient.’”312 Justifying the Bolshevik’s affirmation of the right of nations to self-determination, he 
wrote: “It is precisely and solely because Russia and the neighbouring countries are passing 
through this period that we must have a clause in our programme on the right of nations to self-
determination.”313 For Lenin, the right to self-determination was therefore the expression of the 
coming transformations of these peripheral societies, which would include the formation of 
centralized states, the adoption of constitutions, and the establishment of democratic rights. 
Luxemburg, writing from Germany, assumed that the revolutionary process in the West 
would lead the way for all other oppressed peoples. Here, in the capitalist heartlands, a mature 
proletariat could directly confront the bourgeoisie. Other classes, like the peasants, were 
retrograde and doomed to disappear.314 Other struggles, like that over national oppression, were 
effectively distractions from the struggle for socialism. For Lenin, writing from the peripheries, the 
revolutionary process had to take place differently. In Russia, the proletariat was miniscule, most 
Russians lived as peasants, and national minorities fought against the Empire. For Lenin, the 
revolution here had to be contradictory and complex. “Whoever expects a ‘pure’ social 
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revolution,” he later wrote, “will never live to see it. Such a person pays lip service to revolution 
without understanding what revolution is.”315 This meant that socialists not only had to ally with 
other classes and class fractions, but they also had to support other struggles which might not be 
immediately socialist. Thus, given the Russian context, struggles for national liberation, even if 
not socialist, could play a crucial role in the overall struggle by striking blows against the Tsarist 
Empire.316  
Lenin’s approach to the national question, then, was purely strategic. The right of nations 
to self-determination, he thought, was the precondition, he thought, for political articulation in 
certain parts of the world: the unification of heterogeneous elements into a political unity. Indeed, 
for Lenin, the national question was purely political, not an economic, psychological, or cultural 
one. The question of self-determination, he wrote, “belongs wholly and exclusively to the sphere 
of political democracy.”317 This is precisely where he differed from Luxemburg. “For the question 
of the political self-determination of nations and their independence as states in bourgeois 
society, Rosa Luxemburg has substituted the question of their economic independence,” he 
argued.318 “This is just as intelligent as if someone, in discussing the programmatic demand for 
the supremacy of parliament, i.e., the assembly of people’s representatives, in a bourgeois state, 
were to expound the perfectly correct conviction that big capital dominates in a bourgeois country, 
whatever the regime in it.”319 Thus, for Lenin, it made no difference if new nations could not be 
economically independent. To begin with, no country was wholly independent. “Not only small 
states, but even Russia, for example, is entirely dependent, economically, on the power of the 
imperialist finance capital of the “rich” bourgeois countries.”320 But more importantly, the national 
question was not about economics at all.  
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In this, Lenin insisted that the right of nations to self-determination was not the obligation 
of nations to secede.321 The right, he clarified, was the precondition for politics. As historian 
Michael Löwy has explained, Lenin “understood, firstly, that only the freedom to secede makes 
possible free and voluntary union, association, co-operation and, in the long term, fusion between 
nations. Secondly, that only the recognition by the workers’ movement in the oppressor nation of 
the right of the oppressed nation to self-determination can help eliminate the hostility and 
suspicion of the oppressed, and unite the proletariat of both nations in the international struggle 
against the bourgeoisie.”322 Thus, for Lenin, the right to national self-determination was the basis 
for a deeper international solidarity.  
Luxemburg had mounted a string of brilliant criticisms only to deliver a highly 
unsatisfactory political solution. Lenin, on the other hand, seemed to have found a solution that 
emphasized the agency of oppressed peoples outside the capitalist core, included them in the 
global revolutionary struggle, and therefore encouraged future internationalism. The solution no 
doubt had its limits, which would become apparent over the course of the twentieth-century, but 
Lenin’s advocacy of the right of nations to self-determination had an undeniable appeal. For 
better or worse, his positions on the national question achieved hegemony in the international 
communist movement after 1917.   
Since Lenin himself had directly connected the national question, which had originally 
been limited to Europe, to the larger “colonial question,” his ideas also came to play a 
fundamental role in shaping the way Marxists approached the question of anti-colonialism and 
anti-imperialism. 323 As prospects of revolutionary victory in the West subsided into 1920, Marxists 
began to turn their attention to the struggles outside of Europe. Thus, at the Second Congress of 
the Communist International that year, Marxists from both the West and the East met to establish 
the Comintern’s formal policy with regards to the colonial question. Lenin’s “Draft Thesis on the 
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National and Colonial Question,” served as the basis for the discussion. In the Theses, Lenin 
argued that the revolution in the colonies and what he called the “semi-colonies” would effectively 
pass through two stages. In the first, colonized peoples would join in a united front for national 
self-determination. Socialists, based in the tiny working classes, had to unite with both the 
peasants, the immense majority of the population, and also “enter into a temporary alliance” with 
the “bourgeois-democratic” movement, that is to say, the nationalist movement of the 
bourgeoisie.324 Lenin added that while socialists should always retain their autonomy, advancing 
an independent socialist perspective throughout the struggle, the first phase could not be 
socialist. Only after the successful realization of national liberation, and with it the fundamental 
tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, would the struggle for socialism proper commence. 
At the Second Congress M. N. Roy objected to Lenin’s call to ally with the national 
bourgeoisie, arguing that the bourgeoisie would only pursue the most reactionary aims.325 As a 
compromise, the Comintern made an important distinction between two kinds of nationalist 
bourgeois movements, the “reformist” and “revolutionary.”326 The former, to be called the 
“bourgeois-democratic” movement, was not to be supported; the latter, to be called “national-
revolutionary” movement, could serve as an ally. In addition, Roy, as well as other 
representatives from the colonized countries, pressured Lenin to consider the possibility that 
revolutions in these “backwards” countries might be able to bypass capitalism on the way to 
socialism. As Lenin explained in his report to the Comintern, “the Communist International should 
advance the proposition, with the appropriate theoretical grounding, that the backwards countries, 
aided by the proletariat of the advanced countries, can go over to the soviet system and, through 
certain stages of development, to communism, without having to pass through the capitalist 
stage.”327 But as historian Demetrio Boersner has shown, Lenin and Roy assumed this path 
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would only be possible if the communist revolution met imminent success in the West. Barring 
that outcome, the revolution in the colonies and semi-colonized would have to pass through two 
stages.328 Thus, in his Supplementary Theses, Roy stated quite clearly that the “revolution in the 
colonies will not be a communist revolution in its first stages.”329 Immediately after the Congress, 
Marxists realized the revolutionary wave in the West was about to subside, and the Comintern 
formalized the two-stage policy, establishing the basic outlines of the anti-imperialist problematic 
within which most radicals would operate until the crisis of the late 1970. 
Subsequent thinkers introduced important clarifications over the decades. For radicals in 
the 1960s, the two most important were the Maoist and the Trotskyist. Following the Comintern 
model, Mao Zedong reiterated that in colonized and semi-colonized countries like China, the 
revolution would have to pass through two stages, the bourgeois-democratic and then the 
proletarian-socialist. In the first stage, the revolution would result in “the joint dictatorship of all the 
revolutionary classes of China headed by the Chinese proletariat.”330 Politically, this joint 
dictatorship, which Mao called the “New Democracy,” would include the peasantry, the petty 
bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, and even the nationalist bourgeoisie. Its two primary tasks would be 
the overthrow of imperialism through national liberation and the destruction of feudalism through 
agrarian reform. Under the “new-democratic republic,” the state would nationalize enterprises 
such as banks, railways, and airlines, but “the republic will neither confiscate capitalist private 
property in general nor forbid the development of such capitalist production as does not ‘dominate 
the livelihood of the people.’”331 Mao insisted that given the backwardness of China, the first step 
would take a “long time.” “We are not utopians,” he wrote, “and cannot distance ourselves from 
the actual conditions confronting us.”332 Mao’s model soon spread to other anti-imperialist 
struggles, and became one of the pillars of what was called “Maoism” in the 1960s. 
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Leon Trotsky proposed yet another variation. As is well known, since 1905, Trotsky had 
begun to experiment with a different strategy in which the two distinct revolutions, the bourgeois-
democratic and the socialist, could in fact be compressed into a single continuous revolution, or 
what he called the “permanent revolution.”333 However, Trotsky did not initially extend this new 
model to the colonized world, considering it far too backwards. Indeed, when it came to China, 
Trotsky fully supported the stagist model; he only felt that proletarian socialist forces should 
preserve their autonomy.334 After the disastrous results in China, however, Trotsky extended the 
model of permanent revolution to the colonized world, making three basic arguments about the 
nature of anti-imperialist revolution there. 
First, in the colonized world there could be no sharing of power between different classes 
in some kind of “democratic dictatorship.” There would emerge either a bourgeois dictatorship or 
a proletarian dictatorship, which meant, first, that, contra Mao, the national bourgeoisie could not 
be counted as an ally; and second, that other classes, like the peasantry, had to follow one or the 
other, but could not ally as equal partners. “This means that the ‘democratic dictatorship of the 
proletariat and the peasantry’ is only conceivable as a dictatorship that leads the peasant masses 
behind it.”335 Thus, the only form of revolution in the Third World had to be proletarian 
dictatorship. Second, Trotsky insisted that there could not be an “intermediate stage” on the way 
to socialism, but only a single continuous revolutionary process.336 “The democratic revolution 
grows over immediately into the socialist, and thereby becomes a permanent revolution,” Trotsky 
explained.337 This meant that a “country is ‘ripe’ for the dictatorship of the proletariat of the 
proletariat not only before it is ripe for the independent construction of socialism, but even before 
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it is ripe for far-reaching socialization measures.”338 Lastly, although Trotsky still conceptualized 
the process as a single “national democratic revolution,” which would culminate in an 
independent nation-state, he insisted that the process could not be completed within a single 
state, but required an international revolution. It was this position that most Trotskyists followed 
into the 1960s and 1970s. 
In the 1960s, most anti-imperialists in France, and later the United States, adopted some 
version of these two models, which framed their solidarity with Vietnam. That said, the 
Vietnamese Communists, themselves sophisticated Marxists in their own right, developed their 
own unique model. Like all other models, the basis of the Vietnamese model of anti-imperialist 
revolution derived directly from Lenin’s theses. Like many radicals from the colonized world, Ho 
Chi Minh was first exposed to these ideas during a sojourn in Paris.339 In July 1920, he studied 
Lenin’s writings on imperialism, published in L’Humanité, the main paper of the PCF.340 He 
recalled years later: 
There were political terms difficult to understand in this thesis. But by dint of reading it 
again and again, finally I could grasp the main part of it. What emotion, enthusiasm, 
clear-sightedness and confidence it instilled into me! I was overjoyed to tears. Though 
sitting alone in my room, I shouted out aloud as if addressing large crowds: “Dear martyrs 
compatriots! This is what we need, this is the path to our liberation! After then, I had 
entire confidence in Lenin, in the Third International.341 
 
In 1929, Vietnamese radicals from three parties merged into the Vietnamese Communist 
Party, soon to be converted to the Indochinese Communist Party on instructions from the 
Comintern. In October of the following year, the ICP adopted a formal program that would guide 
Vietnamese communism for the next forty years. Directly modeled on the Leninist problematic, 
the 1930 Theses followed the classic two-stage model of revolution. The two primary tasks of the 
“bourgeois democratic” phase would be to “do away with the feudal vestiges and the model of 
pre-capitalist exploitation and to carry out a thorough agrarian revolution; on the other hand, to 
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overthrow French imperialism and achieve complete independence for Indochina.”342 In so doing, 
the “bourgeois democratic revolution is a preparatory period leading to socialist revolution.”343 But 
the Vietnamese added a surprising twist, arguing that crucial historical events – namely, the rise 
of global revolutions, the capitalist crisis, and the consolidation of the first socialist state – 
necessitated a revision of the model. In this context, the 1930 Theses asserted, “Indochina will 
bypass the capitalist stage and advance direct to socialism.”344  
Although the imminent collapse of capitalism prophesized by the Comintern in 1930 did 
not come to pass, subsequent developments led Vietnamese revolutionaries to believe that the 
unique path they had sketched for themselves remained valid. As Le Duan, General Secretary of 
the Vietnamese Workers Party, explained years later, the confluence of a set of unique 
conditions, such as the existence of a weak national bourgeoisie, the underdevelopment of 
capitalist relations, a very militant peasantry, a tightly organized Communist Party, and the 
certainty of aid from the Soviet Union meant that the “North can and must bypass stage of 
capitalist development to advance to socialism.”345  
Reflecting on the Vietnamese experience in 1971, Le Duan explained that in the first 
stage of the revolution the Vietnamese revolutionaries formed a united front, which included the 
bourgeoisie, to simultaneously fight the French and complete the tasks of the “national 
democratic” revolution. After 1954, however, the country was split in half, and the national 
democratic revolution was completed in the North, but left unfinished in the South, creating an 
imbalance. The Vietnamese communists therefore had two tasks ahead of them. In the North, the 
Democratic Republic effectively functioned as the dictatorship of the proletariat, abolishing 
capitalist relations, building the productive forces, launching a cultural revolution, and constructing 
socialism. In the South, the NLF, working with the North, would have to complete the prerequisite 
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national democratic revolution, which meant breaking up the landed estates, redistributing land, 
and uniting with the North to create an independent nation-state. 
In this way, the complexities of the Vietnamese experience had radicals from a variety of 
competing currents vying to claim Vietnam as their own. The Maoists approvingly cited the VWP’s 
theoretical distinction between the two stages, and believed they perceived the two-stage model 
in action, above all in the South. But some Trotskyists argued that in leaping through the various 
stages towards socialism in the North, the Vietnamese Workers Party, the party that had 
repressed Trotskyists in Vietnam, was in fact following a path described by Trotsky. Indeed, for 
the Ligue Communiste, the successor of the JCR, the Vietnamese revolution represented “the 
concrete verification of the theory of the permanent revolution.”346 The specific historical 
conditions in Vietnam, the international context, and the decisive leadership of the VWP, the 
Ligue argued, had pushed the Vietnamese to move from democratic tasks to socialist ones. 
As the Vietnamese case shows, anti-imperialists remained divided over crucial questions 
about the nature of anti-imperialist revolutions abroad. Who was to lead the revolution? Who 
could be included? How many stages would it require? How long would these last? What were 
their tasks? Despite these differences, virtually all anti-imperialists shared the same fundamental 
assumption: the conjugation of anti-imperialism with national-self-determination. Of course, anti-
imperialists recognized the pitfalls of nationalism, but they argued, following Lenin, that 
nationalism always had a dual character, the nationalism of the oppressor nations and the 
nationalism of the oppressed nations. And the only way to combat national oppression, they 
continued, was through the right to self-determination. They were also all cognizant of the 
dangers of states, but as Marxists they believed that some kind of “non-state” state was still 
essential for the transition to socialism. Thus, all major trends of radical anti-imperialism believed 
that anti-imperialism required the struggle for an independent nation-state, which would then 
create the conditions for the subsequent transition to socialism. These independent nation-states 
would then cooperate in some kind of international. 
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It should be noted that the struggle against imperialism does not necessarily need to 
result in the formation of a nation-state. Indeed, other polities could replace the nation-state, such 
as communes. Yet since Lenin, the link between anti-imperialism and the nation was 
unbreakable, serving as the foundation for the imaginary of the radical anti-imperialist left not only 
in the United States and France, but of anti-imperialist radicals across the globe, including the 
Vietnamese themselves. For the colonized, this meant creating an independent nation-state 
where none existed. For those with their own nations, it meant defending national sovereignty 
from imperialist depredations. For those living in the imperialist centers, it meant assisting, in 
whatever way possible, all those oppressed by imperialism to realize their own sovereign nation-
state. In this way the fight for national liberation became the dominant principle of anti-imperialist 
internationalism. In the 1960s, empires crumbled, dependent nation-states tried to achieve a 
more robust independence, and oppressed peoples across the world joined together. The 
inspiring successes of national liberation struggles and the enormous promises they seemed to 
hold for the future of the world put wind into the sails of anti-imperialist internationalism. But the 
alliance between anti-imperialism and nationalism could be double-edged. For if national 
liberation were to ever fail, then anti-imperialism would pay dearly. 
 
The Rights of the Nation 
For better or worse, Marxist anti-imperialists ignored Luxemburg’s warnings and 
embraced the language of rights. By the 1960s and 1970s, the impulse to frame the struggle 
against imperialism in the framework of rights had become second nature. But what did anti-
imperialists mean by rights? In recent years, historians have spilled considerable ink on this 
question. Turning their attention to this period, some have argued that when anti-imperialists 
spoke about rights, they meant principally the right to national self-determination, which should be 
contrasted with the idea of individual rights. Thus, scholars like Samuel Moyn argue that whatever 
the rhetoric, the vast majority of anti-imperialists did not make use of anything like the human 
rights discourse so common today. Others have pushed back, arguing that the idea of human 
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rights was in fact not only present in the 1960s, but a crucial aspect of the struggles of these 
decades, often pointing, for example, to how black radicals in the United States like Malcolm X 
framed political demands in the language of human rights.  
As an international gathering of anti-imperialists appealing to international law it is no 
surprise that the Russell Tribunal has emerged as a flashpoint in this debate. For Robin 
Blackburn, for example, the Tribunal was a clear example of how activists employed ideas about 
human rights to further social justice. As evidence of the Tribunal’s immersion in rights talk, he 
argues, “One of its members, Jean-Paul Sartre, declared in this journal that its deliberations were 
animated by ‘a certain idea of human life.’”347 As further evidence, he points out how in later 
iterations the Tribunal investigated the crimes of Latin American dictatorships. Moyn, however, 
insists on a sharp distinction, arguing that this version of internationalism was a “world away from 
the human rights movement soon to form.”348 While the debate over the Tribunal seems 
academic, the stakes are in fact quite high; determining exactly what anti-imperialists meant by 
human rights at this time is essential to understanding the broader trajectory of the radical left, 
and, as we will soon see, explaining its eventual collapse decade later. 
At first sight, the Russell Tribunal would seem to have fit neatly under the sign of human 
rights. Activists invoked the Nuremburg trials, made regular appeals to international law, 
investigated acts of atrocity against the Vietnamese, and often spoke of “war crimes,” “humanity,” 
and “inhuman treatment.” But upon closer inspection, we see that despite the rhetoric, the 
participants had a very different conception of rights in mind. In his inaugural statement to the 
Tribunal, Sartre tried to explain the need for a Tribunal following in the footsteps of Nuremberg. 
Curiously, though, while he made reference to genocide, Nazi crimes, and the Nuremburg Trials, 
he justified the new Tribunal with reference to the recent phenomenon of decolonization. “You 
know the truth. In the last twenty years, the great historical event has been the struggle of the 
Third World for its liberation: colonial empires have collapsed and in their place sovereign nations 
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have come into existence, or have recovered a lost traditional independence, destroyed by 
colonization.”349 This, Sartre says, is the historical context of the Tribunal: the struggle for national 
sovereignty. 
But all this, he continues, has “taken place in suffering, in sweat, and in blood.”350 
Because of the great suffering surrounding the struggle for national independence, he concludes, 
“A tribunal such as that of Nuremburg has become a permanent necessity.”351 In this way, Sartre 
argued that the precedents set at the Nuremburg Trials should now be used to safeguard the 
rights of oppressed people against imperialist aggression. He added that after Nuremburg, no 
one can “prevent people from thinking back to its sessions whenever a small, poor country is the 
object of aggression, prevent them from saying to themselves, ‘but it is this, precisely this, which 
was condemned at Nuremberg.”352 Sartre, it seemed was trying to rewrite history: Nuremberg’s 
objective was to uphold the right of nations to self-determination, condemning imperialist 
aggression against “small, poor” countries seeking liberation. Whether this was actually what 
Nuremberg did is irrelevant; what is significant is that for the participants Nuremburg established 
guidelines for trying violations to the rights of national self-determination. And it was precisely this 
crime that had brought them together. 
This was a view shared not only be other members of the Tribunal, but by the 
Vietnamese themselves. For their part, the Vietnamese covered the Tribunal very closely, 
publishing articles, informing the people about the proceeds, and organizing their own meetings. 
In the Courrier du Vietnam, Do Xuan Sang, deputy Secretary General of the Association of 
Vietnamese jurists, argued that the Tribunal was not only a great political act, but carried 
tremendous importance from a “juridical point of view.”353 Arguing that “sovereignty, 
independence, unity, and territorial integrity” formed the “touchstone” of contemporary 
international relations, it was imperative to condemn all infractions of the right to national self-
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determination.354 In his message to the preliminary meeting of the Tribunal, Ho Chi Minh 
underlined this point: “The tribunal is an action of world-wide importance for justice and for the 
right of people to self-determination.”355 Violating this right was in fact the primary crime to be 
investigated. 
Everyone involved in the Tribunal understood rights in a collective manner. In his opening 
statement, Russell explained: “There is one reason for this International War Crimes Tribunal: 
Overwhelming evidence besieges us daily of crimes without precedent. Each moment greater 
horror is perpetrated against the people of Vietnam.”356 Indeed, participants thought in terms of a 
collective subject, not individuals. The victims were not individual Vietnamese, but the 
“Vietnamese people” as a whole. The War Crimes Tribunal certainly investigated crimes that may 
now be considered attacks on individuals: for example, whether the United States and its allies 
had taken hostages, tortured or mutilated prisoners, or forcibly relocated communities. But at the 
time, these were not seen as violations of the basic liberties of individual Vietnamese. There was 
no appeal to their “human rights.” Operating as they did within the framework of collective rights 
to national self-determination, anti-imperialists saw these kinds of atrocities as attacks on the 
entire people: a collective people with a collective right to nationhood. Hence their particular focus 
on genocide, which they understood not as affronts to individuals, but as an attack on an entire, 
coherent people, on the totality. As Russell put it, the opposite of genocide was national 
liberation: “the war knows no middle course between national salvation and genocide.”357 
In short, the Tribunal, despite its constant references to international law, was not 
interested in establishing international legal protection for individuals. Instead, as with all Marxist 
anti-imperialists at the time, it understood rights only within the context of the right of nations to 
self-determination. If anti-imperialists occasionally spoke of human rights, they did so only 
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rhetorically. Indeed, for them, human rights could only mean the right to national self-
determination.  
It is important to also point out that while the Vietnamese and their antiwar comrades 
abroad justified their revolution in terms of the right to self-determination, President Lyndon 
Johnson justified his war in the same terms. In his famous 1965 speech explaining to the 
American public why their sons were dying in a country few could find on a map, Johnson 
explained, “Tonight Americans and Asians are dying for a world where each people may choose 
its own path to change. This is the principle for which our ancestors fought in the valleys of 
Pennsylvania. It is the principle for which our sons fight tonight in the jungles of Viet-Nam.”358 In 
other speeches, he explicitly named that principle. Thus, on September 29, 1967, just a couple 
months before the Second Session of the Russell Tribunal, Johnson flatly announced, “We 
cherish freedom – yes. We cherish self-determination for all people – yes. We abhor the political 
murder of any state by another …”359 This is the same language one could expect from Ho Chi 
Minh. Indeed, the NLF and DRV argued that their war was a justified struggle for national self-
determination: an imperialist power had divided their country in half, denied them the right to 
choose their fate, and now murdered them in order to prevent the formation of a unified, 
independent nation-state. The United States justified its war by arguing that North Vietnam was 
violating the national self-determination of South Vietnam.  
In this way, the Vietnam War was also a struggle over the meaning of self-determination, 
which reflects just how hegemonic the idea had become not only on the left, but in mainstream 
political culture. Neither the anti-imperialists nor the U.S. government justified their actions or 
articulated their objectives in the language of human rights, but as the struggle between one 
nation-state against another. This, however, would begin to change over the next few years, as 
the U.S. government, anti-imperialist radicals in France and the United States, and 
representatives from the NLF and North Vietnam began to talk about individual rights. This shift is 
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reflected in the fact that the Bertrand Russell Tribunal focused on what were increasingly called 
“human rights violations” in Argentina and Brazil. But that was not until 1973, and to use this as 
evidence of what radicals thought in 1967, as Blackburn does, prevents us from understanding 
exactly how and why the meaning of rights began to change.  
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CHAPTER 3: FROM PROTEST TO REVOLUTION 
 
On December 6, 1967, a handsomely dressed Stokely Carmichael addressed four 
thousand French antiwar activists at the Mutualité in Paris. After a five-month world tour that 
included stops in Cuba, Vietnam, Algeria, Syria, Guinea, Tanzania, and Sweden, Carmichael 
landed in Paris, his final stop before returning to the United States. Although French police 
detained immediately after he stepped off the plane at Orly airport, on Tuesday, December 5, he 
remained defiant. When the authorities let him free, he set to work, filling his schedule with 
political meetings with Laurent Schwartz, army resistor Dick Perrin, black expatriates, and antiwar 
organizers. The highlight of his brief, but eventful stay was a thunderous speech at the CVN’s 
latest event, “Che Guevara Week,” a weeklong action intended to commemorate Che’s death 
earlier that year.360 
There, beneath a giant poster of Che Guevera, and flanked by NLF flags, Carmichael 
launched into a militant critique of the Vietnam War. Calling for a shift from protest to active 
resistance against the war, he declared: “We don’t want peace in Vietnam. What we want is a 
Vietnamese victory over the U.S. In spilling our own blood to help this victory, we feel that we’re 
not paying too high a price, even if we have to destroy the structures of the United States.”361 
Soon after, at a press conference, he was even more blunt: 
The war in Vietnam must be brought to the United States of America. If Ho Chi Minh 
cannot sleep, Lyndon Johnson shall not sleep. The babies in Vietnam are in threat of 
their lives, and people in the United States must be in threat of their lives. If fire is raging 
in Vietnam, then fire must rage in the United States. And as long as the United States 
oppresses black people inside the United States and oppresses Vietnamese in Vietnam, 
we have a common bond against a common enemy.362 
 
Carmichael’s militant speech captured an important shift among antiwar radicals. Despite 
coordinated international protest, the U.S. military continued to escalate the war. In light of this, 
some radicals now argued that the kind of ideological struggle exemplified by the Bertrand 
Russell Peace Tribunal was simply insufficient; radicals had a duty to end the war by any means 
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necessary. As Julius Lester, a member of SNCC, explained in his reflections on the Russell 
Tribunal, “Commitment is something that Sartre has written extensively on, and I presume that his 
involvement at Stockholm was an example of his commitment. If so, possibly what this age needs 
is not commitment but just caring about other people and being willing to die because you care so 
much.”363 The black nationalists who led this revolutionary charge argued that African Americans 
had a particularly important role to play in this respect: as an “internal colony” inside the United 
States, they faced the same enemy as the Vietnamese, and could therefore open a second front 
right inside the belly of the beast. Other radicals quickly began to embrace this idea, arguing that 
the best way to aid the Vietnamese was to bring the war home. Soon after, Che Guevara codified 
this new strategy of anti-imperialist internationalism, calling for “two, three, many Vietnams.” For 
their part, representatives from the National Liberation Front and Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
welcomed Che’s new internationalist strategy, and the General Secretary of the Vietnamese 
Workers Party, Le Duan, even called for a worldwide anti-imperialist front.  
The CVN’s decision to invite Carmichael to Paris reflected, but also contributed to, the 
growing radicalization of French antiwar activists. Although many radicals were already 
committed Marxist anti-imperialists, and therefore open to the theoretical possibility of revolution, 
making domestic revolution to aid the Vietnamese abroad was not on the agenda. Even though 
they had already made a strong case for including Europe in the international antiwar struggle, 
antiwar activism was primarily oriented towards winning the ideological struggle, putting pressure 
on their governments, and condemning NATO. But over the course of 1967, the escalation of the 
war in Vietnam, the growing militancy of movements in the United States, and domestic struggles 
in France, signaled to many French radicals that making revolution at home may not seem so 
farfetched after all. Thus, when Carmichael spoke at the Mutualité in December, he struck a 
chord, articulating what French radicals were starting to think. The time for revolution had come. 
Although they did not confront U.S. imperialism in the same way as African Americans or 
Latin Americans, French radicals began to suggest that they, too, could play an important role in 
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this anti-imperialist front. Building on earlier arguments about how U.S. imperialism depended on 
the support of other capitalist states, they argued that opening a “second front” in Europe would 
deal a decisive blow to imperialism, relieving the pressure on the Vietnamese. Antiwar activism 
grew more militant, culminating in February 1968, when thousands of radicals from over a dozen 
European countries met in Berlin to coordinate their efforts to open new fronts across the 
continent. As they met, the NLF launched a surprise attack against the U.S. military throughout 
South Vietnam. If the Vietnamese could repel the most devastating military machine in history, 
they thought, then surely they could make revolution. 
 
The Internal Vietnam 
In December 1965, a teach-in at Wayne State University took a confrontational turn. 
Activists sneered at the American flag, prowar students interrupted speeches by screaming the 
Star Spangled Banner, and a conservative heckler was punched in the face. Amidst the chaos, 
John Watson, a black nationalist, stood up, connected the war in Vietnam to the one waged 
against African Americans at home, and, in what amounted to a declaration of war, threatened 
that “the only fighting we are going to do is right here in America.”364 Even the organizers, some 
of whom were professed socialists, thought he had gone too far. Three years later, declarations 
such as this would become commonplace. In 1965, they appeared outrageous. 
John Watson, however, was not alone. He belonged to a vibrant constellation of black 
nationalist organizations that emerged in the cities of the northern United States in the early 
1960s. In Detroit, Watson was joined by Luke Tripp, John Williams, Charles (Mao) Johnson, 
General Baker, and Gwen Kemp in the leadership of a revolutionary nationalist student collective 
named UHURU. In early 1965, some of them regrouped as the Detroit chapter of the Afro-
American Student Movement (ASM), editing a journal for black students called Razor and a 
publication for factory workers called Black Vanguard. In Oakland, radicals led by Ernest Allen, 
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who by chance met an UHURU delegation on an illegal trip to Cuba in 1964, organized the Soul 
Students Advisory Council, which produced the journal Soulbook.365 
The organizational node of this emerging black nationalist network was the Revolutionary 
Action Movement (RAM), a small but extremely influential clandestine group founded in the spring 
of 1962.366 Beyond its core of young radicals, which included Max Stanford, Donald Freeman, 
and Wanda Marshall, RAM was closely associated with nearly all the major radical figures of 
black nationalism. James Boggs, for example, served as the group’s Ideological Chairman, 
Robert F. Williams as International Chairman, and Malcolm X as International Spokesman.367 
RAM not only kept disparate radicals tightly connected, largely through the tireless efforts of its 
field organizer, Max Stanford, but it also played a crucial role in the circulation of revolutionary 
black nationalist theory through its journals Black America and RAM Speaks. 
What brought these groups together was the fundamental idea that African Americans 
constituted an oppressed nation within the United States. This belief, of course, was not invented 
by radicals in the 1960s, but can be traced at least as far back as the nineteenth century. It had 
formed the basis of the various Back-to-Africa proposals, with Marcus Garvey’s perhaps only the 
most famous. While many of these exodus formulations may have seemed somewhat farfetched 
even at the time, they persisted deep into the twentieth century precisely because they captured 
the unfulfilled desire for full self-determination. In the 1930s, the idea of black national self-
determination was reframed in a Marxist register by the Communist Party USA as the famous 
“black belt thesis.” 
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In the 1950s and early 1960s, inspired by the wave of national liberation movements 
overthrowing colonialism across the globe, many American radicals came to imagine the history 
of black struggle through the optic of colonialism.368 While the comparison with colonialism was 
not new, the preferred term in radical discourse had always been the nation, and whenever the 
term colony was used, it was often put in quotation marks, suggesting a distance, perhaps even 
discomfort with the word.369 Indeed, the Communist International, pushed by black radicals such 
as Harry Haywood, Claude McKay, and others to formally adopt a resolution in 1928 recognizing 
African Americans in the Southern United States as an oppressed nation, clearly stated that while 
national oppression of colonial peoples and African Americans was “of the same character,” it 
was “not correct to consider the Negro zone of the South as a colony of the United States.”370 
In the early 1960s, however, the idea of the nation, while by no means abandoned, was 
increasingly recoded in the language of the colony, the black nation understood as a specifically 
colonized nation rather than just an oppressed or minority one. For instance, after returning from 
Cuba in 1960, Harold Cruse argued371: 
From the beginning, the American Negro has existed as a colonial being. His enslavement 
coincided with the colonial expansion of European powers and was nothing more or less 
than a condition of domestic colonialism. Instead of the United States establishing a 
colonial empire in Africa, it brought the colonial system home and installed it in the 
Southern states.372 
 
Since African Americans were a colonized people, even if they happened to live within the 
imperialist world, their struggles could only be understood within the framework of national 
liberation.373 This line of reasoning had a powerful impact on a number of young revolutionaries, 
especially those in RAM, and the colonialist paradigm, now shorn of its scare quotes, became 
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hegemonic among black radicals, forming the basis, for example, of Stokely Carmichael’s 
influential concept of Black Power.374 
The idea of the “internal colony” helped black radicals clarify their status as oppressed 
peoples inside the heartland of the oppressors, as pockets of the Third World inside the First. In 
addition, it gave even greater legitimacy to their struggles. For decolonization seemed to be an 
unstoppable force – new nations appeared everywhere, the old colonial powers crumbled, and 
even those in the imperial centers wished to be on the right side of history. Drawing attention to 
their own colonized situation allowed the internally colonized to ride the anticolonial wave. As 
Cruse put it: “Those on the American left who support revolutionary nationalism in Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America must also accept the validity of Negro nationalism in the United States. Is it not 
just as valid for Negro nationalists to want to separate from American whites as it is for Cuban 
nationalists to want to separate economically and politically from the United States?”375  
Above all, it was precisely this “colonial consciousness” that allowed transnational 
solidarities to emerge, creating the possibility of an international of the colonized. This is why 
black nationalist organizations like RAM were so fervently internationalist. RAM was not only 
inspired by the Cuban revolution, decolonization in Africa, or the Chinese Communists; it believed 
that African Americans, as a colonized people, formed an integral part of what they called the 
“Bandung World.”376 “We must all do what is necessary to gain our rightful freedom,” they 
declared, “for the world can never be free until Black America is free, and Black America cannot 
be free until the Bandung world is free.”377 
This self-identification as a colonized people allowed African Americans to advance a 
vision of solidarity with the Vietnamese that was inaccessible to many other radicals in North 
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America and Western Europe.378 They could oppose the war not only on the grounds that African 
Americans were disproportionately drafted, that they faced racial discrimination at the front, or 
even that the money wasted in Vietnam could be better spent assisting poor black communities – 
all arguments mobilized by more moderate African American leaders, such as Martin Luther King, 
Jr. For black nationalists, the basis of their solidarity with the Vietnamese lay in the fact that they 
experienced an analogous form of colonial oppression.379 
African Americans, they argued, lived the same colonial situation, facing the kinds of 
racial discrimination, legal injustices, economic domination, and political violence that other 
colonized peoples like the Vietnamese did. “When a child is murdered by bombs in the Congo, or 
Vietnam,” young black nationalists powerful reminded each other, “it is the same as a child 
murdered in a church bombing in Alabama or in Harlem.”380 In addition, African Americans and 
Vietnamese shared a special bond since they not only suffered the same colonial violence, but 
confronted the exact same enemy. “The same white man who is killing our brothers in Vietnam,” 
Black Women Enraged (BWE), an early black nationalist women’s group closely affiliated with 
RAM, explained, “is lynching our black brothers here in Mississippi, Los Angeles, and New 
York.”381 American imperialism, black nationalists argued, was waging not one, but two wars, one 
at home against African Americans, another abroad against the Vietnamese. “The gas used in 
                                                
378 One may also add that this self-identification allowed African Americans to build international 
alliances with other internal colonies, not only Puerto Ricans or Mexicans in the United States, 
but even white Quebeckers, who also argued they constituted an oppressed colony inside 
Canada. In 1965, for instance, some RAM militants allied with the Rassemblement pour 
l’lndépendance Nationale (RIN), a Quebecois political party that called for full independence from 
the rest of Canada, in a plot to blow up the Statue of Liberty, Liberty Bell, and Washington 
Monument. See Salar Mohandesi, “Black Americans, French Quebeckers, and the Allied Struggle 
against Internal Colonialism,” paper delivered at Southern American Studies Conference, 
February 20, 2015, Atlanta, Georgia. 
379 For an excellent survey of black responses to the Vietnam War, see Tracy Tullis, “A Vietnam 
at Home: Policing the Ghettos in the Counterinsurgency Era,” (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 
New York, 1999), chapter 2. 
380 Charles Simmons, “Declaration of the Afroamerican Student Movement,” 1964, 1, The Black 
Power Movement: Papers of the Revolutionary Action Movement, 1962-1996, Folder 010629-
014-0108, Series 10. 
381 Black Women Enraged, “Black Women!!” no date, SNCC Records, Box 141, Folder 1, 1106, 3 
of 3, King Center. For more on Black Women Enraged, see, Maxwell C. Stanford, “Revolutionary 
Action Movement,” 165. 
  
 
127 
Vietnam,” they claimed, “was first ‘tested’ in Selma, Ala.”382 
Lastly, both sides fought for the same project: national liberation. On Independence Day 
1964, for instance, RAM penned an open letter of solidarity, titled, “Greetings to Our Militant 
Vietnamese Brothers,” 
On this Fourth of July 1964 when White America celebrates its Declaration of 
Independence from foreign domination one hundred and eighty-eight years ago, we of 
the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) congratulate the Vietnamese Front of 
National Liberation for their inspiring victories against U.S. imperialism in South Vietnam 
and thereby declare Our Independence from the policies of the U.S. government abroad 
and at home.”383 
 
Like the Vietnamese, whose own declaration of independence quoted the American Declaration 
of Independence of 1776, RAM believed, as so many black nationalists had argued before, that 
African Americans had to win independence, even if this meant forming a separate black state. 
 The strong parallelism between Black Americans and Vietnamese articulated by RAM 
and other early black nationalist groups became a defining trope in radical discourse. Vietnamese 
face the US army; African Americans face the American police. Vietnamese are shot; African 
Americans lynched. Vietnamese are denied full civil rights in South Vietnam; African Americans 
are denied the same freedoms in the Southern United States. Vietnamese are racially degraded; 
African Americans confront racial discrimination throughout the United States. In the words of a 
later Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) pamphlet, which reproduced this 
parallelism in its very structure, with images of African Americans on the one side, and 
Vietnamese on the other: “black people in Washington want: black power … The colored people 
of Vietnam want: Vietnamese Power.”384  Occasionally such comparison bordered on 
straightforward identification. For example, Soulbook closed a 1967 issue with the following 
announcement: “To the Vietnamese people: your confidence and determination lends impetus to 
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our own struggle for national liberation, North America’s “internal Vietnam,” and renews and 
revitalizes each day our unshakable faith in mankind. SOCK IT TO ‘EM!!!”385 
 Given this idea of solidarity, it is no surprise that radical African Americans were the first 
in North America and Western Europe to seriously argue that the best way to aid their comrades 
was to open another front inside the imperialist world. If African Americans lived the same 
colonial experience, faced the same enemy, and held the same desires for emancipation, black 
nationalists argued, then they could not limit themselves to simply holding demonstrations, 
fighting the draft, or pressuring the American government to negotiate, but had to follow the 
Vietnamese and wage armed struggle inside the United States. Ridiculing Martin Luther King, 
Jr.’s threat to help the Vietnamese by using non-violence tactics to push the American 
government into negotiations, John Watson, General Gordon Baker, and other young black 
nationalists argued it was time to use Vietnamese tactics to help African Americans win their own 
war against American imperialism. “Let us remember, first of all,” they wrote, “that the 
Vietnamese people have already shown that they really know how to handle Charlie. We support 
the Viet Cong, they are our blood brothers, having spilt their blood fighting the same white racist 
beast which we have! The Viet Cong know how to take care of themselves. It is high time we 
learned to do the same.”386 “Cowboy Johnson wants to double the daft induction into the white 
U.S. army of slavery,” they continued. “Well my program calls for tripling that number of recruits 
into an Army of Black Freedom Fighters.”387 
 The Black Army was no idle threat. In fact, RAM was busily forming a youth army, called 
the Black Guards, which was to be the forerunner of a Black Liberation Front (BLF) intended to 
wage revolution inside the United States.388 Inspired by Robert F. Williams, RAM and other 
nationalist organizations not only experimented with the idea of armed guerilla warfare, but 
practiced with firearms, studied military strategy, and made preparations for the coming 
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insurrection.389 RAM members even participated in the famous Watts Riots in Los Angeles, which 
they saw as “the inauguration of the guerilla war.” 
 For RAM, Watts was intimately connected to the war in Vietnam, a point captured by the 
agenda for the conference on Black Power they called for September 4-5, 1965 in Detroit, 
Michigan. Two of the key tasks were to “evaluate the Los Angeles Campaign,” and to “discuss the 
afroamerican’s international responsibility and the war in Vietnam.” In November 1965, RAM’s 
Chairman-in-Exile, Robert F. Williams, made these links explicit to the Vietnamese, when he 
delivered a speech at the International Conference for Solidarity with the People of Vietnam in 
Hanoi, North Vietnam. “As a representative of the Revolutionary Action Movement, I am here to 
give support to the Vietnamese people in their struggle against U.S. imperialist aggression,” he 
said. But this was not enough: 
Not only do we condemn, protest, and raise our fists in indignation at these brutal crimes 
perpetrated against the noble patriots of this gallant land, but we promise our brothers, 
and let the whole world bear witness, that we shall intensify our struggle for liberation in 
the so-called free world of the racist USA. We shall take the torch of freedom and justice 
into the streets of American and we shall set the last great stronghold of Yankee 
imperialism ablaze with our battle cry of freedom! Freedom! Freedom now or death!390 
 
 RAM’s pioneering ideas about internal colonization, armed struggle, and international 
solidarity had a profound influence on other, more visible organizations. RAM introduced Huey 
Newton and Bobby Seale, both of whom joined the Soul Students Advisory Council, to black 
nationalism and revolutionary Marxism.391 The Black Panther Party, SNCC, and others eagerly 
adopted RAM’s idea that making internal war against the American empire would be the best way 
to support the National Liberation Front (NLF).392 In September 1967, for instance, a delegation of 
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Americans led by David Dellinger, Tom Hayden, and others met representatives of the NLF in 
Bratislava, Czechoslovakia.393 There, John Wilson of SNCC told his Vietnamese counterparts 
that “we feel very close to your struggle and understand it to its fullest since we are a colonized 
people also.”394 He continued: 
It is not our job to give our brothers in arms advice. But it’s our job to do what we can to 
forward their struggle for liberation and self-determination. Therefore it is our job to 
disrupt American society by any means necessary. The duty of a revolutionary who finds 
himself captured in the heart of imperialism is to destroy that imperialism by any means 
necessary so that it cannot carry its aggression to other people of color around the 
world.”395 
 
“We believe this linkage is necessary,” he concluded, “because the goals of our struggles are the 
same and we have the same enemy.396 
 The Vietnamese, for their part, applauded African Americans for helping the Vietnamese 
by making revolution inside the United States, lending legitimacy to their claims. An August 1966 
article in the Courrier du Vietnam, North Vietnam’s primary foreign language newspaper – printed 
in French as well as English, and therefore read by radicals in North America and Western 
Europe – explained: 
The first front against American imperialism is to be found in Vietnam. The second is in the 
United States itself. In this country there are 20 million Blacks oppressed, exploited, 
despised like slaves… they realize that they share a common enemy with the Vietnamese 
people – American imperialism – and that to win freedom and equality, they must, like the 
Vietnamese people, oppose counter-revolutionary violence with revolutionary violence.397  
  
Surprisingly, although this article, acknowledged the special bond between the Vietnamese and 
African Americans, it simultaneously expanded the idea of the second front to include the white 
antiwar movement as well. These two movements, the white and the black, “fusing into an 
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imposing force,” the article read, “constitute the Second Front against American imperialism.”398 
African Americans and white radicals could both offer tremendous assistance to the Vietnamese 
since they were strategically placed inside the United States, able to wage the struggle behind 
enemy lines, so to speak. “Attacked on both fronts,” the article concluded, “American imperialism 
will be defeated by the American people and the Vietnamese.”399 
Most white radicals in the United States, however, did not take the offer seriously. Some 
accepted that African Americans could play this role – the organizers of the famous October 1967 
march on the Pentagon, for example, officially declared, “We recognize that there is only one 
struggle – for self-determination – and we support it in Vietnam and in Black America.”400 Most, 
however, did not feel that white Americans could play this kind of revolutionary role. Some, like 
the Communist Party USA (CPUSA), were happy to link the war to struggles at home, but like 
most of the official Communist Movement, did not call for revolution, either at home or abroad, 
believing the war could end through negotiations.401 Others, such as the Socialist Workers’ Party 
(SWP) felt the best way to end the war was not to bring it home, which sounded adventurist, but 
to agitate around a single-issue campaign for immediate withdrawal.402 The Progressive Labor 
Party (PL) called for revolution, but eventually condemned all national liberation struggles, 
including those of African Americans at home and the Vietnamese abroad, as reactionary.403 As 
for Students for a Democratic Society, by far the largest formation on the American left, while 
some of its members did identify with the NLF, even to the point of trying to share their struggle, 
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this was often framed within a moralistic perspective. For instance, at the very same 1967 
meeting in Bratislava, Tom Hayden reportedly said, “now we are all Viet Cong.” While the media 
spun this as a declaration of war, he was not suggesting that American radicals emulate the Viet 
Cong ’s model of guerilla warfare in the United States, but that Americans should share the 
suffering of the Vietnamese victims. As Hayden, bemoaning the misquote, clarified later, the “test” 
of solidarity “is whether we as Americans can identify enough with the suffering and ordeal of the 
Vietnamese people to feel what they feel, and not turn away. So when the Pentagon carries out a 
search-and-destroy mission and demands to know where are the Viet Cong, we will be able to 
step forward and say, ‘Here we are, take us instead …’”404 Thus, with few exceptions, the white 
American left, though bestowed a place in the second front, did not accept the offer at this time.  
 
Multiplying the Fronts 
If white Americans were not ready to join the second front, radicals elsewhere were. In 
April 1967, one revolutionary fighting deep in the jungles of Bolivia issued an appeal for not only a 
second front, but for multiple fronts. In his final address to “the peoples of the world,” Ernesto Che 
Guevara laid out what, in the words of one radical, would become “the internationalist manifesto 
of our generation.”405 Che’s vision of solidarity was simple: he proposed that the best way to help 
the Vietnamese would be to create a worldwide front against American imperialism. Of course, 
although he was one of the earliest defenders of the Vietnamese revolution, the idea of a 
worldwide anti-imperialist front preceded him, perhaps most powerfully expressed at the first 
meeting of the Tricontinental in January 1966.406 After all, the Tricontinental, which brought 
together delegates from Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the first international body committed 
to the overthrow of imperialism to be organized by the Third World itself, unanimously recognized 
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the program of the FLN and the four points of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, offered its 
active support to the revolution, and created a continuing solidarity committee. In his closing 
speech, Fidel Castro even offered to send Cubans to fight there: 
Thousands and thousands of Cubans have expressed the desire and readiness to go 
anywhere in the world where they may be needed to help the revolutionary movement and 
this is logical. If the Yankee imperialists feel free to bomb anywhere they please and send 
their mercenary troops to put down the revolutionary movement anywhere in the world, 
then the revolutionary peoples feel they have the right, even with their physical presence, 
to help the peoples who are fighting the Yankee imperialists.407 
 
The Vietnamese welcomed this tremendous show of support, proposing a worldwide front 
to combat American imperialism. Since the “struggle, destiny, and future of the Vietnamese 
people are tied to those of the peoples of the three continents of Asia, Africa, and Latin America,” 
the Courrier du Vietnam’s report declared, their task was to “concentrate all their efforts in order 
to defeat, together with the Vietnamese people, the new military adventures of Yankee 
imperialism.” 408 This meant demonstrations, boycotts, financial donations, and even sending 
“volunteers to fight alongside the Vietnamese people.”409 
But in 1967, Che advocated a different vision.410 Instead of dispatching revolutionaries to 
Vietnam, as Castro offered, he suggested that the best way to assist the Vietnamese revolution 
would be to intensify struggles wherever else American imperialism was engaged. Vietnam, he 
said, is “isolated”; to break that isolation, revolutionaries had to “create, two, three, many 
Vietnams.”411 Instead of fortifying one front, they had to build new ones. 
While in certain respects Che merely updated an already familiar idea of solidarity, his 
contribution nevertheless proved decisive. Not only did he articulate a complex strategy into an 
elegantly poetic slogan, he found a way to justify the move from the two to the many. While the 
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Vietnamese often spoke of the “second front,” it was not until Che that radicals across the globe 
could seriously contemplate a plurality of coordinated fronts. Above all, he personally 
demonstrated how his sensational slogan could be operationalized; he lived his vision of 
solidarity, setting an example for others to follow. 
Of course, Che primarily had Latin America in mind. It is often forgotten that the phrase 
“two, three, many Vietnams,” is used twice in that address, the first time in overt reference to 
Latin America. “America, a forgotten continent in the last liberation struggles,” Che explained, “will 
today have a task of much greater relevance: creating a Second or a Third Vietnam …”412 Latin 
American countries faced the same kind of imperialism as the Vietnamese, he said. While they 
had won their independence long ago, unlike the newly decolonizing countries of Asia and Africa, 
they were the first to feel the brunt of American imperialism, which had now subsumed the 
colonialism of the old European empires. Latin America, more than anywhere else, offered the 
most fertile terrain for building new fronts against imperialism. At the same time, however, Che’s 
grandiloquence pushed the idea further, suggesting that any country facing Yankee imperialism 
could become a front. Many Vietnams would “flourish throughout the world,” he prophesized, as 
American imperialism would be “impelled to disperse its forces under the sudden attack and the 
increasing hatred of all peoples of the world!”413 While Latin America was perhaps best poised to 
make new fronts, it was not the only place where this could happen.  
Vietnamese representatives had the opportunity to officially welcome his conceptual 
discovery at the first meeting of the Organization for Latin American Solidarity (OLAS) in Havana, 
Cuba the following July: “when ‘2, 3, or many Vietnams,’ as comrade Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara puts 
it, emerge, when in the very heart of the USA the movement of the American people in struggle, 
particularly the black sector, develops with the force of a storm, it is certain that North American 
imperialism can no longer stay standing.”414 Solidifying this emerging alliance between the 
Vietnamese, Latin Americans, and African Americans, SNCC’s Stokely Carmichael spoke at the 
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meeting as well.415  “The struggle we are engaged in is international,” he argued, “we know very 
well that what happens in Vietnam affects our struggle here and what we do affects the struggle 
of the Vietnamese people.”416 OLAS’s General Declaration echoed the sentiment, formalizing the 
mutual reciprocity of their struggles: “the heroic struggle of the people of Viet Nam aids all 
revolutionary peoples fighting against imperialism to an inestimable degree and constitutes an 
inspiring example for the peoples of Latin America.” OLAS ended the conference by advocating 
for armed struggle throughout Latin America.417  
This emerging worldwide front against U.S. imperialism prompted the NLF to update its 
program almost immediately after the conference. Departing from the original 1960 statement, the 
new program assumed an aggressive internationalist stance. In Part 4, Section 3, the NLF vowed 
to “actively support the national liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America against imperialism and old and new colonialism,” support “the just struggle of Black 
people in the United States for their fundamental national rights,” and “the struggle of the 
American people against the U.S. imperialists’ war of aggression in Viet Nam.” In a passage read 
by radicals the world over, the NLF called to consolidate their struggles into a “world peoples’ 
front in support of Viet Nam against the U.S. imperialist aggressors…”418 
In late 1967, Le Duan, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam and Ho Chi Minh’s right hand man, went further, condensing all these 
internationalist ideas into a powerful historical statement. “The struggle of the Vietnamese people 
is the offensive point of the global revolutionary tide,” he declared.419 The “global counter-
revolutionary strategy of American imperialism,” however, was to “contain the revolutionary wave” 
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by destroying the Vietnamese revolution.420 Thus, the “objective situation” called for a worldwide 
coordination of forces, “the constitution of a united global front against imperialism, with American 
imperialism at the head.”421 
 
 
The Worldwide Anti-Imperialist Front 
Radicals in France followed these developments with great interest. The Comité Vietnam 
National reported on OLAS,422 glowingly reviewed Le Duan’s book,423 interviewed Vietnamese 
officials, and ravenously consumed literature from Vietnam, including Le Courrier Vietnam. 
Despite their differences, French radicals paid close attention to black struggles in the United 
States, which they all saw as an integral front in the global struggle against American imperialism. 
As the Union jeunesses communistes marxistes-léninistes (UJCml) argued, “The resolute 
struggle of the African American people of the United States is a blow against American 
imperialism, it forms an integral part of the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and 
nations of the world.” “Each battle fought by black Americans,” they continued, “weakens 
imperialism and constitutes support for the revolutionary struggles of people elsewhere in the 
world.”424  
A few, like the Jeunesse communiste révolutionnaire (JCR) even toyed with the idea of 
opening new fronts inside Western Europe. The JCR argued as early as 1965 that “the best way 
to support a people in struggle is to intensify the class struggle against one’s own bourgeoisie. 
The best way to help the Vietnamese revolution is to weaken global imperialism by effectively 
threatening the capitalist order in one’s own country.”425 The delegates to the March 1967 
Vietnam conference in Brussels shared this sentiment: “the worldwide escalation of the anti-
imperialist struggle involves in Western Europe the intensification of the struggle against capitalist 
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governments and against their political and military instruments …”426 But for these radicals, such 
notions, however rhetorically persuasive or intellectually seductive, nevertheless remained 
unrealizable as strategy. These groups were far too marginal, they had no examples to follow, 
and struggles at home never approached the desired degree of mass militancy. The idea was 
therefore banished to abstraction and many Western European groups focused their activism on 
winning the ideological war, that is, changing public opinion, raising consciousness, pressuring 
their own governments, and hoping to isolating the United States. In their day-to-day practice, 
they continued to collect aid for Vietnam, circulate literature, and hold demonstrations. 
Over the course of 1967 and into the beginning of 1968, however, a series of events not 
only legitimated the idea of waging war at home, but convinced many French radicals to adopt it 
as the most effective form of solidarity. First, struggles in the United States, especially those led 
by African Americans gained in militancy, suggesting to the French that black radicals’ objective 
of opening a second front could succeed. In the summer of 1967, Detroit city police raided a party 
where a number of African-Americans celebrated the return of two local GI’s from Vietnam. An 
altercation ensued, followed by one of the largest riots in American history.427 When it was over, 
43 lay dead, 1,189 injured, 7,200 arrested, and over than 2,000 buildings razed. Detroit was not 
the only uprising in the United States; that summer 159 race riots exploded across the country.428 
For Pierre Rousset, the JCR’s Vietnam specialist, these events confirmed that African Americans, 
“concentrated in the vital centers of the U.S.A., the most exploited part of the working class, 
oppressed racial minority, experiencing the intolerability of the present situation, possessing the 
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will to act,” were emerging as the vanguard of the coming American Revolution.429 The JCR 
certainly projected its desires onto these riots, contorting all African Americans into urban 
guerrillas. Yet the thought of a revolutionary force struggling inside the heart of American 
imperialism, even if based on a misreading, gave substance to the idea of multiple fronts. 
Second, a new round of struggles at home suggested the return of revolution to the 
imperialist countries. In France, workers struck at a nylon and polyester factory in Besançon on 
February 25, 1967, with demonstrations rapidly spreading to neighboring plants. 430 The workers 
even convinced Chris Marker to document their struggle, and the film would have an enormous 
radicalizing effect on the new generation of activists.431 Indeed, young radicals from all 
tendencies hailed the strike, perhaps the most militant in over a decade, as signaling the 
definitive return of “class struggle.”432  The “length, scale, and violence of the movement,” the 
JCR wrote, not only revealed the bankruptcy of syndicalist capitulation, but also put to rest all 
those “neo-capitalist ‘theories’ about the deep complacency of a sated and bourgeoisified working 
class.”433 The strike prefigured the militant mass actions of May 1968, opening the cycle of what 
historian Xavier Vigna has called “worker insubordination.”434 At the same time, events were 
moving rapidly in those countries that neighbored France. In Germany, for example, German 
police shot and killed a young student, Benno Ohnesorg, triggering a wave of militant action. 
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The heightened political situation in North America and Western Europe in turn 
radicalized growing frustration with the antiwar movement. Despite persistent worldwide 
condemnation, the war continued to escalate. In March 1967, the United States increased its aid 
to South Vietnam to a total of $700 million for the year. In December, the number of US military 
personnel on the ground reached 486,600. By the end of the year, the United States had dropped 
864,000 tons of American bombs on North Vietnam – compared with 653,000 tons during the 
entire Korean War and 503,000 tons in the Pacific theater during the Second World War.435 In the 
face of such carnage, traditional forms of protest appeared ineffective. At a strategic impasse, 
antiwar activists in Western Europe searched for more militant forms of solidarity. 
Even if the idea of opening another front seemed more legitimate, revolution appeared 
more likely in Europe, and the influence of radical groups seemingly greater than ever before, an 
intractable theoretical problem remained: how could these radicals possibly justify opening 
multiple fronts in Western Europe, which was not directly involved in the war?436 Before radicals 
in Western Europe could make the slogan “two, three, many Vietnams” the “categorical 
imperative of solidarity,” as Daniel Bensaïd, one of the leaders of the JCR, later put it, they still 
had to resolve a final conceptual obstacle: they did not confront American imperialism in the 
same way that African Americans, Latin Americans, or the Vietnamese did.437 
These radicals solved the problem by arguing, along the lines of the Brussels Statement, 
that imperialism was a larger system that was not reducible to the foreign policy of the United 
States alone. While the United States formed imperialism’s “head,” it needed the support of other 
capitalist countries in Europe, which meant that European radicals had an equally revolutionary 
part to play in the struggle. But they went even further, effectively decoupling imperialism from the 
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United States, and turning it into its own autonomous force. In this way, the enemy ceased to be 
“U.S. imperialism,” but “imperialism” pure and simple. For radicals, imperialism was basically 
synonymous with worldwide counter-revolution in the service of capitalism. As radicals explained 
in the antiwar youth international’s official announcement for their next conference, scheduled to 
take place in Berlin in February 1968: “Imperialism seeks, through its offensive operations in 
Vietnam, in Latin America, its maneuvers in Greece with its general, to change the international 
relations of force. Its goal is to terminate the development of the global revolution and to attempt 
an attack on the conquests of the workers movement.”438 In other words, wherever capitalism 
was in danger, imperialism would rush to the rescue, repressing struggles, overthrowing 
governments, or going to war. This conceptual reduction, it should be noted, had ambiguous 
results. On the one hand, it risked evacuating the concept of imperialism of its historical 
specificity, turning it into a subject with its own will. On the other hand, reducing imperialism to an 
abstract synonym of capitalist counter-revolution was immensely effective at the agitational level. 
It gave radicals a broad, expansive enemy that could be fought wherever they were.  
All these ideas were codified into an official strategy in the Executive Bureau of the 
Brussels Conference’s statement, released in December 1967. The statement argued that 
Vietnam served as a focal point, a “a decisive confrontation between the international revolution 
and counter-revolution.” But that struggle between imperialism and world revolution extended 
globally, assuming different forms in different national contexts. In Europe, the struggle took the 
form of an attempted onslaught against the working classes, who were said to be objective allies 
of the national liberation struggles abroad. Thus, “Europe constitutes a decisive battlefield in the 
anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist struggle.”439 The duty of the revolutionaries in Europe, the 
authors of the statement argued, was to open another front against “the international counter-
revolution,” which meant the “intensification of class struggle.”440 “This strategy,” the statement 
concluded, “finds its expression in Guevara’s call to “create two, three, many Vietnams, a 
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conception that revives proletarian internationalism.”441 With this, French radicals not only found a 
way to justify making domestic revolution, the antiwar international transformed itself into a 
revolutionary, anti-imperialist international. 
 
Meeting of the Tribes 
In the days before February 17, 1968 radicals from North America and Western Europe 
filed into trains, boarded planes, and packed into cars. Their destination: Berlin. Their objective: to 
build the worldwide anti-imperialist front inside the advanced capitalist world. The Berlin 
Conference held at the Technical University on February 17-18 1968, and the international march 
that followed, marked an important turning point for radicals.442 “It was the first real gathering of 
the clans,” recalled Tariq Ali, who represented the British VSC, “and it reinforced our 
internationalism as well as the desire for a world without frontiers.”443  
The choice of Berlin was deliberate. Germany was not only the home of the most militant 
student organization in Europe. As the CVN put it, “‘Showcase’ of capitalism and emblem of the 
‘German Miracle,’ Berlin is also the outpost of the Federal Republic of Germany, where, over 
twenty years after the war, 250,000 American soldiers are still stationed, and which is presented 
as a model of social stability where the great mass movements are practically inexistent.”444 
Gathering in Berlin, the JCR argued, “assumed a particular resonance,” since they would be in 
the very “bastion of European capitalism.”445 
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Berlin was also a city under siege. Police murdered a demonstrator in 1967, the press 
demonized the student movement as terrorists, and the Bundestag discussed banning SDS. 
Meeting in Berlin, then calling for a massive demonstration the following day, was not only a show 
of strength, but a direct provocation. Upon hearing that thousands of radicals from all over Europe 
would storm Berlin, the municipal government prepared for battle, further encouraging radicals. 
The JCR reported to its readers that the Senate had banned the international demonstration, 
“3,000 cops were directed to reinforce the city,” and “the chief of police had reserved 4,000 
vacant cells in the central prison, in the English sector.”446 
It was against this background that approximately five thousand radicals from over fifteen 
European and North American countries – including a delegation from Turkey – met to discuss 
the future of the international radical left. Although a number were in some way affiliated with the 
Trotskyist Fourth International, participants represented a broad spectrum of political ideologies, 
from anarchism to Third Worldism, Trotskyism to Situationism, and insurrectionism to anti-
revisionism. The conference brought together personalities as distinct as Manuel Castells, the 
theorist of urban space, Paola Parangua, the future Argentinian revolutionary, Gianciacomo 
Feltrinelli, the publishing magnate turned guerilla, and Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a Nanterre sociology 
student who would be catapulted into fame during May 68.447 Those unable to attend such as 
Stokely Carmichael and Jean-Paul Sartre delivered messages of support.448 There was even a 
delegation from Vietnam present.449 
Indeed, what brought them together, despite their differences, was precisely Vietnam. It 
not only united the radical tribes, it did so under the sign of international revolution, something 
captured by the enormous NLF flag blanketing the main auditorium, which blazoned Che’s 
unforgettable command that “The Duty of Every Revolutionary is to Make Revolution.” For two 
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days, radicals not only traded stories, shared tactics, and briefed one another on the political 
situations of their own countries, they discussed how to contribute to the Vietnamese revolution. 
There was a general consensus that it was time to intensify the struggle in the imperialist 
countries themselves. The most vocal proponents of this idea, as we have seen, were radical 
African Americans, primarily represented at the conference by Ray Robinson and Dale Smith of 
SNCC. “As long as parents in Vietnam are crying about their children,” Smith threatened in Berlin 
“parents in the USA should cry about their children, too.”450 
The Germans were also exceptionally militant.451 They had, more than other European 
groups, forged deep transnational ties with the American movement, through which they learned 
direct action tactics.452 They were also acutely aware of their country’s Nazi past, vowing to 
prevent such horrors from repeating, unlike their parents, whom they pinned as cowards.453 This 
seemed particularly exigent given the country’s incomplete de-Nazification – Nazi laws were still 
active, the civil service had not been purged, and many leading businessmen and politicians had 
loyally served in the SS.454 In addition, the radical left was an isolated minority in a very hostile 
country. The Federal Republic of Germany aligned strongly with the United States, the state was 
fiercely anti-communist, and there was little chance the working class would join in any kind of 
revolution, as in France or Italy. This extreme marginalization led many German radicals to 
militant action. If they could never hope to sway the majority of public opinion in their favor, why 
fear radical actions that might further alienate a fundamentally hostile populace?  
Lastly, since Germany was, of all the European countries, closest to the United States, 
with its accommodating government, American military bases, and GIs, the German left could 
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more easily justify bringing the war home as a way to materially aiding the Vietnamese. Peter 
Weiss, the revolutionary artist, gave expression to this sentiment when he unequivocally 
declared: “The NLF – the sole and victorious representative of the revolutionary people – has 
given us the task of organizing the resistance in the metropoles.” Only by meeting this challenge, 
he continued, would radicals in the imperialist world pass from mere “spectators” to “participants 
in the liberation struggle.” It was time to begin the struggle in the “cities, universities and schools, 
and vulnerable industries of the capitalist world,” resorting to sabotage “wherever possible.”455 
Rudi Dutschke, one of main leaders of SDS, further emphasized the need to internationalize the 
revolution, “if to the Viet-Cong there will not be added an American, a European, and an Asiatic 
Cong, the Vietnamese revolution will fail as others before.”456 
Significantly, however, most radicals, even those not from Germany, were ready to 
accept this logic. Of course, making revolution at home necessarily meant very different things in 
different contexts, but the Berlin Conference effected a kind of synchronization whereby the 
various national radical lefts – all of which, though certainly networked to one another, had 
nevertheless developed according to their own temporal rhythm – for a brief moment converged 
on the same plane of consistency. It is only in this context that we can understand why, at what 
Tariq Ali called a “high point” of the Conference, everyone joined the chant led by African 
American radicals: 
I ain’t gonna go to Vietnam 
Because Vietnam is where I am 
Hell no! I ain’t gonna go! 
Hell no! I ain’t gonna go! 457 
 
While these words were accurate only for African Americans and other oppressed minorities in 
the United States, and certainly not for West European radicals, the Conference nevertheless 
allowed radicals to adopt a common form of international revolutionary solidarity. 
As radicals plotted to bring revolution to the imperialist world, the city authorized the 
scheduled march, and the next day around 20,000 revolutionaries draped in red banners 
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marched through the streets of Berlin.458 Hoping to discredit German radicals, the papers 
regularly referred to the SDS as “a small radical minority.” In response, when reporters, 
administrators, and the police came to surveil the march, the impressive crowd boomed in unison, 
“we are a small active minority,” as if to show that, globally speaking, the German radical left was 
not at all isolated, but could count on the active solidarity of radicals throughout Europe and 
beyond. Some German bystanders were emboldened to join, even though the state exhorted 
citizens to avoid the march. The JCR reported that one German remarked, “It’s the first time since 
1933 that one sees so many red flags on the streets of Berlin!”459 
Even more significantly, radicals not only reactivated, and even exchanged, their own 
national revolutionary traditions – Germans carrying portraits of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa 
Luxembourg; the Italians of Falce Martello and the PSIUP chanting “Bandiera Rossa” – they saw 
the march as the first step in formalizing the united European Front. As the CVN put it “this 
European Front must not be a word just thrown onto paper,” but should “really lead to the war 
against imperialism in the metropoles.” “The Berlin demonstration of February 17 and 18,” the 
article went on, was at the same time its “beginning and guarantee.”460 
The Berlin demonstration was important in one final, unanticipated respect. At the very 
moment that all these radicals linked arms and dreamt of revolution, the Vietnamese unleashed a 
devastating surprise attack. Beginning on January 30, 1968, the Vietnamese lunar New Year Têt, 
nearly eighty thousand NLF and NVA soldiers launched what was at that point the largest 
offensive of the war, overrunning 100 cities, towns, and provincial capitals throughout Vietnam in 
a coordinated strike that shocked the entire world. Communists held Hué for twenty-five days, 
dislodged only after the United States Air Force destroyed eighty percent of the city; 35 NLF 
battalions invaded Saigon; and, most daringly, nineteen guerillas stormed the US Embassy.461  
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The campaign hit like a thunderbolt. Millions of Americans, told for years that the war was 
almost over, now gaped at images of slain GIs sprawled on the Embassy floor. Têt set the 
media’s tapestry of lies ablaze, violently exposed American imperialism’s fragility, and proved to 
the world that the Vietnamese would win. Its effect on young radicals was immeasurable. To 
radicals, the worldwide anti-imperialist front was no longer just rhetoric; revolution had become a 
reality. 
News of the ongoing offensive poured in as thousands of these radicals gathered in 
Berlin. Tariq Ali recalls how 
The Tet offensive had begun even while we were preparing to open the Congress. Every 
fresh victory was reported to the Congress amidst louder and louder applause. The 
Vietnamese were demonstrating in the most concrete fashion imaginable that it was 
possible to fight and win. This was critical in shaping the consciousness of our 
generation. We believed that change was not only necessary, but possible.462 
 
Following the offensive as it unfolded, radicals felt they were fighting alongside the NLF. “This 
was a time,” Ali continued, “when it really seemed as if our actions in the West were co-ordinated 
with what was happening on the actual battlefields in Vietnam.”463 The Vietnamese were beating 
imperialism in South East Asia; it was time for radicals to do their part in North America and 
Western Europe. Têt accelerated political time. Defeat was around the corner; worldwide 
revolution felt immanent. When radicals left Berlin that February, they took with them not only 
new tactics, contacts, and slogans, or even a committed revolutionary perspective, but a feeling 
of incredible urgency.464 
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CHAPTER 4: TRANSLATING VIETNAM 
 
In the 1967 omnibus film Far from Vietnam, Jean-Luc Godard muses aloud about what it 
means to support a struggle when one is so far, in every sense of the word, from the scene.465 He 
admits, with brutal honesty, how he wanted to travel to Vietnam, but the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam declined his offer. This refusal, he confesses, was for the best. Driven by altruism, yet 
knowing nothing of that struggle, he was more likely to have “made things worse, rather than 
better.” Vietnam was not his struggle; how could he possibly film it? You cannot “talk about 
bombs when they are not falling on your head,” he sagaciously pointed out.466  
 Godard posed the most important political question of the period – how could one most 
effectively demonstrate solidarity with a struggle that is not one’s own? Antiwar radicals in France 
experimented with many forms of international solidarity in the 1960s: they formed grassroots 
committees, hosted teach-ins, held mass marches, agitated in neighborhoods, schools, and 
factories, assisted deserting GIs, put the United States on trial for genocide, and some even 
attempted to organize international brigades to combat U.S. imperialism directly in Southeast 
Asia. But by the end of the decade, an escalating war, an increasingly militant global political 
landscape, and a new conception of anti-imperialist struggle pushed thousands of radicals to 
embrace one form of solidarity above all others. 
“Instead of invading Vietnam with generosity,” Godard explained, we must “let Vietnam 
invade us.” 467 In other words, the best way to support Vietnam would be to “create a Vietnam” in 
France. For Godard in 1967, this meant looking to the struggles already unfolding in France, such 
as the Rhodiaceta factory strike in Besançon, which prefigured the explosive events of May 1968. 
While Far From Vietnam became enormously important for the young radicals later involved in 
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the May events, the directors debuted the film not in a Parisian theatre, but inside the Rhodiaceta 
plant itself. The connection was not lost on the audience. Georges Maurivard, a Rhodiaceta 
worker, introduced the film by affirming: “It will be about us.”468 
Neither Godard nor any of the thousands of radicals who pursued this strategy invented 
the idea in the 1960s; but they did, through a dense transnational network, reanimate it for their 
own historical conjuncture. Some French radicals, especially youths, formed a new antiwar 
international to coordinate their efforts. Through these exchanges, many came to believe that the 
best way to assist their Vietnamese comrades would be to open a second front within the 
imperialist countries of North America and Western Europe. The best form of solidarity, therefore, 
was one that could reproduce the distant struggle they sought to support. To do so, they 
translated that struggle into their own particular contexts. In France, young radicals’ efforts to 
bring home the anti-imperialist revolution of the Vietnamese triggered a series of events that 
would culminate in May ’68. Internationally, just as the Vietnamese inspired the French, the 
events of May ’68 inspired radicals in the United States, who in turn tried to translate May ’68 into 
their own domestic vernaculars. Thus, the radical left’s turn to revolution was in large part an 
attempt to bring the anti-imperialist struggles of the Vietnamese home to the imperialist world. 
Seen in this way, the entire arc of radical upheaval in the United States and France from late 
1967 to the early 1970s must be understood as the opening of other fronts in the worldwide anti-
imperialist struggle led by the Vietnamese, with the wars at home serving as auxiliaries to the war 
in Vietnam. 
 
The Second Front Opens in Europe 
French radicals from the JCR, CVN, ESU, and other formations returned from Berlin high 
on revolution. Losing no time, they prepared to “inaugurate a new type of political demonstration” 
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on February 21, 1968 to “break decidedly with the routine of nonchalant processions.”469 Although 
some plans had been laid in advance, the events of Berlin changed the action’s tenor.470 From 
Berlin, they not only brought a German SDS banner, which they would wave during the 
demonstration, but the fast-march chant “Ho Ho Ho Chi Minh,” which now spread throughout 
Western Europe, and a variety of confrontational street tactics they had learned from the German 
SDS.471 Their service d’ordre, or what amounted to the group’s flying squad, had been 
“particularly ‘hardened’ since Berlin, they threatened.472 The most important export, however, was 
a more fully developed conviction to wage the revolution at home. That day, CVN, JCR, and 
UNEF radicals would not simply protest the war, but “make the Latin Quarter into the Heroic 
Vietnam Quarter.”473  
On February 21, six CVN activists planted the NLF and North Vietnamese flags on the 
Sorbonne, as hundreds of others changed street signs, renamed buildings, and covered the walls 
of the Latin Quarter with posters celebrating the recent victories of the NLF. Boulevard Saint-
Michel became Boulevard du Vietnam Heroique; the lycée Saint-Louis became the lycée Nguyen 
Van Troi, after the guerilla famously executed in 1964 for attempting to assassinate US Secretary 
of Defense Robert McNamara and future ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge; an effigy of Lyndon 
Johnson was hung in the Fontaine St. Michel, just over the subdued devil, and set ablaze; and 
the words “FNL Vaincra” appeared in burning letters above the gates of the Jardin du 
                                                
469 “21 Février, Journée du Vietnam Héroïque,” Avant-Garde Jeunesse 10-11 (February-March 
1968): 14. See also, Daniel Bensaïd, An Impatient Life, 56; CVN, “Le 21 Février sera la journée 
du Vietnam héroïque,” February 1968, and CVN, “Tout Pour la Victoire,” February 1968, F Delta 
Res 2089, La Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine (BDIC), Nanterre, 
France.  
470 February 21 held great importance in France. In 1944 the Nazis executed 22 immigrants, led 
by the Armenian-French communist Missak Manouchian, at Fort Mont-Valérien near Paris; during 
the Algerian War, activists revived it as an international day of action against colonialism; and in 
1967, radicals rechristened it a day of anti-imperialist solidarity with the Vietnamese Revolution. 
CVN et al., “Journée d’action anti-impérialiste du 21 février,” February 21, 1968, Tract 4628, 
Bibliothèque nationale de France (BNF). 
471 Alain Krivine, Ça te passera avec l’âge (Paris: Flammarion, 2006), 96; Geneviève Dreyfus-
Armand and Laurent Gervereau, eds. Mai 68: Les mouvements étudiants en France et dans la 
monde, Catalogue de la BDIC (Paris, 1988), 140. 
472 “21 Février, Journée du Vietnam Héroïque,” 14. 
473 Ibid. 
  
 
150 
Luxembourg.474 In arguably their most militant antiwar action yet, a coalition of radicals took 
Che’s idea of “creating two, three, many Vietnams” literally, bringing Vietnam to Paris by mutating 
its very physiognomy.  
The campaign continued into the following months. On March 18, 1968, antiwar radicals 
bombed the offices of three American businesses. Two days later, several hundred 
demonstrators smashed the windows of the American Express offices in the Rue Scribe. The 
police arrested six activists, including Nicolas Boulte, one of the student leaders of the CVN, and -
Xavier Langlade of the JCR. Radicals immediately viewed the arrests as part of a state campaign 
to repress antiwar demonstrations, with the CVN publishing an article in Le Monde alerting the 
public to the repression.475 Significantly, the arrest created unity between rival factions.476 On 
March 22, 1968, 150 students from different political tendencies occupied a conference room at 
the Nanterre campus, forming a coalition called the Mouvement du 22 Mars, in direct emulation of 
Fidel Castro’s Movimiento 26 de Julio.477 It was this coalition, in which the JCR played a very 
important role, that would go on to spark the events of May 1968. That month, the efforts of the 
March 22 Movement to defend their arrested antiwar comrades snowballed, prompting the 
closure of not only the Nanterre Campus, but also the Sorbonne, ultimately triggering the police 
repression that kicked off the events of May 68.478 In that month, mass student unrest articulated 
with a general strike of over nine million workers, forcing President de Gaulle to surreptitiously 
flee the country.479 
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Reflecting on the events, Jean-Paul Sartre once suggested that, “the origins of May lie in 
the Vietnamese Revolution.”480 As radicals themselves recognized, Vietnam “played a 
determinant role in radicalizing youth.”481 The war, historian Nicolas Pas has demonstrated, 
allowed the fledgling radical left to escape from the French Communist Party (PCF). For instance, 
while the Party chanted “Peace in Vietnam,” radicals distinguished themselves with “NLF will 
Win!,” proposing their own stance on the burning international issue of the day.482 In addition, 
historian Bethany Keenan has shown how antiwar activity allowed young radicals to gain 
invaluable experiences – learning how to organize events, hold demonstrations, and battle the 
police.483 Above all, antiwar work allowed radicals to experiment with a variety of organizational 
forms that would take center stage during the May events. In some cases, especially at the high 
school level, the Vietnam Committees simply transformed into the Action Committees of May.484 
Antiwar activism, in other words, prefigured May of 1968, providing radicals with a “veritable 
political formation.”485 
More profoundly, however, Vietnam lay at the origins of May, Sartre continued, because 
it “expanded the field of the possible.”486 If Vietnamese peasants could defeat the most powerful 
military machine in human history, then anything was possible. Vietnam played what became 
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known as an “exemplary” role, inspiring the March 22 Movement in France.487 Thus, Vietnam set 
in motion the defining characteristic of this entire period, what might be called a chain of 
exemplarity. One struggle inspired another, which would inspire another, and so forth. “As the 
Vietnamese success inspired the students,” Tariq Ali reflected on May 68, “so now the triumph of 
the students inspired the workers.”488 To this sequence of resonating examples – which was by 
no means unidirectional, as the heroism of the workers worked back on the students – one could 
easily add how the workers’ rebellion in France in turn inspired radicals all over Europe and North 
America. 
Lastly, Vietnam lay at the origins of May because the revolution abroad provided French 
radicals with the very ideas that made May possible. “All militants,” the Maoist Gauche 
prolétarienne explained the following year, “know that the ideas they had in their heads during the 
May struggles came for the most part from the practice of the Vietnamese people.”489 They 
meant, of course, the idea of revolution. The Vietnamese not only revived it, their struggles 
redefined revolution itself as the worldwide struggle against imperialism, as the coordinated 
opening of fronts all over the world. At an international meeting in Paris on May 9, 1968 – 
involving SNCC, the German SDS, JCR, and Italian students – the radicals who made May 
possible revealed they were not just fighting against a repressive university system in France, 
they were opening a new front in the war against imperialism.490 May 68 was not a singular, 
French event; it was merely one front in the worldwide revolution, with the Vietnamese at the 
head.491 As the JCR argued in June, the “French revolution,” by which they meant the events of 
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May 68, “could have been one of Che’s ‘many other’ Vietnams.” “Reciprocally,” they went on, “the 
victory of the Vietnamese revolution reinforces our own fight.”492  
The JCR, March 22 Movement, and others were able to help open this second front 
precisely because they struggled to translate the ideas of the Vietnamese into the French context, 
making Vietnam their own. In contrast, the Maoist UJC-ml argued that this vision of solidarity only 
instrumentalized the struggles of the Vietnamese, doing violence to the particularity of the 
Vietnamese revolution. Instead, they adopted a very literal form of solidarity. Their primary 
activity, after all, consisted of convincing everyone to read the Courrier du Vietnam, for them the 
first and last word on anything that had to do with Vietnam. The group, echoing every position the 
NLF or the RDV took, served as a kind of mouthpiece. While it made for effective propaganda, 
this stance rendered the group’s antiwar work extremely rigid, and they never took the creative 
leaps that others like the JCR, March 22 Movement, or the CVN did. 
This literal attitude is one of the main reasons why the UJCml was caught completely off 
guard when rebellions finally broke out in France.493 Content to simply present what they 
assumed to be the authentic voice of the revolution abroad, unwilling to interpret it in light of their 
own conditions, and therefore unable to see how deeply Vietnam resonated with other seemingly 
distinct issues at home, the UJCml missed the events of May ’68.494 Instead of joining thousands 
of students on the barricades, the UJCml – which had been eagerly awaiting the Peace Talks 
between North Vietnam and the United States, which were held in Paris during May 1968 – 
instructed its members to gather around the Vietnamese embassy as the best way to show their 
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“support and complete solidarity” for North Vietnam as the talks were about to unfold.495 After 
realizing their too literal vision of solidarity prevented them from playing a part in a potential 
revolutionary opening, which would have been an even more profound act of solidarity with the 
Vietnamese struggle than surrounding an embassy, the group saw no choice but to dissolve 
itself. After the May events, the JCR admonished the UJCml, explaining that remaining loyal to 
the Vietnamese did not mean following their every wish, but rather activating the essence of their 
example. “It was stupid,” they wrote, scolding the UJCml, “to put one’s self at the service of the 
Vietnamese because the Vietnamese cannot judge for us the possibilities of our actions.”496 
Some in the UJCml learned their mistake. In June they conceded that “the Vietnamese 
example is universal.”497 After the UJCml’s auto-dissolution in November, some radicals – many 
of whom would go on to form La Gauche prolétarienne, the most dynamic of the Maoist groups in 
France after 1968 – continued the new direction with their paper La Cause du peuple. “The mass 
movement of May-June in France,” a lengthy article announcing their adhesion to the worldwide 
anti-imperialist front explained, “is a link in a long chain that encircles imperialism before 
strangling it. The revolutionary flames spread from one end of the world to the other.”498 
May allowed radicals to explore the challenges of “creating many Vietnams” On the one 
hand, as the UJCml pointed out, this vision of solidarity risked speaking for the oppressed, with 
an orientalizing, even imperialist perspective – silencing the voices of those who fight in favor of 
Western radicals’ own idealist projections. If they ignored difference, radicals not only 
decontextualized struggles, but risked substituting themselves for the Vietnamese, turning 
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solidarity into its opposite. Yet at the same time, other radicals, such as the JCR, recognized that 
bending the stick too far the other way, insisting on absolute difference, risked foreclosing all 
creative resonance with the Vietnamese struggle, reducing solidarity to either hero worship or the 
neurotic policing of others. Radicals struggled to find the best way to approach this field of 
differences in order to make repetition possible. For without difference, there could be no 
repetition, only imitation; but too much difference would occlude all reproduction, and with it 
solidarity itself. 
 
Resonating Revolutions 
The exhilarating events of May 1968 convinced radicals across Western Europe, and 
even North America, that the strategy of building multiple fronts against imperialism could 
succeed, although this would be interpreted differently in distinct national contexts. In retrospect, 
it may seems unsurprising that the breakthrough would come in France, a country known for its 
vibrant revolutionary past. At the time, however, nothing seemed more unlikely. Compared to its 
neighbors, especially the Germans and Italians, the French radical movement seemed tame. 
Norberto Bobbio, who would go on to form Lotta Continua, one of the largest of the extra-
parliamentary groups in Italy, spoke for many when he later revealed radicals initially saw the 
American and German movements, and not the French, as vanguards.499 After May, however, 
France took center stage, to the surprise of everyone, including the French themselves. Mary 
Alice Waters of the Youth Socialist League asked Alain Krivine about the sudden change in an 
interview later published in several languages: 
We worked here month and month to organize demonstration after demonstration in 
support of the student’s struggle in Germany and Italy. We never thought that our turn 
would come so soon. The movements of solidarity in Germany, in Italy, in Belgium, as well 
as in Rome, where thousands of students marched under the slogan of “two, three, many 
Parises,” had a great impact on us; we feel part of a vast movement.500 
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Only Tet rivaled the international impact of the May events. Indeed, the two fused together in the 
imaginary of the North American and West European radical left. “The world had to be changed 
and France and Vietnam proved that it is possible to move forward,” recalled Tariq Ali of the 
Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, the premier antiwar organization in Great Britain.501 Most 
importantly, however, the May events functioned as a relay from the Third World to the imperialist 
centers, showing that North America and Western Europe could again serve as privileged sites of 
radical action.  
Inspired by what was quickly perceived as the return of revolution to the advanced 
capitalist countries, radicals everywhere learned as much as they could. Some, especially those 
in neighboring countries, went to see for themselves. In September 1968 Krivine explained that: 
since the beginning of the struggles there have been numerous delegations from the 
revolutionary student organizations in Italy, Germany, Belgium and England. They want 
to discuss with us, they want to learn from our experience, they want to aid us financially. 
Since the Berlin demonstration in February, all these student organizations have 
participated in struggles in their own countries and are putting up a fight. We will all come 
out of this with a much richer experience.502 
 
Students were not the only pilgrims. To take just one example, Rossana Rossanda, Lucio Magri, 
and Filippo Maone, all established intellectuals within the Italian Communist Party (PCI), also 
made the journey. “When we set out on our journey in France,” Rossanda recalled, “the transport 
system was still on strike, trains were idle, planes were grounded, there was no petrol and the 
filling stations were all closed. Our friend the editor Diego De Donato took the risk of lending us 
his Giulia, and we packed it with cans of petrol and hoped we wouldn’t have an accident, because 
we would have gone up in flames.”503 
Of all the visitors, the Italians had perhaps the most to learn, since their situation 
resembled the French more than any other. As in France, Italy boasted a militant working class, a 
long history of revolutionary struggle, a vibrant Marxist culture, and an enormous though largely 
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obstructionist Communist Party.504 If there was anywhere else in Europe where the political 
sequence of May 68 might have been reproduced, it was Italy, something not lost on Italian 
militants. As Sergio Bologna recalls, “The French May changed everything,” it was “a watershed 
in the collective imagination,” inspiring many Italian radicals to do the same.505 Indeed, only a few 
months later Italy would see its own wave of revolutionary struggles, sometimes called “the 
creeping May” because it spanned an entire decade.506 
The May events and the idea of making revolution inside the imperialist world even had 
an effect in those countries, such as Great Britain, where revolution seemed extremely unlikely. 
This did not stop the British government, however, from fearing they would be next. “France 
shook the ruling classes throughout Europe,” Tariq Ali, one of the main organizers of the Vietnam 
Solidarity Campaign (VSC), later put it, “and the British decided to take no chances that the 
disease would spread.”507 In an almost farcical rerun of 1789, the British state prepared for the 
worst, and the authorities openly feared that the VSC’s planned demonstration for October 1968 
would devolve into “a French-style insurrection.”508 The Press referred to the coming 
demonstration as the “October Revolution,” the government banned The Rolling Stones’ “Street 
Fighting Man,” and secret police infiltrated the VSC’s meetings. Police raided the offices of The 
Black Dwarf, a prominent radical paper with close ties to the VSC. Two days later, The Times 
published an inflammatory article warning that a “small army of militant extremists plans to seize 
control of certain highly sensitive installations and buildings in central London next month.” This 
“starting plot,” the article continued, was “uncovered by a special squad of detectives to track 
down the extremists who are understood to be manufacturing ‘Molotov cocktail’ bombs and 
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amassing a small arsenal of weapons. They plan to use these against police and property in an 
attempt to dislocate communications and law and order …”509 Although fictional, it succeeded in 
inciting fear – and fascination – that spread beyond the British Isles. Journalists flooded in from all 
over, “hoping that the next act after Paris might be London.”510 
As for British radicals, a growing number seriously believed in the possibility of 
revolution.511 Some even expected the October demonstration to trigger a nationwide insurrection 
similar to what was imagined to have happened in France. “None of us knew for sure what might 
happen,” recalled John Rose, an LSE student and member of the International Socialists, the 
other major Trotskyist group in Great Britain. 
But we thought the revolution was going to start then …We would have welcomed a 
major confrontation which would have raised the stakes and drawn the workers into the 
struggle … had there been fighting, with serious injuries, possibly even a killing, I’m quite 
sure a major student rising across the country would have taken place, and the thing 
would have exploded.”512  
 
Other LSE radicals turned their occupied university into a headquarters, complete with a medical 
center for the coming fight.513 During the famous October demonstration, some 6,000 radicals 
from the Maoist Britain-Vietnam Solidarity Front, the Action Committee for Anti-Imperialist 
Solidarity, and several anarchist groups broke from the march in an ultimately unsuccessful 
attempt to storm the US Embassy in Grosvenor Square.514 Inspired by the events in France, 
these radicals hoped to provoke the police into overreacting. Taking the embassy, they thought, 
would lead to precisely the violent confrontation that might trigger the British Revolution.515 
But most radicals, even those affiliated with The Black Dwarf, proved more sober in their 
assessment of the situation. The events in France were no doubt tremendously inspiring, 
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something symbolically captured by the many May 68 posters visible in the October march, but 
Great Britain was not the next domino. “As we listened to the news from Paris,” remembered Pete 
Gowan, a student leader at Birmingham University and a member of the British section of the 
Fourth International: 
we were aware that what was going on there was worlds away from the everyday 
realities of the British student movement. The British state, the whole political system in 
this country, had immensely more ideological authority amongst students than was the 
case on the Continent. British universities were fairly flexible, tough institutions that didn’t 
have great difficulty in absorbing and containing radical impulses.516  
 
“The very thought was absurd,” Ali argued. “Britain was not France. Labour was in office and the 
working class was restive, but quiescent … none of us ever believed that anything remotely 
resembling France could happen in Britain that year.”517 
This attitude was also shared by the International Socialists, who, while certainly inspired 
by May, and still believing in revolution, nevertheless felt that the kind of insurrection some were 
hoping for was simply utopian: 
But in Britain, the new English Jacobins who solidarized with the Vietnamese 
revolutionaries, who flew over to Paris and who pasted over their bathroom mirror Che’s 
imperative injunction “the duty of a revolutionary is to make revolution,” were troubled. 
While events in foreign parts sprouted wild plumage, the struggles in Britain were a 
determined mufti … 
 
What must be emphasized and re-emphasized is the immense gulf that separates the 
working class’s revolutionary potential and our revolutionary ideas. There are no short-
cuts to overcoming this. No amount of verbal euphoria or frenetic activism will do this – 
especially if it is confined to the university ghetto. What is required is not the heroic 
gesture or the symbolic confrontation (any more than the perfect revolution); nor is it 
vicarious participation in the self-activity of others (whether they be in Hanoi or Paris); 
rather we have to be where the various sections of the working class are as they begin to 
work out new ways of dealing with the new problems, in the factories in the unions…518 
 
Revolution was not to be abandoned, but the British could not simply mimic the sequence that 
played out in France. However much inspired by Hanoi or Paris, if it were to happen in Britain, 
revolution must necessarily assume a different form, one that would involve a much longer, less 
glamorous struggle. 
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Sensing the pressure from their left, and hoping to prevent political suicide, The Black 
Dwarf released a special issue with a print run of over 50,000 for the October demonstration, 
which featured an excerpt from Friedrich Engels’ famous essay on the ineffectiveness of street 
fighting.519 The march, numbering some 200,000 people, culminated not in revolutionary violence, 
but in old-fashioned Chartist respectability, when Tariq Ali handed a 75,000-signature petition to 
the government.  
While it seems, in retrospect, that The Black Dwarf and the VSC leadership may have 
bent the stick too far the other way – focusing on the students, avoiding confrontation, insisting on 
a single-issue campaign520 – a real change had nevertheless taken place. For if insurrection 
might not have been on the agenda for most radicals, fundamental social transformation of some 
kind was. Whatever the official public stance of the VSC, most radicals now placed greater 
emphasis on the struggle against capitalism at home. After May, the VSC pushed for an autumn 
offensive, and the discussion, having been “flavoured perceptively by the events of Paris,” called 
for a more direct confrontation with the British government, even if this never materialized in the 
streets.521 “Harold Wilson,” The Black Dwarf reported, “could ponder the problems facing de 
Gaulle at this very moment…”522 
May 68 gave substance to the idea of “creating two, three, many Vietnams” in Europe. 
But as Great Britain shows, this was not a single, unchangeable, universal doctrine, but a flexible 
guide to action, to be translated according to national conditions. Even radicals in those countries 
where revolution seemed completely unlikely, therefore, could uphold the watchword. May was 
the first opening of the worldwide anti-imperialist front’s struggle in Europe. But it would not be the 
last. As the front page of The Black Dwarf’s inaugural issue put it, echoing a chant shouted at a 
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May 25, 1968 solidarity demonstration at the French embassy in London: “We Shall Fight, We 
Shall Win: London, Paris, Rome, Berlin.”523 
 
Reversing the Polarities 
 Claimed by nearly every group, whatever its line, May 68 commanded attention in the 
United States as no other recent militant event in Europe had. The newspapers of the SWP, the 
YSL, and Progressive Labor all featured stories. New Left Notes, the official SDS bulletin, ran a 
series of articles, including a translation of a detailed eyewitness account by French radicals. The 
SDS magazine CAW! devoted its entire third issue to the “Battle of France,” presenting translated 
materials brought directly from France by a March 22 Movement activist.524  
May 68 accelerated three transformations in the United States. Above all, the sight of 
nine million striking workers compelled many radicals to reassess the American working class. 
This alone marked a revolution in ideas. Many of the young white radicals who formed the core 
institutions of the pre-1968 American New Left, especially SDS, disavowed not only the organized 
labor movement, but the broader working class as such. Present at the drafting of the Port Huron 
Statement, the founding document of SDS, activist Kim Moody, for instance, remembers the 
statement as “very, very negative, a dismissal of the labor movement.”525  “Simply stated,” 
historian Peter Levy summarizes, “the New Left inherited an anticlass perspective; it assumed 
that class struggle and class structure were essentially irrelevant to the modern American 
experience. Contemporary social theorists described the workers as satisfied, labor as 
bureaucratized and complacent, and class conflict as anachronistic.”526 There were important 
exceptions, especially among Marxist parties such as Progressive Labor or the Socialist Workers 
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Party. In general, however, during much of the 1960s few in the white American left consistently 
distinguished between the rank-and-file and the supposedly corrupt, torpid, or collaborationist 
unions that claimed to represent them. Convinced that white workers were racist, conservative, or 
bought off by capitalism, many students turned to other social subjects, ignoring the militant 
workers’ struggles slowly re-emerging across the country.527 Unlike France or Italy, much of the 
American student movement remained relatively disconnected from the workers’ movement. 
May 1968 helped change that view, something observed by Jean Dube of the JCR during 
his speaking tour of the United States and Canada in August of 1968: 
I was extremely impressed by the response of the American students. They were eager 
to know what has happened in France. But the most encouraging thing was that they are 
optimistic about the situation in North America and the struggle here. They felt that they 
might soon be confronted with a situation similar to France. On almost every campus the 
students asked how we in the student struggle in France had managed to achieve a link 
with the working class, how we had been able to involve the working class and work 
together. I think the fact that this question was asked is extremely important, because it 
shows that a lot of people here have understood the main lessons and drawn the most 
important conclusion from the May and June struggle in France: the main task of the 
student struggle in any country, if you want to carry it to a higher state, is to involve the 
young workers in the struggle.528 
 
Proposals appeared in publications such as New Left Notes, the Guardian, or Liberation, arguing 
that the strategic question of an alliance with the working class was now the order of the day.  
This new concern with labor gave Old Left groups such as Progressive Labor a shot in 
the arm. As a result, PL argued the May events fully validated their workerist line: 
France is the sharpest people’s struggle in recent history in an advanced Capitalist 
country. It clearly shows that the industrial working class is the key force on the people’s 
side in the advanced Capitalist countries … French students were very clear that while 
they could start the fight, the working class must finish it!529 
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PL tried to capitalize on this renewed interest in workers’ struggles by calling for a “worker-
student alliance,” encouraging SDSers to organize campus workers, and even plan a series of 
“summer work-ins,” and pushing students to take industrial jobs.530 
 This meant that those radicals trying to combat PL’s attempt to take over SDS had to 
confront their adversary on the question of the working class. The very reasoning behind the 
tendency known as the Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) – named after a position paper 
drafted by Jim Mellen, Mike Klonsky, and others – was precisely to “undercut” PL’s “influence in 
SDS and take away their exclusive identification with working-class politics.”531 The working class 
was no longer PL’s pet project, but the burning issue of the entire movement. “At this point in 
history,” the paper explained, “SDS is faced with its most crucial ideological decision, that of 
determining its direction with regards to the working class.”532 Thus, many of the young 
revolutionaries in SDS who once rejected the working class out of hand now upheld the 
proletariat as not only a litmus test, but as the ultimate factor in the revolution to come. 
May 68 also internationalized the white American left. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
despite a few early initiatives, the vast majority of white radicals in the United States did not seek 
out ties with other groups. If they did look abroad, it was almost exclusively to the Third World, not 
to Western Europe. Wherever such transatlantic connections existed, they were often ad hoc, 
isolated, or on a strictly personal level. While there were certainly some very important exceptions 
to the rule, such as the Socialist Workers’ Party, these groups were numerically miniscule. For 
instance, by 1968 the premier organization of the white New Left, SDS, which had discounted 
international ties for most of its history, may have had 100,000 members completely 
overwhelming the ranks of the SWP. This is not to say that the United States was not part of 
some international. For even if most American radicals did not actively build ties with their 
activists in Europe, their struggles did figure quite prominently in the imaginary of Western 
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European radicals, who looked to Americans for inspiration, models, and strategies. Nonetheless, 
for much of the 1960s, the United States was far more important for Europeans than Europe was 
for Americans. By 1968, the polarities were reversed, as it was the Americans’ turn to look 
abroad. 
As Kirkpatrick Sale notes, a sequence of events that year led to a “growing international 
consciousness for the American Movement.”533 First came the Berlin conference, which was not 
only attended by the SWP, but also representatives from SDS. Then, in April, a rightwing student 
shot Rudi Dutschke in the head, provoking a strong show of solidarity from radicals all over the 
world.534 Since Dutschke was regarded as not simply a German radical, but a highly visible 
international figure, perhaps one of the best known European radicals in the United States, his 
attempted murder was interpreted by American groups as an assault on the “international anti-
war movement.”535 The most important chain in this sequence, however, were the events of May 
1968 in France. 
May convinced many American radicals that struggles abroad were profoundly connected 
to those in the United States.536 Carl Davidson, SDS Inter-Organizational Secretary, explained 
how “there are more critical reasons for developing fraternal relations with Europeans and 
Japanese New Left groups than political education or moral solidarity; namely, we have a 
solidarity based in struggle around a community of interests.”537 He surveyed struggles in France, 
Germany, Japan, and Quebec, and proposed joint actions: “A variety of programs joining 
American, Japanese, and European New Left students could be developed, co-ordinating 
international actions around Draft-resistance, desertion, or attacks on the CIA, NATO, and other 
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military alliances.”538  “Hopefully,” he continued, “the recent dramatic struggles of the European 
New Left students will change some of our isolationist attitudes.”539 
SDSers discussed the matter at the National Interim Committee meeting in June. “On the 
whole,” the meeting minutes made clear, “the consensus was that European travel is to be 
stressed at this time. Everybody shouldn’t go to Hanoi as we have been doing; the struggle in the 
advanced capitalist countries has been ignored by SDS.”540 A debate soon erupted about the 
best way to forge these connections. Carl Oglesby suggested inviting European leaders, such as 
Daniel Cohn-Bendit or Tariq Ali, to speak in the United States. Barbara and John Ehrenreich 
vigorously opposed his proposal, arguing that passively inviting foreigners to visit the United 
States would only reinforce “the inexcusable provincialism of American SDS,” while inviting 
celebrities would simply defeat the purpose of understanding the real movements developing on 
the ground: “The bourgeois press has an understandable interest in transforming movements into 
‘personalities’ and their followings. We don’t, so let’s not fall into the trap.”541 
Acknowledging that “Columbia and France” had convinced them “that something was 
happening,” the Ehrenreichs had already embarked on an SDS-sponsored tour of Europe. They 
would write a series of research articles about the various student movements in order “to import 
whatever European movement ideas looked useful to us.” But one could not randomly “transfer” 
ideas from one context to another, they explained; they had to discover the “setting in which they 
were developed and the context in which they were applied.”542 
The Ehrenreichs were correct about forging deeper international ties. “There is no 
question,” Kirkpatrick Sale confirms, “that the growing international consciousness of the young 
American left helped to turn it in a deliberately revolutionary direction.”543  The French events 
played an instrumental role in this transformation because they demonstrated “the possibility of 
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the radical overthrow of established regimes even in advanced industrial nations despite their 
armed might and domestic entrenchment.”544 Of course, just as the May events did not 
singlehandedly convince Americans to rediscover the struggles of their own domestic working 
class, May did not suddenly reveal the idea of revolution. May was just one event in a long chain 
that ultimately pushed many American radicals in the white left into adopting revolution as a 
political possibility. One can mention the October 1967 demonstration, the Têt offensive in 
January 1968, and the riots following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in April. 
Frustration with an unresponsive government, impatience with reforms, and outrage at the 
murder of progressive leaders culminated in the “Ten Days of Resistance,” a series of 
coordinated nationwide actions in late April. At Columbia, demonstrations intersected with an 
ongoing struggle against war research at the university and a campaign against a segregatory 
gymnasium to be built in Morningside Park, which ultimately led to a prolonged campus 
occupation, with African American students holding Hamilton Hall while white SDS students 
captured Low Library, turning it into a “liberated zone” in emulation of the NLF in South 
Vietnam.545 “Two, Three, Many Columbias …,” read the front page of New Left Notes.546 
After Columbia, the ground was well prepared for the reception of May 68.547 May 
seemed to show that radicals could not only occupy buildings, shut down universities, and battle 
the police, but trigger revolution itself. That month, John Jacobs and other radical Columbia 
SDSers, inspired by events at Columbia and in France, coined the phrase “Bring the War Home.” 
Tom Hayden, present at the occupation, raised the war cry: “American educators are fond of 
telling their students that barricades are a part of the romantic past, that social change today can 
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only come about through the processes of negotiation. But the students at Columbia discovered 
that barricades are only the beginning of what they call ‘bringing the war home.’”548 
Revolution filled the air at SDS’s National Convention in East Lansing, Michigan from 
June 9 to 16, 1968. In stark contrast to previous years, hammer and sickle emblems made an 
appearance, portraits of Lenin festooned the walls of the Student Union, and SDSers donned red 
armbands. One could hear such statements like “our movement is an element of the revolutionary 
vanguard painfully forming from the innards of America.”549 Tom Bell, Bernardine Dohrn, and 
Steve Halliwell submitted a proposal to turn SDS into a “professional revolutionary 
organization.”550 On June 10, Bernardine Dohrn, who, in response to a question in the plenary, 
professed, “I consider myself a revolutionary communist,” was elected the new Inter-
Organizational Secretary without opposition.551 Not only had SDS made the leap to revolution, it 
now imagined itself as a front in the worldwide revolutionary movement, perhaps best captured in 
the concluding lines of the Convention’s message to the Iranian Students Association: “Your fight 
against the Shah, the fight of German SDS against Kiesinger, of the French against de Gualle 
[sic], of the Japanese against SATO – these are a few of the current fronts of a single war. We 
are your allies and brothers.552 
 
Bringing the War Home 
In October 1969, American radicals brought the war home. Although united under the 
sign of revolution, those who traveled to Chicago that month remained bitterly divided over just 
what this slogan meant. Some, known as the Weathermen, took it literally. On the night of 
October 8, around 350 radicals, many outfitted with helmets, goggles and wielding lead pipes, 
poured out of Lincoln Park into the affluent Gold Coast neighborhood, waving NLF flags, 
smashing car windows, and destroying property en route to the Drake Hotel, home of the judge in 
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the Chicago Eight trial. Over a thousand police officers intercepted their charge, driving squad 
cars straight into crowds, beating protesters, and firing revolvers.553 When the columns of tear 
gas cleared, six Weathermen had been shot, 68 protesters arrested, and 28 policemen injured.554 
The next day, as the Weathermen’s “Women’s Militia” set out to destroy the Chicago 
Armed Forces Induction Center, another, rival group of radicals held a rally at the Federal 
Courthouse with the Black Panther Party and the Puerto Rican Young Lords, then marched to the 
International Harvester Plant and Cook County Hospital in solidarity with the workers there. 
Although equally convinced that the time had come to bring the war home, this second, anti-
Weathermen group understood this to mean not waging urban guerilla warfare, but linking up with 
the industrial working class, communities of color, and immigrants. The next day, in the largest 
action of the weekend, this loose coalition of anti-Weathermen white radicals, the Panthers, and 
Young Lords led an interracial march through a poor Latino neighborhood.  
As the curious events in Chicago revealed, the strategy of creating “two, three, many 
Vietnams,” now pursued by tens of thousands of radicals throughout North America and Western 
Europe, was as ambiguous as it was inspiring. As a general watchword, its meaning was quite 
clear; but as a specific strategy, it left considerable room for interpretation. Two dominant views 
emerged in the United States by 1969. 
In June, SDS held its last convention.555 Not only SDSers, but radicals of all shades, 
including Mary Alice Waters of the YSL, Abbie Hoffman’s Yippies, and Fred Hampton’s Black 
Panthers attended. Progressive Labor, which officially rejected black nationalism, condemned the 
Vietnamese revolution as revisionist, and repudiated militant confrontation, claimed about one 
third of all delegates. Consequently, those SDSers who saw their mission as forcing open a front 
in the heart of imperialism believed that saving the revolutionary project in the United States 
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meant first defeating PL.556 Since PL based its politics in a detailed knowledge of Marxist theory, 
the response had to take a theoretical form.557 
A collective of radicals led by John Jacobs therefore submitted a position paper called 
“You Don’t Need A Weatherman To Know Which Way The Wind Blows.”558 Since imperialism 
was now overextended, the Weathermen argued, revolutionaries everywhere had to adopt Che’s 
strategy of “creating, two, three, many Vietnams,” in order “to mobilize the struggle so sharply in 
so many places that the imperialists cannot possibly deal with it all.” These many fronts “reinforce 
one another,” since the “existence of any one Vietnam, especially a winning one, spurs on 
others.”559 African Americans already formed a “Vietnam” inside the United States; white 
Americans had to do the same. The problem, the Weathermen continued, rehashing tired New 
Left doxa, was the torpidity of much of the white working class, which benefited from its “white 
skin privilege” as well as the super-profits from American imperialism. The burden of revolutionary 
struggle therefore fell to the shoulders of radicalized white youth, who had to form a 
Revolutionary Youth Movement to force open another front against imperialism. This Movement, 
which would become the basis of a revolutionary red army in the United States, “will in turn 
become one division of the International Liberation Army, while its battlefields are added to the 
many Vietnams which will dismember and dispose of US imperialism.”560 
Armed with this vision, a few careful alliances, and some highly undemocratic 
maneuvering, the Weathermen ousted PL, elected themselves to the National Office, and 
declared the white radical left in favor of revolution. The following month, thirty of them took a 
“Weather trip” to Cuba where representatives of North Vietnam and the newly formed Provisional 
Revolutionary Government in the South guaranteed total victory.561 “The greatest invention of the 
20th Century has not been nuclear weapons, but people’s war,” a representative of the Viet Cong 
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explained to his enthralled audience. “The U.S. can never escape from the labyrinth and sea of 
fire of people’s war.”562 The Weather delegation hoped to bring the people’s war home with 
them.563 The October 1969 Days of Rage in Chicago became the first battle: 
When we move with the people of the world, against the interests of the rulers, we can 
expect their pigs to come down on us. So we’re building a fighting force to struggle on the 
side of the Vietnamese, the blacks, and oppressed people everywhere. There’s a war we 
cannot “resist.” It is a war in which we must fight. We must open up another front against 
US imperialism by waging a thousand struggles in the schools, the streets, the army, and 
on the job, and in CHICAGO: OCTOBER 8-11.564 
 
“We showed them that Wednesday night,” one participant boasted. “It was like unfurling a 
gigantic Viet Cong flag in the heart of Chicago.”565 In fact, the Weathermen, took the slogan “bring 
the war” home literally – “if [the US] demarcated free-fire zones in Viet Nam, we would map our 
free-fire zones in the U.S.; when they bombed Hanoi, we might just figure out how to bomb 
Washington; search and destroy might be played out both ways.”566 
Soon after, the Weathermen went underground to pursue a campaign of terror bombing. 
“All over the world,” they explained, “people fighting Amerikan imperialism look to Amerika’s youth 
to use our strategic position behind enemy lines to join forces in the destruction of the empire.”567 
They were convinced not only that they had to play an indispensable role in the worldwide anti-
imperialist front, but that they were alone in the United States, surrounded by a hostile public and 
an unreliable working class. They were partisans battling a society of collaborators, of “good 
Germans.”568 Everyone was guilty. For their first act, they planned to bomb a Non-Commissioned 
Officers’ dance at the Fort Dix U.S. Army base as well as the Butler Library at Columbia 
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University; it backfired, killing three of their own.569 Although the Weathermen avoided future 
deaths, they continued their guerilla campaign relatively unabated, at one point even bombing the 
Pentagon. Other revolutionary groups, such as the Symbionese Liberation Army, continued the 
struggle, going so far as murder. 
While many on the white radical left despised PL, a number were equally repelled by 
what they saw as the Weathermen’s careless adventurism, even if they agreed about bringing the 
war home. One of the leaders of this tendency, SDS National Secretary Michael Klonsky, penned 
a proposal at the 1969 Convention titled “Take the war to the people – and bring it home,” in 
which he argued that radicals had to “understand the dialectical relationship that exists between 
the struggle in Vietnam and the class struggle in the US.”570 “Each blow we strike against US 
monopoly capitalism,” he continued, “is of multiple benefit not only to the Vietnamese but to all 
other oppressed people as well.”571  Like the Weathermen, he saw African Americans leading the 
way in the United States, arguing that the “rebellions in Detroit, Watts, etc. have been the 
vanguard actions against US imperialism in Vietnam by bringing the war home. Two divisions of 
troops were sent to Detroit instead of to Vietnam to put down urban insurrections.” And like 
Weathermen, he felt white Americans had to do their part by helping to build “a militant class-
conscious movement against the war, here in the mother country,” which could “be the straw that 
breaks the camel’s back.”  
Unlike the Weathermen, Klonsky felt that guerilla warfare was impractical. He was joined 
by other SDSers, such as Les Coleman, Carl Davidson, and Sue Eanet, the latter of whom 
represented SDS at Berlin in 1968; Noel Ignatin’s Chicago Revolutionary League; and Bob 
Avakian, Stephen Hamilton, and H. Bruce Franklin’s Revolutionary Union – all of whom 
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regrouped as a loose coalition called the Revolutionary Youth Movement II (RYM II).572 Against 
the Weathermen, they argued that white skin privilege did not actually benefit white workers, but 
only the white bourgeoisie, since even with their privilege white workers faced massive speedups, 
falling real wages, plant relocations, and widespread layoffs. “To suggest that the acceptance of 
white-skin privilege is in the interests of white workers,” Noel Ignativ argued, “is equivalent to 
suggesting that swallowing the worm with the hook in it is in the interests of the fish.”573 The 
immense majority of white workers in the United States did not enjoy affluence, imperialist super-
profits, or complacent integration, but, Ignativ argued, were still a real fighting force. 
Thus, for RYM II, while it was imperative to follow the Vietnamese example, one could 
not imitate their struggles since terror bombing, camouflaged guerillas, and liberated zones made 
little sense in the United States. Radicals had to translate the inspirational “lesson” of Vietnam for 
American conditions.574 For RYM II, this meant uniting “the struggles of oppressed and exploited 
people in this country with the struggles of the Vietnamese.”575 As their position paper put it, they 
had to connect with the “black and Puerto Rican liberation struggles,” struggles in proletarian 
neighborhoods, and in factories.576 They had to go into workplaces, community centers, and poor 
neighborhoods to do the hard work of organizing, forming coalitions with people of color, building 
trust. In their view, that is precisely what bringing the war home meant in Chicago 1969, not 
storming through streets breaking windows. So vital was this unglamorous, but still revolutionary 
work to the worldwide anti-imperialist front, they argued, that abandoning it as the Weatherman 
had would “have made us scabs on the Vietnamese.”577 
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For the Revolutionary Union (RU), which would eventually become the largest, most 
dynamic revolutionary communist formation in the United States, bringing the war home meant 
articulating it with the struggles of the American working class.578 The “U.S. ruling class not only 
exploits our own working people; it extends its exploitation throughout the world by a system of 
imperialism,” they explained in the first pages of their widely read theoretical statement, the Red 
Papers. “Today, Vietnam is the focal point of these struggles.”579 As the “peoples of the world,” 
led by the Vietnamese, “seize the initiative,” they weaken imperialism inside the United States, 
creating political openings for the American working class. Proletarian revolution was directly 
connected to the war in Vietnam; just as the Vietnamese revolution weakened imperialism in the 
United States, so an American revolution could weaken it abroad. 
For groups like the Revolutionary Union, bringing the war home involved going to 
workplaces across the country to help organize the coming proletarian revolution. The RYM II 
position paper had already argued that an anti-imperialist front meant radicals had to “go into 
shops, plants, hospitals, to work, etc. not only for summer “work in” programs but more and more 
of us should be making longer commitments to live and work among the proletariat.”580 The RU, 
following Mao Zedong, made this a fundamental principle of its political identity.581 RU even sent 
its members to work in critical industries, such as auto, coal, and steel, across the country.582 
Dozens of other radical groups, including the Trotskyist International Socialists, and later, the 
SWP did the same.583 By the 1970s, thousands of young radicals went to work to made 
revolution. 
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Vietnam is Everywhere 
In Nanni Balestrini’s 1971 novel, Vogliamo Tutto, a recently hired autoworker at FIAT’s 
monster Mirafiori plant joins a spontaneous demonstration inside the factory: 
I get there and I join in the shouting, too. We were shouting the strangest things, things that 
had fuck-all to do with anything … Mao Tsetung, Ho Chi Minh, Potere Operaio. Things that 
had no connection to anything there but that we liked the sound of.584 
 
“We wanted to shout things that had nothing to do with FIAT, with all that we had to do in there,” 
he explained. Those who had “no idea” who Ho Chi Minh was began shouting “Ho Chi Minh.” 
Soon after, when these demonstrations turned into a revolt at Corso Traiano, Milan, the 
protagonist vividly describes the street battles: “I saw that lots of policemen were scared and 
were running away. All around our guys started to chant: Ho Chi Minh. Forward, forward.”585 
As Ballestrini shows, after 1968 many radicals began to repurpose the Vietnamese 
struggle for their own needs, abstracting words such as “Ho Chi Minh,” the “NLF,” and “Vietnam” 
from their specific context. Ballestrini may have exaggerated when he had his character confess 
that no one knew who Ho Chi Minh really was, but he was correct to depict how “Ho Chi Minh” no 
longer simply referred to a specific person, but an idea. As Ballestrini’s autoworker explains, Ho 
Chi Minh had nothing to do with FIAT, but everyone chanted his name to “create a moment of 
rupture.” Those three syllables became a symbol of revolution. They came to signify the 
overturning of roles, the eruption of the new, the power of the oppressed.  
In the minds of tens of thousands of radicals in North America and Western Europe, 
“Vietnam” had become much larger than itself. It no longer referred to that Southeast Asian 
country at war with the United States. Or at least, if it did, it had acquired meaning in surplus of its 
referent. By the late 1960s, one could say “Vietnam” had become the master symbol of an entire 
generation, as practically every struggle of the time articulated itself in the language of “Vietnam” 
in some way or another. In creating “many Vietnams” throughout North America and Western 
Europe, radicals succeeded in translating the Vietnamese struggle for their own imperialist 
contexts. But what did “Vietnam” really mean? 
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At its simplest, Vietnam, or related phrases such as “Ho Chi Minh,” often personified 
certain admirable human qualities such as intrepidity, indefatigability, confidence, or fortitude. 
Above all, Vietnam embodied heroism, the adjective most commonly used by radicals to describe 
their Vietnamese comrades. Their tenacity in the face of impossible odds astonished radicals 
everywhere. General Baker, Jr., John Watson’s onetime roommate and a central figure in the 
black nationalist network of the 1960s, recalls traveling illegally to Cuba in 1964, where he met a 
Vietnamese delegation: 
When we talked to the Vietnamese it was just before the Tonkin Gulf and the question of 
escalation was on everybody’s mind. I remember asking the Vietnamese, “Do you think 
that if the United States bombs Vietnam, the Chinese are going to help you?” They tell me, 
“We don’t need Chinese help to defeat the Americans.” That shit just fucked me up. I just 
couldn’t understand how these little-ass Vietnamese were going to handle an American 
invasion. But that was the adamant statement they made.586 
 
Over the course of the 1960s astonishment gave way to veneration. When Balestrini’s protagonist 
battles the police, what possible meaning could chanting “Ho Chi Minh” have if not to show one’s 
courage, dedication, commitment? Shouting such phrases, common throughout North America 
and Western Europe, were ways of channeling the bravery of the Vietnamese. This meaning of 
Vietnam was so abstract, it could be used for literally any struggle, however tenuous its relation to 
what was unfolding in Southeast Asia. For instance, queer radicals in a number of countries, 
including France and the United States, further translated the famous “Ho Chi Minh” chant to suit 
their own needs, shouting “Ho Ho Homosexual.”587 
Since Vietnam was above all a war, radicals also used the term to evoke how they, too, 
were in a state of war. During the May 68, for instance, striking workers in Besançon put forth the 
slogan “Combat in the maquis of the factories of France.”588 The maquis – literally the thick 
shrubland of certain Mediterranean regions – referred here not simply to the experience of World 
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War II resistance fighters in the thicket, but to guerillas in the jungles of Vietnam.589 Italian 
workers in turn translated the expression into the simple, “Vietnam is in our factories,” later 
reimported to France.590 Expressions such as “The university is our Vietnam,” or “The struggle at 
Fiat must become the Vietnam of the bosses of Italy,” or even portmanteaus such as “Fiat-Nam,” 
became common in Italy.591 To describe the factory, university, or any site in this way was 
effectively to call it was a war zone, a site of pitched battles, shifting fronts, new campaigns. 
Perhaps most importantly, radicals not only translated Vietnam for their own contexts, 
they projected their struggles back onto Vietnam in a way that amplified them. To their eyes, 
Vietnam was not simply a specific struggle, but appeared as the concentration of all struggles, in 
the same way, perhaps, that white light is composed of all the colors on the spectrum. Vietnam’s 
polysemy allowed it to signify political projects as diverse as national liberation, socialist 
construction, cultural revolution, and women’s liberation. For this reason, it was not uncommon 
for struggles at home to play out symbolically over Vietnam. Take, for instance, the women’s 
liberation movement in France.  
For instance, to bolster its antiwar message of charity and goodwill, the PCF invited 
women to express their antiwar politics through their “natural” maternal instincts. The Communist 
Party coaxed women into protesting the war by appealing to their “natural” maternal instincts. 
“Today we address ourselves especially,” one flier went “to all the women, you mothers, also to 
you whose profession it is to care for, heal, and educate children. ”592 The PCF thus tended to 
reduce the Vietnamese to mere victims in need of sympathy, justifying its particular approach of 
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solidarity: charity, goodwill, and pressure politics; and that reduction simultaneously forced 
women back into the traditional gender roles of caretaker, mother, and nurturer.593  
In response to this victim-centered approach to solidarity that forced women back into 
traditional roles, revolutionary feminists insisted that the women of Vietnam were obliterating 
these very roles in the act of revolutionary struggle. Indeed, for many radical feminists Vietnam 
meant Women’s Liberation itself.  Le Torchon Brule, the first journal of the French Mouvement de 
libération des femmes (MLF), often treated Vietnamese women as the vanguard of the liberation 
struggle. As an MLF flyer explained, 
In Vietnam, women don’t stay confined to their maternal and domestic role, they 
undertake, in their own right, the constant reconstruction, the defense of villages, or they 
enlist in the liberation army. They therefore wholeheartedly join in the fight, whether they 
pick up the rifle, or take on responsibilities … In actively struggling, in the same way as 
the men, for the liberation of the Vietnamese people, they move towards their own 
liberation, breaking with the image and the role that until now they’ve been assigned: 
passivity, domestic tasks, the sole functions of mother and spouse. 
 
“There is ruin, death, suffering in Vietnam,” the flier concludes, but also the seeds of something 
new: “the laying of the foundations of a new world, liberating women and men.”594  
To be sure, women’s liberation was indeed a cornerstone of the Vietnamese revolution. 
After 1954, traditional gender relations in the North were rapidly overturned as women found work 
outside the home; participated in political life; and won legal equality with men, equal pay, paid 
maternity leave, access to free childcare, the right to divorce, and equal rights of use, ownership, 
and disposal of property acquired before and during marriage. During the war, women in both the 
North and the South continued to challenge gender boundaries. Playing an indispensable role in 
the war effort, they carried supplies, built infrastructure, managed the village economy, organized 
political opposition, staffed anti-aircraft guns, took up arms against the Americans, planted booby 
traps, and at times even assumed leadership roles in the revolution.595 Of course, important 
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barriers to full gender equity continued to exist, but North American and Western European 
feminists upheld these experiences as a model for women’s liberation in their own countries.596 
“Our Vietnamese sisters hold out their hand,” the first issue of Le Torchon brûle explained. “They 
show us the example.”597 
Indeed, the NLF and the DRV themselves invited this kind of semiotic play, allowing 
western radicals to read the Vietnamese revolution in ways that enlivened their own struggles at 
home. The Courrier du Vietnam, for instance, ran numerous articles on the role of women in the 
Vietnamese Revolution. Although much of it was veracious, some was propaganda, designed to 
inspire radicals abroad – the Vietnamese woman could set a revolutionary example to be 
translated into diverse national contexts. 
As the experience of the MLF shows, this period was rife with projections, many of which 
involved Vietnam, yet these were all intended to be emancipatory. These projections even 
traveled in both directions. For example, in its open letter to women in the American anti-war 
movement, the South Vietnamese Women’s Union for Liberation revealed a similar kind of 
productive misreading: “We have often told one another moving stories of American mothers, like 
Mrs. Evelyn Carasquillo and Anne Pine, throwing back to the US rulers the ‘Bronze Star’ medals 
of their sons who had died meaninglessly in Vietnam. These acts are the continuation of the 
conscious anti-war activities which have multiplied daily and formed an irresistible current.”598  
Or recall how in 1966 the Courrier du Vietnam not only named African Americans the 
second front, but convinced its readers that the latter were fighting the same violent struggle as 
the Vietnamese. “The United States faces two violent wars, one inside the country, the other in 
Vietnam,” the article proclaimed. “Almost everyday,” it continued, “struggles against racial 
segregation explode somewhere in the USA,” which supposedly proved that the United States 
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careened towards civil war, in the same way, for example, that black nationalists treated the 
NLF’s resistance as definitive proof that American imperialism approached terminal crisis.599 
Lastly, “Vietnam” simply became a universal. In the words of the workers who 
successfully self-managed the Lip watch factory in Besançon, France for several months in 1973: 
“VIETNAM: is not the endowment of the Vietnamese. In Franc-Comtoise, you say ‘Lip.’”600 
“Vietnam” did not even belong to the Vietnamese; it was a global tendency simply assuming 
different forms. Just as radicals redefined the relationship between “imperialism” and the United 
States as one of synecdoche, they did the same with “Vietnam” and Vietnam, positioning them as 
opposite poles in a Manichean struggle. Imperialism represented reaction, repression, counter-
revolution; Vietnam connoted revolution, self-determination, and heroism. Vietnam became 
everything as everything became Vietnam. 
 In direct proportion as Vietnam began to appear everywhere, however, it began to vanish 
as a particularity. Although radicals liberated Vietnam from the news cycle, translating it into an 
everyday reality, adding its own particular color to almost every major social movement of the 
time, in most countries radicals withdrew from specifically antiwar activity after 1968. In fact, in 
France, radicals effectively abandoned Vietnam as such, devoting their attention to factory 
struggles, university organizing, or new social movements such as gay liberation or the women’s 
movement.601 This was not lost on some radicals, for example, who occasionally lamented how 
the left had “forgotten” Vietnam as a specific issue. 
 Even as the PCF, moderates, and some Christian groups continued to protest the war, 
Vietnam, as a specific issue, grew less visible after May 68.602 Historians have variously 
suggested this was because the Vietnamese achieved their goals, or because radicals saw their 
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antiwar demands fulfilled, or even because Vietnam merely played an instrumental role – and 
now that radicals won their autonomy, and revolution appeared on the agenda, they had no 
further need for Vietnam.603 In reality, radicals withdrew from specifically anti-Vietnam war activity 
precisely because they felt the best way to aid Vietnam was no longer to rally around Vietnam as 
such, but to translate Vietnam into a domestic idiom.604 Radicals never abandoned Vietnam; they 
assimilated Vietnam so thoroughly it seemed to disappear.605 As Fredy Perlman, an American 
present during the May events, reported on French radicals in 1968, “the war in Vietnam ceased 
to be an ‘issue’ and became a part of their own daily lives.”606 
The major exception, however, was the United States, since radicals found themselves 
inside the very country at war with Vietnam. But even here, despite a brief revival in 1970 when 
President Nixon announced the bombing of Cambodia, Vietnam as a specific issue generally 
declined in importance after 1969, precisely when many in the American radical left turned to 
revolution.607 And with departure of radicals, who now pursued other struggles, what remained of 
the movement grew more moderate.608 
Of course, some radicals in North America and Western Europe did not accede to 
revolution. Others, such as the Italian workerists, arrived at revolution, but not by way of 
Vietnam.609 In general, however, many radicals in North America and Western Europe came to 
see revolution as not only possible, but necessary, and they arrived at this conclusion through 
anti-imperialist solidarity with Vietnam. And even while some radicals affirmed revolution 
theoretically, it was only Vietnam that gave substance to this dream. Other struggles no doubt 
pulled some radicals to revolution, such as the Cuban Revolution, the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution in China, and for a time, the Palestinian liberation movement, but Vietnam stood apart. 
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In Vietnam, there was a definite adversary, insurmountable odds, high stakes, terrible costs, and 
ongoing struggle reported daily. There was also a sense of measurable progress, usually very 
hard to gauge in most revolutionary struggles. Above all, however, Vietnam possessed this power 
to inspire precisely because it was the most inherently translatable struggle of the period. Its 
revolutionary lessons could be easily learned, its example readily followed. Vietnam became a 
semantic tapestry, an immense storehouse of revolutionary symbols, ideas, experiences, and 
feelings for radicals throughout the world to draw upon. “There were layers upon layers in Viet 
Nam,” one American radical later recalled, “meanings within meanings, wheels within wheels.”610 
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CHAPTER 5: THE DEMOCRATIC TURN 
  
On June 20, 1970, sixty-seven-year-old Jean-Paul Sartre defied the government’s new 
censorship laws by promenading down the avenue du Général-Leclerc in Paris hawking a stack 
of political newspapers. Although the police detained him for disseminating the recently banned 
radical paper, La Cause du peuple, Sartre was quickly released, evading the two-year prison 
sentence that other less famous activists could face for the same crime. Sartre expected as 
much, and his action aimed not only to protest the government’s flagrant violation of civil liberties, 
but to lay bare for the French public the hypocrisy of the state’s selective repression of the radical 
left, which had by then landed hundreds of young activists in prison.611 As he put it, “the 
government could not try to turn the repressive laws of the bourgeoisie against [the radicals] 
without itself stepping outside the law, outside its own law.”612 
State repression of openly revolutionary organizations not only in France, but throughout 
North America and Western Europe, did not come as a surprise. As Sartre reflected in 1972, 
“since they wanted to overthrow the bourgeoisie by force, they were sooner or later going to fall 
before the arsenal of bourgeois law.”613 Governments revoked civil liberties, outlawed radical 
organizations, threw activists in prison, and terrorized social movements. In this context, radicals 
in the United States and France, from the Black Panther Party to the Gauche prolétarienne, had 
to reevaluate their strategies: how could they continue the revolutionary project in the face of 
such harsh repression? In response, most radicals, who had only recently shunned talk of reform 
in favor of violent revolution, paid closer attention to civil rights, built alliances with progressive 
organizations, and demanded liberties from the very states they sought to abolish.  
Experiences of incarceration in the United States and France also pushed many radicals 
to reconsider the rights, status, and struggles of prisoners. Whereas many activists had initially 
overlooked prisons as sites of politics, internalizing the assumptions of bourgeois criminal 
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categories, they later began to turn their attention to organizing prisoners, learning from one 
another in a transnational network that included the United States, France, and Italy. This 
organizing in turn prompted a substantial rethinking of the repressive role of the law, the struggle 
for reform, and the rights of the individual. In this context of repression and reassessment, 
radicals now saw the struggle for what they called “democratic rights” as not only a legitimate 
form of activism, but a strategically necessary phase of the revolutionary movement.  
This chapter examines the origins and consequences of this “democratic turn.” It first 
synthesizes the history of fierce repression that the U.S. and French governments wielded 
against revolutionary organizations, and shows how this repression led French and American 
activists to forge new links across the Atlantic, but also among themselves. It argues that in both 
the United States and France, some radicals responded to the wave of repression by moderating 
their internal rivalries, reaching out to intellectuals, cooperating with progressive but not radical 
organizations, and allying with other social classes. In placing themselves at the head of a new 
democratic front fighting for the restoration of basic civil liberties, radicals were able to turn the 
tables on the state, using repression to win popular sympathy. But in the process, what began as 
a purely instrumental advocacy of civil rights slowly transformed the way radicals thought about 
class struggle, rights, and revolution, fundamentally reshaping the radical imaginary in both the 
United States and France in the early 1970s.  
 
Repressing Revolution 
Today, it is sometimes assumed that only a handful of North American and Western 
European radicals truly believed in revolution in the 1960s and early 1970s. Even then, some 
argue, this revolution amounted to nothing more than empty phraseology, innocuous cultural 
experimentation, tragi-comic role-playing, or Oedipal psychodrama.614 Nothing could be further 
from the truth. As the previous chapter showed, after the transformative global events of 1968, 
                                                
614 For an excellent critical survey, and thorough refutation, of many of these positions, see Kristin 
Ross, May ’68 and its Afterlives (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2002), especially 1-
27, 138-215. 
  
 
184 
hundreds of thousands of radicals in North America and Western Europe rapidly moved from 
antiwar activism to committing their lives to revolution. And as the colossal wave of state 
repression that rose to crush them attests, their revolution was not a game. 
In France, perhaps over a hundred revolutionary groups mushroomed after May 1968, 
representing every imaginable shade of the radical spectrum. Membership, difficult to gauge 
since many groups chose to forego party cards, varied tremendously. Some, like Vive la 
révolution, counted no more than four hundred comrades at best.615 Others, such as the Ligue 
Communiste or the Parti communiste marxiste-léniniste de France (PCMLF), may have had 
several thousand members at their height.616 Most of them exercised significant influence beyond 
their core, enjoying not only the support of a sea of domestic sympathizers, but the active 
contributions of respected figures or foreign governments. For instance, the PCMLF, which the 
Communist Party of China officially recognized as its fraternal Maoist party in France, was heavily 
subsidized and internationally promoted by China. Meanwhile, groups like the Maoist Gauche 
prolétarianne could count on support from the philosophers Simone de Beauvoir and Michel 
Foucault, filmmakers Jean-Luc Godard and Claude Lanzmann, writers like Jean Genet, and 
musicians such as folk celebrity Dominique Grange and Rolling Stones front man Mick Jagger.617 
 In Italy, groups grew considerably larger than anywhere else on the continent. For 
instance, Lotta Continua, a leading extra-parliamentary group, claimed some 30,000 members by 
1971, and even then represented only one pole in a vast ecosystem of radical organizations that 
included Avanguardia Operaia, Il Manifesto, Potere Operaia, and many others.618 All of them 
included militant workers, counted memberships in the thousands, and, since many were deeply 
embedded in factories, neighborhoods, and universities, wielded the power to organize crippling 
mass actions. Countless other revolutionaries did not belong to these formal parties, but militated 
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in other ways, rallying to looser coalitions, new social movements, or, towards the end of the 
decade, as an archipelago of autonomous collectives known as “autonomia.”619  
While France and Italy were admittedly exceptional – both boasted vibrant workers’ 
movements, a revolutionary past, and a pervasive Marxist culture – other countries witnessed this 
turn to revolution as well. In Germany, after the implosion of SDS, some students regrouped into 
highly disciplined parties known as K-gruppen. According to one estimate, by the mid-1970s 
perhaps 15,000 radicals belonged to these groups.620 Chary of such doctrinaire organizations, 
tens of thousands of German radicals joined other initiatives.621 Some remained in the more 
flexible Basisgruppen.622 Others, such as those involved in the Proletarische Front, followed 
models imported from Italy.623 A few pursued terrorism.624 
Even in the United States, where in retrospect revolution seemed unlikely, tens of 
thousands of radicals devoted themselves to the cause.625 Some groups were miniscule, and 
often confined to a single state or region – the Sojourner Truth Organization, for example, 
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claimed perhaps no more than forty members.626 Others, such as the Revolutionary Union (RU), 
or the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), enjoyed a national presence and boasted over a thousand 
members each in the mid-1970s.627 The Black Panther Party peaked at around 5,000 members in 
1969.628 These figures may not seem impressive, but for every committed party member there 
were likely many more radicals who sympathized. Some unaffiliated radicals donated to radical 
groups, attended their events, or read their newspapers. By 1971, for example, the Party’s 
newspaper reached a top circulation of 250,000 copies a week.629 Others simply organized their 
own informal initiatives, which were often no less radical than those of the formal organizations. 
Therefore, while formal organizations may have been small in numbers, taken in their 
totality, they nevertheless made for an imposing force, exercising influence far beyond their 
official membership. Party radicals committed their entire lives to revolution: many sought out 
industrial jobs, attended regular party meetings, and threw themselves into whatever campaigns 
were on the agenda. Dan La Botz, of the International Socialists, recalled life with his branch 
leader, Kevin Katz: 
Forceful and persuasive, and absolutely dedicated to building a socialist movement in the 
United States, Kevin pushed to make us all professional revolutionaries. His view was 
that as full-time socialists we should give every waking hour to the cause, as he himself 
did. He established a pace of work that was demanding, even exhausting …630 
 
This frenetic activity and herculean effort allowed radicals to shape struggles in workplaces, 
unions, local politics, and neighborhoods despite their modest numbers. 
Most significantly, governments in the United States and Western Europe were 
themselves so convinced that these groups posed a significant threat that they responded in kind. 
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Indeed, the U.S. government advanced a frightening expansion of its repressive state 
apparatuses. The police, the FBI, the CIA, and the Pentagon all collaborated to stem the 
revolutionary tide. Soldiers hardened from combat experience abroad, especially in Vietnam, 
trained local police officers. The state worked closely with corporations, such as RAND, to 
implement domestic counterinsurgency strategies. Congress passed new legislation, such as the 
Anti-Riot Act, which meted out harsher sentences to those suspected of inciting violence, and the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which expanded the FBI, augmented local 
police departments, and funded weapons research.631 
Repression took many forms. The U.S. government began by raising an army of 
informants to spy on American citizens. In May 1969, the New York Times alleged that the FBI 
had “undercover agents and informers inside almost every [SDS] chapter.”632 By 1970, Army 
Intelligence had a network of some 1,500 agents across the country, some operating in the 
ghettos, others scrupulously observing various organizations.633 But surveillance often joined with 
other, more egregious forms of repression. Local police, and above all the FBI’s COINTELPRO, 
spread misinformation, tapped phone lines, aggravated rivalries between groups, raided offices, 
destroyed property, targeted specific individuals for selective enforcement of tax laws, arrested 
radicals on trumped up charges, and even turned to intimidation, torture, and murder.634 
Unsurprisingly, a close relationship developed between the U.S. government’s repression 
at home and its war in Vietnam. Vietnam had become a laboratory for the military, and many of 
                                                
631 Nelson Blackstock, Cointelpro: The FBI’s Secret War on Political Freedom (New York: 
Pathfinder Press, 1988); Seth Rosenfeld, Subversives: The FBI’s War on Student Radicals, and 
Reagan’s Rise to Power (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012), Parts 2 and 3; Aaron J. 
Leonard and Conor A. Gallagher, Heavy Radicals: The FBI’s Secret War on American’s Maoists: 
The Revolutionary Union / Revolutionary Communist Party 1968-1980 (Winchester, UK: Zero 
Books, 2014); “Tracy Tullis, “A Vietnam at Home: Policing the Ghettos in the Counterinsurgency 
Era,” (Ph.D. diss., New York University, New York, 1999), 111-16, 145-54. 
632 Barnard L. Colliers, “S.D.S. Scores Big Gains But Faces Many Problems: S.D.S., Though It 
Scored Several ‘Victories,’ Faces Potentially Grave Crises,” The New York Times, May 5, 1969. 
633 Frank J. Donner, The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America’s Political 
Intelligence System (New York: Knopf, 1980), 294; For more on the U.S. Army’ surveillance of 
civilian politics, see Christopher Howland Pyle, “Military Surveillance and Civilian Politics, 1967-
1970” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, New York, 1974), chapters 1-4. 
634 Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin, Jr., Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the 
Black Panther Party (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 211-12. 
  
 
188 
the strategies, and even weapons, tested in Vietnam were soon redeployed in the United 
States.635 Some police officers, veterans of Korea or Vietnam, adapted their combat skills to the 
domestic context.636 Others like Commander Daryl Gates studied guerilla warfare in Vietnam to 
learn how to contain domestic struggles such as the Watts Rebellion.637 Police departments 
acquired communications technology, ammunition, weapons, riot material, and sensors designed 
to track the NLF, all developed in Vietnam.638 In 1968, for example, the Army began distributing 
CS gas to local police forces to use against radicals.639 Helicopters, which featured prominently in 
Vietnam, also became a regular part of U.S. police operations.640  
This wave of repression smothered all radical organizations, but the state persecuted 
antiwar activists in particular. The Vietnam Day Committee in Berkeley, California, for example, 
was an early target. After acquiring declassified COINTELPRO documents, antiwar activists later 
confirmed that the FBI “monitored all phases of VDC activity, regularly compiling comprehensive 
reports on VDC finances, membership and meetings.”641 The Bureau tracked VDC co-founder 
Stephen Smale’s every move, even reporting on his speech at the  “Six Heures pour Vietnam” 
event in Paris.642 The FBI also attempted to directly “handicap” VDC operations through 
sabotage. Activists later proved that the FBI burglarized the VDC office, stole materials, 
collaborated with local police to harass targeted activists, jammed radios during marches, 
tampered with mail to cancel or change dates of proposed actions, sent false letters to other 
groups like SDS to turn them against one another, coordinated with rightwing groups such as the 
Young Republicans or the Young Americans for Freedom to plan counter demonstrations.643 
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Tellingly, although the VDC had already begun to decline on its own by the spring of 1966, it took 
a terrorist attack to put an end to the organization. Just minutes past midnight on April 9, 1966 a 
bomb demolished the VDC headquarters, shattering windows within a one-mile radius. While 
there is no proof that the FBI had any hand in this attack, records indicate that the FBI did try to 
blame the bombing on Progressive Labor in order to destroy both groups at once.644 
The VDC was not unique. The 1976 Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, also known as the Church Committee, later 
confirmed that the FBI had targeted “almost every anti-war group.”645 And as the antiwar 
movement grew more militant, state repression grew more violent, famously culminating in May 
1970 when National Guardsmen murdered four students on the Kent state campus in Ohio and 
killed two and injured eleven at Jackson State College in Mississippi. 
The extreme hostility towards antiwar radicals can partly be explained by the fact that 
many American politicians – including National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Special 
Assistant to National Security Affairs Walter Rostow, top military leaders, and above all President 
Lyndon Johnson – were convinced that the movement was part of an international Soviet 
conspiracy to overthrow the United States.646 According to Johnson’s advisor Richard Goodwin, 
the President was certain that “the communist way of thinking had infected everyone around him,” 
and he ordered the CIA to prepare an investigation into the antiwar movement’s international 
connections in October 1967.647 Whatever its disagreements with Lyndon Johnson, the Nixon 
Administration shared the same suspicions, no doubt encouraged by J. Edgar Hoover’s 
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continuous stream of memos alleging communist control of the antiwar movement – most of it 
was revealed to be based on faulty or fabricated evidence.648 
The only activists who suffered worse than those involved in the antiwar movement were 
black radicals.649 African Americans regularly confronted police brutality, watched local police 
patrol their communities like an occupying army, and saw their political organizations harassed by 
the state, with members often imprisoned on trumped up charges.650 Indeed, the number of 
incarcerated African Americans rose significantly in the late 1960s.651 The FBI hounded groups 
like the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), at one point even entrapping three radicals in a 
bizarre conspiracy to destroy the Liberty Bell, Washington Monument, and Statue of Liberty.652 In 
the face of mass arrests, RAM soon went underground, and in late 1968, voted to dissolve the 
organization in order to embed themselves in other movements.653 The black nationalist Republic 
of New Afrika had 140 of its supporters arrested in a single day.654 SNCC also came under heavy 
fire as police arrested chairman H. Rap Brown for allegedly inciting a riot.655  
Of all black radicals organizations, the Black Panther Party soon emerged as the state’s 
primary target. On July 15, 1969, J. Edgar Hoover labeled the Panthers the “greatest threat to the 
internal security of the country.”656 Party offices were raided, news stories planted, rivalries 
intensified, and Panthers arrested. Huey Newton was imprisoned in October 1967. Eldridge 
Cleaver fled the country in the fall of 1968. On December 4, 1969 the FBI murdered Fred 
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Hampton, chairman of the Illinois chapter of the Black Panther Party. In November 1969, Chicago 
judge Julius Hoffman sentenced Bobby Seale, to four years imprisonment, and in 1970 he was on 
trial once again, this time for a murder he did not commit.  
Yet in many cases, widespread state repression had the unexpected effect of bringing 
black radicals and white antiwar activists closer together. For example, antiwar students arrested 
during the 1967 Stop the Draft Week in Oakland were joined in Alameda County Prison just a 
week later by Huey Newton.657 They shared not only the same prison, but also the same lawyer, 
Charles Garry. As growing numbers of antiwar demonstrators and draft resisters confronted 
arrest, brutality, and imprisonment, they became particularly attuned to the repression of the 
black movement.658 Some black radical organizations, such as the Black Panther Party, were 
therefore eager to reach out to white antiwar activists facing repression.659 Sensing a potential 
alliance, the Panthers specifically asked antiwar activists involved in those demonstrations to help 
organize the Free Huey Campaign, and the Panthers made an effort to defend the antiwar 
activists. Many white radicals, such as Bob Avakian, future leader of the Revolutionary Union, 
answered the call, and worked to “link these things and to build support, particularly among 
people who’d been active in the ‘Stop the Draft Week,’ for Huey Newton and the Black Panther 
Party.”660 
On January 28, 1968, at a UC Berkeley rally defending students arrested during Stop the 
Draft Week, Bobby Seale remarked: 
Black people have protested police brutality. And many of you thought we were jiving, 
thought we didn’t know what we were talking about... But now you are experiencing this 
same thing. When you go down in front of the draft, when you go over and you 
demonstrate in front of Dean Rusk, those pig cops will come down and brutalize your 
heads just like they brutalized the black heads of black people in the black community. 
We are saying now that you can draw a direct relationship that is for real and that is not 
abstract anymore: you don’t have to abstract what police brutality is like when a club is 
there to crush your skull; you don’t have to abstract what police brutality is like when 
there is a vicious service revolver there to tear out your flesh; you can see in fact that 
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the real power of the power structure maintaining its racist regime is manifested in its 
occupying troops, and is manifested in its police department – with guns and force.”661 
 
Through shared experiences of state repression, different elements of the American radical left 
began to coalesce against repression. 
 
Building the United Front 
On February 25, 1970, Connie Matthews, the Black Panther Party’s International 
Coordinator, approached famed writer Jean Genet in Paris about putting his talents to the service 
of black liberation.662 With the Party under heavy attack, and many of its leaders in exile, prison, 
or awaiting trial, the Panthers searched for allies. At this “critical stage,” in which the Party 
struggled to spread the movement against racism, repression, and incarceration, Angela Davis 
recalls how they “thought Genet, thanks to his fame, could help us reach White progressives.”663 
One of the most vocal supporters of the Black Panthers in France, Genet was not content to 
simply raise awareness in his own country.664 To the surprise of the Panthers, he left for North 
America only a few days later, clandestinely entering the United States through Canada. For two 
months Genet traveled the United States to rally support for not only the besieged Black Panther 
Party, but for black political prisoners in general.665 For the Panthers, however, working with 
people like Genet was not just a way to fend off repression. They saw these careful alliances as 
part of a concerted strategy to turn state repression to the Party’s benefit. 
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While it is true that in some cases repression destroyed movements, in others, it allowed 
radical organizations to transform and grow. The Panthers, for example, successfully survived 
massive repression by using it to win sympathy. The repeated trials of black radicals, often over 
fabricated charges, before white juries, and in the courts of racist judges won many over to the 
Panther cause.666 For example, when Judge Hoffman ordered Bobby Seale bound and gagged 
for contempt of court, he only attracted further support for the Panthers. By highlighting the 
inherent racism of the entire justice system, the Party could convince even those who disagreed 
with its revolutionary politics that African Americans could not receive fair trials in the United 
States. 
The Panthers also succeeded in spinning armed confrontations with the police to their 
favor. For example, on November 12, 1969, the Los Angeles police launched a coordinated 
assault on the Panthers, arresting dozens, firing thousands of rounds of ammunition, and 
ordering a helicopter to bomb the Panther headquarters with dynamite. Even though the Panthers 
fired back, organizations overtly critical of the Panther call for revolution, such as the American 
Civil Liberties Union and the NAACP, nevertheless rallied to the Party’s defense.667 The Party’s 
actions, they felt, were a justified response to the inadmissible violence of the state. The key to 
the Panther strategy, therefore, was transforming this sympathy into formal alliances, and then to 
use those alliances to organize support, win protection, and accumulate moral capital against the 
state. The Panthers forged links with lawyers, academics, writers, progressive organizations, 
such as the Peace and Freedom Party, as well as with celebrities such as Jane Fonda, Jean 
Genet, and Jean-Luc Godard. In this way, the Panthers used repression to fuel the growth of the 
party.668  
Jean Genet’s tour culminated on May 1, 1970 at Yale University where he addressed a 
crowd of over 25,000 about Bobby Seale’s pending murder trial. “For Bobby Seale, I repeat, there 
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must not be another Dreyfus affair,” he said, referencing his country’s own racist past.669 Calling 
on the audience to “speak out across America” on behalf of the Panthers, he declared, “Bobby 
Seale’s life depends on you. Your real life depends on the Black Panther Party.”670 Immediately 
after his impassioned speech, he fled the country, returning to France through Montréal, where 
he attended the opening of a Black Panther information center to solidify an alliance between the 
Party and Quebec separatists.671 Genet drew parallels between the two sides, and his escort, 
Panther spokesman, Zayd-Malik Shakur declared: “We understand that Quebec is colonized by 
the same system that confronts us. Our party is not racist, but internationalist, and we think it is 
essential to link up with other liberation struggles to form a world-wide anti-imperialist front.”672 
But as Genet’s sojourn proved, the major task for radicals was now to find creative ways to 
counter state repression, both in North America and in Western Europe.  
Genet returned home as the embattled French left began, like the Panthers, to 
experiment with its own united front. During the events of May and June 1968, the new Minister of 
the Interior, Raymond Marcellin, utterly convinced of an international plot to subvert the French 
state, banned eleven radical organizations, including the JCR and the UJCml.673 In addition, he 
tightened censorship laws, harassing radical publishers such as François Maspero, who 
distributed revolutionary literature like the Tricontinental’s quarterly.674 In March 1970, he arrested 
Jean-Pierre Le Dantec, the editor of the Gauche prolétarienne’s paper, La Cause du peuple.675 
On April 30, the state passed the “Anti-Casseurs” law, which held that anyone associated with 
any demonstration in which persons were harmed, property damaged, or violence committed 
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against police officers could be arrested for those crimes, no matter how tenuous the link.676 Then 
on May 27, 1970, Marcellin officially banned the Gauche prolétarienne (GP), arresting Alain 
Geismar, one of its leaders, the following month.677 
Outlawed, the “ex-GP,” as it was now called, rethought its strategy in June 1970. A 
theoretical statement published in January 1971 reflected on the ex-GP’s trajectory and 
articulated a new way forward. The statement argued that in the first phase, from the group’s 
founding to May 1970, the GP had successfully sharpened the revolutionary perspective through 
“aggressive” struggle. But now that the balance of forces had shifted, it was time to “destroy” their 
old style of brazen confrontation. “We adopted the habit of dividing morale by introducing class 
struggle,” but now “it is necessary to acquire the habit of uniting.” The new objective was to 
“conquer the center,” with a new style of work that emphasized “unity and the democracy of the 
majority.”678 The ex-GP now called for a united “democratic front” to expand and strengthen the 
opposition to the state’s repressive turn.679  
The concept of the “democratic front” derives directly from Chinese communism, and 
especially Mao Tse-Tung’s argument that while the revolution would still be led by the working 
class, particular historical conditions in China meant that it required an interclass alliance of 
different social forces, such the peasantry, small business owners, and even certain national 
capitalists.680 The ex-GP translated this idea for their own context, arguing that the new 
conditions of repression meant that revolution in France necessitated a similar alliance. This 
meant deescalating rivalries with other radical organizations, collaborating with prominent 
intellectuals, forming coalitions with progressive forces, and uniting with other social classes, 
including the petty bourgeoisie. To hold this potential bloc together, the front would fight for 
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“democratic rights” – such as the freedom of assembly, speech, the press, and protection from 
arbitrary arrest or search and seizure – that would appeal to most social classes in France. 
This democratic front would serve several concrete functions. Above all, it would offer 
protection. For instance, the ex-GP could only continue publishing La Cause du peuple by asking 
Jean-Paul Sartre, who was virtually immune to arrest, to serve as editor.681 Second, with the 
official ban forcing the ex-GP underground, members risked losing contact with struggles; by 
linking with other legal organizations, however, they could remain connected to the movement. 
Lastly, allying themselves with more moderate groups and respected intellectuals in a struggle 
against threats to democratic freedoms could elevate their cause in the eyes of a public that had 
long been told that ex-GP radicals were terrorists. Far from becoming the enemy of democracy, 
the ex-GP could become its greatest champion. By uniting radicals, working people, intellectuals, 
and shop-keepers, this front, the ex-GP declared “is perfectly capable of taking back from the 
bourgeoisie that which it has stolen: liberty is an important task.”682 
The ex-GP took this new role seriously, putting itself in the service of many popular 
struggles. For instance, after a mining disaster at Lens left sixteen miners dead, Sartre and the 
ex-GP organized a popular tribunal that eventually found Houlières, the state-owned mining 
company, guilty of murder for neglecting the safety of the workers.683 In the factories, the Maoists 
defended workers charged for kidnapping their bosses by arguing that these “sequestrations” 
were actually forms of popular justice.684 At the same time, the group advocated for the rights of 
immigrants, organizing anti-racist campaigns.685 And, to the consternation of many other radicals, 
the ex-GP even extended an olive branch to small shopkeepers, some of whom were still 
sympathetic to the xenophobic populism of Pierre Poujade.686  
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Indeed, not all French radicals shared the ex-GP’s perspective. While the ex-GP, along 
with the Parti communiste marxiste-léniniste de France, tried to justify the new turn towards 
democratic struggles by arguing that France was undergoing a turn to “fascization,” most other 
groups, such as the Ligue Communiste and the VLR, firmly disagreed.687 They also felt that 
widening the “democratic front” to include potentially reactionary forces such as small 
shopkeepers would reproduce the pitfalls of the classic popular front of the 1930s. The ex-GP’s 
concept of popular justice came under fire as well. The Ligue Communiste blasted the Maoists for 
having confused “popular justice” with “revolutionary justice.”688 Even Michel Foucault, who 
nonetheless collaborated closely with the ex-GP, raised concerns about the glorification of the 
popular tribunal promoted by the ex-GP leadership, famously arguing that the court is not “the 
natural expression of popular justice, but rather its historical function is to ensnare it, to control it, 
to strangle it, by re-inscribing it within institutions which are typical of a state apparatus.”689  
Nevertheless, since the massive state repression affected everyone, sympathetic 
intellectuals, progressive organizations, and other radical groups initially put aside their 
differences and heeded the call. As early as May 25, 1970, a panoply of otherwise fratricidal 
organizations – including the GP, Ligne Rouge, Ligue Communiste, Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU), 
Lutte ouvrière, and Vive la Révolution (VLR) – gathered to discuss their common future.690 While 
relations certainly remained tense, most radical groups at the time did embark on their own 
“democratic turns.” This consensus appeared powerfully in the new Secours Rouge (SR).691 The 
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SR first emerged in the 1920s as a communist counterpart to the Red Cross, providing aid to all 
those struggling against oppression internationally. In October 1970, soon after the wave of 
repression, former French Resisters, Christian socialists, academics, and lawyers collectively 
reactivated the defunct SR.692 The new SR temporarily drew together radicals from groups such 
as the ex-GP, the PSU and the Ligue Communiste. Indeed, open to everyone, the SR proclaimed 
itself a nonsectarian “democratic association” aiming to “assure the political and juridical defense 
of victims of repression and to give them and their families material and moral support with no 
exceptions.”693 The SR, which soon included radicals of all stripes, advocated for immigrants, 
activists, workers, prisoners, and everyone else faced with state repression. 
The new SR’s self-described struggle to “defend all fundamental rights” marked an 
important shift for the radicals in France.694 In 1968, French radicals had equated the struggle for 
rights as mere reformism, but by the early 1970s, state repression had compelled them to adopt 
democratic struggles as a fundamental axis of their political work. This did not mean that these 
groups abandoned violent revolution, the overthrow of capitalism, or the dictatorship of the 
proletariat as final goals, or that they confined their efforts to the narrow field of parliamentary 
politics. Rather, they felt that, given the new balance of forces, radicals could no longer afford to 
behave as they did in 1968 or 1969, when many believed, in the words of Alain Geismar, that the 
revolution was only a few years away in France.695 Thus, radicals preserved the goal of 
                                                                                                                                            
American liberation news service, Libération, a broadly leftwing newspaper designed to counter 
false information about the movement, soon emerged as a way to “help the people prendre la 
parole.” Christofferson, French Intellectuals Against the Left, 72-74; Rémi Guillot, “Les réseaux 
d’information maoïstes et l’affaire de Bruay-en-Artois,” Les Cahiers du journalisme, no. 17 (2007): 
218. 
692 For the revived Secours Rouge, see Bernard Brillant, “Intellectuels et extrême-gauche: le cas 
du Secours rouge,” Lettre d’information n°32, Les années 68: événements, cultures politiques et 
modes de vie, CNRS, Institut d’Histoire du Temps Présent (May 1998); Bourg, From Revolution 
to Ethics, 71-72; Jean-Paul Salles, La Ligue communiste révolutionnaire (1968-1981): Instrument 
du Grand Soir ou lieu d’apprentissage? (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2005), 93. 
693 Manifeste Secours Rouge, June 2, 1970, F Delta Res 576/5/8, La Bibliothèque de 
documentation internationale contemporaine, Nanterre, France. 
694 Secours Rouge, “Projet de resolution: sur l’orientation politique du Secours Rouge,” 1971, 3, F 
Delta Res 576/5/8, BDIC. 
695 “Sans vouloir jouer aux prophètes: l’horizon 70 ou 72 en France, c’est la revolution.” Alain 
Geismar, Serge July, and Erylne Morane, Vers la guerre civile (Paris: Éditions et publications 
premieres, 1969), 16. 
  
 
199 
communist revolution, and many, especially the ex-GP, still engaged in violent struggle, 
encouraging bossnappings, beating hated foremen, organizing acts of sabotage, battling police, 
and planning militant strikes. But they agreed that in this new democratic phase, they had little 
choice but to also struggle for democratic rights and unite with the broader public.696  
This strategy began to appear outside of France as well. Faced with similar forms of 
repression, radicals elsewhere in Europe followed suit. Branches of Secours Rouge emerged in 
other countries, notably in Belgium, Italy, and Germany, helping to lay the scaffolding for a new 
international movement for democratic rights.697 
 
Rethinking the Prison 
One of the most transformative consequences of this democratic turn was a new concern 
with the status, rights, and struggles of prisoners, an issue most radicals had initially overlooked. 
In the aftermath of the May events, and even into 1970, most French radicals had tended to 
ignore the prisons. As an ex-GP circular complained in 1970,  “concern for the prisoners does not 
exist,” and many act as if “an imprisoned militant is a dead militant.”698 But with escalated 
repression throwing radicals behind bars, many groups finally began to regard the prison as a 
political space, committing themselves to sustained prison organizing for the first time. In June 
1970, for example, the ex-GP created the Organisation des prisonniers politiques (OPP) to 
advocate for imprisoned militants.  
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For their first campaign in September, OPP worked with Secours Rouge to organize a 
coordinated twenty-five-day hunger strike at six prisons, including a women’s prison.699 The strike 
enjoyed mixed success. On the one hand, the Supreme Court of Appeals granted Geismar the 
“political regime” status, according him certain privileges, such as the right to order books, receive 
visitors, and write. On the other hand, as a political action, the strike had little overall effect on the 
political situation. Reflecting on the action, OPP activists argued that the limited results of the 
strike could be traced back to the general isolation of the strikers from those on the outside, not 
just radicals, but lawyers, doctors, and families. For the next action, set for January 1971, the 
OPP had to rethink its entire strategy.700 
In December 1970, ex-GP militants Jacques Rancière, Daniel Defert, Christine Martineau 
and others outlined a new direction for the group. To widen the struggle, and truly link prisoners 
to the growing democratic front, Defert proposed to “form an investigative commission of experts 
on the general situation of the prisons, and that we entrust the leadership to Michel Foucault.”701 
Foucault – along with other figures like Gilles Deleuze; Jean Genet; Jean-Pierre Domenach, the 
editor of the progressive Christian journal Ésprit, who had taken a stance against the Algerian 
War; and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, the historian of Ancient Greece also active in the earlier struggles 
against the Algerian War – agreed, and a new democratic coalition was born.702 On February 8, 
1971, Foucault formally unveiled the new Groupe d’information sur les prisons (GIP):703 
There is little information published about the prisoners; it is one of the hidden regions of 
our social system, one of the dark zones of our life. We have the right to know. We want to 
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know. This is why, with magistrates, lawyers, journalists, doctors, and psychologists, we 
have formed the Groupe d’information sur les prisons.704  
 
To learn about the prisons, the GIP drafted a questionnaire to circulate among prisoners, drawing 
heavily on the “workers’ inquiry” model first proposed by Karl Marx in 1881, and later adopted by 
French Maoists in the late 1960s and early 1970s in factories and farms.705 Organizationally, the 
group relied on the experiences of établissement – or the practice of sending activists to find jobs 
at specific workplaces to organize workers – to form investigative work teams for each prison.706 
With the help of doctors, lawyers, and family members, the GIP, working with the Secours Rouge, 
smuggled inquiries into the prisons. These investigations not only gathered valuable information; 
they gave voice to the silenced demands of the prisoners.  
The GIP not only inspired other radical groups in France, such as VLR or the Mouvement 
de libération des femmes, but also began to connect with prison activist movements in other 
countries.707 For French radicals, prisoner struggles in Italy emerged as a central reference point. 
After reading Lotta Continua’s coverage of the rebellion at Le Nuove prison in Turin, Italy on 
Easter of 1971, a rebellion that sparked a wave of prison unrest across the peninsula, Daniel 
Defert and Jacques Donzelot of the GIP traveled to Italy. There, they initiated a fruitful 
collaboration with Lotta Continua, which left a profound influence not only on how French radicals 
understood prison organizing, but on the revolutionary struggle itself. 
Italian radicals’ turn to prison organizing began after a wave of workers’ struggles 
reached an impasse after 1969. Known as the “Hot Autumn,” this movement won pay raises, 
better benefits, and greater say in the operations of the factory, but was outmaneuvered when 
capitalists subsequently raised the cost of living and encouraged trade unions to institute a new 
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council system.708 Some Italian workers therefore began to devise an alternative organizing 
strategy. “In view of this,” Italo Sbrogio, a factory worker at the Porto Marghera petrochemical 
plant, put it, “we put our back into it and said that the intervention inside the factories would have 
to be carried to the outside, to the ‘social,’ as well, broaching the issue of the rise of living 
costs.”709 The new strategy was to surround the factory by waging struggles on what was called 
the terrain of social reproduction, that is to say, schools, houses, civic centers, neighborhoods, 
and streets.710 Housewives launched a vast movement of “autoreduction” to unilaterally reduce 
bus fares, electricity bills, or rents.711 In some cases, Sbrogio recalls, “people lowered rents, 
occupied empty houses, paid less for their food. We organized all this by establishing local 
committees in the various parts of town. We even managed to organize a shopping strike which 
forced some supermarkets to cut prices for basic food.”712 
Lotta Continua was one of the strongest advocates of this new strategy, and went further 
by rethinking the role of prisons from this perspective.713 Prisons, they argued, were sites of 
social reproduction, and prisoners’ struggles were therefore intimately linked to the fight for lower 
rents, affordable food, and accessible transportation.714 The French GIP was immediately 
inspired by this new conceptualization. In a report on their 1971 meeting with Lotta Continua, the 
GIP wrote that “the struggle of the inmates is taken up in a strategy of struggle in the 
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neighborhoods.”715 For the French, who steadfastly prioritized organizing at the point of 
production, these Italian ideas about reorienting away from the giant factories to the surrounding 
communities came as a revelation. Soon after, the GIP’s close collaborator in France, Secours 
Rouge, threw itself into a long campaign over housing.716 Other radical groups in France were 
similarly inspired by Lotta Continua, forging new links and translating their articles on the politics 
of tenant struggles and social reproduction.717 
But an even more important transnational influence on the French was the struggle of 
African American prisoners. The ex-GP, the GIP, and other French radicals avidly read, 
translated, and circulated material about the black prison movements, and the GIP devoted an 
entire booklet to George Jackson after his murder on August 21, 1971. In fact, these struggles, 
particularly the writings of the Panthers and Jackson, substantially challenged how many French 
radicals understood the prison, class composition, and revolutionary politics.  
When French Maoist groups first entered the prisons, they drew a line between the 
“political” prisoners and the “common law” inmates, arguing that as specifically political prisoners, 
they deserved what was known as “political regime” status. They aimed “to force the enemy to 
recognize us as a political force and not as a band of criminals – as communists and not as 
thieves. The people mobilize behind communists, not behind thieves … The car thief, the 
common law criminal, reflects society; the communist transforms it.”718 As Michel Foucault later 
put it:  
When Maoists were put in prison, they began, it must be said, by reacting a little like the 
traditional political groups, that is to say: “We do not want to be assimilated with the 
criminals of common law, we do not want our image to be mixed with theirs in the opinion 
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of people, and we ask to be treated like political prisoners with the rights of political 
prisoners.”719 
 
This was, after all, the primary objective of the first strike in September 1970. However, as 
historians like Julian Bourg have noted, the combination of that strike’s limited gains, along with 
subsequent prison inquiries, collaboration with “common law” prisoners, and engagement with 
Foucault’s ideas helped push the ex-GP beyond this rather narrow conception of the prison.720 It 
is often forgotten, however, that black prison organizing, especially the figure of George Jackson, 
played the most decisive role in this rethinking.  
In his writings, Jackson, an African American Marxist and one of the three Soledad 
Brothers, demonstrated that the prison, just as much as the high schools, universities, factories, 
or the union offices, could be a site of politicization. He argued that prisons did not in fact 
suppress politics, but rather, were places where many people learned politics for the first time. 
The GIP came to see Jackson, imprisoned since the age of eighteen, as “one of the first 
revolutionary leaders to acquire his political education entirely in prison.”721 This in turn had a 
profound impact on the ex-GP, which began to argue, paraphrasing Jackson, that “the prisons 
are not only ‘Marxist universities,’ but training camps.”722 They saw the 1971 Attica riot, where 
incarcerated rioters had inscribed the words “prison is the school of revolution” on the prison 
walls, as definitive proof.723 
Jackson, and the Panthers more broadly, also helped French radicals overcome their 
scorn for what was known as the lumpen proletariat, that is to say, the underclass of criminals, 
vagabonds, ragpickers, and others at the margins who were allegedly hostile to proletarian 
revolution. This bias revealed an inability to recognize the class dimensions of the prison, and 
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was directly responsible for the Maoists’ initial decision to separate themselves from the common 
law prisoners. Jackson, now seen as “the first to carry out a class-based analysis of the 
prisoners,” changed their view.724 In an interview translated by the GIP, Jackson wrote, “All these 
cats in here are lumpen, that’s all I’ve ever been.” However, he continued, “you would be very 
surprised to see how these particular lumpen in here accept class war and revolutionary 
socialism.” Jackson argued that prisoners were not selfishly individualistic, as traditional Marxist 
theory seemed to suggest, but rather that their isolation from community, family, clan, or national 
ties, engendered an intense longing for “community, commune-ity.” “That’s what helps define us 
as a class,” Jackson explained.725 
Indeed, Jackson continued, the prison, bourgeois law, and the judicial apparatus were 
themselves responsible for creating the very category of the lumpenproletariat. In 1971, the 
Cause du Peuple translated some of Jackson’s writings in which he argued that even when 
released, prisoners were marked with a record, had enormous difficulty to find jobs, and were 
quickly arrested again, often charged with the crime of “the inability to keep paid work.”726 Another 
article in the Cause du Peuple argued that the prison, as the “privileged instrument” of the justice 
system, marginalized certain sectors of the proletariat, drained resources from workers facing 
trial, and, echoing Jackson, ensured that once convicts were released, they would face 
unemployment or highly exploitative and precarious jobs.727 
Through the perspective of the black prison experience, French radicals such as Jean 
Genet began to see how the justice system branded certain people as always-already guilty. As 
Genet wrote in his preface to Jackson’s Soledad Brother, “the black man is, from the start, 
natively, the guilty man.”728 In other words, the law itself had created an entire category of people 
designated as criminal, expendable, surplus. The insights gathered from the struggle of African 
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Americans, the GIP later realized, “overturn many commonly accepted ideas in the history of the 
working-class movement about the population in the prisons.”729 Paired with the GIP’s own 
empirical discoveries in French prisons, these arguments forced many radicals to not only 
fundamentally rethink the idea of class, but also change their very political strategies. Instead of 
separating themselves from the petty criminals, whose existence they initially felt was 
nonpolitical, radicals now demanded the special “political regime for everyone.”730 
Reflecting on these shifting ideas in an article published in La Cause du peuple, the GIP 
argued that “the struggle of prisoners is not different, at bottom, from those that are carried out in 
the society from which they are ‘excluded.’”731 The new political project, therefore, was to 
overcome these artificially imposed divisions. Analyzing the GIP’s discovery, theorist Alberto 
Toscano notes that unity now meant breaking a division that “was both imposed upon and 
eventually affirmed by the workers’ movement, with its debilitating introjection of a bourgeois 
morality itself reproduced by legal and penal institutions: the division between the proletariat and 
the ‘non-proletarianized plebs.’”732 Instead of trying to advance the struggles of a visible, 
spectacular, mythic vanguard, that of the wageworker in the factory, radicals now considered 
rearticulating a fractured class by reintegrating the forgotten, invisible, so-called “backwards” 
figure, reorienting the focus away from independent class figures to the relationships between 
those figures – a task all the more pressing given the plurality of new social movements emerging 
at this time.733 
This rethinking demanded a more nuanced engagement with the law. Through their 
experiences organizing around prisons, some radicals began to see the law as a more subtle, 
creative form of power, rather than a blunt instrument wielded by the bourgeoisie in reaction to 
movements. Foucault summarized the new thinking: 
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If one makes the distinction, if one accepts the difference between political law and 
common law, that means that fundamentally one recognizes bourgeois morality and law 
as far as respect for the property of others, respect for traditional moral values, etc., are 
concerned. The cultural revolution in its widest sense implies that, at least in a society 
like ours, you no longer make the division between criminals of common law and political 
criminals. Common law is politics, it is, after all, the bourgeois class that, for political 
reasons and on a basis of its political power, defined what is called common law.734 
 
As they began to understand the law as a creative political force, activists demanded further 
inquiry. The ex-GP called for the creation of “study groups” to not only investigate different legal 
matters, such as arrests or violation of press laws, but to publish accessible brochures to help all 
militants familiarize themselves with the political function of the law.735 Indeed, the ex-GP, along 
with other radicals, began to see the law as itself a site of struggle, and called for an “army of 
lawyers” allied with the left to “open a breach in the legal apparatus of the bourgeoisie.”736 Thus, 
through this transnational experience of prison organizing, some radicals began to see the subtle 
ways in which politics was at work even in those places they once ignored or wrote off as 
nonpolitical, such as the prison of the “common law.” 
French radicals initially made the “democratic turn” out of immediate strategic concerns, 
as a kind of political expedient in a changed situation. But as they followed this turn, they began 
to rethink many of their long held assumptions. The democratic turn did not just buy radicals time, 
space, and allies, leaving the core of their project unchanged; it transformed the very way radicals 
thought about class struggle, politics, and the revolution itself. This was clearly felt in the new 
confrontation with rights. Through prison organizing, radicals begin to rethink how rights might fit 
into their more general conception of revolution. The GIP, by no means a reformist organization, 
later reflected that their investigations into the prisons ended up speaking “less about the 
experience of prisoners, or their misery, than their rights – right to defend oneself against 
tribunals; the right to news, visits, mail; the right to hygiene and food; the right to a decent wage 
for work done, and the right to keep working when one been released …” The questionnaires, 
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which asked very specifically what rights prisoners had, and what rights they wanted, was, upon 
further reflection, seen as a way of “declaring these rights.” Most profoundly, the GIP argued that 
while some of these rights had already been won, they were always being taken away, meaning 
that the struggle for rights would never be finished once and for all, a mere one way step on the 
way to revolution, but an ongoing, integral part of the revolutionary process.737 
This process was not without its contradictions. While radicals increasingly adopted the 
new rights discourse, most did not embrace the notion of individual sovereignty, but continued to 
place their advocacy of “democratic rights” firmly within the framework of collective revolution. But 
attempting to reconcile a commitment to democratic rights with the overall struggle for the 
dictatorship of the proletariat was bound to raise some serious questions about the meaning of 
both rights and revolution. This tension risked rendering the politics of some of these groups, 
especially the ex-GP, incoherent. For at the same time that the ex-GP assured the French public 
of its commitment to basic liberties, its militants assaulted security guards and foremen and 
plotted the overthrow of the French state.  
This fraught relationship between rights and revolution grew even more serious when 
radicals looked abroad. As the next chapter will show, the concern with rights began to affect their 
organizing beyond French prisons, shaping the way radicals conceptualized international 
solidarity. For radicals soon learned that revolutionaries in South Vietnam faced far higher levels 
of state repression. The dictatorial government of General Nguyen Van Thieu revoked civil 
liberties, imprisoned hundreds of thousands of political dissenters, and tortured those suspected 
of revolutionary sympathies. Activists, as we will see, responded by grafting their new concerns 
with rights onto the antiwar movement, demanding the immediate release of the political 
prisoners. Yet in arguing that South Vietnam violated fundamental democratic rights, the defense 
of national liberation against imperialism increasingly took the form of criticizing the internal affairs 
of a sovereign state. In so doing, they not only began to lend legitimacy to a competing form of 
international solidarity that shared the progressive aspirations of anti-imperialism but rejected 
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national sovereignty and collective rights in favor of human rights; this new iteration of 
international solidarity accentuated some of the implicit contradictions between rights and 
revolution in the strategy of the radical left in the 1970s. 
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CHAPTER 6: FREEING THE POLITICAL PRISONERS 
 
On April 16, 1971, President Richard Nixon responded to questions about Vietnam at a 
panel interview at the annual convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. During 
the interview, Otis Chandler, publisher of the Los Angeles Times, broached the question of the 
U.S. prisoners of war in North Vietnam. Nixon responded bluntly: the North Vietnamese have, 
“without question,” been the “most barbaric in their handling of prisoners of any nation in modern 
history.”738 Insisting that he would never abandon the POWs, he threatened, “As long as there is 
one American being held prisoner in North Vietnam,” he would “retain that force.”739 The POW 
issue, in other words, had become a central justification for the prolongation of the war. 
Indeed, at the very same moment that radicals in France and the United States began to 
make the rights of prisoners a central dimension of their revolutionary struggles, the U.S. 
government launched an ambitious strategy to transform the entire discourse on the war into one 
about the repression of American prisoners of war. While the plight of the POWs had always 
been part of the debate about the war, especially within the anti-war movement, under the Nixon 
Administration, the safe release of the American POWs would become a primary justification for 
the prolongation of the war in Vietnam. By 1969, most Americans had come to believe the war 
was a mistake, the international community had turned against the United States, and the Nixon 
Administration had lost moral legitimacy. Hoping to revive support, Nixon, backed by a loose 
coalition of conservatives, gambled that he could use the cause of the political prisoners to 
rebrand the American war as a just fight for humanitarian principles. 
Antiwar radicals in the United Sates, then France, responded by pointing to the tens of 
thousands of political dissidents imprisoned, tortured, or disappeared by the U.S.-backed 
government of South Vietnam. Drawing on their considerable transnational experiences with 
prison organizing, they grafted their newfound concern with rights directly onto antiwar solidarity, 
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calling for the liberation of all political prisoners in South Vietnam. Indeed, after the United States 
withdrew from Vietnam in 1973, thereby depriving anti-imperialist international solidarity 
movements of their primary target, antiwar radicals made the liberation of the political prisoners 
one of their primary concerns, demanding that South Vietnam free all its political dissidents, 
restore civil liberties, and adhere to the Paris Accords. Hoping to revive the international antiwar 
movement, French radicals used this common demand to unite the radical left at home and 
abroad. These efforts culminated in a massive antiwar demonstration in May 1973, when over ten 
thousand Western European and American radicals met in Milan, Italy. 
Despite the focus on rights, anti-imperialists still framed internationalism around national 
liberation, believing that socialist states, at least in the short run, remained the primary vehicles of 
emancipation. Yet in arguing that South Vietnam violated fundamental democratic rights, anti-
imperialist solidarity increasingly took the form of criticizing the internal affairs of a sovereign 
state. Thus, while most radicals did not convert to human rights in the early 1970s, their new 
attention to rights, along with alliances with rival groups such as Amnesty International, created 
the political terrain that allowed a competing form of solidarity to attract new audiences. In so 
doing, anti-imperialists lent legitimacy to a competing – and at the time relatively marginal – form 
of internationalism that shared the progressive aspirations of anti-imperialism but rejected 
nationalism in favor of human rights. 
 
Prisoners of War 
In the early stages of the war the U.S. government said very little publicly about POWs 
and MIAs. Believing that drawing attention to the prisoners could hamper the government’s efforts 
to secure their freedom, the Johnson Administration practiced what was known as “quiet 
diplomacy.”740 But dissenting voices soon emerged from within the government. As early as 1967 
several proposals from the military recommended the United States mobilize the POW issue for 
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“counter-propaganda.”741 The Marine Corps, for instance, argued that it was imperative to counter 
North Vietnam’s claims to treating American POWs humanely, believing they could easily win 
“world public opinion” in this matter.742 According to the Army, the United States needed “a 
strategy which aggressively grasps the initiative for us and keeps the other side reacting in the 
desired direction.”743 The Air Force went furthest, advocating the United States seize this 
opportunity to influence both domestic and foreign audiences by targeting major institutions, 
national media, social clubs, and Congress. A Working Group for the Proposed Publicity 
Programs Working Group, created to evaluate these proposals, concluded that the POW issue 
would help the United States take the offensive in its losing ideological war. 
Although the Johnson Administration resisted these proposals, by 1969 the U.S. 
government changed direction. The incoming Nixon Administration proved far more receptive to 
the military’s proposals. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird took a personal interest in the issue, 
and, encouraged by conversations with “experienced DoD officials about the pent up urge to go 
on the offensive,” he openly advocated change of strategy.744 In fact, within only a few months of 
taking office, Laird publicly raised the issue, releasing a memorandum to the press condemning 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) for denying the POWs “basic rights.” 
This new direction away from “quiet diplomacy” was paralleled by considerable pressure 
from below. POW/MIA families, tired of staying silent, turned against “quiet diplomacy.” Certain 
the U.S. government was not doing enough for the prisoners, the National League of Families of 
American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia initiated a very aggressive campaign to 
“publicize the plight of our men,” publishing stories in newspapers across the country, 
bombarding Richard Nixon with telegrams on his inauguration, and later appearing on television 
shows.745 In 1969, the League went national, Sybil Stockdale, wife of the highest ranking naval 
officer imprisoned in North Vietnam, became its coordinator, and the group forged powerful ties 
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with major Republican politicians, including Defense Secretary Laird, California Governor Ronald 
Reagan, Senator Bob Dole, and President Nixon himself. For their part, these politicians 
recognized they could not afford to alienate the families. 
Above all, the U.S. government realized it could not afford to lose the ideological war. 
After Têt, morale plummeted and opposition rose. In January 1969, for example, 52% of Gallup 
respondents said the war was a mistake.746 In July, Nixon’s own ratings began to decline, leading 
to a “public relations crisis.”747 In October and November, he would face the first two nationwide 
demonstrations against his administration. With the majority of Americans against the war, the 
U.S. government, which did not intend to withdraw from Southeast Asia, needed to not only justify 
its actions, but revive prowar sentiment. With pressure from the grassroots, a new strategy from 
the White House, and support from within the military, the U.S. government settled on the POWs 
as the perfect issue to outflank the Vietnamese on the ideological front.  
To be sure, it was the Vietnamese, then the American anti-war movement, who first 
politicized the POWs. North Vietnam periodically released American POWs as early as 1965 to 
foster goodwill, pressure the United States to negotiate, and cast the Vietnamese as the real 
humanitarians.748 But the Nixon Administration, following suggestions from the military, gambled 
that it could use the POW issue to, in the words of Laird, “marshal public opinion” against the 
antiwar movement at home and the DRV abroad.749 Thus, the Nixon Administration hoped that, if 
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approached correctly, the POW issue could be used to rally prowar support, transforming the 
“silent majority,” as Nixon later called it, into an active coalition.750 
Thus, on May 19, 1969, the last birthday Ho Chi Minh would live to celebrate, the U.S. 
government launched the Go Public campaign. At a press conference, Secretary of Defense 
Laird called for the “prompt release of all American prisoners,” denounced the North Vietnamese 
for their treatment of the POWs, and put forward five concrete demands.751 Although led by the 
Nixon Administration, the campaign was a coming together of relatively independent efforts 
involving the military, social clubs, veterans associations, the League of Families, conservative 
politicians, wealthy philanthropists, the mainstream news media, and prowar ideologues. While 
they all had different immediate interests, their common goal was an American victory in Vietnam, 
and they all saw the POW/MIA issue as playing a crucial role in revitalizing the pro-war 
campaign.752 In fact, through the Go Public campaign, a new right-wing coalition began to take 
shape.753 
Few could have anticipated the scope of the Go Public campaign. In late July 1969, 
prowar groups printed 5,000 bumper stickers with the words, “Don’t let them be forgotten: POWs, 
MIAs.” Within four years there would be fifty million in circulation.754 In October, three groups of 
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POW/MIA families flew to Paris to accost the “enemy face-to face.”755 In November, Congress 
unanimously declared November 9 a National Day of Prayer for POWs in Vietnam, and the 
House Subcommittee on National Security Policy formally condemned North Vietnam for violating 
the Geneva Convention’s statutes on POWs.756 Reader’s Digest sponsored a “write in,” 
instructing its readers to send letters to Xuan Thuy, North Vietnam’s chief negotiator in Paris.757 
That same month, billionaire Ross Perot not only paid major newspapers to run full-page 
advertisements about the prisoners, he purchased time on 53 stations to run a half-hour 
propaganda film. By the end of November 1969 Perot had spent over one million dollars.758  
The campaign continued unabated into 1970 and 1971. On May 1, 1970 Bob Dole 
teamed up with the League to organize an extravaganza, meretriciously titled, “An Appeal for 
International Justice,” in Constitution Hall that featured one thousand POW/MIA families. On May 
9, 1970, at the Salute to the Armed Forces Ball, the Victory in Vietnam Association (VIVA), 
unveiled its fundraising campaign to sell nickel and copper bracelets engraved with the names of 
POWs and MIAs. By January 1973, when the Paris Peace Agreements were finally signed, four 
to ten million Americans wore these bracelets.759 
The Go Public campaign signaled an entire reorientation of U.S. policy in Vietnam. In a 
national broadcast on October 7, 1970, President Nixon presented a new proposal to end the 
war, announcing that one of the highest priorities would be the immediate release of “all prisoners 
of war, without exception, without condition.”760 To prove his commitment to freeing the prisoners, 
he even ordered a daring military raid to liberate the Son Tay prison camp outside Hanoi.761 
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Through these stunts, televised speeches, and the Go Public campaign, the Nixon Administration 
and its allies hoped to make the entire war about freeing the prisoners. As Reagan once put it, 
“The issue of the prisoners is the single most important issue involved in this long and savage 
war and we want them back now.”762 
Nixon went further, menacing that “as long as there are American POWs” he would have 
to “maintain a residual force in South Vietnam.”763 He even implied that the United States was still 
in Vietnam precisely to free the prisoners of war. Critics highlighted the absurdity of this new 
position, arguing that the war itself was creating the very thing it was now allegedly being waged 
to end. When they suggested that if the United States really wanted to bring the POWs home, the 
military should simply withdraw, Nixon maintained that announcing withdrawal would only play 
into the enemy’s hands, and that “we will have given enemy commanders the exact information 
they need to marshal their attacks against our remaining forces at their most vulnerable time.”764 
Nixon took every opportunity to lambaste “the enemy’s callous indifference,” repeatedly 
suggesting that the North Vietnamese used the POWs as “hostages for political or military 
purposes” or as mere “negotiating pawns” in some “barbaric” game.765 It was a cunning move. 
For at the very same time that U.S. government violated civil liberties at home, and supported a 
dictatorship in South Vietnam, it arraigned the North Vietnamese for infringing “basic rights.” At 
the same time that the pro-war conservatives disregarded the Geneva Accords of 1954 on 
Vietnamese self-determination, they fulminated against the Vietnamese for breaking the Geneva 
Convention of 1929 regarding prisoners of war. And at the same time that American imperialism 
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murdered hundreds of thousands in Indochina, its proponents sought to divert attention to the no 
more than several hundred captured soldiers. 
Most insidiously, however, the Nixon administration aimed to redefine the POW/MIA 
matter as a purely humanitarian issue, to be treated independently of not only military, but also 
political concerns. As early as October 1970, Nixon argued that the “release of all prisoners of 
war would be a simple act of humanity.”766 Not only, he explained again in March 1971, had the 
Vietnamese contravened the statues of the Geneva Convention, but, on a “moral plane above 
and apart from these formal rules, all civilized peoples are subject to the basic humanitarian 
standards long established in international law and custom.”767 Appealing to universal 
“humanitarian standards,” the United States hoped, could move the question of imprisonment 
beyond its specific historical context, turning it into a purely ethical issue.  
The United States’ growing concern with the plight of the prisoners of war in Vietnam 
moved in the exact opposite direction as radicals’ equally new concern with the status of political 
prisoners in North America and Western Europe. For while radicals tried to repoliticize seemingly 
nonpolitical experiences, such as “common law” imprisonment, the United States tried to 
depoliticize the emphatically political experiences of the POWs. While radicals aimed to reactivate 
a language of rights in the service of global revolutionary transformation, the U.S. government 
aimed to confine all rights discourse to a notion of intrinsic humanitarian ethics that could 
ultimately preserve the status quo. Thus, the United States implicitly tried to outflank radicals on 
both the issue of the war and that of imprisonment by shifting the discussion to a different terrain, 
focusing on morality instead of politics, universal standards instead of historical contingency, and 
individual rights instead of the collective right to self-determination. 
 
What About the Other POWs? 
In 1969, the Black Panther Party disclosed that North Vietnam would release captured 
American POWs in exchange for the freedom of Chairman Bobby Seale and Minister of Defense 
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Huey P. Newton, then incarcerated as “political prisoners here in fascist Babylon.” “If you have 
sons, husbands or friends who are prisoners of war in Vietnam,” their paper enjoined, “send us 
their name, rank, and serial numbers.”768 The U.S. government declined the offer, but the Party 
persisted. “This proposed freedom of Political Prisoners in exchange for Prisoners of War,” the 
Panthers continued, “could only be ignored by a government that has no concern for its poor, its 
peace-loving, its non-White, and its soldiers, and even less concern for PEACE.”769 
The Panther’s call for a prisoner exchange was just one of many swift responses to the 
U.S. government’s POW strategy. Some radicals exposed the POW campaign as a U.S. plot to, 
in the words of DRV Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, “cover up its odious crimes against the 
Vietnamese people, its war acts against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, and its schemes to 
prolong and extend the war of aggression.”770 Others, such as the Panthers, pointed to the 
thousands of political prisoners languishing in penitentiaries at home. Still others tried to 
outmaneuver the Nixon Administration by convincing the public that antiwar radicals and the 
Vietnamese were not only concerned about the POWs, but could allay their plight more effectively 
than the U.S. government. This was precisely why in August 1969, just months after the United 
States fired the opening salvos of the Go Public campaign, the DRV released three POWs 
directly to a representative of the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, 
rather than government officials. Hoping to transform this gesture of goodwill into an ongoing 
campaign to meet Nixon’s challenge, in January 1970, representatives from the DRV and a 
contingent of anti-war activists led by Cora Weiss and David Dellinger formed the Committee of 
Liaison with Families of Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam (COLIAFAM). 
 COLIAFAM tackled the POW issue from a resolutely anti-war perspective, arguing in its 
very first press release that the “safe return of American pilots held in North Vietnam can only 
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come with a decision on the part of the U.S. government to withdraw from Vietnam.”771 Until then, 
COLIAFAM would cooperate with the North Vietnam to improve the situation as best as possible. 
The committee produced a complete list of American POWs, convinced the DRV to allow POWs 
to receive heavier packages, and provided the only functional channel for relaying mail to the 
prisoners. COLIFAM was so successful that even Nixon’s ally, the prowar League of Families, 
ultimately voted down a proposal to boycott the Committee.772 This did not stop the government, 
however, which felt sufficiently threatened that it strove to smear and harass the Committee, 
going so far as to seize 379 letters from POWs sent to COLIAFAM in September 1970.773 
While pursuing all these other paths, radicals, beginning with American antiwar activists, 
ultimately focused on one strategy to expose the hypocrisy of the U.S. government’s concern with 
POWs: drawing attention to the political prisoners rotting in South Vietnamese jails.774 By the late 
1960s, South Vietnam was rapidly becoming an authoritarian state under the firm control of 
President Nguyen Van Thieu. In the August 1971 presidential election, he ran unopposed, 
winning 94 percent of the vote in what many considered a rigged contest. Although already 
repressive, his regime took a sharper autocratic turn in response to the DRV’s 1972 spring 
offensive. Thieu imposed martial law, ruling by decree, limited the rights of political parties, and 
strangled basic democratic rights throughout the country, especially the freedom of speech.775 
This destroyed what little popularity Thieu’s dictatorial government could count on, leading him to 
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turn to violent repression to maintain order. Until the end of the war in April 1975, he would 
imprison hundreds of thousands of suspected dissenters – communists and anti-communists, 
Buddhists and Christians, poor farmers and outspoken intellectuals – without trial. In many cases, 
the guards tortured the prisoners, keeping them awake for weeks on end, mutilating their bodies, 
feeding them only grass to eat, or in some cases even blinding dissidents with caustic lime.776 
Gaolers locked thousands of prisoners in dreaded “tiger cages” no more than five or six feet long 
and four feet high. In the face of such repression a coalition of progressive South Vietnamese 
organizations, including the Union of Women, the Mouvement des Catholiques pour la paix, and 
the National Liberation Front, as well as the government of North Vietnam quickly organized on 
behalf of the prisoners.777 In Saigon, Vietnamese activists even braved further reprisals to found a 
specific solidarity group, the Comité pour la réforme du régime de détention au Sud Vietnam. 
A central component of this coalition’s strategy was to publicize the issue internationally. 
For example, in 1970, the South Vietnamese Committee of Women’s Action for the Right to Live, 
which unsuccessfully tried to meet with Vice President Spiro Agnew during his visit to the 
Republic of Vietnam, circulated an open letter to the Nixon Administration about the suffering of 
the political prisoners in the South, which the Women’s International League for Peace and 
Freedom later distributed internationally.778 “We are the mothers of the political prisoners 
detained in the various prisons of South Vietnam,” they announced. “None of our children is 
convicted of a crime,” the women continued, but all of “them are being imprisoned because they 
have dared spoken of Peace and Independence, a most profound desire of all the Vietnamese 
People after years and years of war.”779 The women concluded their open letter by demanding 
the liberation of their children from the “present inhuman system of imprisonment in South 
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Vietnam.”780 More damning, however, the Committee directly implicated the United States in 
these crimes. “Our children witness the presence of American Advisors at the prisons,” they 
warned.781 The United Sates, the Committee accused, not only funds, equips, and trains Thieu’s 
police force, but the American military carries out its own arrests, sometimes handing over 
suspects to the South Vietnamese government without trial. 
Although Thieu denied these accusations, irrefutable evidence appeared in the summer 
of 1970. Congressional aid Tom Harkin, accompanying a group of House representatives to 
Vietnam, visited antiwar journalist Don Luce in Saigon, where he happened to meet a group of 
former political prisoners claiming Thieu had locked them in hidden tiger cages on the island of 
Con Son.782 One of them, Cao Nguyen Loi, drew Harkin a map, and Harkin convinced two 
representatives to investigate the Con Son penitentiary.783 Once there, the delegation broke from 
the official tour, following their map to a secret entrance leading to tortured political prisoners. 
Luce, who served as translator, recalls how the “faces of the prisoners in the cages below are still 
etched indelibly in my mind: the man with three fingers cut off; the man (soon to die) from Quang 
Tri province whose skull was split open; and the Buddhist monk from Hue who spoke intensely 
about the repression of the Buddhists. I remember clearly the terrible stench from diarrhea and 
the open sores where shackles cut into the prisoners’ ankles.”784 
From that point on, the suffering of the political prisoners became a recognizable issue. 
Harkin published his photographs in a July 1970 edition of Life Magazine and penned a lengthy 
story about the political prisoners in an issue of The Progressive. Don Luce provided further 
revelations about the violations of basic civil liberties in South Vietnam, the suffering of the 
political prisoners, and the dreaded tiger cages. The stories soon reached an international 
audience. The Front Solidarité Indochine (FSI), the successor to the Comité Vietnam National, 
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led by the indefatigable Laurent Schwartz, helped publicize the issue in France. Drawing directly 
on Luce’s research, as well as statements from Vietnam, the FSI published an article in 1971 on 
Thieu’s regime, calling French radicals to “help the 200,000 political prisoners in South 
Vietnam.”785 
The struggle to free the political prisoners gained further momentum in 1972. Don Luce’s 
Indochina Mobile Education Project and Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden’s newly formed Indochina 
Peace Campaign (IPC) led the way in the United States.786 They were joined by dozens of other 
newly formed antiwar organizations specifically devoted to the issue. These groups, such as the 
Bay Area Committee of Inquiry into Political Prisoners in South Vietnam and American 
Responsibility, circulated detailed pamphlets that often presented, among other things, statistics, 
letters from prisoners, or revelations about U.S. aid to Thieu’s regime.787 Some of these groups, 
such as the International Committee to Free South Vietnamese Political Prisoners from 
Detention, Torture, and Death drew on their strong international connections to coordinate efforts. 
These varied initiatives proved so successful that by the end of 1972 even most mainstream 
American newspapers, such as the New York Times, The Washington Post, and the San 
Francisco Chronicle, felt obliged to run lengthy stories on the issue.788 
 In January 1973 the campaign crossed a threshold when two Frenchmen formerly 
detained in South Vietnam published an eyewitness account of the brutality in the prisons. In 
1968 André Menras and Jean-Pierre Debris traveled to Vietnam as teachers on a governmental 
exchange program. Although “nonpolitical” when they first arrived in Saigon, by the summer of 
1970, they found Thieu’s regime so oppressive that they staged a risky protest – they scaled the 
monument adjacent to the National Assembly, unfurling an NLF flag, and scattering leaflets 
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demanding peace.789 The government had them arrested immediately and thrown into Chi Hao 
prison, where they remained until December 29, 1972. Upon returning to France, they furnished 
the most authentic non-Vietnamese statements about the treatment of political prisoners in South 
Vietnam. Their testimonies were immediately translated into many languages, and the two men 
embarked on an international speaking tour to publicize the political repression in the South. 
 Menras and Debris worked especially closely with American activist groups, above all 
Tom Hayden’s IPC.790 In March 1973, Studs Terkel interviewed the pair on the radio, where the 
two described, in heavily accented English, the oppressiveness of Thieu’s regime and the 
gruesome tortures in the prisons.791 Their accounts, along with the careful research of Don Luce, 
who had just published a book called Hostages of War: Saigon’s Political Prisoners, formed the 
factual basis of much of the antiwar literature on the issue in the United States and elsewhere.792 
After these revelations, practically every American antiwar organization made the political 
prisoners a central feature of their activity. By 1973, even rival revolutionary organizations, such 
as the Socialist Workers Party and the Revolutionary Union, joined the same cause.793  
The campaign to liberate the political prisoners gave radicals the perfect response to the 
Nixon Administration. How could the U.S. government, antiwar radicals asked, criticize the DRV 
for its treatment of a few hundred POWs when it supported a brutal dictatorship that tortured 
literally hundreds of thousands of prisoners in the South? Many American radicals explicitly 
counterposed their political prisoner campaign to Nixon’s Go Public campaign. “For years 
Americans have worn name bracelets symbolizing their deep concern for the release of American 
POWs,” one group argued, but “a tragedy of a far larger scale continues for 200,000 Vietnamese. 
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These are the civilian POWs in the prisons of South Vietnam.”794 Moreover, since the political 
prisoners would remain imprisoned even after the United States agreed to withdraw in January 
1973, the radicals held a lasting campaign in their hands. Thus, when Nixon triumphantly 
welcomed the POWs home in early 1973, hoping to definitely close the issue, antiwar activists 
pointed to the political dissidents still imprisoned in South Vietnam, chanting, “not all the prisoners 
are home.”795 As the Black Panther Party’s Intercommunal News, drawing on Menras and Debris’ 
testimony, put it “What about the Other POWs?”796 
Antiwar activists had effectively routed the U.S. government on the issue of the prisoners 
by channeling the widespread concern over American POWs into one for Vietnamese political 
prisoners.797 In the process, they hoped to reorient the discussion about prisoners in Vietnam to 
its proper political context, rather than the nonpolitical moralism the United States championed. 
But in their struggle to outmaneuver the Go Public campaign, some antiwar activists came 
dangerously close to simply mimicking the strategies, tactics, and arguments of their rivals.  
In a bizarre mirroring of the earlier prowar POW campaign, the new antiwar political 
prisoner campaign sold bumper stickers, buttons, and even plastic bracelets with the names of 
specific Vietnamese prisoners.798 Where some prowar activists, including Joe McCain, captured 
Navy pilot John McCain’s brother, once sat in bamboo cages eating “POW food” to dramatize the 
plight of the Prisoners of War, antiwar activists now circulated instructions for creating their own 
model tiger cages to use in demonstrations.799 And in place of the POW days of prayer, activists 
organized the “International Days of Concern with Saigon’s Political Prisoners” in September 
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1973.800 In some cases, for example, activists appealed to moral conscience, spoke about 
humanitarian standards, or circulated lachrymose tales and grotesque images of the broken 
Vietnamese prisoners, which stood in stark contrast to the earlier days when radicals generally 
represented the Vietnamese as heroic guerillas, not miserable victims whose “lives are in our 
hands.”801 Thus, in their campaign to win broad public support and beat the U.S. government at 
its own game, activists sometimes ran the risk of copying the kind of moralism deployed by their 
enemies, thereby muddling the specificity of their political message. 
 
Reorienting the Antiwar Movement 
By the end of 1972 it seemed increasingly that the United States, the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government 
(PRG), the successor to the NLF in the South, were approaching an agreement. But instead of 
welcoming the coming negotiations as an opportunity to finally demobilize, antiwar activists in 
North America and Western Europe redoubled their efforts to ensure that the United States would 
sign the Peace Accords. On Nixon’s second inauguration on January 20, 1973, just one week 
before the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, antiwar radicals coordinated international 
demonstrations across the globe. In Washington, D.C., 80,000 Americans held a “counter-
inauguration,” involving a number of radical groups, such as the Vietnam Veterans Against the 
War and the Attica Brigade, the youth affiliate of the Maoist Revolutionary Union.802 
The following day approximately 15,000 activists, organized by the Comitato Italia 
Vietnam demonstrated in Turin, Italy.803 In France, an incredibly broad coalition of otherwise rival 
groups – including the ex-GP, Ligue Communiste, the PSU, Ligne Rouge, Revolution!, as well as 
Christian groups such as the Fraternité chrétienne avec le Vietnam – gathered in Paris, led in 
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large part by the new Front Solidarité Indochine (FSI).804 They even drafted a collective 
statement, ominously warning demonstrators that every time an American President made some 
promise to end the war the “anti-war movement believed” him, and “demobilized itself.”805 The 
movement, they promised together, would not fall for that trap again. As another FSI pamphlet 
phrased it, “nothing is decided; nothing is finished.”806  
For the Americans, the Inauguration Day Protest would be the last major antiwar 
demonstration of the Vietnam War. Wracked by internal tensions, and faced with a public that 
simply wanted to put the war behind it, the movement as a whole declined significantly compared 
to the late 1960s. But even if the movement declined as an organized presence, it should be 
remembered that tens of thousands of radicals – through specifically antiwar groups such as the 
Indochina Peace Campaign, through revolutionary groups like Socialist Workers Party, or simply 
through local initiatives – continued to protest the war.807 In surprising contrast, however, while 
the formal American movement had been steadily weakening since 1972, the organized 
movements in European, and above all in France, witnessed a remarkable resurgence. Indeed, 
the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973, far from spelling the end of the 
movement, turned the war into an even more important issue for French radicals. 
The Peace Accords represented a major turning point in the war. They signaled the 
departure of the United States from Vietnam, which, for the Nixon Administration, meant the end 
of the war, and hopefully the complete demobilization of the radical movements at home and 
abroad. On May 25, 1973, just a few months after the signing of the Accords, President Richard 
Nixon boasted of his victories to an auditorium filled with returned American prisoners of war. 
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January 1973, he remarked, “saw the return of all Americans from Vietnam, all of our combat 
forces, the return of all of our prisoners of war, the end of the American involvement in Vietnam, a 
peace agreement which, if adhered to, will mean peace for Vietnam and Southeast Asia.”808 With 
the war over, Nixon argued, it was time to put the past to rest. 
Of course, the war was not over.809 The United States continued to bomb Cambodia, 
dropping over 250,000 tons of ordinances in 1973 alone, far more than the tonnage dropped on 
Japan during the entirety of the Second World War. Laos, which had been bombed since 1964, 
suffered even worse, becoming the most heavily bombed country per capita in history.810 As for 
Vietnam, the country remained divided, with the United States continuing to support the 
extraordinarily unpopular, authoritarian regime it had spawned in the South. While the Peace 
Accords brought the North much needed respite, the threat of war still loomed large. In June 
1973, for example, US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger even threatened to resume 
bombing of North Vietnam if the Democratic Republic of Vietnam launched another offensive.  
In retrospect, it may seem that with the United States formally out of the fighting, a North 
Vietnamese and PRG victory was a foregone conclusion. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
The North was devastated, Thieu’s regime hardened into a police state, and American aid 
continued to bolster South Vietnam’s military. At the start of 1975, for instance, South Vietnam 
had nearly three times the artillery, twice the number of armored vehicles, and double the combat 
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troops as the North.811 While North Vietnam and the PRG no doubt scored a tremendous victory 
in January 1973, the struggle for a unified, independent, socialist Vietnam was far from over. 
For the renascent antiwar movement in Europe, following the lead of Vietnamese 
revolutionaries, it was clear that the struggle had to continue. “Total support until the final victory,” 
French radicals chanted after the signing of the Accords.812 But while it was clear to radicals that, 
contrary to the United States’ assertions, the Paris Peace Accords had not ended the war, the 
Accords nevertheless posed an enormous strategic dilemma. For now that the United States had 
formally withdrawn from the war, with the last combat troops set to leave the battlefield in March 
1973, the international antiwar movements were deprived of their primary target. For years 
antiwar radicals had mobilized against the United States as the personification of imperialist 
aggression in Vietnam. Of course, everyone argued that, through the puppet regime in South 
Vietnam, the United States was still involved, but its role had changed. How could they continue 
to support the Vietnamese revolutionaries now that the U.S. military no longer bombed the North 
or terrorized the PRG in the South? Who was the new target? 
For Vietnamese revolutionaries, who counted on the continued support of antiwar 
movements abroad, the answer was clear: radicals should call for the institution of full democratic 
freedoms in South Vietnam, criticizing in particular Thieu’s treatment of political dissenters. In 
fact, as early as October 1972, Madame Zung, representative of the PRG in Paris, explained to 
French radicals that while the upcoming Accords would be a tremendous victory, there was still 
much to be done about Thieu’s regime in the South. Indeed, at this point it had become clear not 
only that the United States would not replace Thieu’s authoritarian rule in the South with a 
democratic governing coalition as part of the Accords, but that because of American withdrawal 
from the war, which left the South vulnerable, Thieu would escalate repression in the South. 
Vietnamese activists genuinely feared “imminent, generalized massacres in the prisons in the 
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South,” Madame Zung confided to Madeleine Rébérioux of the Front Solidartié Indochine on 
October 24, 1972.813 Thieu’s regime, she continued, was becoming ever more repressive in the 
hopes of finally “decapitating” the resistance, depriving the movement of its most “experienced 
cadres.” Thus, with South Vietnamese radicals in significant danger, North Vietnam unable to 
liberate them through quick military victory, and the war likely lasting much longer than expected, 
the struggle now had to reorient itself towards the goal of “obtaining and respecting democratic 
freedoms.”814 Focusing the campaign on basic democratic rights could save the lives of the 
prisoners, protect the rights of dissidents, and isolate Thieu internationally. 
The FSI, the premier radical antiwar organization in France, led the way. The immediate 
task, they wrote in the February 1973 issue of their paper, was to save “the some 300,000 
political prisoners crammed in Thieu’s prisons, these indomitable men and women who must be 
the cadres of the free Vietnam of tomorrow.”815 “Nothing is more important right now,” the editorial 
continued, “than demanding their freedom. The Vietnamese revolution needs them. It’s up to us 
to make sure that they are returned to the revolution.” Although continuing to champion other 
demands – such as cutting U.S. aid to Thieu, withdrawing the remaining American military 
advisors from the South, or ending the bombardment of Cambodia – the FSI went on to make the 
campaign to liberate the political prisoners in South Vietnam the dominant form of Vietnam 
solidarity work for French radicals. The group wrote about the prisoners in its journal, circulated a 
comprehensive brochure across all the radical milieus, and organized numerous meetings 
throughout the country, often in close collaboration with Vietnamese radicals living in France.816 
At one of these meetings on February 5, 1973, in a message of gratitude, the PRG delegation in 
France formally thanked the FSI for focusing on the struggle to realize “democratic freedoms in 
the liberated zones” and win the “liberation of all the patriots by the Saigon regime.”817 
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Remarkably, despite their disagreements, other antiwar radicals followed suit, focusing 
their efforts on the same issue. The Trotskyist Ligue Communiste, FSI’s ally from the very 
beginning, collaborated most closely on the campaign. On February 26, 1973, for example, the 
FSI and the Ligue Communiste organized a day of solidarity with the prisoners in South 
Vietnam.818 The Ligue, much larger than the FSI, went even further, sharing resources, publishing 
FSI articles in its newspaper, and even printing the FSI journal on its own presses.819 Yet rival 
formations also made the plight of the prisoners the primary axis of their solidarity with Vietnam. 
Some ex-GP radicals not only demonstrated with the FSI, but also penned collective statements 
on occasion. Even those groups ferociously opposed to the FSI – such as the Maoist Prolétaire 
ligne rouge, which sponsored its own anti-imperialist formation known as the Mouvement national 
de soutien aux peuples d’Indochine (MNSPI), and the official, hardline pro-Chinese Party in 
France, the Parti communiste marxiste-léniniste de France, through its competing anti-imperialist 
front group, the Centre d'information sur les luttes anti-impérialistes (CILA) – shared this concern 
over the liberation of the prisoners. Although at odds with each other, the MNSPI and CILA put 
aside their differences to collaborate on the campaign, producing, among other things, a 
coauthored booklet on the prisoners. The “problem of the political prisoners,” they explained, 
“poses the question of the democratic freedoms trampled every day by the Saigon administration 
…” Radicals everywhere had to develop “concrete forms of support” for the prisoners and the 
struggles for democratic rights in South Vietnam.820 
In the same way that after 1967 many radicals in France united around the belief that 
solidarity with Vietnam meant bringing the war home, in the changed conjuncture of 1973 they 
rallied around the idea that the best form of solidarity with Vietnam would be to struggle for the 
restoration of democratic rights in South Vietnam. As with the turn to revolution in 1968, the 
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leadership of Vietnamese revolutionaries proved decisive. Through their heroic example, most 
powerfully demonstrated in the Tet offensive of 1968, Vietnamese revolutionaries convinced 
radicals everywhere of the possibility of revolution in the imperialist centers; and through their 
advocacy of democratic struggle in the South as the best way to destroy Thieu’s regime from 
within, they guided radicals into making the rights of political dissidents their primary concern in 
1973. Given the new balance of forces in Vietnam, with the United States certainly out of the war, 
but Thieu escalating repression and the DRV in no position to win a quick victory, it was likely the 
war would last much longer than they had expected. It made perfect sense to struggle to reorient 
their anti-imperialist solidarity.  
Of course, while Vietnam always played a special role in the imagination of French 
radicals, it never exhausted radical internationalism. Therefore, just as the turn to revolution was 
inspired not simply by Vietnam, but also by events unfolding around the entire globe, so too did 
other international developments inspire the new turn to democratic struggles. In fact, many 
antiwar radicals in France – but also across North America and Western Europe – had already 
gained significant experience advocating for prisoner rights in other countries. For example, in 
1969, many radicals drew international attention to the Burgos Trial in Spain where sixteen 
Basque radicals faced the death penalty for killing superintendent Melitón Manzanas. Groups like 
the French Secours Rouge, supported by figures such as Jean-Paul Sartre, demonstrated in 
defense of their comrades, denouncing Francisco Franco’s authoritarian regime.821 And when the 
French Right, led by Georges Pompidou, tried to deflate the international movement, arguing that 
“France was not Spain,” the SR pointed to France’s own violations of democratic liberties, 
chanting “the cops are the same in Paris and Madrid.”822 The massive international pressure not 
only forced Franco to commute the death penalties, but further mobilized the domestic movement 
against repression. The struggle to defend prisoners abroad could work back on the movements 
at home. 
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The most prominent international campaigns, however, defended the rights of political 
dissidents in South and Central America, and especially Argentina during its military dictatorship. 
In the early 1970s, French radicals – including figures such as Marguerite Duras, Jean Paul 
Sartre, André Gorz, Régis Debray, Laurent Schwartz of the Front de Solidarité Indochine, and 
Daniel Bensaïd and Alain Krivine of the Ligue Communiste – founded the Comité de Défense des 
Prisonniers Politiques Argentins to secure the liberation of the prisoners, denounce torture, win 
international legal assistance, and offer “material and moral support to the prisoners and their 
families.”823 The committee, although initiated by the French, had strong international 
connections. Beyond a notable Italian contingent that included Pier Paolo Passolini and Rossana 
Rossanda, the committee also reached British radicals by way of its ties to the Bertrand Russell 
Peace Foundation, and even had links to American radicals through the U.S. Committee for 
Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners, which was then in the midst of a major campaign to 
defend the prisoners in Argentina.824  
Indeed, many antiwar radicals in the early 1970s, such as FSI founder Laurent Schwartz, 
were deeply involved in solidarity campaigns to restore democratic liberties in both Latin America 
and Vietnam. As with the turn to revolution in the late 1960s, developments in Latin America and 
Vietnam frequently intersected with each other, with radicals often transferring the languages, 
strategies, and concerns from one context to the other. In fact, although international solidarity 
work with Vietnam temporarily overshadowed other campaigns in 1973, especially in France, 
many radicals later transferred their experiences from the campaign to liberate the political 
prisoners back to the other international campaigns, particularly those focused on Latin America. 
For example, when the FSI declined in late 1973, many of its personnel, led by Laurent Schwartz, 
redirected its organizational apparatus to defending the political dissidents in Chile after the coup. 
 But the reason why radicals, despite their many differences, came to focus their antiwar 
international solidarity on the struggle of the South Vietnamese prisoners had just as much to do 
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with developments at home. The “democratic turn,” just as the earlier turn to revolution, emerged 
from the encounter of events abroad with those at home in Western Europe and North America. 
By 1967, important political shifts in the imperialist centers made it possible for the Vietnamese 
example to resonate in the first place, enabling radicals to successfully translate the struggle into 
their own contexts. In the same way, their transnational experiences struggling against 
repression, fighting for popular justice, experimenting with united fronts, organizing with prisoners, 
and rethinking the political importance of democratic rights allowed radicals to easily shift the 
focus of their international solidarity to demanding the immediate liberation of the prisoners. 
Given these previous experiences, radicals in North America and Western Europe could lucidly 
connect the struggles of prisoners at home to the struggles of prisoners in Vietnam.  
In fact, radicals not only grafted their concern with democratic rights directly onto the anti-
Vietnam war movement in 1973, they brought with them the insights gleaned from prison 
organizing. For instance, at a press conference on the South Vietnamese prisoners in March 
1973, Madeleine Rébérioux of the FSI argued that antiwar activists had to demand “the liberation 
of all those incarcerated and not only the ‘political’ prisoners” since “the label ‘common law’ is 
stuck to all those who oppose the regime, whoever they may be.”825 In this, Rébérioux drew 
directly on the lessons GIP organizers and other radicals learned about how the law itself creates 
divisions within those it oppresses, deciding what counts as political and what does not. Since 
these discoveries were made through transnational circuits, radicals in other countries made the 
same arguments about the common fate of the so-called “common law” and “political” prisoners. 
As the Italian Comitato Vietnam dramatically put it, “‘political’ prisoners and ‘common law’ 
prisoners: for Thieu as for Hitler, a single ‘final solution.’”826 
 
From Berlin 68 to Milan 73 
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In November 1971, several hundred radical students organized a contingent for a large 
antiwar demonstration in New York City called the “Attica Brigade.” Later, when asked to explain 
their name, they wrote, “the struggles at the Attica Prison and in Vietnam are part of the same 
fight …”827 This belief that the struggles of prisoners in the imperialist centers were linked to 
events in Vietnam was shared by radicals throughout North America and Western Europe. Since 
radicals everywhere had faced repression, which led them to reconsider the struggle for 
democratic rights and the plight of political prisoners, the call to organize around the liberation of 
the political prisoners in South Vietnam carried a deep resonance. And the transnational 
convergence on this issue even served as the basis for a brief revival of internationalism around 
the Vietnam War in 1973 
The FSI, perhaps the most dynamic anti-Vietnam war group in Western Europe, took the 
lead in transforming these common concerns into an organized international movement. On 
March 3 and 4, 1973, the FSI brought together the Italian Comitato Vietnam, the English ISC, 
Swiss SKI, the Belgian FUNI, two German antiwar organizations, and a Danish group to discuss 
the possibilities for a coordinated antiwar campaign in Europe.828 Emboldened by this initial 
interest in international unity, the FSI organized an even larger gathering of a dozen European 
antiwar organizations in Paris, including their rivals, the MSNPI. On March 24, 1973, the start of 
an entire week of organizing for the “liberation of all the prisoners in Saigon,” and “the immediate 
implementation of democratic freedoms in South Vietnam,” delegates met to revive the 
international antiwar movement.829 
Emulating previous meetings, the delegates drafted a collective statement. They 
denounced the United States’ continued “neo-colonial presence” in Southeast Asia and called for 
the combined victory of the three peoples of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. As for Vietnam 
specifically, they argued that Thieu’s regime continued to violate articles 8 and 11 of the Paris 
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Peace Accords, which guaranteed the release of the prisoners and the restoration of democratic 
liberties, respectively. Months after the Accords, Saigon continued to violate the freedom of 
information, seize newspapers critical of Thieu, and quash progressive groups.830 Indeed, while 
North Vietnam had already freed the American POWs, Thieu imprisoned even more political 
dissidents. In this context, the statement declared, Vietnamese revolutionaries still had a long 
struggle ahead, and it was up to Europeans to maintain their “militant international solidarity” by 
organizing “a vigorous mobilization to win democratic freedoms and the liberation of the prisoners 
as stipulated by the Accords.”831 Needing to coordinate their efforts, the groups agreed to 
organize “a European campaign to liberate the political prisoners” to culminate in a massive 
international march in Milan, Italy on May 12, 1973.832 
Energized by the meeting, radicals redoubled antiwar activity in their respective 
countries. They organized protests in Paris on April 12, in Milan the day after, and in Belgium on 
May 5, 1973.833 Elsewhere, antiwar groups, such as the Swiss Comité Indochine Vaincra, 
circulated the joint statement, advertising the forthcoming international demonstration in Milan, 
Italy.834 In France, the Ligue Communiste billed the May 1973 meeting as the successor to the 
famous international gatherings of the 1960s. “For the first time since the Berlin demonstration in 
February 1968,” they wrote, “anti-imperialist Europe will meet again in one same city, en masse in 
the streets.”835 Even though, as with the earlier meetings, Milan 73 was to be a primarily 
European convergence, Western European radicals not only invited American representatives, 
but some hoped that event could help the “antiwar movement in the U.S.A. redeploy its action.”836 
Just as the U.S. movements inspired European antiwar organizing in the 1960s, perhaps the 
European antiwar movements could rekindle the U.S. movements in 1973. 
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On May 12, 1973 some 50,000 radicals converged on Milan to demonstrate their 
solidarity with the unfinished Vietnamese revolution. While groups from across the globe, from the 
African National Congress of South Africa to the Palestinian Liberation Organization, supported 
the meeting, most of the delegates unsurprisingly hailed from Western Europe.837 Representing 
the French, who played an enormous role organizing the event, a number of rival groups – 
including the FSI, MNSPI, Alliance Marxiste Révolutionnaire, ex-GP, PSU, Fraternité Chrétienne 
pour le Vietnam, Ligue Communiste, Ligne Rouge, PSU, and Revolution! – put aside their 
differences to sign the joint appeal, and most sent delegations to Milan.838 The Italians naturally 
mobilized the largest national contingent, attracting revolutionary organizations from across the 
entire spectrum, with the exception of the Italian Communist Party. Even the American 
movement, caught between organizational decline and internecine strife, managed to participate. 
Sydney Peck of the People’s Coalition for Peace and Justice addressed the entire gathering on 
the situation in the United States, as did Vernon Bellecourt, a delegate from the American Indian 
Movement who had participated briefly in the recent occupation of Wounded Knee.839 Many other 
American radicals who could not attend, such as Jane Fonda and Angela Davis, delivered letters 
of support, which those present read aloud.840  
The event began with a massive march through the streets of Milan, with radicals 
channeling the energies of the previous international antiwar meetings with chants such as “Berlin 
68, Milan 73, the struggle continues!”841 Afterwards, radicals met to discuss the major issues that 
had brought them together, calling for the United States halt the bombardment of Cambodia, cut 
aid to Thieu, and end its involvement in Laos.842 But their focus remained the struggle to win 
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democratic liberties in South Vietnam – a concern that only grew in importance after other 
demands became less relevant, as when the United States stopped bombing Cambodia a few 
months later. They were strongly encouraged in this by the PRG, which delivered the 
demonstrators a letter thanking them for their “support in the past and in this new stage of our 
struggle.” In the words of PRG Minister of Information Phan Van Ba, the three major demands in 
this new phase of the struggle remained respecting the cease-fire, liberating all political prisoners, 
and guaranteeing “democratic liberties” in the South, a necessary precondition for “a truly free 
and democratic general election” that might remove Thieu and unite Vietnam.843  
Of course, many radicals did not attend the demonstration.844 And even the radicals who 
chose to participate remained bitterly divided. At the march itself Italian radicals from the Marxist-
Leninist PC(ml)I violently attacked the Fourth International contingent, denouncing them as 
“Trotskyist fascists.”845 Yet surveying the literature, it is clear that by 1973, the vast majority of 
antiwar radicals in Western Europe as well as the United States, from Trotskyists to Maoists, 
libertarians to Stalinists, had come to agree that the best way to support the incomplete 
Vietnamese revolution was to fight for the liberation of the prisoners, the restoration of democratic 
rights, and the observance of the Paris Accords. But what did they mean by this? 
Even if Thieu somehow relaxed his rule, reestablished liberties, and freed many of the 
political dissidents, most radicals would not have been satisfied. In fact, most antiwar radicals 
involved in the campaign fought not for the creation of a more democratic regime in the South, 
but rather the overthrow of the Republic of Vietnam, which they saw as nothing other than a 
political fiction created by American imperialism to obstruct full Vietnamese self-determination. 
Their goal was a united, independent, socialist Vietnam.846 Far from a single “issue,” freeing the 
political prisoners served as an intermediary demand in a much longer revolutionary process. As 
the Comitato Vietnam put it, speaking on behalf of those at the Milan convergence, the “struggle 
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for the liberation of the political prisoners is not and cannot be considered a purely ‘humanitarian’ 
battle” that activists could simply “delegate to some ‘charitable’ organization” whose motivations 
had nothing to do with politics or “the class struggle.” It is instead a “struggle of the first order,” of 
“great importance in the context of all the work to support the Indochinese peoples,” and an 
important step in the “future development” of the revolution.847 
Of course, this did not mean that radicals had no genuine concern for the prisoners, or 
cared less about democracy than liberals. Rather, it meant that, given the specific balance of 
forces, the best route towards the goal of a revolutionary Vietnam was the liberation of the 
prisoners. For under the current regime, with thousands in prison and democratic freedoms 
routinely violated, political organizing in the South had become arduous. If radicals in Western 
Europe and North America could free the prisoners, they might come one step closer to 
overthrowing Republic of Vietnam. After all, the very same logic pushed radicals to pursue united 
fronts at home. Thus, the call to free the prisoners did not represent a retreat from the 
revolutionary goals of international solidarity voiced in 1968, but rather a strategic readjustment in 
response to changed historical circumstances. In both cases, radicals firmly rooted their 
internationalist imaginary in a militant anti-imperialism based in collective self-determination.  
 
Competing Visions 
 While antiwar radicals may have been some of the most ardent supporters of the struggle 
to restore democratic freedoms in South Vietnam, they did not monopolize the issue in North 
America and Western Europe. As with the antiwar movement as a whole, activists of innumerable 
political persuasions, from revolutionary anti-imperialists to progressive liberals, contributed to 
this massive international campaign. Often, many of these initiatives intersected. For example, on 
April 12, 13, and 15 nearly one hundred different organizations from half a dozen countries – 
including the nonpolitical Amnesty International, the revolutionary Front Solidarité Indochine, the 
revisionist Parti Communiste Français, the Christian socialist Jeunesse Étudiante Chrétienne, the 
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humanitarian Red Cross, and the legalist Comité des Juristes pour le Vietnam-France – gathered 
in Paris for an International Conference for the Liberation of the Political Prisoners of South 
Vietnam organized by American, French, and Vietnamese activists.848 Despite their 
disagreements, all signed a joint resolution denouncing the authoritarian regime in the South and 
demanding the liberation of the prisoners.849 
But in many cases, despite rallying to the same issue, various groups advanced not 
simply different but actually competing visions. Many activists involved in the campaign to free the 
political prisoners rejected the radical call to overthrow the South; they had instead very different 
ideas about what it meant to free the political prisoners, how this should happen, and why this 
mattered. Liberals, Christians, the official communist movement, and many others all proposed 
their own alternative visions of international solidarity.850 Of all the visions that entered the arena, 
one in particular warrants considerable attention because, although completely marginal in the 
early 1970s, it would in fact supplant all other forms of internationalism, especially that of the 
radicals, by the end of the decade. While certainly heterogeneous, like the radical internationalist 
imaginary itself, this alternative conception of internationalism is perhaps best associated with the 
name Amnesty International.851  
In May 1961, British lawyer Peter Benenson penned what would become Amnesty 
International’s founding statement. “Open your newspaper any day of the week and you will find a 
story from somewhere of someone being imprisoned, tortured or executed because his opinions 
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or religion are unacceptable to his government,” Benenson wrote.852 “The newspaper reader feels 
a sickening sense of impotence,” he continued, “yet if these feelings of disgust all over the world 
could be united into common action, something effective could be done.”853 Soon after, he 
founded Amnesty International to support victims of persecution worldwide, often through 
campaigns involving candlelight vigils, letter writing, and publicizing human rights violations.854  
But Benenson did not simply call for an international body to advocate for the rights of 
those unjustly imprisoned; he and his collaborators adumbrated a distinct vision of international 
solidarity, one that would rival the internationalism of the radicals. As he clarified in his book, 
Persecution 1961, he hoped for an explicitly “non-political, non-sectarial, international movement 
…”855 Amnesty’s idea of internationalism, unlike that of the radicals, would refuse to align itself 
with national governments of any kind, and would even try to bypass bodies of international 
governance such as the United Nations, since these were composed of nations. In addition, 
Amnesty’s internationalism would be entirely based on the fight for rights. But unlike the radicals, 
for whom rights were based in collective self-determination, Amnesty narrowly saw rights as 
residing in the individual alone.856 Furthermore, while the radicals situated rights in the context of 
social struggles, Amnesty championed a notion of rights that placed them well outside the 
vicissitudes of history. Rights, for Amnesty, were universal human rights, valid in all cases. Lastly, 
and again unlike the radicals who grounded their vision of internationalism in politics, Amnesty 
anchored its internationalism in morality. Explicitly hoping to transcend politics, Amnesty 
cultivated a kind of moral authority that was objective, disinterested, universal, and global in 
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scope, and therefore able to speak for all of humanity, rather than only particular classes, nations, 
or oppressed peoples.857 
 Thus, while both Amnesty and many radicals in North America and Western Europe 
threw themselves into the campaign to free the prisoners in South Vietnam, they did so with 
radically different objectives. Amnesty’s preferred strategy was to send comforting letters to 
“adopted” individual prisoners, inform Thieu that the detention of said prisoner “seems in direct 
violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” and then to beg the South Vietnamese 
government for that specific prisoner’s release.858 The differences with the radicals were 
enormous. First, Amnesty’s involvement bordered on the paternalistic. For instance, Amnesty 
instructed letter writers to reassure adopted prisoners that “there are people all over the world 
working for ‘human rights’ who think of you, and hope for your early release.”859 In this way, 
Amnesty reduced the political prisoners to victims in need of hope, adoption, and protection. 
Salvation would not come through autonomous militant struggle, but from the fact that other 
people in the West believed in human rights. Second, Amnesty tried to completely abstract the 
plight of the prisoners from the broader political context, turning the campaign into a purely moral 
affair. “Please take care NOT to advance political or religious positions,” Amnesty advised in its 
instructions to letter writers. “Your mission is purely humanitarian. It is not to criticise or reform the 
government but to Protect and Help the individual person.”860  The only justification for 
international solidarity, and the only means of measuring that solidarity, was human rights. Lastly, 
in focusing on specific individuals, rather than the rights of the Vietnamese as a whole, Amnesty 
tried to make the campaign about the inviolable rights of the sovereign “individual person.” This 
was a world apart from the radicals, for whom the basis of solidarity was the struggle for collective 
self-determination. While both sides spoke of rights in this campaign, they meant different things. 
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Despite this enormous gulf between Amnesty’s conception of international solidarity and 
those championed by radicals in North America and Western Europe, in some cases radicals 
collaborated with Amnesty on the issue of the political prisoners to build as inclusive a campaign 
as possible. In March 1973, for example, the Front Solidarité Indochine, after mentioning 
Amnesty’s contributions, argued that any initiative that could contribute to “the solution of this vital 
problem, must receive all of our support.”861 The FSI even promoted Amnesty International’s 
Amsterdam conference on the political prisoners in October 1973.862 Beyond this, some radicals 
felt that Amnesty’s specific approach to the issue, although completely opposed to their own, 
might actually serve a useful tactical function. Since AI was explicitly nonpolitical, and based 
much of its authority on an illusion of objectivity, some radicals felt that Amnesty data and 
statements would have more authority in the eyes of the public than information from radical 
groups, which might be denounced as biased.863 Thus, radicals from many different groups 
internationally, from the Bay Area Committee of Inquiry to the Italian Comitato Vietnam, drew on 
Amnesty International’s research to give their own claims an air of legitimacy.864 As the FSI put it, 
“internationally, Amnesty International was one of the first movements to denounce, with 
supporting evidence, the lot of the prisoners”865  
While their tactical alliance with such an irreconcilable form of international solidarity 
helped radicals turn the tide against Thieu, the collaboration unintentionally benefited their 
competitors. For while Amnesty International, and the specific vision of internationalism it 
represents, may seem hegemonic today, the organization, along with others that shared its 
approach, was marginal throughout all of the 1960s and even the early 1970s. In 1969, Amnesty 
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counted no more than 15,000 members internationally.866 In the early 1970s in the United States, 
Amnesty mustered no more than a few thousand members. The French section, founded in 1971, 
was even more miniscule. In 1973, it numbered only a few thousand members.867 This was a 
mere fraction of the vast number of radicals across North America and the United States who still 
advocated revolution, self-determination, and anti-imperialist internationalism. In addition, the 
radicals’ conception of international solidarity as based in the struggle for the self-determination of 
all peoples enjoyed a kind of hegemony among other progressives as well. But by promoting 
Amnesty through campaigns such as the one to free the South Vietnamese prisoners, radicals 
lent the more marginal organization credibility, drawing it closer to progressive, and even radical, 
audiences. 
Radicals inadvertently promoted Amnesty beyond just sharing their audiences. While 
radicals continued to believe in self-determination in the early 1970s, they had modified their 
concerns, language, and even practices in a way that began to mutate their vision. Specifically, 
we saw that while radicals largely ignored the question of rights during the heady days of 
revolutionary fervor, after the wave of state repression, they adopted a kind of rights discourse. 
To be sure, when they spoke of rights, they meant something very different from groups like 
Amnesty International, evidenced by the fact that radicals rarely mentioned “human rights.” 
Nevertheless, in the early 1970s the two sides began to converge. In 1968, when radicals threw 
themselves into revolution, while Amnesty shunned politics altogether, almost no one could 
confuse the two. But in the early 1970s, when both sides organized around the same issues with 
vaguely similar appeals to rights, points of contact emerged. 
Similarly, not only were radicals far more concerned with rights, but when they grafted 
this newfound concern onto their anti-imperialist solidarity work, they began to parallel other 
visions of internationalism. Over the course of the early 1970s, and especially after the United 
States withdrew from the war in 1973, radicals targeted the government of South Vietnam. 
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Instead of defending the national liberation of a people against imperialism, in their antiwar 
activity radicals now focused much of their energy on criticizing the internal affairs of a sovereign 
nation-state. When it came to Vietnam, fighting to overthrow global imperialism increasingly took 
the form of denouncing South Vietnam for ignoring basic democratic liberties, violating the 
fundamental right of its citizens, or failing to adhere to the Paris Accords. At least at level of 
appearances, the international solidarity of North American and Western European radicals now 
came dangerously close to that of Amnesty, for whom solidarity basically consisted of intervening 
in the domestic affairs of states to pressure them to observe universal rights. 
To be clear, despite these shifts in emphasis, the adoption of a seemingly different 
language, and the apparent convergence with the human rights internationalism of Amnesty, 
radicals still adhered to the distinct framework of self-determination. The point, then, is not so 
much that radicals somehow personally transformed themselves into advocates of human rights, 
though in some important cases this certainly happened, but that radicals shifted their struggles, 
language, and concerns to a terrain that was more welcoming to the discourse of human rights. In 
other words, while they did not adopt the specific language of human rights, their own attention to 
rights discourse unwittingly helped to develop the intellectual terrain on which a properly human 
rights discourse could grow. And in building tactical alliances with this competing form of 
internationalism, radicals in the early 1970s rendered Amnesty’s vision more palatable and 
comprehensible to their followers. Indeed, in this way, human rights could be perceived as a 
distinct, yet related form of internationalism, able to share some of the progressive aspirations of 
anti-imperialist internationalism even while rejecting the core principles of national liberation. 
Of course, radicals had little to fear in the way of competition since their vision of 
international solidarity dominated the peripheral views of groups such as Amnesty 
International.868 But when the radical imaginary entered into crisis later in the decade, the human 
rights forms of international solidarity represented by groups such as Amnesty International, 
which survived these crises unscathed, could appear as a viable alternative. In fact, despite 
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appearances, the radical forces had already begun its slow decline, and the years from 1972 to 
1974 are often regarded as the final crest of the radical wave in most North American and 
Western European countries. In France, for example, the GIP disbanded in December 1972, the 
Minister of the Interior banned the Ligue Communiste in June 1973, and the ex-GP finally 
dissolved itself on November 1, 1973, just a month after the Black September terrorist 
organization murdered eight Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics and Salvador Allende was 
overthrown in Chile. As for solidarity with Vietnam, the movement declined precipitously 
everywhere after 1973 as anti-imperialist radicals threw themselves into other campaigns. The 
Milan 1973 meeting, thought by some to mark a new cycle of anti-imperialist international 
solidarity, proved to be the final great international meeting of radicals during the Vietnam War. 
Even in France, where radicals played the greatest role in reactivating international solidarity with 
Vietnam, the FSI died a quiet death in late 1973. 
Of course, tens of thousands of radicals in North America and Western Europe continued 
to dedicate their lives to the idea of revolution throughout the decade. In Italy, for instance, a 
completely new cycle of revolutionary struggle emerged in the mid-1970s.869 Moreover, even in 
spite of these setbacks, in 1973 or 1974 the radical imaginary still remained more popular than 
that represented by Amnesty International. But this would change in the final years of the 1970s 
when the bottom fell out of the radical imaginary, leading to an astonishing reversal few could 
have predicted in the early 1970s. When that happened, youth in search of new visions of 
internationalism could find a home in the nonpolitical internationalism of Amnesty and other 
organizations of its kind. But for that to happen, Amnesty’s internationalism did not simply have to 
survive while other competing imaginaries collapsed. It had to remain comprehensible, attractive, 
and capable of effecting change for those who would have otherwise rallied to the radical 
imaginary, in some ways sharing its project or at least aspirations. In other words, if Amnesty’s 
internationalism were completely different, a newer generation with progressive ideas might have 
ignored it. Amnesty would not have spoken to their needs.  
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Thus, through the points of contact formed in the 1970s – exemplified by the common 
campaign to liberate the prisoners in Vietnam – Amnesty could emerge as distinct, yet not utterly 
alien. It could represent a new path, yet at the same time emerge as a credible successor to other 
visions, winning over all those who still cared about transforming the world. And this, of course, 
was always Amnesty’s plan. As Benenson once put it, speaking of Amnesty’s overall ambitions, 
“the underlying purpose of this campaign – which I hope those who are closely connected with it 
will remember, but never publish – is to find a common base upon which the idealists of the world 
can co-operate. It is designated in particular to absorb the latent enthusiasm of great numbers of 
such idealists who have, since the eclipse of Socialism, become increasingly frustrated; similarly 
it is geared to appeal to the young searching for an ideal …”870 
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CHAPTER 7: ANTI-IMPERIALIST INTERNATIONALISM IN CRISIS 
 
On December 21, 1978, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam shocked the world by invading 
Cambodia, its socialist neighbor. Writing in Lotta Continua, Marco Boato captured the immensity 
of the crisis for radicals everywhere. Our generation, he explained, “was defined as the 
‘generation of Vietnam,’ and we “accepted that definition with pride and satisfaction, because with 
Vietnam we had experienced a new form of revolutionary internationalism.”871 Solidarity with the 
Vietnamese struggle, he continued, marked every step of the radical left’s early development. In 
“1967 we took to the streets with Vietnam; in ’68, we said ‘Vietnam is here.’”872 Given such deep 
investment in Vietnam, the internecine war in Southeast Asia could only have devastating 
consequences for radicals.  
Of course, the Third Indochina War did not destroy the radical left on its own. Radicalism 
had already substantially declined as an organized force throughout most of North America and 
Western Europe before the winter of 1978, especially outside of Italy, where Boato wrote. Faced 
with an unsettling array of political challenges, both at home and abroad, many anti-imperialist 
radicals abandoned their activism, rejoined mainstream politics, or pole-vaulted to the other end 
of the political spectrum. In France, to a degree unparalleled elsewhere, prominent former 
radicals not only disavowed anti-imperialist internationalism in the 1970s; they embraced a new 
kind of human rights internationalism that prioritized the rights of the individual over those of the 
nation-state, morality over politics. There, Médecins Sans Frontièrs (MSF), a non-governmental 
humanitarian aid organization with roots in anti-imperialism, played the decisive role of a relay 
station, not only facilitating the transfer from anti-imperialism to human rights, but helping to 
transform human rights themselves into a robust form of international activism with some radical 
credibility. In this way, anti-imperialism not only found itself in rapid decline, but also faced an 
insurgent challenger for the title of international solidarity. 
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Although radicals in France, but also the United States, may still have been able to re-
invent anti-imperialist internationalism for their changed postcolonial conjuncture, a series of 
devastating crises in the late 1970s triggered its collapse. Vietnam invaded Cambodia, China 
retaliated with its own incursion into Vietnamese territory, and a humanitarian crisis of 
catastrophic proportions engulfed the entire region. The Third Indochina War split radicals, but it 
also put into question the core assumptions of anti-imperialist internationalism. Since the early 
twentieth century, radicals had linked anti-imperialism with the concept of national self-
determination. Though cognizant of nationalism's dangers, radicals fully embraced the nation-
state as the necessary form of political emancipation from imperialism. The decolonization 
movements of the 1960s, and the enormous promises they seemed to carry, only encouraged 
this assumption. Yet a series of defeats in the 1970s, which reached a high point in the Third 
Indochina War, problematized this faith in the progressive role of the nation-state. Radicals 
watched as newly liberated countries not only turned against their own citizenry, but rapidly 
elevated their own interests above those of the international struggle, in some cases going so far 
as to wage expansionist wars with one another. Far from appearing as the strongest defense 
against imperialism, the nation-state seemed to be inherently imperialist. Despite their 
revolutionary credentials, Vietnam, China, and Cambodia descended into wars that looked eerily 
similar to the very imperialist aggressions radicals had been denouncing for decades.  
This turn of events threw anti-imperialist solidarity into disarray, but it also further 
destabilized Marxism, the fundamental language of anti-imperialist internationalism since the late 
1960s, and the primary resource for radicals trying to find a way out of their sanguinary quandary. 
Already undergoing a major crisis in the 1970s, Marxism's inability to adequately explain the 
bloodshed in Southeast Asia further highlighted its sharp limits in the new conjuncture, revealing 
in particular its failure to fully understand nationalism, the state, and the international system, 
among other conceptual blind spots. “The crisis of Marxism,” Boato somberly explained, “is not 
measured by disputes over Proudhon, but by what is happening in Cambodia and Vietnam.”873  
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Some radicals tried to continue as if nothing was happening. Others, above all the pro-
Chinese, doubled down on the idea national sovereignty, producing a caricatured version of 
internationalism that amounted to nothing more than parroting the policies of a foreign nation-
state. Thus, when Vietnam attacked the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, China's strongest ally, these 
radicals organized an international campaign to denounce the Vietnamese, casting them as 
genocidal murders. Given the immensity of the humanitarian crisis in Cambodia, they worked with 
humanitarian groups like MSF, who also came to turn against Vietnam. Even more astonishingly, 
in their quest to destroy the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, these pro-Chinese radicals found 
themselves objectively allied with the United States against the "imperialism" of the Vietnamese. 
Of course, most radicals did not follow this path, but they had little else to offer in place of the 
obviously deficient notion of anti-imperialist internationalism. The crisis was deeper than even the 
most prescient knew at the time, and it opened the space for a rival form of human rights to 
definitively seize center stage.874 
 
The Radical Left in Disarray 
Over the course of the 1970s, the radical left declined as an organized force in almost 
every North American and Western European country. In some cases, as in France, the reversal 
was drastic. Once regarded as the country closest to insurrection, by the end of the decade, 
revolutionary prospects in France seemed dim. The proximate causes were manifold, but in 
retrospect, it seems that radicalism fell into disarray because radicals proved unable to creatively 
reinvent their political project in the face of a vastly changed political conjuncture. 
To begin with, the mass worker insurgencies that buoyed so many radical hopes met 
defeated. In the early 1970s, distinct sectors of the working class, led above all by the 
autoworkers, wages a relentless struggle across the hexagon. They experimented with a dizzying 
array of tactics, including everything from organized slowdowns to occupations to self-
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management to “bossnappings.” Taken as a whole, the offensive proved crippling. Between 1971 
and 1975, for example, the annual number of strike days in France averaged four million.875 As 
historian Xavier Vigna has shown, this mass worker “insubordination” left the world of the factory 
virtually ungovernable.876 But capitalists, along with the French state, soon deployed a set of 
strategies to firmly close this cycle of struggle. The crudest response was of course repression: 
radical workers were fired, organizers turned over to the police, worker committees destroyed, 
strikes crushed, and in some cases agitators murdered. But while certainly effective, repression 
could not secure victory on its own. 
Beginning in the early 1970s, French firms allied with the state explored ways to 
accommodate worker demands in an effort to defuse them. Initially, this meant passing a 
cornucopia of social legislation, such as four weeks paid holiday in 1969, a guaranteed minimum 
wage in 1970, and a law fixing maximum working hours in 1970.877 But, as Luc Boltanski and Eve 
Chiapello have shown, when these “quantitative” reforms failed to quell worker contestation, firms 
took the more dramatic step of “qualitatively” altering the work process.878 Recognizing that the 
basis of the worker revolt was in fact a refusal of work itself, many firms experimented with a 
series of reforms designed to provide workers with greater creative control, gambling that a less 
alienating work environment would push workers to identify with work again. Many firms began to 
grant workers greater decision making powers, further autonomy at work, flexible hours, shorter 
contracts, and human resources departments. 
Encouraged by these successes, firms began a wholesale restructuring of the Fordist 
regime of accumulation itself. The militant struggles of the 1970s revealed that the giant factories, 
which concentrated thousands of workers in the same place, putting them in control of the levers 
of economic power, could become a weakness for capitalists. Thus, by the late 1970s, French 
industry, following in the footsteps of the United States, reordered capitalist production relations in 
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order to decompose the bases of class power. Firms were decentralized, factories simply 
relocated either to other parts of the country or abroad, working class neighborhoods dissolved 
through urban renewal projects, and longterm union contracts replaced by precarious working 
conditions. The factory universe, which had been the condition of possibility for the historical 
workers’ movement, the basis of its culture, politics, and strategy since the twentieth century, and 
the horizon of revolutionary politics, was being dismantled. While repression, recuperation, and 
restructuring did not spell the inevitable end of the radical left, it did disorient radicals, all of whom 
were attached to a certain idea of worker revolt, forcing the radical left to reinvent itself on the 
spot. 
 In addition to the crisis of the historical workers’ movement, new movements posed a 
second major challenge to the radical left in France. The 1970s witnessed a proliferation of what 
were sometimes called “new social movements,” or movements – such as those centered on 
women, homosexuality, ecology, or against nuclear weapons – that focused on particular issues 
beyond the traditional cultures, organizations, and languages of the workers movement. Tired of 
seeing their specific concerns subordinated to narrowly defined “class” needs in the official 
workers movement, activists in these movements struggled to carve out an independent space 
for themselves, something strongly encouraged by radical left organizations that hoped to liberate 
social movements from the clutches of reformist politics. Yet at the same time, these movements 
risked renting the coherency of the left itself.879 Their insistence on identity, personal experience, 
and autonomy risked foreclosing a united movement, reducing the left to congeries of 
innumerable fragments.880 To remain relevant, radicals had to find a way to rearticulate these 
diverse, and sometimes opposed, movements, needs, and cultures into a new political 
movement. 
 Lastly, the mainstream political horizon in France had changed. Ever since General de 
Gaulle wrote the constitution of the Fifth Republic, the mainstream political process remained 
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effectively blocked.881 But after May 1968, de Gaulle’s resignation in 1969, and especially after 
the sudden death of his lieutenant, George Pompidou, in 1974, openings began to emerge.882 
Hoping to fill the void, mainstream political parties, above all the newly founded Parti Socialiste 
(PS) led by François Mitterand, reformed themselves in order to channel the political desires of 
these social movements into parliamentary victory. The PS, which tellingly entitled its 1972 
program “changer la vie,” attempted to rally young radicals by absorbing their major demands, 
such as the call for autogestion, or self-management, not only in the workplace, but in all aspects 
of life.883 The Communist Party (PCF) also reinvented itself by, among other things, drawing 
closer to new social issues such immigrant rights, condemning the repression of democratic 
freedoms in the Soviet Union, and forging a common program with the PS. While this 
“Eurocommunist” flirtation proved short lived, the reforms proved successful as party membership 
spiked from 410,000 in 1974 to 600,000 in 1977.884  
These uncertain historical events provoked the philosopher Louis Althusser to diagnose 
the entire conjuncture as having precipitated a “crisis of Marxism.”885 Indeed, in the 1970s, 
radicals increasingly became aware of a series of contradictions, difficulties, and absences within 
Marxism, the theory of so many anti-imperialist radicals. To begin with, the rapidly changing 
composition of the working class raised significant questions about one of Marxism’s most 
fundamental concepts: What was the working class? What did it want? What did its changing 
physiognomy mean for revolutionary strategy?886 Relatedly, the explosion of the new social 
movements, and the challenges of inventing new organizational forms adequate to these diverse 
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struggles, led some to the realization that Marxism lacks, in the words of Louis Althusser, a “real 
theory of the organisations of class struggle.”887 The party, once taken as axiomatic by most 
Marxists in the 1960s and 1970s, was quickly becoming an open question.  
But perhaps the most important limit was the state. As Althusser put it, there does not 
really exist a “Marxist theory of the State.”888 To be sure, the changing structure of the state 
apparatuses in the 1960s and 1970s did prompt a major rethinking of inherited assumptions, of 
which the oeuvre of Nicos Poulantzas was the most important in France.889 Even the otherwise 
sclerotic PCF abandoned the concept of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” in 1976 as part of an 
effort to reimagine the state. Yet the PCF’s failure to invent a replacement spoke volumes. While 
many Marxists were finding conventional theories of the state inadequate, they proved unable to 
develop an alternative state strategy. With all these glaring limits, Marxism had without a doubt 
reached a “crossroads,” which led many to either abandon it, or try to move beyond it.890 But as 
Althusser himself concluded, Marxism had passed through many such crises before, and while 
the task of renewing Marxism was no doubt very difficulty, it was not necessarily impossible.  
Nevertheless, taken together, transformations in workers struggles, mass social 
movements, the mainstream political horizon, and a crisis in Marxism left radicals in a quandary. 
Some, after years of frenetic activity fueled only by messianic faith in the coming revolution, 
dropped out of politics altogether. Others remained radical at heart, but abandoned the organized 
political world, rooting themselves in local issues, returning to the land in a kind of rural exodus, 
or diving into the various autonomist scenes.891 Still other radicals, such as those in the Ligue 
Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR), the successor to the banned Ligue Communiste, attempted 
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to revise their communist politics in light of the changed conditions – they drew closer to the new 
social movements, embedding themselves in the women’s and gay movements or supporting the 
struggles inside the army, and formed electoral alliances with other radicals to take advantage of 
the opened parliamentary terrain.892 
 Many radicals, however, returned to mainstream politics. Weary of subsisting on the 
political margins, a growing number of radicals were seduced by the growing possibility of a leftist 
parliamentary or even Presidential victory and threw their weight behind the PS. During the 1974 
Presidential elections, for example, large swathes of the radical left voted for François Mitterand 
instead of either abstaining or putting forward their own radical candidates, as many had done in 
the past. When some diehards refused to vote, a number of prominent intellectuals, including 
Simone de Beauvoir, Michel Foucault, Henri Lefebvre, and the anarchist Daniel Guérin, issued a 
collective manifesto in May 1974 exhorting radicals to participate in the election.893 In an act that 
spoke volumes about how deeply the left had changed, Danny Cohn Bendit, famed student 
leader of the May events, rewrote the famous 68 slogan, “Elections are trap for idiots,” as 
“Abstention is a trap for idiots.”894 Strategic electoral alliances with mainstream political parties 
rapidly evolved into cooptation as many radicals simply joined the ranks of the PS itself. In 
October 1974, the PS, hoping to absorb young radicals, invited representatives from practically 
the entire spectrum of the radical left to the Assises nationales du socialisme. Soon after, many 
radicals abandoned their erstwhile revolutionary parties to adhere to the PS. In December 1974, 
for example, Michel Rocard, a leader of the radical Parti Socialiste Unifié, formally joined the PS, 
bringing a sizeable section of his party with him.895 Others from groups like the Ligue 
Communiste Révolutionnaire followed.  
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Some radicals responded to the challenges of the decade by turning against the left itself. 
In June 1976, for example, Maurice Clavel, a leading journalist and philosopher who had rubbed 
shoulders with radicals after May 68 and helped found the Agence de presse liberation with the 
ex-GP, gathered many former Gauche prolétarienne militants, including Jean-Pierre Le Dantec, 
Alain Geismar, and André Glucksmann, to discuss, in the words of historian Michael Scott 
Christofferson, “their disillusionment with political activism.”896 This gathering, which led to regular 
meetings as the “Cercle socratique,” eventually prepared the way for the bizarre rise of the 
Nouveaux Philosophes.897 A mass media phenomenon, the New Philosophers were a highly 
farraginous group of intellectuals whose only real point of commonality was that they traded on 
their radical past to justify a denunciation of the far left in the present. In a series of extremely 
popular books – including Christian Jambet et Guy Lardreau’s L’Ange (1976), André Glucksman’s 
La Cuisinière et le mangeur d’hommes (1975) and Les Maitres penseurs (1977), and Bernard-
Henri Lévy’s La Barbarie à visage humain (1977) – the New Philosophers abandoned revolution 
for ethics, denounced the organized left, and equated Marxism with the gulag. Regularly 
appearing on television, selling their books into the tens of thousands, and enjoying the support of 
famous intellectuals, from Michel Foucault to Roland Barthes, the New Philosophers became the 
most visible representation of the extent of radicalism’s disarray. 
 
Against the Third World  
Since the radical left was not shaped exclusively by events at home, but through complex 
encounters between developments in North America and Western Europe and those in the Third 
World, it should come as no surprise that simultaneous transformations in the Third World played 
a crucial role in the radical left’s political decomposition in the 1970s. For at the very same 
moment that radicals confronted a strange new political conjuncture at home, forcing them to 
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rethink their political assumptions, developments abroad began to shake their faith in Third World 
revolutions. Despite initiatives like the New International Economic Order, the continued 
economic dependence of newly liberated countries on the imperialist core pointed to the limits of 
national sovereignty.898 Countries like China, for example, abandoned internationalism, 
collaborating with the United States to destroy liberation movements in places like Angola.899 In 
some cases, as in East Timor, newly independent countries refused to recognize the self-
determination of minority peoples.900 Throughout Africa postcolonial states spawned autocratic 
regimes or military dictatorships. In socialist countries, ruling Communist Parties regularly violated 
basic civil rights. Reports of human rights abuses arrived from Vietnam. In Cambodia, Pol Pot’s 
Khmer Rouge unleashed genocide. In short, radicals watched as the struggles that once inspired 
them to make revolution at home fell short of their goals, betrayed their promises, or turned into 
their opposites. 
These astonishing events entered France through a series of highly publicized 
“revelations.”901 In his 1975 book, Prisonnier de Mao, Jean Pasqualini chronicled his life in 
Chinese labor camps. In 1976, Gérard Chaliand, who participated in the investigative 
commissions of the Russell Tribunal, published a richly documented survey of the Third World 
that began to unravel many of the myths held so dearly by the radical left. The following year saw 
the appearance of Deuxième retour de Chine, in which onetime Maoists Claudie Broyelle, 
Jacques Broyelle, and Evelyne Tschirart captured their generation’s disillusionment with China.902 
Perhaps most devastating of all, in 1977 François Ponchaud, a Catholic missionary in Cambodia, 
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published Cambodge année zero, revealing the full extent of the Khmer Rouge’s terror. In some 
cases, such as the Cambodian genocide, these reports came as a complete shock. In others, 
however, these “revelations” were far from new. In 1971, for example, Simon Leys had already 
revealed the unsavory side of China, just as all radicals were well aware of Soviet crimes before 
the publication of Aleksandr Solzhenitzyn’s Gulag Archipelago in 1974.903 Yet these “revelations” 
had such an enormous impact in the mid-1970s precisely because they found fertile ground at 
home. Disorientation, exhaustion, and growing bitterness in France allowed these reports to 
resonate. This confluence of the domestic and the international worked to destabilized anti-
imperialist internationalism. 
Uncoincidentally, these events triggered a full-scale ideological offensive against anti-
imperialism that lasted well into the 1980s.904 Jacques Juillard fired the opening shot on June 5, 
1978 in the pages of Le Nouvel Observateur. The main target of his scurrilous attack was the 
nation-state, the keystone of anti-imperialist internationalism. Juillard blamed the misguided 
notion that the nation-state could act as the “expression of the freedom of the people” for the 
seemingly endless accumulation of tragedies in the Third World.905 Instead of the old “forty-
eighter idea” that national self-determination would lead to harmony between equal nations-
states, it produced only interstate conflict.906 Instead of socialism, national liberation struggles 
resulted in tyranny. Instead of guaranteeing the freedoms of its citizens, the idea of collective 
sovereignty now justified boundless violence against unprotected individuals. For all his rhetorical 
excess, Juillard had rightly identified the limit point of anti-imperialist internationalism: the 
coupling of anti-imperialism with national self-determination. But Juillard’s aim was not to help 
renew anti-imperialism for a new postcolonial conjuncture; he, and those who quickly followed his 
lead, wished to use anti-imperialism’s Achilles’ heal to demolish the entire far left, the very idea of 
revolution, and even the Third World itself. 
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This is precisely why the assault took as its object not anti-imperialism itself, but the 
expansive and nebulous idea of “Third Worldism.” In many respects, the attack itself created the 
very notion of “Third Worldism.” For although the term “Third World” was ubiquitous, “Third 
Worldism” was almost nowhere to be found in the literature of the radical left in the 1960s. It only 
really appears in certain places in the early 1970s, but even then carried no meaning for 
Americans and was not widely used by French radicals until the mid-1970s. Indeed, anti-
imperialist radicals never described their politics as “Third Worldist,” but rather as “anti-
imperialist.” Of course, as Maxime Szczepanski-Huillery points out, even if the specific word 
cannot be found, this does not necessarily mean that traces of the concept were absent.907 Since 
the late 1970s, the term has come to mean something to the effect of a belief in, or perhaps 
fascination with, the ideas, struggles, models, and aspirations of the Third World. According to 
this very loose definition, “Third Worldism” certainly existed in the 1960s and 1970s, but only as a 
general sentiment, not as a politics. Indeed, a definition such as this does not really enable a 
specific political project in the same way that anti-imperialism does. It is little wonder that few 
used the word. One can therefore speak of “Third Worldism” in the 1960s, but aside from some 
vague banalities, this term reveals little about the politics of the era.  
There is, however, another, more specific definition of Third Worldism, one that does 
denote a specific politics rather than a sentiment. According to this definition, “Third Worldism” 
was the idea that since the primary contradiction in the world is between the First World and the 
Third, the revolution will only unfold in the Third World, spreading across the globe as the Third 
World encircles the First, in the same way, for example, that the countryside was said to have 
encircled the cities in the struggle for national liberation.908 It must be insisted that this position 
was not only relatively marginal among radicals, but that it was in many respects opposed to anti-
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imperialism. As Samir Amin, a major participant in the debates over “Third Worldism,” explained 
in 1977: 
For Third Worldism is a strictly European phenomenon, Its proponents seize on literary 
expressions, such as “the East wind will prevail over the West wind” or “the storm 
centers,” to illustrate the impossibility of struggle for socialism in the West, rather than 
grasping the fact that the necessary struggle for socialism passes, in the West, also by 
way of anti-imperialist struggle in Western society itself.909 
 
This is why this political perspective found more traction in countries like West Germany where 
the possibility of revolution backed by mass worker struggle seemed unlikely. But even where the 
idea existed in the 1960s in 1970s, few referred to it as “Third Worldism” until the late 1970s. 
Nevertheless, the broad definition of “Third Worldism” deployed by certain figures in the 
late 1970s – and still used by historians today – allowed critics of anti-imperialism like Juillard to 
accomplish several goals at once. They were able to flatten and homogenize a very diverse set of 
struggles, reduce a specific political strategy to a rather banal sentiment, and caricature radicals 
as a cohort of misguided dreamers. More insidiously, the term ahistorically anchored the 
existence of the radical left to the fate of a few tragedies in the Third World, discrediting the entire 
project of radical change. At the same time, by reducing the Third World to an immiserated land 
in need of Western aid, it helped erase the indelible impact of Third World struggles on the 
imperialist centers.910 For example, in his contribution to the debate that ensued, Jean-Pierre le 
Dantec, the former editor of La Cause du peuple, argued that in projecting their desires for 
revolution onto the Third World, radicals had in fact “invented the ‘Third World.’”911 In denying the 
self-activity of Third World peoples, apostates like Dantec reasserted the centrality of the 
imperialist world, and by association, their own activism. 
In fact, Le Dantec’s intervention reveals that one of the most important functions of the 
“debate” on “Third Worldism” in France was to sanctify the conversion of a number of anti-
imperialist radicals to a rival form of international solidarity. There is, in other words, a profound 
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connection between the fact that anti-“Third Worldism” reached such apoplectic heights in France 
and the fact it was here, more than anywhere else, that former anti-imperialist revolutionaries 
became some of the most vocal proponents of “human rights internationalism.” Renouncing their 
anti-imperialist pasts in this spectacular, caricatural, but also self-aggrandizing manner allowed a 
number of French radicals to leap into a new faith. 
 
The Human Rights International 
A particularity of the French scene was that disenchantment with revolution, the idea of 
the nation-state, and the emancipatory potential of Third World struggles led a significant number 
of these erstwhile radicals to not only criticize anti-imperialist internationalism, but to help fashion 
a distinct conception of international solidarity based not in anti-imperialism, but in human rights. 
Rony Brauman, once a member of the Gauche Prolétarienne, recalled that reading Cambodge 
année zero was “the shock that made me break definitively with political radicalism.”912 Searching 
for a new form of internationalism, he joined an iconoclastic nongovernment humanitarian aid 
organization, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), rising through the ranks to 
become its president in 1982.913 More than any other group, MSF came to play the role of a relay 
station in the transition from anti-imperialism to human rights in France. For while campaigns 
such as the one to free the South Vietnamese political prisoners reshaped the intellectual terrain 
in a way that drew anti-imperialism and human rights closer together, MSF helped some French 
radicals make the leap from one to the other. 
MSF was born on December 20, 1971, just over a year before the signing of the Paris 
Peace Accords, when two smaller organizations merged: on the one side, the Secours Médical 
Français, created by the French medical journal TONUS; on the other, the Groupe d’Intervention 
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Médicale et Chirurgicale en Urgence, a team of radicalized French doctors who had cut their 
teeth in the Nigerian Civil War, which erupted after the country’s Eastern Region declared 
independence as the Republic of Biafra in May 1967.914 To force the secessionists to capitulate, 
Nigeria’s Federal Military Government (FMG) blockaded supply routes, triggering a humanitarian 
crisis. Relief organizations, above all the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
organized volunteers. One of these was a young radical named Bernard Kouchner, the future 
face of MSF. Like many of his generation, Kouchner began as a committed Marxist anti-
imperialist: he joined the Communist student union, protested the Algerian War, organized with 
the Comité Vietnam National, and traveled to Cuba in 1964 where he met Che Guevara, to whom 
he would dedicate his medical thesis.915  
Like Che, Kouchner became a professional doctor as well as an anti-imperialist, and saw 
in the Argentinian revolutionary a model of “humanist” socialism defined by international 
solidarity, voluntaristic action, dedication to radical change, and compassion for those in need. In 
the following decade, Kouchner and other “French doctors,” combined these radical ideals, based 
in anti-imperialist internationalism, with elements of traditional humanitarianism to invent a kind of 
radical humanitarianism, known as sans-frontiérisme, that would transform international 
solidarity.916 Although MSF, reflecting its origins, remained a highly heterogeneous organization, 
Kouchner’s wing helped turn it into a vehicle for this new kind of humanitarianism. 
 But while solidarity with anti-imperialist struggles shaped the broader context in which 
MSF eventually emerged, it was not so much anti-imperialism itself that spawned Kouchner’s 
brand of radical humanitarianism, but rather a particular contradiction within anti-imperialism most 
powerfully personified by the Biafran struggle. The newly independent state of Nigeria, which had 
couched its struggle against the British Empire in the language of national self-determination, now 
denied that same right to a minority population within its own borders. Biafran leaders argued in 
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their “Proclamation of Biafra” that secession was fully justified because all peoples had a right to 
national self-determination, the colonial boundaries of Nigeria did not reflect existing tribal and 
communal sovereignties, and because the FMG violated the democratic rights of minority peoples 
such as the Igbo, thereby forfeiting the right to govern in their name. But the FMG, arguing that 
secession jeopardized the viability of new nation-states, moved against this national liberation 
struggle, revealing the limits of national self-determination, and accordingly, anti-imperialism 
itself, which, after all, saw the nation-state as the primary vehicle for collective liberation.917 
Should anti-imperialists defend the FMG’s right to administer its own internal affairs and protect 
the integrity of a united Nigeria against its balkanization? Or should anti-imperialists defend the 
rights of Biafrans to achieve their own sovereign nation state against Nigeria’s own imperialism? 
The international context exacerbated the dilemma: was not the French government backing the 
Biafrans in part because it hoped secession could weaken Nigeria, the largest, most populous, 
and wealthiest African state; and was not Great Britain supporting the FMG in large part because 
of its desire to control Nigeria’s rich oil industry, much of it now lost to independent Biafra?918  
While many anti-imperialists tried to ignore the thorny issue, Kouchner and the other 
“French doctors” resolutely defended the Biafrans, whom they argued were “a people” with an 
irrevocable right to national self-determination. In this way, Kouchner and his comrades helped 
establish a defining aspect of MSF’s agenda: in addition to aiding victims of natural disasters, 
crises, and war, a certain fraction of MSF came to advocate for the rights of minorities within 
newly independent states – such as the Bengalis of East Pakistan or the Kurds in Iraq. This 
emphasis soon transformed into support for those people ignored by anti-imperialist radicals in 
North America and Western Europe because their political struggles did not conform to 
preconceived molds. “[I]f the struggle is said to be progressive (Cambodia), the progressives will 
take notice,” Kouchner said in 1976, pointing to the limits of radical solidarity, “if not, peoples can 
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very well die (Kurdistan).”919 By the end of the decade, he had elevated this argument into a 
principle: politics should not be allowed to make the suffering of one people more deserving of 
solidarity than another; there are no “good or bad deaths.”920  
But Kouchner’s response to the aporias of anti-imperialist solidarity came at the cost of 
effectively bracketing the politics of those who suffered, which risked decontextualizing 
oppression altogether. Indeed, as the 1970s wore on, the object of solidarity increasingly became 
the deracinated “victim,” rather than the “people” in political struggle. Of course, in many cases 
figures in the Third World themselves encouraged this displacement. For example, Biafran 
leaders, who had hired a Swiss public relations firm to handle external communications, tried to 
cast the Biafrans as helpless victims in a bid to translate international sympathy into political 
recognition – the war was, after all, deliberately portrayed as genocide.921 Thus, some peoples, 
such as the Biafrans, Kurds, or the people of East Pakistan, came to be seen as an aggregation 
of miserable, individual objects, not a singular, heroic, political subject like the Vietnamese. In this 
way, some currents within MSF helped reorient solidarity to offering aid to individual victims 
regardless of the political context. 
Under Kouchner’s leadership, MSF also heralded a revolution in the mediatization of 
solidarity. During the Biafran War, the ICRC not only exercised strict impartiality, but required all 
volunteers to sign agreements promising confidentiality. But as Kouchner later put it, some of the 
“French doctors” felt that by “keeping silent, we doctors were accomplices in the systematic 
massacre of a population.”922 Upon their return to France, Kouchner and Max Récamier violated 
their agreement by publishing an article in Le Monde describing what they had seen, giving rise to 
the key concept of “témoignage,” or bearing witness. In addition, Kouchner and others channeled 
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the anti-imperialist activism of the time to form a Comité de lutte contre le génocide au Biafra and 
tapped all their media contacts to popularize the plight of the Biafrans.923  
In the following years, Kouchner went further, experimenting with the mass media. 
Humanitarians had long used vivid images, emotional appeals, and riveting news stories, and 
radical activists had always resorted to spectacular actions. But Kouchner, like the New 
Philosophers with whom he increasingly allied himself, began to wed solidarity to the mass media 
to a degree far beyond anything either humanitarians or radicals had contemplated. In his mind, 
orchestrating a media uproar, or a “tapage médiatique,” as he later called it, to carve out airtime, 
coax celebrity endorsements, win the attention of pop stars, secure private funding, and sir up the 
emotions of viewers was now just as vital to the success of a humanitarian campaign as the 
actual relief work, if not more so. Historian Michael Barnett has gone so far as to write that for 
Kouchner the “primary purpose of relief was to generate publicity and international action; that is, 
MSF’s relief operations might save some lives directly, but the real value in the operations was 
their ability to attract concerted action.”924 Of course, this non-neutral, mediatized radical 
humanitarianism was certainly not born of a single rupture, and many in MSF opposed it. Indeed, 
MSF did not formally abandon the principle of neutrality until 1977, and Kouchner’s media antics 
split the organization in 1979. Nevertheless, even many of his opponents eventually adopted 
Kouchner’s brand of mediatized international solidarity. 
Lastly, Kouchner and others helped further transform international solidarity through what 
they later termed le droit d’ingérence.925 After Biafra, Kouchner and other “French doctors,” 
argued that humanitarians, as well as states, had a right to intervene in the internal affairs of a 
nation-state. They made certain to inscribe this concept in the very name of the new organization: 
the suffering of victims supersedes all national borders. To be sure, this kind of forcible 
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intervention in the name of humanity was not new.926 But Kouchner’s wing of MSF did enrich the 
concept: they coupled intervention with idea of “engagement” popular among French radicals, 
recasting humanitarianism as a form of “militant” action.927 They used the idea of urgence to 
reframe humanitarian intervention as a kind of state of emergency in which the need for swift 
medical action could justify the suspension of official rules and regulations.928 And they clamored 
not only for the intervention of states, but also for the right of private individuals with no real 
jurisdiction to cross sovereign borders to protect victims.  
It is not surprising that such a strong interventionist line developed in France. While 
Biafra triggered tense discussions in other countries over the right to interfere, the concept of 
intervention found easy acceptance in France largely because it was legal.929 In addition, MSF’s 
radicalized humanitarianism could be seen as an attempt to rearticulate historically French 
notions of universality and solidarity in a postcolonial context – of course, as others have pointed 
out, this meant that Kouchner’s insistence on the right to intervene in the Third World tracked 
eerily close to France’s sordid history of civilizing missions.930 Yet despite such firm roots in the 
French context, the notion of the droit d’ingérence, some have argued, did make its way beyond 
France, in large part through the efforts of Kouchner after his appointment as both Minister of 
Health and action humanitarie in 1988 and his subsequent involvement with the United 
Nations.931 
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 Over the course of the 1970s, this radical humanitarianism encountered an ascendant 
human rights discourse. The convergence was made possible by the particular international 
conjuncture, which included the unique legacy of Biafra in France.932 As Brauman later explained, 
“The revelations of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Helsinki conference, the proliferations of 
dictatorships in Latin America, the crisis in revolutionary ideologies after failure of the socialist 
experiments in the Third World, and the 1977 award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Amnesty 
International,” all contributed to the popularity of human rights discourse in France.933 By the end 
of the decade, the MSF’s radicalized humanitarianism and the kind of human rights most visibly 
represented by Amnesty International achieved a kind of temporary fusion. In 1979, for example, 
MSF cofounder Xavier Emmanuelli openly spoke about “the questions of human rights.” “[W]e are 
speaking today,” he continued, pointing to the model of Amnesty, “of orienting Médecins Sans 
Frontières’ action towards this field of morality and justice.”934  
The encounter transformed both elements.935 Human rights allowed MSF to ground 
humanitarian intervention in the conceptual framework of universal rights, justifying their belief in 
the primacy of the individual victim over national sovereignty. At the same time, the fusion 
boosted human rights in the late 1970s. Since MSF emerged out of the far left, with a number of 
its members having belonged to anti-imperialist formations in their youth, the organization’s 
pedigree helped further infuse human rights with the radicalism of the 1960s and 1970s. As 
Kouchner repeatedly stated, MSF was an heir to 1968, which cunningly suggested that human 
rights might be as well. And despite its political ambiguities, Kouchner’s wing of MSF managed to 
preserve some of its radical credentials by siding with the same radical struggles, such as those 
of the Palestinians or the Sandinistas, that anti-imperialists supported in the 1970s.936  
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But more than attributing human rights with a progressive aura, MSF offered human 
rights an attractive model of radical activism. Of course, human rights groups like Amnesty 
International already had their own forms of activism, such as letter writing, but these seemed 
uninspiring compared to the dynamic activism associated with the anti-imperialist radicals of the 
1960s and early 1970s. MSF, by contrast, appeared as a human rights organization that could 
channel much of the daring, confrontational, and personally transformative activism of the anti-
imperialists. With this basis in radical activism, MSF helped elevate human rights into a 
substantial form of international solidarity that could not only compete with anti-imperialism, but 
perhaps even beat it at its own game. 
Indeed, this is precisely what happened in 1978. MSF’s growth, the rise of a new rights 
discourse, the growing marginalization of the radicals, and above all disasters in the Third World 
prompted a few thinkers to call for a new “international of human rights” to replace the failed anti-
imperialist internationalism of the earlier decade. Juillard’s attack on “Third Worldism,” for 
example, ended with just such call. Channeling the anti-totalitarian discourse exemplified by the 
New Philosophers, he set collective self-determination against individual liberty: “The rights of 
peoples have become the principal instrument in strangling human rights.”937 As such, the 
interstate rivalries, ideological divisions, and political struggles that defined the Cold War were 
over. “There are certainly two camps in the Third World,” he explained, but “these two camps are 
not the American and the Soviet.”938 They are those of “torturer states” and “martyred people.”939 
In other words, the struggle was now between suffering individuals and nation-states.  
In this context, Julliard argued, international solidarity had to be overhauled. He therefore 
proposed a new internationalism: integrating the victims of the world into “an Internationale of 
human rights, which is the sole response to the Internationale of States.”940 This, he added, was 
the “only possible” path, since “any other attitude would make us accomplices of the 
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executioners.”941 When Juillard came under attack for his provocative comments, none other than 
Bernard Kouchner, the man who had helped turn MSF into a model for the kind of human rights 
international Juillard called for, rushed to his defense, just as he had defended the New 
Philosophers. Slamming the far left, Kouchner asserted that the only acceptable form of 
international activism was the “relentless defense of all minorities,” the fight against “all 
oppressions.”942 The defense of the human demanded the overturning of all inherited political 
coordinates, especially those of the radicals. 
As criticism of Juillard’s article showed, not all radicals abandoned anti-imperialism for 
the emergent human rights international. Despite their diminished numbers and exacerbating 
internal rivalries, revolutionary groups, such as the Trotksyist LCR or the pro-Chinese Parti 
Communiste Marxiste-Léniniste (PCML), successor to the PCMLF, resisted the new wave of 
reaction. Radical intellectuals such as Nicos Poulantzas, Jacques Rancière, and Gilles Deleuze 
criticized the anti-revolutionary trend personified by the New Philosophers. Others, like Régis 
Debray, denounced human rights as the new face of imperialism:  
The dominant ideology of “human rights,” which contains a bizarre blend of the political 
decomposition of May and the most classic imperialist practice, both represents and 
travesties (like all judicial ideology) a relation of social forces. It indicates simultaneously 
the growing awareness in the industrial West of the extreme fragility of its world 
domination and its will to defend it by any means, economic, technical or military. For 
precise economic reasons, respect for the white man’s rights passes by way of the 
violation (systematic in principle but variable in its methods) of the right of brown, black, 
yellow and red men.943 
 
To be sure, anti-imperialist radicals, not only in France, but throughout North America and 
Western Europe, were in an extremely precarious position in the 1970s. Nevertheless, radicals 
might have been able to reinvent revolutionary politics, and with it, a new kind of anti-imperialist 
internationalism, in spite of these defeats. But in the final years of the 1970s and especially in the 
early 1980s radicals faced a series of domestic and global crises that would completely shatter 
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the very idea of anti-imperialist internationalism. As history would have it, Southeast Asia once 
more became an epicenter of change for radicals, though this time, in the opposite direction.  
 
The Crisis of Revolutionary Internationalism 
On December 21, 1978, two divisions of Vietnamese soldiers crossed the border into 
Cambodia, claiming to support an autonomous uprising of Cambodians against the Khmer 
Rouge. Four days later, another 150,000 soldiers followed. Despite Chinese aid, the 
Kampuchean military suffered a crushing defeat, and Cambodian leader Pol Pot ordered a 
general evacuation to the west of the country. After a series of lightening victories, Vietnamese 
troops marched through the streets of Phnom Penh on January 7, 1979. The following day, with 
victory over its socialist neighbor secure, the military announced the formation of a new coalition 
government under the aegis of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Though nominally 
independent, it was clear who controlled the government. 
This astonishing turn of events did not come from nowhere. Even if Vietnamese and 
Cambodians fought together against France and then the United States, relations were far from 
amicable. The Vietnamese, who had always played the most visible role in the struggle against 
imperialism in Southeast Asia, felt they should exercise a kind of revolutionary hegemony in the 
region. For their part, the Khmer Rouge, the xenophobic ruling party of Cambodia, resented the 
Vietnamese. Recalling Vietnam’s historical dominance over the Khmer people, the loss of a 
significant part of Cambodia’s territory to its neighbor during the colonial period, as well as the 
Vietnamese communists’ often paternalistic, controlling attitude towards militants in neighboring 
countries, the Khmer Rouge espoused a fanatically anti-Vietnamese line. In fact, on May 1, 1975 
less than twenty-four hours after the fall of Saigon, the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army – which 
in April defeated the Khmer Republic, a dictatorship supported by the United States – promptly 
invaded Phú Quốc, the largest island in Vietnam, claiming it as Cambodian territory. Just ten days 
later, the Cambodian Army invaded another island. In retaliation, the Vietnamese Army swiftly 
recaptured them both and then invaded Koh Wai, one of Cambodia’s own islands. Despite 
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declarations of unity, these disputes only continued over the next four years, and the rivalry 
between Cambodia and Vietnam deteriorated further.944  
To make matters worse, this rivalry grafted directly onto the Sino-Soviet split. During the 
war, Vietnamese revolutionaries studiously avoided taking sides in the conflict. Yet after Chinese 
aid dwindled in 1968, and the People’s Republic of China (PR) reached a rapprochement with the 
United States in 1972, Vietnam increasingly tilted towards the Soviet Union. The fall of Saigon in 
1975, and the prospect of a strong, united Vietnam, made China anxious, leading Beijing to 
increase its support to Cambodia to provide a counterweight to Vietnam’s potential dominance in 
the region. The Khmer Rouge, heavily influenced by Maoism, firmly aligned itself with its Chinese 
patron. Feeling encircled, and battered from years of war, the Vietnamese drew closer to China’s 
rival, signing a treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviets in November 1978, which 
guaranteed Soviet support in case of Chinese invasion. Only a few years after finally winning 
peace, Southeast Asia had once more become a geopolitical powder keg, though this time, 
between governments that all called themselves socialist. 
These geopolitical maneuvers, along with diplomatic breakdown, border skirmishes, and 
even a brief Vietnamese retaliatory invasion of Cambodia in December 1977 were not lost on 
radicals abroad. Few, however, expected the massive Vietnamese invasion that overthrew the 
Khmer Rouge. Even fewer suspected that the Vietnamese incursion, ostensibly to aid rebelling 
Cambodians, would end in occupation. Fewer still could believe that the PRC would retaliate the 
following month. Indeed, the People’s Liberation Army, with encouragement from the United 
States, decided to “teach Vietnam a lesson” by invading its southern neighbor with over 200,000 
soldiers on February 17, 1979.945 In response, the Soviets deployed troops on the Sino-Soviet 
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and Mongolian borders. World war appeared imminent. Sensing the risks, the PRC withdrew after 
three weeks, declaring its limited, punitive incursion a success. Nevertheless, the conflict 
continued: the Khmer Rouge waged guerilla war against the Vietnamese military, the SRV 
effectively occupied Cambodia for the next decade, and much of the international community, led 
by the United States, imposed a crushing embargo on the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.946 
This astonishing turn of events stunned radicals in North America and Western Europe, 
especially in countries like the United States and France where anti-imperialism had been so 
essential to their identity. In the 1960s and early 1970s, unity on the wars in Indochina was 
practically a given. Of course, radicals had always found something to disagree about. Should 
they defend the DRV or publicly denounce it? Should they support the NLF or was another 
organizational force possible? Could the revolution produce genuine socialism, or was it doomed 
to devolve into a kind of “state capitalism?” Many of these disagreements grafted onto preexisting 
political divisions between Maoists, various shades of Trotskyists, and other radical tendencies. 
Yet, despite these differences in analysis, slogans, and tactics, when anti-imperialist radicals had 
to choose between American imperialism or the Vietnamese liberation struggle, Thieu or the 
Provisional Revolutionary Government, Lon Nol or the Cambodian insurgents, the Kingdom of 
Lao or the revolutionary Pathet Lao, the answer was obvious. 
But now, in 1979, radicals found themselves faced with a very different situation. The 
lines, relatively clear in the past, now blurred, the old certainties faded, and the heroes became 
indistinguishable from the villains. The official communist movement, following the USSR’s lead, 
unequivocally defended Vietnam. Yet some radicals shared this assessment as well. For 
example, one French activist argued in a letter to Rouge, the LCR’s paper, that “there is nothing 
questionable” about the Vietnamese “lending a helping hand to the struggle of the real Khmer 
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communists” in the civil war with Pol Pot’s regime.947 Citing France’s disastrous non-intervention 
policy during the Spanish Civil War, he argued the duty of real internationalists was precisely to 
involve themselves in wars of this kind. 
Most radicals, however, adopted a more ambivalent approach. The PSU, for example, 
welcomed the fall of Pol Pot’s “tyrannical, atrociously bloody” and “fascist” regime, but objected to 
Vietnam “deliberately violating the sovereignty of an independent state.”948 The LCR, which saw 
the invasion as the logical product of the “socialism in one country” doctrine allegedly pursued by 
Vietnam’s “Stalinist bureaucracy,” denounced Vietnam for violating the socialist principle of 
internationalism and, in an echo of the antiwar struggle, demanded “immediate withdrawal.”949 At 
the same time, however, the LCR argued that most of the blame fell on China. The PRC, along 
with Cambodia, had conspired to contain the Vietnamese revolution; encircled, the Vietnamese 
had no choice but to turn to the Soviet Union to break free. After the Chinese invasion, the 
Ligue’s critical support for Vietnam grew.  
But some radicals, especially the pro-Chinese, not only excoriated Vietnam, they even 
rallied to Pol Pot’s defense. When the PRC invaded Vietnam, pro-Chinese groups like the French 
Parti Communiste Révolutionnaire (PCR) rushed to justify China’s actions: confronted with 
Vietnam’s expansionist provocations, on full display in Laos and Cambodia, the PCR argued, 
China had no choice but to launch a “defensive action” to push back the “aggressors.”950 In fact, 
China was not only defending its right to national sovereignty and territorial integrity, the PCR 
continued, its swift action helped “push back the danger of world war,” and in this sense, was in 
full accord with “the interests of the people of the world.”951 Invasion was internationalism. 
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These same fault lines emerged within the much smaller American radical left. There, 
groups such as the Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP) argued that while the Vietnamese Communist 
Party’s Stalinism deserved international condemnation, “the responsibility for the bloodbath in 
Indochina falls squarely on Washington.”952 For the SWP, the Chinese invasion of Vietnam was 
actually part of an ongoing international counterrevolutionary campaign led the United States to 
overthrow the Vietnamese revolution. Thus, although critical of Vietnam, like the LCR, its fraternal 
party in France, the SWP demanded an end to “the imperialist campaign against the Vietnamese 
revolution!”953 Other groups, like the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP), openly defended the 
Khmer Rouge, arguing that the “struggle of the Kampuchean people and government for 
liberation and independence” is “a just and heroic struggle.”954 Other American radicals, 
especially those not in formal groups, were simply bewildered by the war. 
To be sure, this was not the first time that radicals in both the United States and France 
had split so sharply over an international issue, but the disagreement over the wars in Southeast 
Asia assumed a different magnitude. This had to do in part with radicals’ deep identification with 
Indochinese struggles, and particularly those of the Vietnamese, in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
After all, the Vietnamese struggle played a decisive role in the formation of the radical left in 
France and the United States, served as the basis for international unity, and helped turn radicals 
towards revolution. Radicals were so wedded to Southeast Asia that confronting the crisis there 
necessarily meant confronting their own identity and founding assumptions. 
But the Third Indochina War, as it is sometimes called, proved so cataclysmic not only 
because it provoked sharp disagreements, or even because it triggered a kind of identity crisis, 
but because it completely undermined the theoretical basis of anti-imperialist internationalism. 
After all, what could internationalism possibly mean when socialist movements that once united 
against U.S. imperialism now went to war against each other? As historian Benedict Anderson 
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observed, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the subsequent Chinese response, was 
completely unprecedented: the war “represented the first large-scale conventional war” between 
socialist governments.955 The war showed that anti-imperialist internationalism had in fact not 
culminated in a network of sovereign nation-states working together to build socialism, but in 
imperialism and anti-internationalism.  
Radicals were devastated. Whatever its intentions, Vietnam, once the leader of a revived 
internationalism, had become its gravedigger. As Daniel Bensaïd of the LCR explained, the first 
fall of Phnom Penh, just a week before that of Saigon in 1975, was the “highest symbol of the 
struggle against imperialism and the rallying point of militant internationalism across the world.”956 
But the second fall, at the hands of the Vietnamese just five years later, marked the collapse of 
internationalism. In unilaterally invading Cambodia, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam “beat back 
all internationalist solutions to the Indochinese question,” foreclosing genuine international 
solidarity.957 Watching the peoples of Southeast Asia, once allied in a struggle for total victory, 
only added to the enormous crisis in which radicals had already found themselves in the 1970s. 
But more than that, it raised major questions about the constituent ideas of anti-imperialist 
internationalism. 
  
The Anti-Vietnam International 
While many radicals recognized the gravity of the situation, and what it meant for radical 
politics as a whole, some radicals, above all those who looked to Mao’s China, simply doubled 
down on anti-imperialist internationalism. Although Maoist, anti-revisionist, and pro-Chinese 
formations mushroomed throughout North America and Western Europe in the 1960s, a 
coordinated international did not initially take shape there.958 One of the largest stumbling blocks 
                                                
955 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 2006 [1983]), 1. 
956 Daniel Bensaïd, “Le deuxième chute de Phnom Penh,” Rouge 835, January 9, 1979, 1. 
957 Ibid. 
958 For a useful, though incomplete, litany of pro-Chinese, Marxist-Leninist, and Maoist formations 
in North America and Western Europe, see Robert J. Alexander, Maoism in the Developed World 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001). For the development of such formations in the United States and 
  
 
275 
was that in the 1960s these radicals formed many, rival formations in the same country that 
refused to fuse. In France, for example, by the early 1970s there were perhaps over two-dozen 
parties that took their inspiration from China.959 Most of them jealously guarded their autonomy, 
disagreeing on almost everything except their common support of the People’s Republic of China. 
In fact, Maoist groups would frequently denounce each other for revisionist errors, having 
misunderstood Mao’s teachings, or acting disloyally to China. 
In this context, it made little sense for China to explicitly favor one party over the others. 
Thus, while the Chinese Communist Party did bestow the “franchise” on one national pro-Chinese 
party in each country, effectively making that formation its “official” representative, this 
designation ultimately carried little weight, at least in the 1960s, since China continued to support, 
publicize, and even fund a variety of pro-Chinese parties in the same country. Although aware of 
the risks, China nevertheless did encourage unity of some kind, often inviting Maoists and anti-
revisionists to attend China for special events, where they were regaled as foreign dignitaries.960 
In addition, some parties even developed special lateral relations with one another, such as the 
French Gauche prolétarienne and the Belgian Université-Usine-Union, a concord usually based 
on the fact that they happened to share a particular interpretation of what the “Chinese example,” 
in itself a highly ambiguous reality, actually signified.961 Moreover, in some cases, rogue radicals 
such as Hardial Baines even tried, though always unsuccessfully, to link up these allied groups in 
their own trans-Atlantic Maoist international. Thus, despite all these initiatives, a formal anti-
revisionist international did not emerge in the 1960s.962 
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The preconditions for a functional pro-Chinese international emerged only after the PRC 
began to pursue a radically different foreign policy in the mid-1970s, officially expressed in the 
Theory of the Three Worlds.963According to the Theory, the globe was now divided into three 
distinct worlds: the First composed of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet 
Union; the Second including all the lesser powers, especially those of “Britain, France, West 
Germany, and Japan;” and the Third comprising the rest of the developing world.964 According to 
China, in this new situation, the competition between the two superpowers for global hegemony 
was leading to instability, imperialism, and even world war. It was therefore up to the Third World 
to build the largest possible international front to repel the “imperialism, colonialism, and 
hegemonism” of these two superpowers, especially the Soviet Union, which China soon identified 
as the main threat to world peace.965 While the Third World, naturally led by China, constituted 
the core of this front, it could count on the help of countries in the Second World: faced with the 
growing threat of war, and needing to defend their “national independence” from the 
superpowers, it was in the best interest of those Second World countries to join the international 
front.966 
Despite its seemingly revolutionary rhetoric, the Theory effectively justified China’s 
abandonment of global revolution in favor of pursuing domestic development, building tactical 
alliances with other countries, and above all, containing its greatest rival, the Soviet Union. In 
arguing that the contradictions between nations had definitely replaced contradictions between 
classes, the Theory of the Three Worlds allowed China to reinscribe anti-imperialist 
internationalism within the framework of geopolitics, state rivalries, and international diplomacy. 
For pro-Chinese parties around the world, this meant downplaying class struggles at home in 
favor of national unity in the face of “hegemonism.” In Western Europe, many radicals promoted a 
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kind of ultra nationalism in the hopes of pushing their respective Second World countries into an 
alliance with the Third World against the First. In Scandinavia, six pro-Chinese parties held a joint 
meeting where they announced that, since the two superpowers were using Nordic waters as 
staging ground, encroaching on the “national sovereignty” of several countries, their task was to 
“mobilize the peoples of the Nordic countries to defend their countries’ right of self-determination 
…”967 In France, the PCML even allied with Gaullists, monarchists, and extreme right 
organizations such as Action Française to defend French national sovereignty against the United 
States and the Soviet Union.968 Internationalism had become national chauvinism, and anti-
imperialism now meant joining with the bourgeoisie to defend the right to independence.  
Many pro-Chinese radicals were unsurprisingly dismayed. Some argued that China, after 
having denounced the Soviet Union for raising its national interests before those of revolutionary 
internationalism in the 1950s and 1960s, was now doing precisely the same, which led to a major 
split in the international pro-Chinese movement and ruptures within individual parties.969 Many 
radicals, however, remained ardently loyal to China. The PRC, trying to use the split in its favor, 
began to encourage a kind of pro-Chinese international, hoping that a tight network of parties 
across the world could help bolster its stature internationally. After 1976, a remarkably 
coordinated pro-Chinese international began to take shape, stretching from Argentina to East 
Germany to Cambodia. But, in contrast to the 1960s, China took special interest in cultivating an 
international network not so much in the Third World, but in North America and above all Western 
Europe, the core of the Second World, and hopefully a key ally in the fight against the United 
States and especially the Soviet Union. For their part, loyal parties in North America and Western 
Europe were only too eager to build the new international.  
Forging the international often proceeded along prosaic routes. One way pro-Chinese 
parties connected was to showcase one another in their publications. For example, in 1976, the 
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October League, China’s official arm in the United States, ran a series of articles introducing 
American readers to the fraternal parties in Western Europe, since, following the Three Worlds 
Theory, that region was to become a major battleground in the fight against “hegemonism.”970 
Moreover, the League explained, “U.S. Marxist Leninists have a lot to learn from the communist 
movement in the countries of the second world. In many cases, they have longer and broader 
experience in both the class struggle and the struggle against modern revisionism. The workers 
in all countries have always learned and supported each other, and it is in this proletarian 
internationalist spirit that this series is written.”971 In December, they published a lengthy, two-part 
interview with Jacques Jurquet, leader of the Parti Communiste Marxiste-Léniniste (PCML), who 
discussed the struggle against “modern revisionism” in France.972 
From there, parties regularly congratulated one another on formal achievements, creating 
the appearance of a coherent pro-Chinese world. Whenever a party reached a milestone, such as 
adopting a new program, holding a national conference, or celebrating the anniversary of the 
party’s founding, parties from across the globe would publicize the achievement and issue 
dozens of letters of support. Thus, in June 1977, when the October League formally reorganized 
itself as the Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) – led by Mark Klonsky, onetime national 
secretary of the Students for a Democratic Society, and including a number of respected 
communists, such as Carl Davidson and Harry Haywood – the PCML saluted them on the front 
page of its paper, pontificating, “the creation of your party, in the very heart of one of the two most 
aggressive imperialisms of the present epoch is a harsh blow to the international bourgeoisie.”973 
In gratitude, the Communist Party (ML) reprinted the PCML’s statement, along with over a dozen 
letters of support from other countries, in the pages of its newspaper. All pro-Chinese parties did 
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the same for every marginally formal event. In this way they helped create the sense that they 
were more numerous, organized, and coordinated than they actually were. 
Lastly, parties penned joint statements. Although often little more than restatements of 
the official Chinese stance on a given issue, empty rhetoric, or quotations from Lenin, Stalin, or 
Mao, these performances helped forge unity. Thus, the October League and the Canadian 
Communist League released a joint communiqué in May 1977 supporting one another’s 
struggles.974 Or in 1978, the Austrian Communist League and the Workers’ and Peasants’ Party 
of Turkey published a common statement reconfirming the need to build an international front to 
fight the “Soviet social imperialists and the U.S. imperialists …”975 These kinds of actions even 
worked to unite rival pro-Chinese parties in the same country. For example, by the end of 1978, 
the PCML and the Parti Communiste Révolutionnaire (PCR), were not only releasing common 
declarations, or even sharing resources, but even entered negotiations to fuse into a single party. 
 While all these gestures may appear foolish, they were in fact necessary. For what 
pulled this international together was unanimity on the correct ideological line. Its organizing 
principle was the centrality of the People’s Republic of China, its theoretical core the Theory of 
the Three Worlds, and its primary function to project China’s official position on any given issue. 
Whatever the event, the PRC could expect a united chorus to echo its line throughout the world. 
In this way, the International’s tight coordination compensated for its numerical weaknesses. 
Indeed, with the exception of Norway, which boasted a Maoist party with 5,000 members, a 
widely read newspaper, and strong ties to intellectuals, most national pro-Chinese parties were 
rather small, never more than 1,000 members at their height. But they amplified their power by 
operating as a kind of echo chamber, trumpeting the same line at the same time in every major 
country in North America and Western Europe. It is precisely this machine that went into action 
during the Third Indochina War. 
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When Vietnam invaded Cambodia, the pro-Chinese parties sprung into action. Since the 
Khmer Rouge was China’s closest ally, these parties immediately turned their guns against the 
SRV. They denounced Vietnam for violating Cambodia’s national sovereignty. They compared 
Vietnam’s offensive to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the U.S. war in 
Vietnam. They even tried to blame Vietnam for the mass suffering caused by the Khmer Rouge, 
charging that it was the SRV, not the Khmer Rouge, that was perpetrating genocide. The 
Canadian Communist League, which had sent a representative to Cambodia just days before the 
invasion, charged that Vietnam had deliberately planned to “let people starve.”976 In the United 
States, Carl Davidson, writing for the CPML’s paper, called the invasion a “war of 
extermination.”977 In France, the PCML – whose leader, Jacques Jurquet, visited Pol Pot in 
September 1978 – claimed that Vietnam had knowingly unleashed a “holocaust” in Cambodia.978 
Going even further, some parties alleged that Vietnam planned to colonize the occupied 
territories once they had eradicated the native Cambodians, as the Nazis hoped to do in Eastern 
Europe. Intent on pursuing a kind of “settler colonialism,” the PCML argued, “Vietnamese 
colonists are progressively replacing the Cambodian peasants.”979 The PCR added that Vietnam 
would not stop with Cambodia, but planned to colonize all of Southeast Asia.980 
While one could dismiss these accusations as the propagandistic ravings of marginal 
extremists, in some countries pro-Chinese radicals overcame their fringe reputation to play a role 
in the discourse surrounding the Southeast Asian crisis. In France, the PCML seized the lead, 
encouraging its members to organize among all sectors of society – in the unions and 
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universities, within the religious and intellectual milieus – to shape public opinion over the war.981 
Cognizant of the need to downplay their extremist reputation, the PCML pursued the widest 
possible popular fronts while deliberately effacing its own involvement in the campaign.982 On 
January 10, 1979, for example, the PCML organized a solidarity demonstration in Paris with the 
PCR and the Comité des Patriotes du Kampuchea démocratique en France, a group of 
Cambodians residing in France.983 Later that month, the PCML gathered signatures for a call to 
solidarity with the Cambodian people, which they published in Le Monde. We who “supported the 
struggles of the Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian people against American aggression,” the 
statement read, “condemn the occupation of this country by the Vietnamese army, denouncing it 
as an infringement of the independence of a State and of a people.”984 In addition to confirming 
their radical credentials, recalling the Vietnam War in this manner allowed these anti-Vietnam 
activists to legitimate their campaign by grounding it in the very same principles of national self-
determination that guided the anti-imperialist struggle against the United States.  
These activists also looked to the antiwar movement for organizational models. The 
PCML, for example, later established a Comité Kampuchea, explicitly based on the Comité 
Vietnam National and Comité Vietnam de Bases, in which some of these anti-Vietnam activists 
had once participated.985 Following the anti-Vietnam War struggle, the new anti-Vietnam 
campaign made international solidarity a priority. Drawing on the networks of the pro-Chinese 
International, activists, again led by the PCML, organized a conference for “international solidarity 
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with Cambodia” in Stockholm in November 1979, gathering over 250 delegates from 31 countries. 
To make sure the conference would reach as wide an audience as possible, pro-Chinese activists 
also encouraged sympathetic journalists, artists, scientists, academics, priests, and politicians to 
endorse the event. They secured the support of luminaries such as Albert Memmi, the famous 
anticolonial theorist, Alain Badiou, the philosopher, and Joris Ivens, the filmmaker.986 Folk singer 
Joan Baez sent a message to the conference, as did the French Resister Charles Tillon, while the 
Swedish writer Jan Myrdal delivered a rousing speech.987 “Our solidarity work,” he said, could 
“signify the life or death of an entire generation in Kampuchea, maybe even for the Khmers as a 
nation and people as well …”988 
 In Stockholm, then at another organization meeting in Paris soon after, activists formed 
an international movement, the Mouvement Solidarité Cambodge, and organized a series of other 
events, including two more international conferences in Tokyo, which involved Samir Amin, and 
Paris.989 In true anti-imperialist fashion, the movement’s official platform condemned Vietnam for 
violating Cambodian national sovereignty, demanded immediate withdrawal, and insisted on the 
Cambodian people’s “right to self-determination.”990 It also called on activists to support all 
Cambodian efforts without exclusion – which really meant supporting the Khmer Rouge – for the 
“liberation and independence of Cambodia.”991 Significantly, the Mouvement Solidarité 
Cambodge tried to legitimate its demands by appealing to the United Nations Charter’s principle 
of non-intervention.992 The conference, international movement, celebrity sponsors, and 
conscious attempt to code the campaign in the mainstream language of rights helped the pro-
Chinese become a part of the discussion. 
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 The pro-Chinese parties also reached out to those non-governmental humanitarian 
organizations such as the ICRC, UNICEF, and MSF now turning their attention to the disaster 
unfolding in Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese invasion, which aggravated years of social 
dislocation under the Khmer Rouge, triggered a demographic catastrophe. Cambodians freed 
from the work camps rushed to escape, while those beyond the reach of the Vietnamese fled in 
panic, spurred on by Khmer Rouge propaganda promising that Vietnamese troops would 
slaughter everyone in their path. The retreating Khmer Rouge abducted thousands more at 
gunpoint, driving them into crowded camps on the Thai border to serve as slave laborers, human 
shields, or soldiers for the resistance.993 The Thai government, although happy to provide 
sanctuary for Khmer Rouge forces, forcibly repatriated thousands of refugees, in one case 
literally driving them off a cliff into mines; and when some returned to the border, Thai soldiers 
opened fire.994 Although humanitarian organizations, such as MSF, had operated in the region 
before the invasion, they now made Southeast Asia a priority.995 
But the situation inside Cambodia was even worse than on the border. When the 
Vietnamese liberated the collectives, hundreds of thousands of Cambodians abandoned the 
recently planted crop to return to their home villages, and with the ongoing war, harvests 
elsewhere were destroyed in the fighting and the main 1979 crop went unplanted, virtually 
ensuring a famine.996 Humanitarian organizations begged the new People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea to allow them into the country.997 While the Vietnamese and Cambodian authorities 
initially welcomed foreign aid, they soon changed their mind, arguing that international aid would 
act as “a cover for intervention and aggression.”998 They not only downplayed the magnitude of 
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the crisis, but imposed strict requirements: fearing both foreign intervention and the chance that 
aid would fall into the hands of Khmer Rouge forces amassing in the border camps, they forbade 
humanitarian organizations from entering Cambodia unless they surrendered control of 
distribution to the new government and promised to abandon the refugee camps on the border. 
They had reason to worry: the Khmer Rouge had appropriated large quantities of medical 
supplies, some relief organizations like the Red Cross were directly working with camps 
controlled by the Khmer Rouge, and the U.S. government had already hatched plans to use relief 
operations to find ways to help the Khmer Rouge fight Vietnam.999 
Nevertheless, Vietnam’s actions aggravated the crisis, infuriating the humanitarians, 
which in turn led the pro-Chinese to regard them as potential allies in the fight against 
Vietnam.1000 The humanitarian campaign, the PCML put it, “is the terrain of an important political 
battle that we must not abandon.”1001 At the international level, the Mouvement Solidarité 
Cambodge recognized not only the importance of the humanitarian front, but also the immense 
popularity of the issue, soon making the call for immediate medical relief the central pillar of its 
program.1002 In France, the PCML used both its newspaper and public events to explain how 
Vietnam blocked humanitarian groups such as the Red Cross, UNICEF, and MSF from entering 
Cambodia, encouraging activists to put pressure on Phnom Penh to allow international relief, 
pushing readers to link up with humanitarian groups like MSF, and regularly exhorted their 
followers to donate to groups like the International Red Cross and UNICEF.1003 Indeed, since 
these latter two organizations were working in camps with the Khmer Rouge, the PCML warmly 
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identified them as part of the overall “solidarity campaign,” and called their work “positive” for the 
struggle.1004  
The PCML also had nice words for MSF. In November 1979, L’humanité rouge, the 
PCML’s paper, interviewed an MSF worker who had just returned from Cambodia. Given the 
organization’s principle of neutrality, the MSF activist chose to remain anonymous, but offered 
some damning remarks about the new government in Phnom Penh. “There is a paradox that one 
must emphasize: there are volunteers, there are people, there is money, there are donations,” in 
short, everything to help Cambodia, and yet, “all of that is blocked.”1005 The situation grew so 
intolerable that just one month later, MSF decided to break with neutralism to directly intervene in 
Cambodian affairs. “Today, in Cambodia, children starve to death before tons of rice,” began their 
rousing call to action, published in all the major newspapers.1006 “But the hundreds of doctors, 
surgeons, and nurses whom we are holding ready,” MSF continued, have for months found 
themselves “forbidden from entering the country.”1007 Tired of waiting on the Vietnamese 
authorities, MSF took matters into its own hands, organizing a campaign, the Marche pour la 
survie, to forcibly enter Cambodia to save the dying. The PCML quickly reproduced excerpts of 
the call, obviously quite pleased by this clear attack on Vietnam. 
Although MSF criticized Vietnam most vocally, it was not alone. While humanitarians 
realized that the Khmer Rouge had caused the impending cataclysm, the situation had degraded 
so badly that by late 1979 they began to shift the blame to the Vietnamese. This redirection, 
along with the dramatic rhetoric surrounding Cambodia, increasingly made it seem as if the 
Vietnamese were deliberately murdering the Cambodians. Aid agencies blasted the airwaves with 
advertisements warning of “two million more before Christmas.”1008 Francois Bugnion of the Red 
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Cross compared Cambodia to Buchenwald. In France, Claude Malhuret, who had been active on 
the Thai border since 1976 before becoming MSF’s president, spoke to the rightwing Le Figaro 
about an impending “massacre” in Cambodia, comparing the Vietnamese invasion to the 
Armenian genocide.1009 Kouchner spoke of the “extinction of Cambodian children,” proclaiming 
that [g]enocide is happening every evening, over supper.” Unsurprisingly, the New Philosophers 
joined the chorus, with Bernard-Henri Lévy speaking of a new “final solution.”1010 
In this context, pro-Chinese attacks were no longer disregarded as fanatical ravings. 
Indeed, groups like the PCML, which quoted testimonies, statistics, and statements from 
humanitarian groups to allege that the Vietnamese were committing genocide, capitalized on a 
major slippage in the public discourse.1011 For if there was indeed an ongoing genocide or 
holocaust, as everyone seemed to suggest, then who was perpetrating it? With the Khmer Rouge 
firmly out of power, and the Vietnamese at the helm, there could really only be one answer. Thus, 
in blaming the Vietnamese, the pro-Chinese were only spelling out that which was already implicit 
in the language of the humanitarians, human rights activists, and increasingly the public at large. 
The campaign against Vietnam, which began on the fringes of the political spectrum, had become 
completely mainstream by 1980. 
In their campaign against Vietnam, pro-Chinese groups found objective allies in the very 
imperialist governments they once denounced. In France, government officials began to blame 
Vietnam, and the Foreign Minister warned that the Cambodians were “on the edge of 
extinction.”1012 But it was the U.S. government that led the charge. Still smarting from its 
humiliating defeat, the United States relished in Vietnam’s discomfiture, accusing the Vietnamese 
of looting peasants, destroying food stocks, hoarding outside aid, and deliberately trying to kill 
Cambodians. Moving past denunciations, the U.S. government actively isolated Vietnam in the 
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international arena, effectively authorized China’s punitive invasion in February 1979, and 
orchestrated a massive international embargo to suffocate Vietnam for the next decade – of all 
the countries in Western Europe and North America, only Sweden and France continued to help 
Vietnam rebuild after four decades of almost continuous war.1013  
Still not satisfied, the United States backed the Khmer Rouge in its guerilla war against 
the Vietnamese. While it still remains unclear whether the United States directly armed the Khmer 
Rouge, U.S. representatives did nix an ASEAN proposal to disarm the party while National 
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski himself admitted that he “concocted the idea of persuading 
Thailand to cooperate fully with China in its efforts to rebuild the Khmer Rouge.”1014 On the 
international terrain, the United States lobbied the United Nations to recognize Pol Pot’s recently 
deposed government as the official representative of Cambodia, deliberately avoiding the word 
“genocide” in its statements in order to present the overthrown party as the victim of an 
inexcusable Vietnamese incursion. Overriding the expostulations of the Soviet Bloc, on 
September 21, 1979 the United Nations General Assembly formally recognized Pol Pot’s 
Democratic Kampuchea – a regime that relocated millions of people for torture, forced labor, and 
ultimately mass extermination, resulting in the annihilation of perhaps twenty-five percent of 
Cambodia’s population – as the rightful voice of the Cambodian people. 
 Perhaps unthinkable a decade earlier, pro-Chinese radicals found themselves siding with 
the United States against what they now called Vietnamese imperialism. While they welcomed 
the U.S. government’s role in weakening Vietnam, the association looked bad, forcing them into 
political contortions. For example, in its article hailing the U.N. decision to recognize Democratic 
Kampuchea as a victory for the principles of “independence, sovereignty, non-interference, and 
the safeguarding of peace,” the PCML carefully listed how each country voted, yet studiously 
avoided mentioning the United States, the very country that had actually led the charge to defend 
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Pol Pot.1015 The American CPML found itself in an especially unpleasant bind. Following China’s 
lead, the party had to congratulate the decision, which owed much to American imperialism; yet 
showing any support for the U.S. government contradicted most of the party’s domestic 
campaigns, such as the fight for Puerto Rican independence. There could not be a more 
illustrative, yet also tragic, image of how deep the crisis of the anti-imperialist internationalism ran. 
 
Ant-Imperialist Internationalism in Crisis 
The Third Indochina War presented radicals with an intractable question: why did 
revolutionary struggles in Cambodia, Vietnam, and China, once united around the ideas of anti-
imperialism, internationalism, and socialism, go to war against one another almost as soon as 
they achieved victory, turning these foundational ideas into their very opposites? Despite the 
gravity of the question, some denied that there was a problem to begin with. Others largely 
blamed the entire fiasco on American imperialism, which, while true in some respects, seemed 
more like an evasion than an answer. A few offered more honest answers, which often meant 
locating the problem within the anti-imperialist struggles themselves, rather than trying to deflect 
blame. The RCP, for example, identified the “bourgeois outlook” of nationalism as the cause.1016 
The LCR blamed the state itself, arguing that “logic of the state’s interests” had led the 
Vietnamese to reduce internationalism to geopolitics, international rivalries, and territorial 
disputes.1017 Indeed, while there were many possible causes, the most perspicacious radicals 
were beginning to point to the nation-state as a major reason for the implosion of anti-imperialist 
internationalism. 
As we have seen, in the 1960s, many radicals from a number of distinct currents, 
especially those most active in the antiwar movement, coupled anti-imperialist internationalism 
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with the right to national self-determination.1018 Internationalism meant supporting the struggles of 
oppressed nationalities, national liberation struggles were to produce nation-states that would 
ensure collective sovereignty, and these states were in turn supposed to transition into 
dictatorships of the proletariat that would open the path for socialism. Of course, these anti-
imperialist radicals were aware of the dangers of nationalism, understood that the dictatorship of 
the proletariat had to radically supersede the conventional nation-state, and firmly believed that 
socialist states would eventually have to “wither away” into more emancipatory forms. 
Nevertheless, despite these dangers, in the context of the Third World, nation-states were said to 
serve a progressive historical role in the struggle for global socialism.  
The changing conjuncture in Southeast Asia in the 1970s raised serious questions about 
this strategy, unraveling the presumed connections between the nation-state and liberation, 
socialism, anti-imperialism, and internationalism. The Vietnamese invasion unearthed the full 
extent of the Khmer Rouge’s crimes, demonstrating that the notion of collective sovereignty 
promoted by these revolutionary nation-states could not guarantee individual emancipation. 
China’s conservative turn in the 1970s, in which the PRC dismantled communes, embraced the 
free market, and solidified a Party bureaucracy, raised serious questions about the connection 
between the nation-state form and socialism. Cambodia’s constant border attacks, Vietnam’s 
invasion, and then China’s incursion indicated that instead of serving as the bulwark against 
imperialism, the nation-state might itself possess inherently imperialist tendencies, regardless of 
the politics of those in power. And the internecine conflagration showed that individual nation-
states always seemed to end by elevating their own national interests above those of 
internationalism. While struggles of the 1960s led radicals to connect the nation-state with anti-
imperialism, the culmination of those very struggles in the 1970s seemed to suggest that the two 
terms might actually be antithetical. Indeed, while not fully apparent at the time, looking back, this 
crisis showed the specific function of states in social formations propels them towards imperialism 
of some kind. In the words of theorists John Milios and Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos, all states, even 
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socialist ones, have an “outward-looking impulse of national expansion.”1019 Thus, the Third 
Indochina War, the later Iran-Iraq War, and other such conflicts cannot be seen as the result of 
interference by “Western imperialism”; their cause must be located in the specific nature of the 
states themselves.  
Thus, the wars in Southeast Asia pointed not only to the bankruptcy of the concept of 
national self-determination, but to the limits of Marxism’s understanding of the nation-state. It is 
revealing, for example, that all sides in the war justified their actions through the idea of national 
sovereignty. The Khmer Rouge justified mass population transfers by arguing that they formed a 
necessary part of the project to forge a new nation. Both the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese 
claimed they were merely defending themselves from infringements on their rightful national 
territories. Vietnam asserted that the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge was not the product of a 
foreign intervention, but of an autonomous revolutionary uprising of the Khmer people fighting for 
their “right to self-determination.”1020 The SRV justified its occupation of Cambodia by saying the 
new government requested Vietnamese support to help protect the country’s national sovereignty 
from interference by the deposed Khmer Rouge and the Chinese.1021 The Chinese claimed that 
their invasion of Vietnam was simply a counterattack designed to protect Chinese sovereignty 
from Vietnamese border attacks.1022 
In diagnosing the crisis, Benedict Anderson argued that “none of the belligerents has 
made more than the most perfunctory attempts to justify bloodshed in terms of a recognizable 
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Marxist theoretical perspective.”1023 While the belligerents did advance certain concepts, these 
were wholly inadequate to the theoretical problem. None of the states involved were capitalist, 
and yet they behaved in ways very similar to capitalist nation-states – they made geopolitical 
alliances with neighboring states, jealously guarded their borders, exerted influence over other 
nation-states, crafted a national populace, and placed the self-interest of the state above all else. 
In short, they seemed imperialist, but since radicals had always conceptually anchored 
imperialism to capitalism, the term, they thought, could not truly explain the behavior of these 
socialist states. Chinese Marxists, who had earlier confronted a similar problem in the form of 
Soviet revisionism, proposed the concept of “hegemonism” as a solution. Unrelated to Antonio 
Gramsci’s idea of “hegemony,” this concept simply referred to a nation-state’s desire to expand 
its power, either by applying pressure on other states, or through direct expansion, irrespective of 
that country’s modes of productions, level of class struggle, and so forth. Thus, the Chinese saw 
the Third Indochina war as the product of the Soviet Union’s “big hegemonism” and Vietnam’s 
“little hegemonism.”1024 The Vietnamese, lacking their own explanation, adopted the concept as 
well, blaming the war on “Peking hegemonism” allied with American imperialism.1025 While the 
concept may have described some of the geopolitical dimensions of the war, it did not explain 
why states, whether socialist or capitalist, felt compelled to expand in this way. The only thing 
“hegemonism” truly revealed was Marxism’s great difficulty in explaining the nation-state.1026 
But it was not just Southeast Asian Marxists, but also French and American radicals who 
had a difficult time making sense of the problem, even if they began to see the nation-state, or 
more narrowly, nationalism, as major problems. When the RCP explained the situation in 
Southeast Asia by arguing that too many individuals with the bourgeois world outlook of 
nationalism had joined the Vietnamese Party, it said very little about the structure of the state 
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itself, reducing the problem to the ideas of individuals. When the LCR rightly noted that the 
problem was the state, but then proposed the alternative of a “socialist federation of Indochinese 
States,” it, too, revealed a limited understanding of the nation-state – after all, how was a 
federation of states any different if it were ultimately composed of other smaller states?1027 Were 
not all states comprised of other states? And where did nationalism fit into this? 
This theoretical limit is precisely why radicals encountered such difficulty in reinventing 
internationalism. Changing circumstances at home and abroad had always forced radicals in the 
United States and France, indeed, throughout North America and Western Europe, to periodically 
reinvent international solidarity. But in the late 1970s, radicals proved unable to fashion a 
historically apposite response, as they had in the early 1960s, in 1968, or in the early 1970s. The 
domestic situation went from bad to worse, especially as the 1980s arrived. Internationally, 
revolutions seemed to be in retreat almost everywhere. And the Third Indochina War, which was 
in fact only one in a long series of crises, shook anti-imperialist internationalism to its very core, 
completely destabilizing its basic assumptions and constituent categories, such as the idea of the 
right to national self-determination. While earlier moments required a recalibration of 
internationalism, the crises of the late 1970s were so thorough that they demanded a 
refoundation of anti-imperialist internationalism itself. Still, the blow was not necessarily lethal, 
and radicals could have tried, through very hard intellectual, political, and organizational work, to 
create a new kind of international solidarity. But on the whole, most radicals, because they were 
demoralized, completely weakened at home, stupefied by the turn of events abroad, or simply 
intransigent, did not succeed. Once the dominant form of international solidarity, by the late 
1970s anti-imperialist internationalism was in crisis, opening the field for a new kind of solidarity 
to take the lead. 
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CHAPTER 8: SAVING THE BOAT PEOPLE 
 
In July 1981, just a few years before his death, Michel Foucault spoke on behalf of yet 
another cause. Surrounded by enormous photographs of suffering refugees, this time he spoke 
for the “boat people” fleeing Southeast Asia.1028 In the late 1970s, hundreds of thousands of 
Indochinese fled communist governments in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam; over the next quarter 
century, their numbers would swell to nearly three million. While some fled by land, many took to 
the seas in teeming, decrepit boats. Countless drowned, starved to death, or were murdered by 
pirates. Those fortunate enough to survive the perilous journey to neighboring Southeast Asian 
countries were thrown into overcrowded camps upon arrival. Under considerable strain, and 
unable to take any more refugees, some of these countries began to push incoming boats back to 
sea. By early 1979, all of Southeast Asia found itself gripped by a humanitarian crisis of 
unprecedented proportions. 
At Geneva, Foucault announced the creation of an International Committee of Piracy, 
headed by Bernard Kouchner. While Foucault’s support for a people in need was unsurprising, 
the way he now chose to theorize international solidarity certainly was. Instead of drawing on the 
ideas that marked his earlier activism with the Maoists – ideas such as popular justice, class 
struggle, and plebian revolt – Foucault now grounded his internationalism in the notion of the 
“private individual.” He gestured to a new “international citizenship,” whose duty it was to “always 
bring the testimony of people’s suffering to the eyes and ears of governments,” to “speak out 
against every abuse of power, whoever its author, whoever its victims.” He called for a new right, 
“that of private individuals to effectively intervene in the sphere of international policy and 
strategy.”1029 And he finished his speech, subsequently published under the title, “Confronting 
Governments: Human Rights,” by pointing to concrete initiatives that he believed embodied this 
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new kind of individualist, interventionist internationalism – the French and German campaigns to 
send ships to rescue the boat people, as well as the work of international human rights and 
humanitarian organizations such Amnesty International, Terre des Hommes, and Medecins du 
monde.1030  
If the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia helped shatter an already declining anti-
imperialist internationalism, then the concomitant refugee crisis offered the rival human rights 
internationalism a remarkable opportunity to fill the void of international solidarity. While what 
remained of the anti-imperialist left contributed little to resolving the refugee issue, the human 
rights internationalists sprang into action. Former French revolutionaries now turned 
humanitarians, like Bernard Kouchner, Claudie and Jacques Broyelle, or André Glucksmann, 
worked with Vietnamese refugees, Eastern European dissidents, and human rights groups such 
as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) to launch a campaign against human rights violations in 
Vietnam. Channeling the social movement strategies of the 1960s, they formed a committee to 
save the boat people, won over prominent intellectuals, including Michel Foucault, and chartered 
a hospital ship to rescue the boat people at sea. Their campaign, which amounted to interfering 
with the internal affairs of a sovereign nation-state, inaugurated a new kind of ostensibly “non-
political,” moral humanitarian interventionism that promised to surpass Cold War ideological 
divisions.  
Their campaign spread internationally, entering the United States through the efforts of 
Joan Baez and Ginetta Sagan, leaders of the West Coast branch of Amnesty International, but 
now directors of their own human rights organization. The pair not only popularized the struggle 
against human rights violations in Vietnam for American audiences, but also worked with the 
Carter Administration, revealing how this new human rights internationalism remained deeply 
implicated in politics, despite its claim to stand above governments. The Carter Administration, for 
its part, jumped at the issue, sensing a perfect opportunity to simultaneously divert attention away 
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from the Vietnam War, make Americans feel good again, and restore the United States’ 
leadership role in the international community. Of course, human rights played an ambiguous role 
in the Carter Administration: some used the new rights discourse as a way to criticize pro-U.S. 
dictatorships, while others wielded human rights as an anti-communist bludgeon against 
countries like Vietnam. In Southeast Asia, the latter approach tended to dominate. Indeed, in that 
part of the world, the United States found that with human rights it could accomplish what a 
decade of war had failed to do.  
Indeed, only five years after the fall of Saigon, the United States had used human rights 
to successfully rebrand itself as the moral conscience of the new age, while the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam, still devastated by over three decades of war, languished in isolation, crippled by 
sanctions, abandoned by much of the international community, and condemned by a new 
generation of activists for violating human rights. Despite its attempt to expose human rights as a 
new form of imperialism, the SRV could do little to explain itself in the face of undeniable 
evidence of massive internal repression, definitively losing the ideological war it had worked so 
hard to win in the 1960s. While the idea of anti-imperialism assured its international victory in the 
1960s, that of human rights sealed its defeat a decade later. Vietnam had won the war, but lost 
the peace. 
The remaining radicals in France and especially in the United States, where human rights 
internationalism had become state policy, attempted to fight back, but little could be done. 
Genocide in Cambodia, a refugee crisis in Vietnam, an internecine war between China, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam had completely discredited the foundational ideas of the radical left – 
anti-imperialism, national sovereignty, and collective self-determination. While its criticisms of 
human rights may have been convincing, the anti-imperialist left had nothing to offer in its place. 
Its own form of international solidarity was moribund. In this context, a new generation of potential 
activists turned to human rights.1031  
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Humanitarian Intervention 
On the night of November 9, 1978, a rusty freighter crawled into Port Klang, Malaysia. Its 
cargo: 2,164 Vietnamese refugees. The Malaysian authorities, unwilling to take more refugees, 
ordered the vessel to turn back. For several weeks, the cramped ship remained anchored beyond 
the port limits, under heavy guard. Imprisoned at sea, the refugees struggled to survive as food, 
water, and medicine dwindled, while disease and misery engulfed the ship. 
The Vietnamese aboard the Hai Hong, whose suffering was promptly televised to 
anguished audiences across the world, were only the latest arrivals in a torrent of refugees 
fleeing Vietnam. After unifying the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in 1976, the new 
communist state initiated a sweeping program of socialist reconstruction to recover from the 
accumulated devastation of three decades of war. The South in particular posed a challenge. 
Years of occupation deformed the region’s economy, making South Vietnam heavily dependent 
on a now absent U.S. military. Drugs, prostitution, gambling, and other illicit activities ran wild. 
Capitalist social relations refused to whither away. The Communist Party therefore launched an 
aggressive campaign to transform the region, which involved expropriations, reeducation camps, 
forced collectivization projects, and harsh punishments for offenders. In light of this, many 
Vietnamese considered emigration, and by mid-1977, a rising wave of refugees began to take 
their chances.  
Disproportionately involved in commerce, and in general wealthier than other Vietnamese 
nationals, the Hoa, or ethnic Chinese, were the hardest hit by this campaign. The Communist 
Party viewed Cholon, the bustling Chinatown of Ho Chi Minh city, as a “strong capitalist heart 
beating inside the Socialist body of Vietnam,” and acted accordingly.1032 Party officials ransacked 
Cholon, searching homes, confiscating money, and closing businesses. The growing political split 
between Vietnam and the People’s Republic of China only exacerbated the repression, leading 
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some in the Party to view the ethnic Chinese in the country as a dangerous fifth column.1033 For 
this reason, the Hoa, who numbered 1.5 million, were the most inclined to leave Vietnam, and in 
fact comprised the vast majority of the “boat people.” 
Escape was no easy matter. In some cases, refugees were forced to pay exorbitant 
prices – to smugglers, corrupt Vietnamese officials, and criminal organizations – to board some of 
these boats and later ships. Those who took to the sea risked drowning, starvation, or pirate 
attacks. The ones who survived were herded into deplorable camps, waiting for neighboring 
Southeast Asian countries, in concert with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
to determine what to do with them. By the end of 1978, over 61,700 boat people lived in such 
camps, and the Southeast Asian governments began to resist taking on more.1034 
Mounting evidence of political repression, forced collectivization, and mass flight reached 
North America and Western Europe in early 1978, though the issue was taken up most forcefully 
in France. France was home to a vibrant Vietnamese community, which had long played a crucial 
role in circulating information about Vietnam. A number of journals, such as Que Me, founded in 
1976, loudly condemned repression abroad. Some Vietnamese expatriates, such as Doan Van 
Toai, were themselves refugees. When he arrived in Paris in 1978, Doan Van Toai, imprisoned 
by both Thieu and then the Vietnamese Communist Party, shared documents from prisoners 
attesting to conditions abroad. Alleging there were over 800,000 political prisoners under 
Communist rule, he immediately launched a campaign. In this, he, along with many other 
Vietnamese refugees in France, were strongly inspired by the human rights campaign waged by 
Soviet dissidents. “Our goal,” he explained, “is to launch a campaign like those organized in the 
West in support of Soviet prisoners.”1035 Indeed, Vo Van Ai, founder of Que Me, recalls that the 
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strongest and earliest supporters of the campaign against what were now being called human 
rights violations in Vietnam were the many Eastern European dissidents taking refuge in Paris.1036 
Doan Van Toai formed a Comité de défense de détenus politiques au Vietnam, published 
a book documenting his experiences in Communist prisons, and gave numerous interviews for 
publications across Western Europe and North America. French journalists followed up on these 
revelations by producing a trickle, then a stream, of reports condemning developments abroad. 
Of course, rightwing papers, such as Le Figaro, opportunistically republished these stories to 
scold erstwhile activists and shame the left. But even more left-leaning publications, such as Le 
Matin or even Jean-Paul Sartre’s Les Temps modernes, ran articles. On October 5, 1978, Le 
Monde published its own editorial, “Peace Crimes,” condemning the repression in Vietnam. 
“Between the Cambodian genocide and the Vietnamese repression there is, of course, an 
enormous difference of degree. But the inspiration, alas, is the same kind. In both cases it is to 
level, to eliminate, all differences that exist.”1037 The editorial launched a public discussion over 
repression, human rights, and the refugee crisis, which involved many activists who had played 
an essential role in the antiwar movement. 
Many of the journalists reporting on repression abroad were former critics of the war who 
had spent time in Vietnam. For example, writing for Le Monde, Roland-Pierre Paringaux, who 
once denounced Thieu’s regime in the South, now turned his pen against the new regime. In a 
front-page article in Le Monde titled, “Human Rights Violations in Vietnam,” Paringaux asked: 
“Does the situation justify the present Communist regime of Hanoi behaving today exactly as the 
anti-Communist government of Saigon used to do and routinely resorting to repression and 
preventative detention on mere suspicion or on the strength of a denunciation, which it has 
elevated to a civic duty?” 1038 Recalling the international campaign to save the South Vietnamese 
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prisoners, he lamented, “The well-known militants who, under the old regime, courageously 
devoted themselves to defending political prisoners, have all gone silent.”1039 
 As it turned out, some of these former antiwar radicals were about to begin a vast 
campaign to target Vietnam for human rights abuses. When news of the Hai Hong broke, these 
radicals saw a perfect “opportunity” to take the campaign to the next level. Drawing on their 
organizing experiences, they felt that, “to act,” they needed “a symbol like the Hai Hong and its 
dramatic effect.”1040 That very night, the Broyelles called Bernard Kouchner, and two meetings 
were quickly organized, the first in the office of Continent, a publication by Soviet dissidents in 
Paris. The group – which consisted, among others, of the Broyelles, Kouchner, Alain Geismar, 
André Glucksmann, Bernard Henri-Lévy, Vo Van Ai, and Ilios Yannakakis, an ex-communist 
militant exiled first in Prague, then Paris – discussed the best way to respond. Henri-Lévy, 
channeling the antiwar tactics of the 1960s, suggested they attack the Vietnamese embassy.1041 
Although they rejected his idea, the group ultimately decided to borrow another page from the 
1960s radical playbook – sending a boat to Vietnam.  
In 1967, over thirty French antiwar organizations, including various Christian groups, the 
PSU, Communist Party, and the Comité Vietnam National, organized a campaign to send a boat 
to Vietnam filled with medical equipment, bicycles, motors, and other supplies.1042 Contributing to 
the campaign, the Association médicale franco-vietnamienne, of which Kouchner had been a 
member, penned a text, circulated by the Comité Vietnam National, explaining how the “Victory of 
Vietnam” also meant “quinine and a surgical kit in every village” as long as the war against the 
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Vietnamese people continued.1043 Just over a decade later, these erstwhile radicals decided to do 
the same. But this time, instead of sending supplies to Vietnamese revolutionaries fighting 
American imperialism, they would use the ship to literally rescue the boat people fleeing from the 
communists.  
With that, a committee was formed, called “Un bateau pour le Viêt-Nam.” Claudie 
Broyelle served as president; Françoise Gautier, a former Amnesty International activist, became 
treasurer; Olivier Todd, the antiwar journalist, helped with public relations; and Bernard Kouchner 
was tasked with gaining the support of Médecins sans frontières.1044 On November 11, 1978, they 
released their first statement: “[we have] to do more: [we must] go find these escapees. A boat in 
the South China Sea must, at all times, find, locate the Vietnamese who have taken the risk of 
leaving their country.”1045 And despite the logistical, organizational, and legal challenges, the 
committee did in fact succeed in acquiring a ship, whose name, the Île de Lumière, or the Ile of 
Light, perfectly captured the temerity of the campaign. 
 Leaning on their experiences in the antiwar movement, the committee circulated 
petitions, held public meetings, published articles in major newspapers, appeared on television, 
raised funds, and connected with famous intellectuals. Their efforts proved remarkably 
successful. To take only one measure, the committee was able to convince 166 persons, from 
most shades of the political spectrum, to sign their names to their call to action, including such 
preeminent figures as Michel Foucault, Raymond Aaron, Roland Barthes, Michel Rocard, and 
Lionel Jospin. For maximum mainstream publicity, they won over Brigitte Bardot as well.1046 
The committee also enjoyed international support. Irving Brown, who headed the 
European Office of the AFL-CIO, not only threw his weight behind the campaign, but convinced 
other American labor leaders such as George Meaney, President of the AFL-CIO, and Paul Hall, 
President of the Seafarers International Union, to sign the call as well. According to Vo Van Ai, 
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through Brown’s efforts, the AFL-CIO promised to provide a crew for the hospital ship free of 
charge.1047 Brown also took the initiative to widen the campaign by hosting an international 
conference, convincing Leo Cherne, head of the International Rescue Committee, and Bayard 
Rustin, the noted civil rights leader, to speak. But disagreements within the committee disrupted 
these plans, as some of the organizers feared that including the AFL-CIO – whose President, 
George Meany, only admitted the war was a mistake in December 1974, long after American 
withdrawal – would give the campaign too much of an anti-communist flavor.1048 
 Indeed, the core group was far from homogenous in its aims. Kouchner, for instance, was 
hoping to use the campaign as the springboard for a new kind of human rights organization. 
Others, such as André Glucksmann, wished to give the project a more explicitly political – and 
anti-communist – direction. There were differences among the politicos as well. Jacques Broyelle, 
for example, had become fiercely anti-Vietnamese, going so far as to argue that, “we would have 
been better to have been on the side of the Americans in the Vietnam War than on the side of the 
North.”1049 While everyone in the campaign was uncompromisingly critical of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, few initially accepted such a harsh view. 
 Despite these important differences, the organizers shared a central idea – concerned 
individuals had the right, in fact the duty, to intervene to stop human rights abuses, and that this 
principle would be the basis of a new internationalism. This was, after all, what their campaign 
had proposed to do. Chartering a ship to rescue Vietnamese nationals in the South China Sea, in 
some cases perhaps even in Vietnamese waters, was tantamount to intervening in the affairs of a 
sovereign state.1050 As it turned out, instead of cruising the seas fishing for refugees, the Île de 
Lumière, manned by Kouchner and a team of doctors, ended up anchoring off the coast of the 
Malaysian island of Poulo Bidong to serve as a kind of hospital ship. This was less egregious 
than invading foreign waters, but the intention was there, and a new idea had taken shape. 
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The action unsurprisingly raised a whole series of thorny questions. What jurisdiction did 
these activists have in Southeast Asia? Who could they claim to represent? Could international 
law be used to justify an action of this kind? What would be the legal status of those refugees 
rescued in this manner? These unresolved questions were precisely why the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, as well as many in MSF itself, opposed the action.1051 Indeed, the 
campaign triggered a major split in MSF as many objected to the interventionism of the project, its 
excessive reliance on the media, the strategy of allying with national governments, and 
Kouchner’s megalomania, and Kouchner went on to form his own rival organization, Médecins du 
Monde (MDM).1052  
Despite the obstacles, the committee accomplished a tremendous breakthrough. The 
effort to save the boat people marked a decisive moment in the development of a new kind of 
humanitarian interventionism, one of the first major campaigns of the new human rights 
international. Even the committee’s detractors eventually followed suit. MSF’s next campaign, for 
instance, was to ignore the conventions of interstate law and march straight into Cambodia to 
provide direct relief to refugees. A new idea of international solidarity – one that prioritized the 
individual, based itself in the right to intervene, relied heavily on celebrities and the media, and 
increasingly moved towards alliances with Western governments – had taken root.1053 
 Central to this new human rights internationalism was the sense that it could supersede, 
and in fact completely reconfigure, the political divisions that had marked the Cold War.1054 As 
Jacques Broyelle later admitted, the boat people campaign “was conceived on a grand scale and 
on a new ideological base,” one that aimed to “go beyond ideological cleavages.”1055 As Ilios 
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Yannakakis put it, the initiative aimed to “break the distinction between left and Right.”1056 Thus, 
the organizing core, though ultimately composed of those who had been on the left, “deliberately” 
asked figures on the right to join the campaign.1057 “People of the Right, people of the left, former 
revolutionaries,” Broyelle remembered, “everyone was there.”1058 The campaign promised a 
much-needed ideological reconciliation after years of political polarization. 
 Nothing captured the feeling of beginning a new chapter more powerfully than when the 
campaign organizers, led by Glucksmann, succeed in reuniting Jean-Paul Sartre and Raymond 
Aaron at the Élysée Palace on June 20, 1979. After refusing to speak to each other for decades, 
Sartre and Aaron, schoolmates who had subsequently come to represent two competing strands 
of French political thought, the anti-communist liberal and the Marxist radical, finally came 
together for the boat people. Sartre, once one of the most visible defenders of Vietnamese 
national liberation, now spoke of the “moral duty” to “save lives.”1059 Ideology had to be put aside 
in the face of human suffering. Glucksmann described the event as “the end of the Cold War in 
our heads.” Left and right were now transcended by human rights. 
Despite the fanfare, the encounter brought not reconciliation, but rather defeat, 
something poignantly captured in Aron’s rather patronizing greeting, “bonjour mon petit 
camarade,” to an infirm Sartre, so shriveled and blind he had to be ferried around by 
Glucksmann.1060 Indeed, after years of relative obscurity, Aron, and the liberal politics he 
represented, had returned, while the radical anti-imperialism of Sartre had withered and would 
finally die the following year. The meeting, Jacques Broyelle admitted years later, was “not about 
a convergence, a consensus, a symbol of rapprochement.”1061 It marked the “victory of Aron’s 
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thought. Period.”1062 And this was precisely the power of the new rights discourse – it could pass 
a clear victory as mere reconciliation, advance its own politics as simple morality, a partisan idea 
as supersession of ideology itself. In short, it had achieved hegemony. 
 
 
Internationalizing the Campaign 
 
The French movement against human rights violations in Vietnam, which had become 
condensed in the campaign to save the boat people, inspired similar, though smaller initiatives 
across Western Europe and North America. In February 1979, German activist Rupert Neudeck 
traveled to Paris where he learned of the Comité un Bateau pour le Vietnam, met Bernard 
Kouchner, Geismar, and the Broyelles, and promised to launch a fraternal campaign in the 
Federal Republic of Germany.1063 Borrowing from the French strategy, he and his wife, Christel, 
courted famous intellectuals, like Heinrich Böll, founded committee, and chartered a freighter 
called Cap Anamur, the French name for the cape on the Turkish coast, to save refugees on the 
high seas.1064 It’s estimated that the German ship rescued over 8,000 Vietnamese refugees over 
the course of the 1970s.1065 Neudeck collaborated very closely with Kouchner, and helped 
introduce some of his ideas of humanitarian interventionism into Germany at this time.1066 
But the movement against human rights violations in Vietnam achieved perhaps its 
greatest international success in the United States, winning the support of the federal government 
itself. The campaign entered North America through two veteran antiwar activists, Joan Baez and 
Ginetta Sagan. Baez, the famous American folk singer, had spoken against the war from the very 
beginning. Though never a revolutionary, she did not shy away from direct action. In October 
1967, she was arrested during the Stop the Draft Week protests. And in late 1972, she traveled to 
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North Vietnam to deliver mail to POWs on behalf of Coliafam, barely surviving Nixon’s “Christmas 
bombing” campaign in Hanoi.  
That same year, Baez recalls, she met Ginetta Sagan, who appeared at her doorstep 
with a “big messy bundle of documents” under arms, “telling me about something called Amnesty 
International and its work on behalf of all political prisoners, regardless of ideology, race, or 
religion.”1067 Sagan, tortured as a political prisoner by Mussolini, immigrated to the United States 
where she joined Amnesty International USA in 1967. Soon after, she founded its West Coast 
branch, which first met at her home. As one of West Coast branch’s primary organizers, Sagan 
threw herself into a number of political initiatives, including the international campaign to liberate 
the South Vietnamese political prisoners. The West Coast branch, for example, organized a 
three-week speaking tour for Jean-Pierre Debris and André Menras.1068 And Sagan was also 
invited to the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, from March 29-31, 1974.1069 
Baez and Sagan, who in 1973 joined the AI USA Board of Directors, worked together to 
build Amnesty International throughout the West Coast. Through their tireless efforts, the West 
Coast branch could come to boast more than half of AI USA’s total membership in 1974.1070 In 
the following years, the two participated in dozens of campaigns to free political prisoners from 
Greece to Argentina to the Eastern Bloc. And through their activism, they filled their Rolodex with 
an impressive array of international contacts, which included figures like Andrei Sakharov. 
After the fall of Saigon, Baez and Sagan began to cast a more critical eye on Vietnam. In 
1976, for example, Baez signed a letter encouraging the Vietnamese government to improve its 
human rights record. While it led to a split with activists like Cora Weiss, little came of it. Only a 
year after the war, there was limited hard evidence of human rights violations, many of the most 
committed activists were unwilling to criticize a struggle they had spent the last decade 
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supporting, and, most importantly, the general language of human rights had not yet become 
common currency. All that would change in 1979, by which time Carter had made human rights a 
centerpiece of his foreign policy, Amnesty International had won the Nobel Peace Prize, the 
suffering of the boat people flashed across millions of television screens, and evidence of rights 
violations in Vietnam mounted. In the new climate, Baez and Sagan would lead the charge again. 
Baez admits that her idea to organize the American human rights campaign against the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam actually came from two refugees, Nguyen Huu Hieu, a Buddhist 
monk, and the indefatigable Doan Van Toai, who toured Canada and the United States for two 
months in late fall 1978.1071 A representative from Amnesty International attended one of Doan’s 
talks at Berkeley that fall, and put him in contact with Joan Baez, who agreed to help.1072 She 
immediately set to work, forming “a research group of five people, including Ginetta.”1073 Sagan 
recalls how the team relied, in particular, on “the invaluable help of “European journalists, 
scientists, refugees, and intellectuals,” some of whom they had befriended through the earlier 
international campaign to liberate the political prisoners under Thieu’s government.1074  
Of all their European contacts, the French proved the most indispensable. Indeed, the 
research group effectively headquartered itself in Paris. Baez recalls actively “seeking out well-
known French journalists of the left who as early as 1976 had begun to realize and denounce 
Hanoi’s policies.”1075 Sagan, who had studied at the Sorbonne from 1949-1951, devoured all the 
French literature she could find on the subject. Baez paid equally close attention to the French 
scene, following “the French debate over Communism, Marxism, New Philosophy, Indochina, and 
all the rest.”1076 In fact, Baez would develop deep ties with the French intellectual community, 
remaining in touch with Doan Van Toai; building connections with MSF; meeting some of the 
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French humanitarian activists, such as Claudie Broyelle; and returning to Paris to throw benefit 
concerts for Indochinese refugees. 
Their research abroad left them so convinced of the human rights violations in Vietnam 
that Baez and Sagan decided to expand to the United States the campaign unfolding in France. 
Although they had by this point formed their own humanitarian organization, 
Humanitas/International Human Rights Committee, they channeled much from Amnesty 
International. Following AI’s conventions, they ultimately decided to launch the campaign with an 
open letter. Drawing on Doan’s testimony, reports by journalists like Paringaux, and the human 
rights debates of French activists, Baez and Sagan penned a letter condemning Vietnam, which 
they circulated, along with a packet of supporting materials, among noted American antiwar 
activists for signatures. They received nearly a hundred signatures from people such as 
Staughton and Alice Lynd, Cesar Chavez, Daniel Berrigan, Allen Ginsburg, and I. F. Stone. 
Before releasing their open letter, Sagan and Baez approached the Vietnamese 
ambassador. “Either Hanoi make a written promise that Amnesty International representatives 
would be allowed into Vietnam within six months, with free access to go where they chose,” or, 
Baez continued, “we would print our full-page letter.”1077 The Vietnamese government, suspicious 
of foreign intervention after decades of war, rejected the proposal. On May 30, 1979, Baez, after 
having raised over $53,000, published the open letter in four major newspapers, The Washington 
Post, The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, and the San Francisco Chronicle.  
The published appeal showcased all the ideas of the new human rights internationalism. 
There is the expected appeal to an idea of universal rights, and the belief that all governments 
must submit to “the tenets of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights.” One also spots theoretical concepts, such as 
“totalitarianism,” recently re-popularized by thinkers like the New Philosophers. Most interestingly, 
the letter also tried to suggest that all these concerns had in fact always been there, that the new 
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campaign for human rights against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam faithfully upheld the 
commitments, aspirations, and guiding ideas of the earlier antiwar movements: 
It was an abiding commitment to fundamental principles of human dignity, freedom and 
self-determination that motivated many Americans to oppose the government of South 
Vietnam and our country’s participation in the war. It is that same commitment that 
compels us to speak out against your brutal disregard for human rights.1078 
 
Of course, this was anachronistic thinking. In reality, the new emphasis on individual freedoms, 
universal human rights, or international covenants marked a significant rupture with much of 
antiwar organizing in the 1960s, especially among radical activists. Indeed, earlier movements 
thought almost exclusively in terms of national liberation, collective self-determination, and anti-
imperialism. Baez’s rhetorical move was to not only render human rights self-evident, but to 
attach to the new campaign the legitimacy of the earlier one. 
But her attempt to establish such a firm continuity between the two movements actually 
belied another major difference between them. In her letter, Baez alleges that the burden of 
struggle had always been placed firmly on the shoulders of Western activists. “As in the 60s,” she 
wrote, “we raise our voices now so that your people may live.”1079 Nothing could be further from 
the truth. In the 1960s, radical activists believed that Vietnam not only led the struggle, but fought 
for activists in the West. This idea was perhaps best captured by Jean-Paul Sartre in November 
1966: “Their fight is ours… The defeat of the Vietnamese people would politically be our defeat, 
the defeat of all free people. Because Vietnam is fighting for us.”1080 Indeed, the slogan, “their 
struggle is ours,” became the watchword of the Comité Vietnam National. According to this view, 
North American and Western European activists were not the ones who had to save the 
Vietnamese, as Baez now suggested in 1979, but rather it was the Vietnamese who, in their 
heroic struggle against imperialism, would save the peoples of North America and Western 
Europe. Although arguing for continuity, human rights internationalism actually inverted many of 
the fundamental assumptions of anti-imperialist internationalism. 
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Perhaps most importantly, the letter, and the human rights campaign it set in motion in 
the United States, claimed to be beyond politics. As Baez explained in an article for The 
Washington Post soon after publishing her open letter, “It is a time to put conscience before 
ideology.”1081 When promoting their efforts, Baez and Sagan insisted that “Humanitas is a non-
partisan, non-political, non-governmental human rights group.”1082 In reality, the new kind of 
human rights activism they championed was deeply political – especially in the narrowest sense 
of that term. Contrary to their public statements, Baez and Sagan worked very closely with the 
American politicians and U.S. government. In October 1979, for example, Baez and Sagan 
worked with an aid of Eunice Kennedy Shriver to organize a fundraiser for the boat people in 
Washington, D.C. Ted Kennedy attended the event, as did Chip Carter, son of the President.  
Sagan, it seems, was one of the first to speak with President Jimmy Carter about human 
rights. While on the campaign trail in 1975, the future President stayed at the California home of 
Sagan’s Amnesty International colleague, Rodney Kennedy, whom Carter would later appoint as 
Ambassador to Sweden. There, he met with Sagan. “Carter then told me,” Sagan explained in a 
1978 article, “that he admired Amnesty’s work and promised that if he were elected he would 
make human rights and decency in foreign policy a priority.”1083 Soon after his stay, Carter wrote 
to Sagan, affirming their partnership, I “really admire the work you are doing. During the 
campaign ahead your advice & active support will be very valuable to me.”1084 Despite its claim to 
operate independently of national governments, Amnesty, along with other such human rights 
organizations, substantially benefited from ties to the American President. As Sagan put it, 
“Carter’s initiatives mean a great deal” in terms of “AI access to governments” abroad.1085 
 Their campaign against human rights violations in Vietnam further developed these close 
links between human rights internationalism and the United States government. In fact, 
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Humanitas directly appealed to the President to increase pressure on Vietnam. Nowhere was this 
clearer than the rally Baez organized on July 19, 1979 in Washington, D.C. That day, she hosted 
a concert at the Lincoln Memorial, at which 12,000 supporters appeared, and then led a march to 
the White House carrying lit candles. Baez had written a letter to the President before the event, 
explaining that “the march was not in any way a protest, but rather a show of support from the 
American people who would back him in any humanitarian effort he made on behalf of the boat 
people.”1086 In particular, she “suggested sending the Sixth Fleet our on a rescue mission.”1087 
While Carter declined the invitation to attend the concert, later in the evening, as marchers 
chanted “save the boat people” outside the White House, he surprised everyone by walking 
across the Presidential lawn, climbing the iron fence, and announcing that he had decided to 
send the Sixth Fleet to rescue boat people in the South China Sea. 
In this way, the French campaign to save the boat people at sea now enjoyed the 
unexpected support of the United Sates military. By summer of 1979, what began as a small 
activist campaign organized by Vietnamese exiles, French journalists, and former revolutionaries, 
now transformed into a massive international movement involving not only other humanitarian 
organizations, but also major national governments, beginning with the United States. 
Governments across the globe echoed the call to save the boat people, politicians organized 
international meetings, major newspapers carried front-page stories. Other ships joined the Île de 
Lumière at sea, including vessels from the Italian Navy and the U.S. Sixth fleet.1088 The United 
Sates military now led the charge in the campaign against violations of human rights in Vietnam. 
In this way, the very force those young radicals had protested so vehemently only a decade 
earlier had now become their most important ally in the fight for human rights. 
 
Winning the Peace 
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After President Jimmy Carter left Joan Baez’s rally for the Boat People outside the White 
House on July 19, 1979, press secretary Jody Powell stayed behind for another hour to speak 
with activists. Reflecting the convivial atmosphere of the rally, someone handed him a popsicle 
during the extemporaneous question and answer session that soon followed. Repeating a central 
theme of the Carter Administration, Powell lamented the general malaise gripping the American 
public. Americans, he said as he bit his popsicle, had grown pessimistic, no longer even trusting 
their own government. “If you look at people’s attitudes,” he continued, “it’s frightening.” “The 
number of people that think all politicians are crooks has tripled since the Watergate era.”1089 
Powell spoke to a fundamental crisis in American politics. By the mid-1970s, many of the 
guiding beliefs, certainties, and values of Americans had come undone. On January 11, 1973, the 
stock market tumbled, foreshadowing a major recession that would bring the exceptional postwar 
economic boom to a definitive end. On August 9, 1974, in the face of now incontrovertible 
evidence of crimes, cover-ups, and conspiracies, President Richard Nixon became the only 
President in U.S. history to resign the office. On April 30, 1975, after billions of dollars, tens of 
thousands of American lives, and millions of Indochinese casualties, the Vietnam War ended in 
stunning defeat. Reeling from these events, many Americans were now left increasingly 
economically insecure, distrustful of their government, uncertain of the United States 
government’s role in the world, and convinced the America had lost its moral compass.  
Jimmy Carter hoped to change that. Running on a politics of morality, he aimed to not 
only restore faith in government, but heal the shame, guilt, and despair many American’s felt after 
the trauma of Vietnam. He began his moral crusade on his very first day in office, choosing to 
walk, rather than drive, from the Capitol to the White House for his inauguration, as if to show 
ordinary Americans that he was no different from them. In the opening line of his inauguration 
speech, he called for unity in the great task of moving beyond the traumas that had scarred the 
country. “For myself and for our Nation,” he began, “I want to thank my predecessor for all he has 
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done to heal our land.”1090 Wishing to move past the rampant corruption, immorality, and 
deception of the past, he outlined the fundamental tenants of his Administration: “Our government 
must at the same time be both competent and compassionate.”1091 In his speech, he spoke of 
fostering greater transparency, moderating the Cold War, and leading by example.  
Most importantly, President Carter signaled a major departure in international relations 
from the Vietnam War era. He spoke of maintaining a “quiet strength based not merely on the 
size of an arsenal but on the nobility of ideas.” The centerpiece of his new arsenal would be the 
notion of human rights, which he implied signified not only a new foreign policy program, but a 
new age for humanity. “The world itself is now dominated by a new spirit. Peoples more 
numerous and more politically aware are craving, and now demanding, their place in the sun,” he 
continued, “not just for the benefit of their own physical condition, but for basic human rights.” 
Accordingly, he promised, “Our commitment to human rights must be absolute…”1092 
The Carter Administration had recently, and somewhat unexpectedly, discovered that 
human rights could serve as the cure to the widespread malaise that characterized American 
politics – and especially U.S. foreign policy – in the 1970s.1093 Human rights could manage the 
legacy of Vietnam by shifting everyone’s attention away from the horrors of that war, redefine the 
U.S. government’s role in the world after Richard Nixon’s realpolitik, and, above all, restore 
American virtue. Yet the different currents that came together to make Carter’s Presidency 
possible had different ideas about exactly how human rights could be used to offer Americans a 
way to finally feel good about their country, its ideals, and its role in the world. For some 
conservatives, which included both Democrats and Republicans, human rights could help 
reestablish the legitimacy of America’s war on international Communism, offering the perfect 
weapon to circumvent a politics of isolationism, guilt, and compromise after the debacle of 
Vietnam. For some liberals, on the other hand, human rights offered the United States a way to 
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recover the country’s honor after a period of Cold War immorality that included not only the 
Vietnam War, but also continued U.S. support of brutal dictatorships.  
Because of these different impulses, human rights came to play a highly ambiguous, and 
at times contradictory, role in the Carter Administration’s foreign policy. Figures like Patricia 
Derian, head of the State Department’s Bureau of Human Rights, regularly criticized pro-U.S. 
dictatorships for human rights violations.1094 Derian, for example, pushed to ban the sale of tear 
gas to the Shah of Iran, who used it to crush demonstrations against his autocratic rule. Other 
figures, like Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
proved very reluctant to openly criticize such allies. For instance, Holbrooke personally deleted 
criticism of the Shah from one of Carter’s speeches.1095 This conflict played out over different 
areas of foreign policy, with partisans of each approach winning the upper hand in different parts 
of the world. In some regions, especially Latin America, figures like Derian scored important 
victories. With regards to Argentina, for example, the Carter administration worked to reduce aid 
levels, cut off military assistance, and generate public pressure against the dictatorship. But in 
Southeast Asia, one of the hottest spots of the Cold War, those who saw in human rights a 
weapon against communism clearly seized the upper hand. 
Vietnam, which played a very special role in American consciousness, became a prime 
testing ground for the anti-communist variant of Carter’s human rights policy. Before his 
presidency, “Vietnam” was practically synonymous with American dishonor, cruelty, and failure. 
For the vast majority of Americans after 1975, sending troops to fight in Vietnam had been a 
mistake. In the eyes of much of the international community, the United Sates had committed 
egregious crimes: denying a people their right to self-determination, killing millions, and 
completely dislocating all of Southeast Asian society in a war the United States could not win.1096 
A stain on America’s virtue, the Vietnam War had severely weakened the U.S. government’s 
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claims to be the leader of the free world, the defender of democratic values, or the world’s 
selfless policeman. 
Since Vietnam lay at the very heart of the United States’ predicament, a central aspect of 
President Carter’s plan to restore the United States’ positive image on the world stage involved 
radically changing the way the world thought about the United States’ role in Southeast Asia. 
Thus, only two weeks after his inauguration, Carter broached the question of normalizing 
relations with the SRV. The greatest initial obstacle was the myth that there were still POWs in 
Southeast Asia. Like Richard Nixon and the POWs before him, President Gerald Ford had 
wielded the MIA issue as a political weapon, refusing to discuss the issue of normalization on the 
grounds that Vietnam had not accounted for all the soldiers missing in action after the war.1097 
Carter, by contrast, hoped to move past the matter. After the “Woodcock Commission” returned 
from Hanoi in 1977, President put the issue to rest by declaring publicly that the Vietnamese “had 
done their best to account for the service personnel who are missing in action.”1098 Negotiations 
could begin in earnest. 
The Vietnamese, for their part, were eager to establish diplomatic relations, and talks 
began in earnest on May 3, 1977. Discussions, which involved several Congressional visits to 
Vietnam, culminated on September 27, 1978 when Holbrooke secretly met with Deputy Foreign 
Minister Nguyen Co Thach. Both sides agreed to normalize relations without preconditions.1099 
But not everyone in Carter’s Administration assented. Zbigniew Brzezinski – Carter’s National 
Security Advisor, a hardline anti-communist, a onetime member of Amnesty International’s board 
of directors – argued that normalizing relations with Vietnam would complicate the 
Administration’s primary goal of normalizing relations with the USSR’s enemy, China.1100 In other 
words, warming up to the Vietnamese, allied to the Soviets, would alienate the Chinese, 
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undermining the United States’ geopolitical strategy of isolating the Soviet Union. Opposition to 
normalization was seconded by anti-communist Democrats such as Senator Henry Jackson, one 
of the strongest proponents of the conservative notion of human rights.1101 For Jackson, who had 
tried to preserve the anti-communist goals of American imperialism by grounding Cold War 
discourse on universal human rights rather than “American values,” normalizing relations meant 
bowing to communism.1102 On the advice of Brzezinski, and with people like Jackson in mind, 
Carter turned against normalization only two weeks after Holbrooke and Nguyen Co Thach 
reached an agreement. 1103 Feeling betrayed, and increasingly concerned about China’s designs 
on the region, the SRV turned completely to the Soviet Union, signing a twenty-five year 
friendship and cooperation treaty on November 3, 1978.  
Despite all the talk of moving past the Cold War, leading by example, and pursuing a 
politics of morality, when it came to Southeast Asia, the Carter Administration’s lofty visions 
ultimately came second to the geopolitical imperatives of the Cold War. Carter’s foreign policy 
goal was to find a way to change how both Americans and the global community saw the United 
States’ role in Southeast Asia. Although consonant with the rhetoric of healing that characterized 
his Administration, the early strategy of normalization provided ineffective because it ultimately 
contradicted the larger geopolitical goals of the United States in that region of the world. Thus, the 
Carter Administration had to find another, more effective way to simultaneously erase the 
memory of the war, make Americans feel good about themselves, and restore the United States 
government’s global credibility without compromising U.S. imperialism. 
Enter the boat people. It seems the idea of seriously involving the United States in the 
boat people issue actually came from Holbrooke.1104 Holbrooke, despite earlier efforts to 
normalize relations with Vietnam, was also one of those figures in the Carter Administration who 
praised human rights but felt they should always be subordinated to American foreign policy. As 
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noted above, while he often turned to the language of rights, he applied them very selectively, 
especially in Southeast Asia. For example, despite massive human rights violations, dictator 
Ferdinand Marcos was frequently let off the hook because the Philippines were so important to 
U.S. geopolitical interests in the region. This kind of hypocritical stance on human rights was not 
lost on the public, and often created problems for the Administration. But with the boat people 
fleeing the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, there was no such contradiction. For here was an issue 
that was perfectly consonant with the Carter Administration’s emphasis on human rights, but did 
not disrupt U.S. strategic interests abroad. In fact, when it came to the boat people, singing the 
praises of human rights could the best way to further American imperialism. 
There was, however, some resistance to the idea to throwing the state’s weight behind 
the issue. The Pentagon felt it was out of its jurisdiction, some in the State Department argued 
that embracing the issue would be tantamount to interfering with the affairs of a sovereign state, 
and others in the National Security Council raised the question of money. Yet Holbrooke had a 
strong ally in Vice President Walter F. Mondale, who had visited a refugee camp in Thailand in 
the spring of 1978. Mondale did not see the issue as simply another refugee problem, but as “a 
sinister and largely racist plot, putting people to sea in something that approached genocide and 
a form of revenge for their support of the United States during the Vietnam War.”1105 But he also 
thought the issue could provide an excellent opportunity to rectify America’s image abroad. “Quite 
apart from the humanitarian case, I saw an important foreign policy argument,” Mondale 
explained.1106 That proved enough to convince Secretary of Defense Harold Brown as well as 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.  
Beginning in late 1978, the United States took a series of well-publicized steps to 
alleviate the refugee crisis. On February 28, 1979, President Carter created the post of U.S. 
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.1107 On June 28, 1979, at an international summit in Tokyo, 
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President Carter pledged to double the number of Indochinese refugees to the United States from 
7,000 to 14,000 a month. “We can and will work together,” he promised, “to find homes and jobs 
for Indochinese refugees.”1108 To handle the influx, the U.S. Department of State created a new 
Office of Refugee Affairs on July 30, 1979. That month, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 
suggested moving 20,000 refugees to a refugee processing center in the United States itself, 
possibly Fort Chaffee in Arkansas. While only “symbolic,” he argued the project would 
nevertheless make for a dramatic gesture on the international stage.1109 President Carter 
ultimately nixed the plan, but by the end of September of 1979, the United States could 
nevertheless boast that it had admitted a total of 248,436 refugees since the spring of 1975.1110 
Mondale proved correct: by acting on this issue, the United States had stumbled onto a way to 
restore its virtue in the very part of the world where it had so recently been associated with 
dishonor. 
This remarkable transformation was best captured at the International Meeting on 
Refugees and Displaced Persons in Southeast Asia called by United Nations Secretary General 
Kurt Waldheim for July 20-21, 1979. Sixty-five governments accepted his invitation to Geneva, 
including Vietnam and the United States. To prove its commitment, the United States sent a 
“high-level delegation” to the Meeting, which included Mondale, the Attorney General, 
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs Richard “Dick” Clark, the Governors of New Jersey and Iowa, a 
number of Congressional representatives, and Elie Wiesel, the Holocaust survivor, author, and 
humanitarian.1111 
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Mondale’s speech in Geneva was a coup.1112 With rhetorical subtlety, he reminded his 
audience that “Forty-one years ago this very week, another international conference on Lake 
Geneva concluded its deliberations.”1113 He spoke of the Evian conference, where thirty-two 
countries gathered to find a solution to the plight of Jews fleeing persecution from the Third 
Reich. Yet no agreement was reached, he lamented: “At Evian, they began with high hopes. But 
they failed the test of civilization.”1114 He then transitioned to the refugee crisis in Southeast Asia, 
warning, “Let us not re-enact their error. Let us not be the heirs of their shame.”1115 In effect, 
Mondale implicitly compared Vietnam to the Third Reich, the flight of the boat people to the 
Holocaust. Mondale then slammed Vietnam for its “callous and irresponsible policies,” charging 
the SRV for “failing to ensure the human rights of its people.”1116 
After depicting the Vietnamese as the villains, he made the United States the hero:  
The United States is committed to doing its share, just as we have done for generations. 
“Mother of exiles” it says on the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty at the port of New York. 
The American people have already welcomed over 200,000 Indochinese.1117 
 
Beyond taking them in, he added, the United States “is acting vigorously to save refugees from 
exposure and starvation and drowning and death at sea.” “[T]he President of the United States 
has dramatically strengthened his orders to our Navy to help the drowning and the desperate,” he 
told his captivated audience.1118 Most importantly, Mondale hoped to convince the world that the 
United States was worthy of once again leading the international community. Unlike during the 
Vietnam War, which, despite some allied assistance, the United States led on its own, blind to 
international pressure, Mondale now called for a truly united, multilateral effort. 
 Mondale lived up to the Administration’s highest goals by appealing to moral conscience. 
In respect to Vietnam, Mondale had substituted morality for politics and history. His speech did 
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not make a single substantial reference to the Vietnam War. In fact, listening to his speech, one 
would have never known the Vietnam War had ever happened. And yet Mondale’s words 
received thunderous applause. As Mondale later recalled, he felt the campaign to save the boat 
people campaign, of which his famous speech was an integral part, “changed the way the world 
looked at America – after some pretty difficult years for us abroad – and I’m proud of it.”1119 
 Thus, only four years after the Fall of Saigon, the United States had managed to rebrand 
itself as a virtuous nation. Astonishingly, when it came to Southeast Asia, the United States 
redeemed itself not by making a lasting, meaningful peace with Vietnam, but by using the peace 
to launch another offensive. The Carter Administration would help Americans move past the 
Vietnam War not by making amends, paying the reparations it promised, or normalizing relations 
with the country it had devastated, but by using the issue of the boat people, and the language of 
human rights, to turn Vietnam into a villain and the United States into a hero. 
 
Responding to Human Rights 
Two words had accomplished what eight million tons of bombs never could. A decade 
earlier, despite the U.S. government’s best efforts, Vietnamese revolutionaries enjoyed the 
solidarity of antiwar movements across the globe, counted on the support of numerous foreign 
governments, and felt comfortable knowing they had secured the moral high ground. Now, 
despite having triumphed against an immoral war, the SRV watched as friendly governments 
turned their backs, a new kind of international activism took aim, and the United States emerged 
as the moral conscience of the age. It is ironic that the Vietnamese revolutionaries, who always 
argued that the war would have to be won not only in the jungles, but also in the minds of people 
everywhere, would face their worst defeat not in the battlefield, but at the level of ideas. Having 
won the ideological war in the 1960s by couching its struggle in the ideas of anti-imperialism and 
national self-determination, the Vietnamese revolution would be defeated in the late 1970s by the 
idea of human rights. 
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Vietnam finally realized the gravity of the situation and mounted an ideological counter-
offensive in 1979. Since the flashpoint of the debate over human rights was precisely the refugee 
crisis, the SRV began by defending itself on the boat people issue. In 1979, after having issued a 
number of rather dubious arguments in its defense – that those fleeing were simply “economic 
refugees,” impatient with the extreme poverty of the country; that many of the Hoa refugees were 
actually agents working with China to subvert Vietnam from within; or that many of those trying to 
escape had collaborated with the old regime but had been unable to flee with the U.S. military 
back in April 1975 – the government presented an official, and in many respects more convincing, 
response in the Vietnam Courier pamphlet, Those Who Leave: The “problem of Vietnamese 
refugees.”1120 
Here, the SRV claimed that the present refugee crisis was not an isolated issue 
disconnected from history, as the U.S. government tried to argue, but had deep roots in the 
region’s past, above all the legacy of three decades of war: 
It is clear that a problem of this kind, owing to its human and political implications, cannot 
be treated in a simplistic way by means of a few humanitarian tirades sprinkled with 
political slogans on human rights. It can only be grasped within the present context of 
Vietnam, which is facing multiple problems left by several decades of war and more than 
a century of colonization.1121 
 
After all, between 1954 and 1973, when the Paris Peace Accords were finally signed, the 
combined effects of war and forced relocation had displaced ten million Vietnamese. By the time 
Saigon fell in April 1975, “nearly half the entire South Vietnamese population had been uprooted 
at least once in the previous two decades.”1122 To make matters worse, the Vietnamese 
government explained, approximately 65 percent of these southerners flooded into cities, leaving 
agricultural production in the countryside in disarray.1123 When the United States withdrew, 
overcrowded metropolises like Saigon, which had come to depend parasitically on the U.S. 
military, risked becoming unsustainable. Vietnam was left with an enormous demographic crisis 
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on its hands. In a very direct sense, the SRV charged, the refugee crisis really began with the 
Americans. 
 But the SRV knew that to win the ideological battle, it could not just spread the blame, but 
also had to try to resolve the issue.1124 Indeed, despite what Vice President Mondale’s speech in 
Geneva suggested, the SRV had taken some positive steps to alleviate the refugee crisis in 
Southeast Asia since early 1978. For example, after the Vietnamese military freed prisoners from 
Pol Pot’s camps, nearly 150,000 liberated Cambodians streamed into neighboring Vietnam, 
prompting Vietnam to ask the UNHCR to help manage situation. In fact, the SRV had absorbed 
far more refugees than neighboring countries, putting paid to the idea that the government was 
deliberately trying to thin its population by expelling undesirables. Vietnam, in other words, was 
actually involved in major humanitarian relief efforts.  
As for Vietnamese nationals hoping to leave, Vietnam showed itself open to finding a 
collective solution, even with the United States. In August 1978, for example, the Vietnamese 
government, after having invited Senator Ted Kennedy to send another delegation to the country, 
assured the American representatives that Vietnam “considered it its duty to act positively on 
legitimate family reunion cases.”1125 During an international meeting on the refugees in December 
of that year, Vietnam agreed to collaborate with other countries, as well as the United Nations, to 
find “[m]ore regular and orderly procedures … in order to facilitate humanitarian solutions.”1126 
Then, on January 12, 1979, the SRV announced that: “In accordance with its humanitarian policy 
and the laws in force, the Government of the Socialist Republic if Vietnam is prepared, as of 
today, to grant exit visas to all Vietnamese who, by written request, express the desire to 
leave.”1127 On May 30, 1979, about a month and half before Mondale’s speech comparing 
Vietnamese to the Third Reich, the SRV, in collaboration with the UNHCR’s Deputy High 
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Commissioner, Dale de Haan, signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Orderly Departure, 
which promised that “[a]uthorized exit of those people who wish to leave Vietnam and settle in 
foreign countries – family reunion and other humanitarian causes – will be carried out as soon as 
possible and to the maximum extent.”1128 
 Thus, by the time of the Geneva conference in July 1979, Vietnam had already taken 
significant steps to resolve the issue. At the conference, Vietnam worked with other countries to 
develop a new set of measures such as third-country resettlement, regional processing centers, 
and an agreement to promote orderly departures. In addition, after Geneva, the SRV assured the 
international community that “for a reasonable period of time, it would make every effort to stop 
illegal departures.”1129 Vietnam kept its word. The numbers of refugees fleeing Vietnam dropped 
from 59,941 in June to 17,839 in July to a 9,734 in August.1130 By the end of the year, writes W. 
Courtland Robinson, “arrivals averaged only 2,600 per month.”1131 As for resettlement, soon after 
the conference, Vietnam, the UNHCR, and other countries led by the United States implemented 
the Orderly Departure Program, which allowed for a direct transfer of refugees from Vietnam to 
countries of resettlement. Resettling over 650,000 people over the next fifteen years, the ODP, 
Judith Kumin writes, became not only the UNHCR’s “first attempt to use orderly migration to solve 
a refugee crisis,” but the “first effort at preventative action.”1132 
 While these multilateral efforts helped contain the flow of refugees, they did little to 
exonerate Vietnam in the eyes of the international community. Some argued that Vietnam’s very 
solution to the crisis – halting illegal departures – was itself a violation of human rights. After all, 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed unequivocally, “Everyone has the 
right to leave any country, including his own …”1133 Others, such as the United States 
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government, argued that despite the attenuation of the crisis, the fact remained: Vietnam still 
violated human rights.  
The SRV therefore felt obliged to challenge the idea of human rights directly, since it was 
precisely through the idea of human rights that the United States was able to turn the boat people 
issue into a concerted campaign against Vietnam.1134 Human rights, the SRV began to believe, 
could be used to make a moral issue out of anything, putting countries like Vietnam on the 
defensive. This was precisely how bellicose governments like the United States, or international 
human rights groups, which had never been elected by anyone, had no independent funds to 
their name, and could claim no jurisdiction in Southeast Asia, could somehow judge, and 
condemn, sovereign nation states such as Vietnam. Today, it was the boat people; tomorrow it 
would be something else. To win the ideological war, Vietnam had to respond to human rights 
itself. 
Vietnamese representatives mobilized a series of related, though at times contradictory, 
arguments against the idea of human rights. One major argument was to show that human rights 
had become a kind of weapon in the hands of imperialist countries like the United States. Several 
Vietnamese commenters very perspicaciously suggested that the United States had effectively 
embraced human rights as a way to resolve its major crises in the 1970s. For example, in a 
speech called, “Defence of Human Rights or U.S. Policy of Interference in the Internal Affairs of 
Other Countries?” Ngo Ba Thanh, who had earned a masters in comparative law at Columbia, 
completed PhDs in Paris and Barcelona, and worked at the Legal Affairs Office of the UN 
Secretariat, argued in December 1979 that the combined effects of domestic strife, economic 
recession, Watergate, and the Vietnam war had not only created a profound moral crisis in the 
United States, but called “into question US leadership of the modern world, to which the US 
leaders have been aspiring to ever since the Second World War.”1135 Faced with the danger of 
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losing its international standing, she argued, Americans “decided to take defence of ‘human 
rights’ as the starting point for regaining this leadership.”1136  
Human rights, according to this argument, were simply part of a duplicitous strategy to 
regain American hegemony after the failure of Vietnam. As Ngo Ba Thanh put it, the new doctrine 
of human rights allows countries like the United States to “set themselves up as international 
judges empowered to hand down judgments on the conduct of other countries, on their internal 
affairs.”1137 And of course, she concluded, “Washington unilaterally claims for itself the right to 
declare where, when, how, and by whom human rights have been violated.”1138 The Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam’s official statement on the boat people was even more blunt: 
This campaign is no novelty. It has indeed started in Washington where the American 
leaders, unable to use Vietnam’s tribulations to erase from people’s minds the immense 
responsibilities of their government and stubbornly refuse to honour their air pledge, seek 
to give a good conscience to the American people. Jimmy Carter has found the method: 
human rights. Vietnam, the victim of American barbarity, will thus find itself in the dock 
while the USA will smartly join the ranks of the defenders of law and justice. There have 
been former friends of Vietnam who had lent a hand to this legerdemain trick; some in 
good faith and without being aware that t hey are being manipulated; others 
knowingly.1139  
 
In other words, human rights were a one-sided weapon used by countries like the United States 
and therefore had to be completely opposed. 
 Instead of rejecting human rights outright, another line of reasoning tried to relativize 
them. According to this view, human rights did not have a singular, universal meaning, but 
necessarily meant different things in different contexts. For example, just as anti-imperialist 
revolution had to unfold differently in Western Europe or North America than in Vietnam, so too 
did human rights. For a society freeing itself from the ravages of over a century of colonialism, 
occupation, and war, human rights meant, above all, struggling to build a functional, independent 
society. Human rights meant repairing communications lines, combatting illiteracy, setting up “a 
health care system which reaches down to the village,” “helping clear large tracts of land mines,” 
or giving “jobs to hundreds of thousands of unemployed people.” It was therefore absurd to hold 
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Vietnam, a war-torn country of peasants, to the standards of a developed country like the United 
States. According to this materialist argument, human rights, whether the Vietnamese or the 
Americans wanted it or not, had to unfold differently in Southeast Asia. And if the situation were 
properly historicized, it could be shown that far from violating human rights, Vietnam was their 
greatest upholder. 
A final, major argument against allegations of human rights violations contended that 
human rights actually constituted a terrain of struggle between different social forces. There were, 
according to this view, two distinct interpretations of human rights, the bourgeois and the 
proletarian, the capitalist and the socialist, the individualist and the collectivist, the purely juridical 
and the more broadly socio-economic. As Ngo Ba Thanh put it, the new proponents of human 
rights, with the United States at the head, only championed the rights of the abstract individual, 
and above all, the right to private property. Thus, she continued, “the ‘free world’ calls ‘free’ one 
who is without a job, does not have enough to eat, lives in poverty, is constantly threatened by 
unemployment, is deprived of the most elementary medical assistance, or sleeps in a hovel.”1140 
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, on the other hand, advocated a view of human rights that 
placed primacy on more “fundamental” socio-economic rights, such as the right to self-
determination, to work, social security, and education. The two interpretations, she argued, 
represented a broader “ideological struggle” on a global scale. Partisans of the collectivist 
interpretation of rights had, she suggested, scored a tremendous victory in 1948, when they 
included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights not only “civic and political rights,” but also 
key “socio-economic rights.” Since then, however, partisans of the individualist conception of 
rights, led by the United States have not only tried to limit the Declaration’s scope, but are sparing 
“no efforts to make this Universal Declaration of Human Rights into a purely formal legal 
document with no concrete provisions to guarantee the effective exercise of human rights.”1141  
According to this argument, Vietnam not only promoted a different idea of human rights, 
but one that was more expansive and therefore qualitatively better. Indeed, if taken to its logical 
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conclusion this argument suggested that in emphasizing basic socio-economic rights, Vietnam 
was providing the best guarantee for the civil rights with which the United States was so 
obsessed. The rights of the individual could never guarantee the rights of the collective, but a 
collectivist emphasis on socio-economic rights ensured the growth of the essential rights of the 
individual. “History has shown,” Ngo Ba Thanh argued, for example, “that by freeing the workers 
from exploitation and the oppressed peoples from arbitrary rule on the national and social levels, 
socialism has effectively ensured genuine freedom and democratic rights for the individual.”1142 
The problem, however, was that the collectivist interpretation of rights championed by socialist 
countries like Vietnam had in fact not only failed to ensure the rights of the individual, but was in 
part responsible for their violation. Why else would hundreds of thousands risk everything to 
escape? 
While the refugee crisis was in part caused by the war with the United States, the 
Vietnamese government bore the brunt of the responsibility. The government’s solution to the 
massive demographic and economic dislocations caused by years of war was forced relocation. 
For example, the Second Five-Year Plan, announced in December 1976, inaugurated massive 
demographic transformations, with the government planning to move some ten million people. By 
1978, the SRV, hoping to reclaim lands through collectivized agriculture, had resettled over four 
million people to what were called “new economic zones” or NEZs.1143 While they were given the 
necessary tools, along with a six-month grain supply, to survive, this often proved inadequate. 
Many of these NEZs failed, the reduced agricultural output further crippled the national economy, 
which in turn prompted many Vietnamese to flee. Not only had many Vietnamese been stripped 
of their civil liberties and forced to relocate, or be re-educated, they were now poorer as per 
capita income actually declined since the start of the Second Five-Year Plan.1144 All this 
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completely unraveled the government’s claims that by guaranteeing socio-economic rights it 
could ensure individual freedoms. Sadly, it could do neither.1145 
Yet the problem could not be reduced to a few mistaken policies; the nation-state itself 
seemed to set the Vietnamese communists down this path of repression. As theorists such as 
Nicos Poulantzas argued in the late 1970s, one of the primary functions of the state is to maintain 
cohesion within a given social formation.1146 In capitalist social formations, the state 
disaggregates heterogeneous social forces and potentially antagonistic dominated classes within 
its territorial borders into individuals, recomposes their unity as a more or less homogenous 
“national people,” while necessarily marking some individuals as outsiders. At the same time, the 
state allows the dominant classes to not only organize themselves, but to articulate their interests 
as those of the entire nation. In this way, the state reproduces a given social formation in a way 
that preserves the power of the dominant classes.  
Although this function of the state was understood to be a function of the capitalist state, 
the events in Vietnam confirmed that even when the nation-state is coded as socialist, the same 
process of homogenization holds. Indeed, while radicals felt that the nation-state produced by the 
national liberation struggles of the oppressed would be the best way to fight imperialism, protect 
the interests of the oppressed, and allow them to transcend their heterogeneity by composing 
themselves into a unified subject, they soon watched as the socialist nation-state embarked on 
the same violent process of homogenization and exclusion.1147 On the one hand, building a 
unified Vietnamese people meant oppressing the many ethnic minorities, including the Moung, 
Tay, and Hoa, within Vietnam’s new borders. Indeed, on December 29, 1975, less than a year 
after liberation, the victorious Vietnamese communists, who, as good Leninists, had always paid 
lip service to the right to self-determination of the many oppressed minorities, officially dissolved 
                                                
1145 Some of this was outside the SRV’s hands – Vietnam experienced terrible weather and 
suffered disastrous floods, while much of the foreign aid, especially that promised by the United 
States, failed to materialize. But, at base, the SRV’s boundless optimism, and perhaps in 
arrogance, led it misunderstand the distinctive economic structures of the South, and the forced 
transformation of society had backfired. 
1146 See especially, Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism (London: New Left Books, 1978). 
1147 For the double-edged nature of “subaltern nationalism,” see Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 
Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 106-109. 
  
 
328 
the national autonomous regions of Vietnam, creating a fully unified nation-state.1148 And it is not 
without significance that the vast majority of the refugees were ethnic minorities. On the other 
hand, building social cohesion meant targeting all those who threatened the specific socialist idea 
of national unity, hence the suspension of civil liberties, the persecution of dissenters, and the 
establishment of re-education camps to produce proper national subjects.  
Radicals saw how, in the context of the Third Indochina War, the nation-state became 
imperialist, even when those in the government had been the leaders of anti-imperialist struggle; 
now they watched as the nation-state, thought to be the vehicle of emancipation, almost 
immediately began to turn on its own subjects. The repressive nature of the Vietnamese state in 
turn raised serious problems since it grounded the entire notion of collective rights, which the 
Vietnamese firmly counterposed to that of individual rights. For if the state was the guarantor of 
collective rights, but had inherent tendencies towards violent homogenization, exclusion, and 
repression in the name of social cohesion, did this mean that collective rights were themselves 
inherently oppressive? Did this mean that collective rights, within the context of Vietnam’s 
socialist nation-building project, precluded genuine individual rights? 
Lastly, not only had Vietnam clearly violated those basic civil rights, such as the freedom 
of speech or movement, that North American and Western European radicals themselves had 
struggled for in the 1970s, it did so in an intellectual climate where the rights of the individual 
were increasingly taking precedence over that of the collective. If we are to accept the SRV’s own 
definition of human rights as a terrain of struggle between two distinct views, by 1979, the 
individualist conception of human rights championed by groups like Amnesty International or 
states like the United States was beginning to win. In this changed context, the violations of 
certain civil liberties in Vietnam seemed especially egregious now that everyone had developed a 
heightened sensitivity to them. Thus, whatever its criticisms of the limitations of the new human 
rights rhetoric, Vietnam could not possibly explain away its own behavior, and after the 
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intellectual transformations of the 1970s, no legitimate emancipatory politics could afford to 
countenance such violations. 
 
Anti-Imperialism on the Margins 
Although responses to the rise of human rights varied by country, the anti-imperialist 
radical ;eft in North America and Western Europe found itself on the defensive everywhere. This 
was especially the case in France, where the campaign against human rights violations in 
Vietnam achieved hegemonic proportions. There, even committed anti-imperialists such Laurent 
Schwartz, the main organizer of the Comité Vietnam National and the Front Solidarité Indochine, 
signed onto the Boat for Vietnam operation. Yet Schwartz simultaneously took great pains to fight 
what he saw as a “political campaign filled with hatred against the Vietnamese government” led 
by “left-wing intellectuals who now hated the same Viet-Nam which they had adored and 
idealized before.”1149 Indeed, in spite of his strong support for the boat people, Schwartz became 
probably the most visible, and credible, public defender of Vietnam in France. He wrote a 
response to Paringaux’s provocative Le Monde article, gave regular interviews on the topic, and 
co-authored a highly publicized piece in Le Monde with veteran antiwar organizer Madeleine 
Rebérioux defending Vietnam.1150 His efforts elicited very sharp polemics from Doan Van Toai, 
Jacques and Claudie Broyelle, and Jean-Pierre Le Dantec, among others.1151 
Significantly, however, in trying to vindicate Vietnam, Schwartz and Rebérioux found 
themselves deploying the language of human rights, concluding, for example, that they had to 
simultaneously “help the third world and defend human rights throughout the world.”1152 In fact, 
Schwartz and Rebérioux proposed that one major solution would be for the Vietnamese 
government to accept an investigation by an objective mission, preferably led by Amnesty 
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International. Not only was this the same solution proposed by Baez and the champions of the 
rival human rights internationalism, the suggestion revealed how Schwartz and Rebérioux – along 
with other French radicals – still believed that Amnesty International was somehow unpartisan, or 
as Schwartz later put it, “ apolitical and neutral.”1153 In other words, they could have conceivably 
admitted that Vietnam had violated civil liberties without making recourse to conceptions of 
human rights, or relying on humanitarian groups. In this, they revealed how even many of the 
critics of human rights in France had to accept its terms, proving just how hegemonic, in the 
deepest sense of the word, human rights had become. 
Other French radicals, such as the militants of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire – 
who had been the strongest backers of the Front Solidarité Indochine, and the Comité Vietnam 
National before that – tried to combat the language of human rights, but in so doing only revealed 
the incapacitation of the anti-imperialist left as a whole. Their initial response to the boat people 
campaign, which was typical of much of the organized anti-imperialist left, was to simply ignore it. 
In fact, their paper, Rouge, did not run a single article on the refugee crisis until the very end of 
June 1979, something pointed out by an irritated reader in a letter to the paper. Rouge finally 
published a few articles on the topic by Michel Thomas, which strongly opposed the boat people 
campaign as a new form of imperialist intervention. The campaign to save the boat people, 
Thomas argued, is in fact nothing but “a very large-scale anti-communist political operation,” 
inspired by “Mister Carter’s conception of human rights.”1154 As for the crisis itself, it is a direct 
result, in fact another episode, of the war, first waged by the French, then by the Americans, 
against the Indochinese people. Thomas ended by blaming Giscard d’Estaing, Carter, and 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt for each refugee killed, drown, or starved, calling on them to accept 
more refugees, organize an airlift, and above all, pay Vietnam reparations.1155 
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While briefly criticizing the Vietnamese Communist Party, the paper said little about 
Vietnam’s rights record, an attitude that prompted a major debate, as a number of readers, 
including members of the Ligue, took issue with the official line of the organization. One reader, 
“Jean-Francois B.,” a former member of the Comité Vietnam National, began by arguing that 
today, in 1979, it was very difficult, “if not to say impossible,” to think politics without confronting 
the issue of the Indochinese refugees, in the same way that it was impossible to have thought 
politics in the 1960s outside of the war in Vietnam.1156 For this reason, he found it inexcusable 
that, first, Rouge had ignored such a vital issue, one that cut to the heart of the anti-imperialist 
left, and second, that when the Ligue finally confronted the matter, it did so with platitudes. For 
“Jean-Francois B.,” Rouge’s answer just boiled down to exclaiming that it was all “imperialism’s 
fault.”1157 But what was imperialism? What was the left’s responsibility? What did this say about 
internationalism? In avoiding these questions, the radical anti-imperialist left was revealing its 
theoretical and political limits. 
Another reader, “Gabriel M.,” a member of Ligue, began by arguing that Thomas’ article 
on the refugee crisis was basically “Stalinist,” that is to say, in some respects, Rouge’s line on the 
boat people was very similar to that of the PCF and the Soviet Union.1158 This was a serious 
charge precisely because one of the defining traits of the radical left in the 1960s and 1970s had 
been a criticism of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the radical left in France emerged in large part 
because Vietnam allowed it to present a distinct, internationalist and revolutionary alternative to 
the position of the Communists. But now, over a decade later, one of the most important voices of 
the radical left in France seemed to assume a position on Vietnam very similar as that of its 
existential rival. Where did that leave the radical left? 
Lastly, “Gabriel M.” echoed a crushing point made by “Jean-Francois B.”  “Thomas’ 
attitude,” he charged, “is a bit like that of someone passing by a woman being raped and explains 
                                                
1156 Jean-Francois B., “En première ligne contre ceux qui assassinent l’espoir communiste,” 
Rouge 876, July 20-27, 1979, 10. 
1157 Ibid., 11. 
1158 Gabriel M., “Le droit de denouncer hanoi,” Rouge 876, July 20-27, 1979, 11. 
  
 
332 
that her rapist is only a product of society and then scampers off.”1159 While certainly an 
exaggeration, his point was that, in the face of a crisis, one that demanded some kind of concrete 
internationalist response, all that the radical left had to offer was an abstract argument about 
imperialism. While true in some respects, bromides such as these only exemplified the real crisis: 
anti-imperialist internationalism had run out of solutions. Thus, while some radicals managed to 
resist the rising human rights internationalism, they not only had little to offer in its place, their 
criticisms of human rights made the radical left in France as whole appear impotent, unable to 
provide anything but empty, formulaic criticisms that resolved nothing. 
The boat people campaign received a very different response from American radicals, 
although in the end, anti-imperialists in the United States found themselves in the same quagmire 
as their French comrades. Because of its unprecedented role in popularizing the issue in the 
United States, much of the debate over human rights violations in Vietnam focused on Joan 
Baez’s public letter against Vietnam. Some, mostly pro-Chinese radicals, opportunistically 
defended Baez in order to attack China’s geopolitical rival in Southeast Asia. Indeed, the 
Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), the official pro-Chinese party in the United States and one of 
the most vocal defenders of the Khmer Rouge, ran a full-page interview with Baez over human 
rights violations. When other radicals excoriated Baez, CPML radicals such as Carl Davidson 
rose to her defense, even though, they admitted to readers, the letter “didn’t reflect a socialist or 
Marxist view.”1160 
 In fact, most antiwar radicals in the United States roundly condemned Baez’s letter, and 
with it, the campaign’s broader allegations of human rights violations in the SRV. Some, such as 
noted antiwar journalist Wilfred Burchett, who had recently spent ten weeks in Southeast Asia, 
questioned the veracity of Baez’s sources. “To the best of my knowledge,” he wrote in The 
Washington Post, “all the accusations in the Joan Baez letter and their imputations are 
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baseless.”1161 He showed that much of the information presented in the public letter was in fact 
based in rumor and generalizations, and concluded that the “‘open letter’ reveals complete 
ignorance of the realities of today’s Vietnam.”1162 Indeed, Doan Van Tai turned out to be a far less 
credible source than assumed, and Sagan had to concede that, regarding the number of 
prisoners in Vietnam, “I really don’t know. The number was arrived at by mathematical 
approximation.”1163 
 Others, such as Don Luce, who had been instrumental in bringing the plight of the 
political prisoners under Thieu to public attention in the early 1970s, took issue with the invocation 
of human rights. The best way to resolve the immense tragedy of the boat people, Luce argued in 
an article in The Progressive, was to start by properly historicizing the refugee crisis, rather than 
using the language of human rights to score political points. “When the ‘boat people’ are 
discussed in the United States, it is often in terms of the human rights issues they represent,” he 
wrote. “That is a convenient way of ignoring American complicity in creating conditions that 
produced this enormous mass of refugees.”1164 
 As Luce’s article implied, one of the main reason why most American radicals, in contrast 
to their French peers, strongly opposed the campaign against human rights violations in Vietnam 
was because human rights had become the doctrine of the United States government. While 
French President Giscard D’Estaing eventually sympathized with activist efforts to save the boat 
people, U.S. President Jimmy Carter had made human rights the cornerstone of his entire foreign 
policy. For American radicals, then, supporting human rights in the United States meant 
complying with U.S. imperialism. This is precisely why many radicals took such a vociferous 
stand against not only Baez, but also human rights as a whole. While in France, even many on 
the radical left accepted the language of human rights in some way or another when discussing 
the boat people, in the United States, many radicals tried to decouple the two. As radical lawyer 
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William Kunstler, who had defended the Black Panther Party, the Weather Underground, and the 
Attica Prison rioters, put it, “I do not believe that the existence or nonexistence of violations of 
human rights in Vietnam is relevant to this discussion.”1165 
 But precisely because of the high stakes of human rights in the United States, some on 
the American left bent the stick too far the other way, practically denying that anything was wrong 
in Vietnam. Kunstler, for example, went on to add: “I would never join in a public denunciation of a 
socialist country.”1166 One group, which counted some people close to the Communist Party, 
challenged Baez with their own open letter in the New York Times. Outdoing the Vietnamese 
government itself, they boasted: “Vietnam now enjoys human rights as it has never known in 
history as described in the International Convenant [sic] on Human Rights: the right to a job and 
safe, healthy working conditions, the right to join trade unions, the right to be free from hunger, 
from colonialism and racism. Moreover, they receive—without cost—education, medicine, health 
care, human rights we in the United States have yet to achieve.”1167  
 Some radicals, such as the Revolutionary Communist Party, tried to take a more 
nuanced approach. On the one hand, the RCP argued that the “classless view of ‘human rights’” 
only served American imperialist interests. In this, the U.S. government received “valuable aid 
from people like Baez and groups like Amnesty International.”1168 On the other hand, the RCP 
equally criticized people like Kunstler, Fonda, and the author of The New York Times letter for 
pretending that the government of Vietnam was free of blame. For the RCP, the Vietnamese 
Communist Party had in fact undermined the revolution. “That the betrayal of the struggle for 
socialism by Vietnam’s revisionist leaders has led to actions and policies that deserve 
condemnation is beyond condemnation,” the RCP admitted.1169 The problem was that those 
honest enough to accept this fact, like Baez, had done so in a way that only furthered U.S 
imperialism. “Many who opposed the war in Vietnam are now disgusted with actions of Vietnam’s 
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present rulers, and justly so. But the Baez letter attempts to channel this disgust in a direction 
which is not only favorable to the U.S. imperialists but is even supported and verbalized by 
them.”1170 The solution, in other words, was to articulate a left-wing criticism of events in Vietnam 
that did not resort to human rights. 
 But the RCP did not offer much of an alternative. In 1984, the party, along with seventeen 
Maoist organizations across the world, did create a new kind of international – loosely Maoist, but 
independent of China – that attempted in part to resist the idea of human rights. The most 
significant member party of this Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) was the 
Communist Party of Peru, also known as the Sendero Luminoso. Speaking for the RIM, the 
Sendero Luminso, deliberately opposed their internationalism to human rights: 
We start by not ascribing to either the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the 
Costa Rica [the American Convention on Human Rights], but we have used their legal 
devices to unmask and denounce the old Peruvian state. . . . For us, human rights are 
contradictory to the rights of the people, because we base rights in man as a social 
product, not man as an abstract with innate rights. “Human rights” do not exist except for 
the bourgeois man, a position that was at the forefront of feudalism, like liberty, equality, 
and fraternity were advanced for the bourgeoisie of the past. But today … it has been 
proven that human rights serve the oppressor class and the exploiters who run the 
imperialist and landowner-bureaucratic states … We reject and condemn human rights 
because they are bourgeois, reactionary, counterrevolutionary rights, and are today a 
weapon of revisionists and imperialists, principally Yankee imperialists.1171 
 
Yet, the RIM was extraordinarily marginal, virtually nonexistent as a force in the United States. 
And in Peru, the only place where it carried any weight, its anti-human rights vision was 
completely undermined by the Sendero Luminoso’s extremely violent trajectory. 
 Thus, while the radical left in the United States, and to some degree in France, could 
occasionally voice sharp criticisms of human rights internationalism, it had little else to offer. 
Some blindly defended Vietnam in spite of clear evidence of civil rights violations. Others 
criticized Vietnam, but had no other viable alternatives to present. Still others resisted the 
campaign against human rights violations in Vietnam yet still accepted its basic terms. Thus, 
while many radicals could point out the dangerous role of human rights interventionism, when it 
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came to acting on concrete issues, such as the refugee crisis, they fell back on bromides, 
blaming everything on “imperialism.” The hard truth was that when it came time to move from 
theoretical criticisms to effecting viable international solidarity, the anti-imperialist left offered no 
real alternative to that of human rights. And this is precisely why human rights emerged as the 
dominant form of international solidarity – it survived when its rivals burned out. 
 Thus, while it is true that a number of former radicals, above all in France, turned coat, 
abandoning anti-imperialism for human rights, on the whole, the decline of anti-imperialism and 
the concomitant rise of human rights had less to do with individuals from the old guard switching 
sides en masse, than with newer activists flocking to human rights as the most effective form of 
international solidarity. The diehard anti-imperialists, in other words, stayed firm, but in the face of 
the major historical transformations in the 1970s, and the resulting inadequacy and incoherency 
of anti-imperialist international, they could no longer recruit young people in the way they did in 
the 1960s. Future generations of activists would instead find a home in the “human rights 
international.” 
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CONCLUSION 
 
On February 6, 1980, about 150 human rights activists attempted to force their way into 
Cambodia to help put an end to the humanitarian crisis rocking the country. Despite the perilous 
situation, where the combined effects of famine, genocide, and war displaced hundreds of 
thousands of starving, homeless, and sick Cambodians, the Vietnamese authorities, suspicious of 
outside intervention after nearly a century of colonialism, occupation, and war, refused to allow 
foreign relief organizations to enter the country. In response, humanitarian activists condemned 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for violating human rights and organized a massive international 
campaign against Vietnam, in which the United States government, a number of human rights 
organizations, and Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge curiously all found themselves on the same side. 
While the United States government organized punitive international sanctions against the SRV, 
and the Khmer Rouge waged guerilla warfare against the occupying Vietnamese army, 
international human rights organizations raised awareness, collected money, and flocked to the 
Cambodian border to provide relief. 
Although the situation had begun to improve by early 1980, a number of human rights 
groups – led by the American International Rescue Committee and the French Médecins Sans 
Frontières – decided to escalate the campaign to “revive flagging world interest” in the issue.1172 
In February, they organized a march to Poipet Bridge, the main checkpoint between Cambodia 
and Thailand, to force open a land bridge into Cambodia. Carrying a banner that read, “Please 
allow us to help the people of Cambodia,” the marchers – which included such noted figures as 
Elie Wiesel, who was now chairman of President Carter’s Commission on the Holocaust; Leo 
Cherne, chairman of the International Rescue Committee; Bayard Rustin, the civil rights leader; 
Claude Malheurt of Médecins Sans Frontières; Alexander Ginsburg, the Soviet dissident poet; 
Fernando Arrabal, the Spanish playwright; a number of French politicians, including the mayor of 
Paris; and Joan Baez, a key organizer of the West Coast branch of Amnesty International USA, 
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and now the director of her own human rights organization, Humanitas – hoped to use the bridge 
to transport doctors, nurses, relief workers, and a convoy of twenty trucks filled with food, 
medicine, and supplies into the country.1173 “This is a major effort to persuade people of the 
urgency of doctors, nurses and medical supplies being brought into Cambodia,” Joan Baez 
explained. “It does not address itself to politics or warfare.”1174 
The “March for Survival” was an odd spectacle: a handful of North American and Western 
European human rights activists with tacit support from the French and U.S. governments but no 
real jurisdiction were effectively attempting to invade a sovereign country in the global South on 
the grounds that they had a duty to protect the fundamental human rights of individuals against 
governments. Although the activists ultimately failed to reach their objective, the campaign 
marked the culmination of a decisive shift in international solidarity. Instead of emulating the 
heroic guerilla, activists now saw only third-world victims; instead of mass mobilizations, human 
rights groups now relied on celebrities, politicians, and philanthropists; and instead of bringing the 
ideas of what was then called the “Third World” home, North American and Western European 
activists now imposed their own notions on those abroad. Just over a decade after the Tet 
Offensive, the high point of anti-imperialist internationalism, international solidarity now involved 
pressuring foreign governments to conform to international law, sending relief workers to save 
victims in poor countries, and collaborating with western governments to levy sanctions against 
third-world states.  
Compared to the disasters of anti-imperialist internationalism in the 1970s and 1980s, 
human rights internationalism promised to offer a new way forward. Indeed, a number of 
important campaigns have been won under the sign of human rights. But on the whole, the record 
of human rights internationalism has not been stellar. Despite some important exceptions, in the 
second decade of the twenty-first century human rights internationalism has largely come to 
mean lobbying governments, making impersonal financial donations, taking spring break off to 
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build a school in a random foreign country, or going to war. Let us not forget that President 
George W. Bush justified the Iraq War in part by appealing to human rights. Looking back, we are 
in a good position to evaluate the results of that war: the United States’ mission to stop 
“outrageous human rights abuses,” has now resulted in untold devastation, over half a million 
deaths, perhaps four million displaced persons, irreparable environmental damage, the 
destruction of cultural artifacts, complete political dislocation, mass poverty, and the rise of the 
most vicious jihadist organizations. While we cannot reduce human rights to the actions of the 
U.S. government, we cannot ignore the connection – in the same way that we cannot turn a blind 
eye to anti-imperialism’s relationship to certain dictatorships. 
Given the fate of human rights, as well as the continued existence of imperialism, there is 
a temptation to return to the idea of anti-imperialism. But as this dissertation has shown, while 
anti-imperialism, at least in its specific form in the 1960s and 1970s, no doubt helped millions 
liberate themselves from imperialism, it also brought immense sorrow. In many countries, anti-
imperialist revolutions led to military dictatorships, massive indebtedness, the destruction of 
democracy and self-management, internal repression, the impoverishment and oppression of 
working people, sexual and gender oppression, forced relocations, xenophobia, ethnic cleansing, 
and even other imperialist wars. The causes are manifold, and obviously differ according to each 
national context. But a central claim of this dissertation has been that anti-imperialism’s equation 
with national liberation – that is, the struggle for a sovereign nation-state as the specific vehicle of 
emancipation – had a part to play. My argument is that whatever the intentions of those leading 
the revolution, the nation-state has in-built oppressive tendencies. Of course, the insitutitional 
materiality of the nation-state in question matters – different states are oppressive in different 
ways. But historical experience clearly indicates that on the whole, the nation-state cannot be the 
subject of any truly emancipatory politics. 
The experience of anti-imperialism in Southeast Asia, where socialist revolutions 
dedicated themselves to abolishing all forms of oppression, is a perfect example. The fate of 
those revolutions reconfirmed, for example, that one of the central functions of the nation-state is 
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to reduce the heterogeneous multitude residing within its borders into the singular “people,” which 
always involves the identification, and elimination, of “others.” No nation-state is exempt from this 
process. In Vietnam, the government repressed the rights of ethnic minorities, particularly the 
ethnic Chinese. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge took this logic to its ultimate conclusion: 
genocide. But just as states tend to homogenize internally, they also possess a tendency to exert 
power externally. Immediately after the liberation of Vietnam and Cambodia, the two went to war 
over borders. In this way, the Third Indochina War showed that far from serving as the bulwark 
against imperialism, the nation-state possesses deeply imperialist tendencies. Whatever the 
politics of those in power, national governments will always seek to extend their power by 
influencing other governments, expanding their borders, or playing diplomatic games. Indeed, we 
should not limit imperialism strictly to the actions of the United States government; we must 
recognize that all states can be imperialist. 
Of course, while anti-imperialism’s foundational assumptions were shaken to the core, 
this did not mean that individual anti-imperialists ceased to exist. Indeed, they lived on, even into 
the present. But without a serious assessment of its failures, anti-imperialist internationalism has 
become either meaningless or a kind of zombie. Almost like the concept of fascism, it has little 
real meaning anymore. When it is given a specific political content, it is often ludicrous. Indeed, if 
millions experienced anti-imperialism’s collapse as a tragedy, today it lives on as a farce. One 
now sees sectarian groups waving North Korean flags at demonstrations, arguing that anti-
imperialist internationalism means defending North Korea’s right to nuclear weapons as a 
defense against U.S. imperialism. Others, rightly critical of U.S. intervention in Syria, nevertheless 
bend the stick the other way, defending Syrian President Bashir al-Assad as an “anti-imperialist.” 
The list goes on.  
Thus, if we are to return to the idea of anti-imperialist internationalism, we must rethink 
and reinvent it. That means, first and foremost, decoupling anti-imperialism from national 
liberation. What would a non-nationalist anti-imperialist internationalism look like? In answering 
this question, we must recall that even though it became orthodoxy, the alliance between anti-
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imperialism and the right of nations to self-determination was contingent, not inevitable. After all, 
before the October Revolution, many Marxists, like Rosa Luxemburg, advocated other ideas. 
Later, when nation-states came to replace crumbling empires, other polities could have been 
possible. Overthrowing imperialism, in other words, need not always mean fortifying the nation-
state. In fact, today, in the twenty-first century, for anti-imperialism to survive, it must mean 
something other than the national project. 
Of course, political projects cannot be invented by myopically looking to the past. They 
must be reinvented based on the conditions of the present. In the case of anti-imperialist 
internationalism, this means careful investigations into how imperialism has changed since the 
1960s and 1970s. How has the end of the Cold War, the rise of multinational corporations, the 
consolidation of supranational institutions, the transformation of nation-states, or shifts in regimes 
of capitalist accumulation changed imperialism? What forms of internationalism are apposite 
given the changed historical conjuncture? This is, of course, a project that extends well beyond 
what a history dissertation can deliver. Nevertheless, the value of this project is that it has traced 
the history of anti-imperialist internationalism, analyzed its rise in the 1960s, uncovered its basic 
assumptions, surveyed its repertoire of forms of solidarity, tracked its transformations over time, 
and explained its collapse. In this sense, it has helped clear the path for a revived anti-imperialist 
project. The real work has only just begun.  
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